TEXTS IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY

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The purpose of this series is to make available, in English, central works of German philosophy from Kant to the present. Although there is rapidly growing interest in the English-speaking world in different aspects of the German philosophical tradition as an extremely fertile source of study and inspiration, many of its crucial texts are not available in English or exist only in inadequate or dated translations. The series is intended to remedy that situation, and the translations where appropriate will be accompanied by historical and philosophical introductions and notes. Single works, selections from a single author and anthologies will all be represented.

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FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE

HUMAN, ALL TOO HUMAN

A BOOK FOR FREE SPIRITS

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INTRODUCTION BY
ERICH HELLER



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triumphs in a nation ought to be that which has been most thoroughly thought out or that which is easiest to understand. The former, the supreme model of which is the Roman, seems to the layman incomprehensible and consequently not an expression of his sense of law. Popular codes of law, for example the Germanic, have been crude, superstitious, illogical and in part stupid, but they corresponded to quite definite, inherited and indigenous custom and feelings. – Where, however, law is no longer tradition, as is the case with us, it can only be *commanded*, imposed by constraint; none of us any longer possesses a traditional sense of law, so we have to put up with *arbitrary law*, which is the expression of the necessity of the fact that there *has to be* law. The most logical is in this event the most acceptable, because it is the *most impartial*: even admitting that in every case the smallest unit of measurement in the relationship between crime and punishment is fixed arbitrarily.

460
The great man of the masses. – The recipe for that which the masses call a great man is easy to give. Under all circumstances one must procure for them something they find very pleasant, or first put it into their heads that this or that would be very pleasant and then give it to them. But at no price do it immediately: one has to gain it by the greatest exertion and struggle, or seem to do so. The masses must receive the impression that a mighty, indeed invincible force of will is present; at the least it must seem to be present. Everyone admires strength of will because no one has it and everyone tells himself that if he did have it he and his egoism would no longer know any limitations. If it now appears that such a strong will, instead of listening to the dictates of its own desires, performs something the masses find very pleasant, everyone marvels on two accounts and congratulates himself. For the rest, the great man possesses all the qualities of the masses: thus are they all the less embarrassed in his presence, thus is he all the more popular. He is violent, envious, exploitative, scheming, fawning, cringing, arrogant, all according to circumstances.

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Prince and god. – Men traffic with their princes in much the same way as they do with their god, as indeed the prince has been to a great degree the representative of the god, or at least his high priest. This almost uncanny mood of reverence and fear and shame has grown and is growing much feebler, but occasionally it flares up and attaches itself to powerful persons in general. The cult of the genius is an echo of this reverence for gods and princes. Wherever there is a striving to exalt individual men into the suprahuman, there also appears the tendency to imagine whole classes of the people as being coarser and lower than they really are.

462
My utopia. – In a better ordering of society the heavy work and exigencies of life will be apportioned to him who suffers least as a consequence of them, that is to say to the most insensible, and thus step by step up to him

who is most sensitive to the most highly sublimated species of suffering and who therefore suffers even when life is alleviated to the greatest degree possible.

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A delusion in the theory of revolution. – There are political and social fantasists who with fiery eloquence invite a revolutionary overturning of all social orders in the belief that the proudest temple of fair humanity will then at once rise up as though of its own accord. In these perilous dreams there is still an echo of Rousseau's superstition, which believes in a miraculous primeval but as it were *buried* goodness of human nature and ascribes all the blame for this burying to the institutions of culture in the form of society, state and education. The experiences of history have taught us, unfortunately, that every such revolution brings about the resurrection of the most savage energies in the shape of the long-buried dreadfulness and excesses of the most distant ages: that a revolution can thus be a source of energy in a mankind grown feeble but never a regulator, architect, artist, perfector of human nature. – It is not *Voltaire*'s moderate nature, inclined as it was to ordering, purifying and reconstructing, but *Rousseau*'s passionate follies and half-lies that called forth the optimistic spirit of the Revolution against which I cry: '*Ecrasez l'infame*!' It is this spirit that has for a long time banished *the spirit of the Enlightenment and of progressive evolution*: let us see – each of us within himself – whether it is possible to call it back!

464
Moderation. – When thought and inquiry have become decisive – when, that is to say, free-spiritedness has become a quality of the character – action tends to moderation: for thought and inquiry weaken covetousness, draw much of the available energy to themselves for the promotion of spiritual objectives, and reveal the merely half-usefulness or the total uselessness and perilousness of all sudden changes.

465
Resurrection of the spirit. – A nation usually rejuvenates itself on the political sickbed and rediscovers its spirit, which it gradually lost in its seeking for and assertion of power. Culture owes this above all to the ages of political weakness.

466
New opinions in an old house. – The overturning of opinions does not immediately follow upon the overturning of institutions: the novel opinions continue, rather, to live on for a long time in the deserted and by now uncomfortable house of their predecessors, and even keep it in good condition because they have nowhere else to live.

