BENEDICT SPINOZA

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BENEDICT SPINOZA

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TO
MY WIFE

PREFACE.

This little work aims at giving, along with a biographical sketch, a general *vue d'ensemble* of the thought of one of the world's greatest philosophers. While engaged in constructing their own philosophy of life and things, all students of human nature will be instructed and stimulated in their own researches by the study of the great classical thinkers. Spinoza has contributed not only to metaphysical enquiry, but to ethical, psychological, religious and political thought. His metaphysics must appeal to the man of science, in spite of Newton's warning—"Physics, beware of metaphysics"—and to all those, happily an increasing number, who find themselves urged to an interest in philosophy by their study of physics or biology. The grandeur of his conceptions must impress the religious mind. His analysis of the human mind discloses in a shrewd but less fantastic manner the operations of human passion about which we hear so much to-day in terms of "the unconscious," and so-called "psycho-analysis." Again, in the realm of political thought Spinoza's discussions of revolution, of co-operation within the State, of the morality of States, are peculiarly relevant to present-day conditions and have a direct bearing upon much which is going on in the minds and hearts of reflective citizens at this time.

It is a significant sign that an International Society has been founded for the special study of Spinoza's doctrines. Among the founders are the well-known Brunschwieg, Höffding, Pollock, Meijer and Gebhardt.

The seat of this *Societas Spinozana* is fittingly at the Hague. This is appropriate to its international character. Science and philosophy are fundamentally international. It is fitting, also, because it was at the Hague that Spinoza spent a great portion of his short life.

Some understanding of the times in which he lived is essential in order to appreciate the difficulties which Spinoza had to face in his fight for "freedom of philosophising," and in his attempts to publish his own work.

His thought remains one of the classics of philosophy, and offers a contrast on a fundamental point to the modern "philosophy of change." For Spinoza change is but an aspect of reality, a reality which abides. Behind all changes there lies a permanent, enduring Reality of which change is a manifestation. Spinoza does not hold to the paradox that the only permanence is change. He stands much nearer to Plato than to Bergson, and these two thinkers represent most clearly contrasting points of view. These contradictory standpoints are consequent upon diverse attitudes towards the problem of the reality of Time. This is a problem which is of vital significance for contemporary philosophy.

Part of the section which we have devoted to Spinoza's view of the State or Commonwealth appeared in the *Contemporary Review* in 1921, as an article