467
Schooling. – In great cities the schooling will always be at the best

physician, artist or artisan, does or makes something for us, we are happy to pay him as much as we can, often indeed beyond our real capacities: on the other hand, we will pay someone unknown to us as little as we can get away with; this is a struggle in which everyone fights for every foot of land and for which he makes everyone fight him. In the case of work done *for us* by someone we know there is something *beyond price*, the feeling and invention he has put into his work *on our account*: we believe we can express our sensibility of this in no other way than through a kind of *sacrifice* on our part. – The highest tax is the *respect-tax*. The more the competitive market dominates and we buy from strangers and work for strangers, the lower this tax will be: whereas it is in fact the standard of measurement of the degree of *commerce* between human souls.

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The means to real peace. – No government nowadays admits that it maintains an army so as to satisfy occasional thirsts for conquest; the army is supposed to be for defence. That morality which sanctions self-protection is called upon to be its advocate. But that means to reserve morality to oneself and to accuse one's neighbour of immorality, since he has to be thought of as ready for aggression and conquest if our own state is obliged to take thought of means of self-defence; moreover, when our neighbour denies any thirst for aggression just as heatedly as our state does, and protests that he too maintains an army only for reasons of legitimate self-defence, our declaration of why we require an army declares our neighbour a hypocrite and cunning criminal who would be only too happy to *pounce upon* a harmless and unprepared victim and subdue him without a struggle. This is how all states now confront one another: they presuppose an evil disposition in their neighbour and a benevolent disposition in themselves. This presupposition, however, is a piece of *inhumanity* as bad as, if not worse than, a war would be; indeed, fundamentally it already constitutes an invitation to and cause of wars, because, as aforesaid, it imputes immorality to one's neighbour and thereby seems to provoke hostility and hostile acts on his part. The doctrine of the army as a means of self-defence must be renounced just as completely as the thirst for conquest. And perhaps there will come a great day on which a nation distinguished for wars and victories and for the highest development of military discipline and thinking, and accustomed to making the heaviest sacrifices on behalf of these things, will cry of its own free will: *'we shall shatter the sword'* – and demolish its entire military machine down to its last foundations. *To disarm while being the best armed*, out of an *elevation* of sensibility – that is the means to *real* peace, which must always rest on a disposition for peace: whereas the so-called armed peace such as now parades about in every country is a disposition to fractiousness which trusts neither itself nor its neighbour and fails to lay down its arms half out of hatred, half out of fear. Better to perish than to

hate and fear, and *twofold better to perish than to make oneself hated and feared* – this must one day become the supreme maxim of every individual state! – As is well known, our liberal representatives of the people lack the time to reflect on the nature of man: otherwise they would know that they labour in vain when they work for a 'gradual reduction of the military burden'. On the contrary, it is only when this kind of distress is at its greatest that the only kind of god that can help here will be closest at hand. The tree of the glory of war can be destroyed only at a single stroke, by a lightning-bolt: lightning, however, as you well know, comes out of a cloud and from on high. –

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Can property be reconciled with justice? – If there is a strong feeling that the possession of property is unjust – and the hand of the great clock has again come round to this point – two ways of remedying the situation are proposed: firstly an equal distribution, then the abolition of property and its reversion to the community. The latter remedy is especially beloved of our socialists, who bear a grudge against that Jew of antiquity for saying: thou shalt not steal. In their view the seventh commandment should read rather: thou shalt not possess. – Attempts to act in accordance with the first recipe were often made in antiquity, always only on a small scale, to be sure, yet with a lack of success from which we too can still gain instruction. 'Equal allotment of land' is easily said, yet how much acrimony is produced by the divisions and separations this necessitates, by the loss of ancient valued property, how much reverence is injured and sacrificed! One digs up morality when one digs up boundary-stones. And how much more acrimony among the new owners, how much jealousy and enviousness, since two allotments of land have never been truly equal, and even if such a thing were possible human envy of one's neighbour would still not believe in their equality. And for how long would this equality, unhealthy and poisoned at the roots as it is, endure! Within a few generations inheritance would here have divided one allotment among five people, there given one person five allotments: and if stern laws of inheritance obviated such improper arrangements there would still be equal allotment of land, to be sure, but at the same time an abundance of the unprovided-for and discontested who possessed nothing except feelings of envy towards their neighbours and relations and a desire that all things should be overturned. – If, however, one wishes to follow the *second* recipe and restore property to the *community*, with the individual as no more than a temporary tenant, then one will destroy the land. For upon that which he possesses only in passing man bestows no care or self-sacrifice, he merely exploits it like a robber or a dissolute squanderer. When Plato opines that with the abolition of property egoism too will be abolished the reply to him is that, in the case of man at any rate, the departure of egoism would also mean the departure of the four cardinal virtues – for it has to be said that the foulest pestilence could not do so much harm to mankind as would be done him if his vanity

disappeared. Without vanity and egoism – what are the human virtues? Which is not intended remotely to imply that these are merely names and masks of such virtues. Plato's utopian basic tune, continued on in our own day by the socialists, rests upon a defective knowledge of man: he lacked a history of the moral sensations, an insight into the origin of the good and useful qualities of the human soul. Like the whole of antiquity he believed in good and evil as in white and black: thus in a radical difference between good and evil men, good and bad qualities. – If property is henceforth to inspire more confidence and become more moral, we must keep open all the paths to the accumulation of *moderate* wealth through work, but prevent the sudden or unearned acquisition of riches; we must remove from the hands of private individuals and companies all those branches of trade and transportation favourable to the accumulation of *great* wealth, thus especially the trade in money – and regard those who possess too much as being as great a danger to society as those who possess nothing.

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The value of work. – If we wanted to determine the value of work by how much time, effort, good or ill will, compulsion, inventiveness or laziness, honesty or deception has been expended on it, then the valuation can never be *just*; for we would have to be able to place the entire person on the scales, and that is impossible. Here the rule must be 'judge not!' But it is precisely to justice that they appeal who nowadays are dissatisfied with the evaluation of work. If we reflect further we find that no personality can be held accountable for what it produces, that is to say its work: so that no *merit* can be derived from it; all work is as good or bad as it must be given this or that constellation of strengths and weaknesses, knowledge and desires. The worker is not free to choose *whether* he works, nor *how* he works. It is only from the standpoint of *utility*, narrower and wider, that work can be evaluated. That which we now call justice is in this field very much in place as a highly refined instrument of utility which does not pay regard only to the moment or exploit opportunities as they occur but reflects on the enduring advantage of all conditions and classes and therefore also keeps in mind the wellbeing of the worker, his contentment of body and soul – *so that* he and his posterity shall work well for our posterity too and be relied on for a longer span of time than a single human life. The *exploitation* of the worker was, it has now been realized, a piece of stupidity, an exhausting of the soil at the expense of the future, an imperilling of society. Now we already have almost a state of war: and the cost of keeping the peace, of concluding treaties and acquiring trust, will henceforth in any event be very great, because the folly of the exploiters was very great and of long duration.

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On the study of the body politic. – The worst ill-fortune for him who nowadays wants to study economics and politics in Europe, and especially in Germany, lies in the fact that, instead of exemplifying the *rule*, conditions

actually obtaining exemplify the *exception* or *transitional* and *terminal states*. For this reason one has first to learn to see past the immediate factual data and to direct one's eyes, for example, to North America – where one can still *see* and seek out the inaugural and normal motions of the body politic, if only one *wants* to – whereas in Germany this can be done only through arduous historical study or, as aforesaid, with a telescope.

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To what extent the machine abases us. – The machine is impersonal, it deprives the piece of work of its pride, of the individual *goodness* and *faultiness* that adheres to all work not done by a machine – that is to say, of its little bit of humanity. In earlier times all purchasing from artisans was a *bestowing of a distinction on individuals*, and the things with which we surrounded ourselves were the insignia of these distinctions: household furniture and clothing thus became symbols of mutual esteem and personal solidarity, whereas we now seem to live in the midst of nothing but an anonymous and impersonal slavery. – We must not purchase the alleviation of work at too high a price.

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Hundred-year quarantine. – Democratic institutions are quarantine arrangements to combat that ancient pestilence, lust for tyranny: as such they are very useful and very boring.

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The most dangerous follower. – The most dangerous follower is he whose defection would destroy the whole party: that is to say, the best follower.

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Destiny and the stomach. – One slice of bread and butter more or fewer in the stomach of a jockey can occasionally decide the outcome of the race and the betting and thus affect the fortunes and misfortunes of thousands. – So long as the destiny of nations continues to depend on the diplomats, the diplomats' stomachs will continue to be the object of patriotic anxiety. *Quousque tandem** –

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Victory of democracy. – All political powers nowadays try to exploit the fear of socialism in order to strengthen themselves. But in the long run it is democracy alone that derives the advantage: for *all* parties are nowadays obliged to flatter the 'people' and to bestow on it alleviations and liberties of every kind through which it will in the end become omnipotent. As socialism is a doctrine that the acquisition of property ought to be abolished, the people are as alienated from it as they could be: and once they have got the power of taxation into their hands through their great parliamentary majorities they will assail the capitalists, the merchants and the princes of the stock exchange with a progressive tax and

* *Quousque tandem*: How much longer . . . ? (the beginning of Cicero's outburst in the Senate against the conspirator Catiline).

slowly create in fact a middle class which will be in a position to *forget* socialism like an illness it has recovered from. – The practical outcome of this spreading democratization will first of all be a European league of nations within which each individual nation, delimited according to geographical fitness, will possess the status and rights of a canton: in this process the historical recollections of the former nations will be of little account, since the sense of reverence for such things will gradually be totally uprooted by the domination of the democratic principle, which thirsts for innovations and is greedy for experiments. The corrections of frontiers which prove necessary will be so executed as to serve the *interests* of the large cantons and at the same time those of the whole union, but not to honour the memory of some grizzled past. The task of discovering the principles upon which these frontier corrections should be made will devolve upon future *diplomats*, who will have to be at once cultural scholars, agriculturalists and communications experts, and who will have behind them, not armies, but arguments and questions of utility. Only then will *foreign* policy be inseparably tied to *domestic* policy: whereas now the latter still has to run after its proud master and gather up in a pitiful little basket the stubble left behind after the former has reaped its harvest.

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End and means of democracy. – Democracy wants to create and guarantee as much *independence* as possible: independence of opinion, of mode of life and of employment. To that end it needs to deprive of the right to vote both those who possess no property and the genuinely rich: for these are the two impermissible classes of men at whose abolition it must work continually, since they continually call its task into question. It must likewise prevent everything that seems to have for its objective the organization of parties. For the three great enemies of independence in the above-named threefold sense are the indigent, the rich and the parties. – I am speaking of democracy as of something yet to come. That which now calls itself democracy differs from older forms of government solely in that it drives with *new horses*: the streets are still the same old streets, and the wheels are likewise the same old wheels. – Have things really got less perilous because the wellbeing of the nations now rides in *this* vehicle?

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Circumspection and success. – That great quality of circumspection which is at bottom the virtue of virtues, their great-grandmother and queen, is by no means always crowned with success in everyday life: and he who had wooed this virtue merely for the sake of achieving success would end up disappointed. For *practical* people hold it in suspicion and confuse it with cunning deceitfulness and hypocritical slyness: he, on the other hand, who obviously lacks circumspection – the man who acts precipitately and therefore sometimes acts wrongly – has in his favour the prejudice that he is a worthy, reliable fellow. Practical people do not like the circumspect man and think he is a danger to them. On the other hand, the circumspect man can easily be taken for timid, narrow-minded, pedantic – impractical and easy-living people especially find him uncomfortable *because* he does not live superficially as they do, heedless of duty and practical affairs: he appears among them as their embodied conscience and the sight of him makes the daylight grow pale. If he thus lacks success and popularity, however, he can always console himself with the reflection: 'this is the high *tax* you have to pay for possessing something of great value – it is worth it!'

295
*Et in Arcadia ego.** – I looked down, over waves of hills, through fir-trees and spruce trees grave with age, towards a milky green lake: rocky crags of every kind around me, the ground bright with flowers and grasses. A herd of cattle moved and spread itself out before me; solitary cows and groups of cows farther off, in vivid evening light close to the pinewood; others nearer, darker; everything at peace in the contentment of evening. The clock indicated nearly half-past five. The bull of the herd had waded into the white, foaming brook and was slowly following its precipitate course, now resisting it, now yielding: no doubt this was its kind of fierce enjoyment. The herders were two dark-brown creatures Bergamask in origin: the girl clad almost as a boy. To the left mountain slopes and snowfields beyond broad girdles of woodland, to the right, high above me, two gigantic ice-covered peaks floating in a veil of sunlit vapour – everything big, still and bright. The beauty of the whole scene induced in me a sense of awe and of adoration of the moment of its revelation; involuntarily, as if nothing were more natural, I inserted into this pure, clear world of light (in which there was nothing of desire or expectation, no looking before and behind) Hellenic heroes; my feeling must have been like that of Poussin and his pupil:† at one and the same time heroic and idyllic. – And that is how individual men have actually *lived*, that is how they have enduringly *felt* they existed in the world and the world existed in them; and among them was one of the greatest of men, the inventor of an heroic-idyllic mode of philosophizing: Epicurus.

296
Calculation and measuring. – To see many things, to weigh them one against the other, to add and subtract among them and to arrive rapidly at a fairly accurate sum – that produces the great politician, general, merchant: it is speed in a kind of mental calculation. To see *one* thing, to find in it the sole motive for action and the judge over all other actions, produces the hero, also the fanatic – it is facility in measuring according to a standard.

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Do not want to see prematurely. – For as long as one is experiencing

* *Et in Arcadia ego*: And I, too, in Arcadia; employed by Goethe as the motto of his *Italian Journey*.

† *Poussin and his pupil*: probably Claude Lorraine (1600–82), who lived in Rome after 1620 where he was a contemporary of Poussin's (1593–1665). The poetic lighting of Claude's Mannerist landscapes forms an obvious contrast with the heroic drama of Poussin's.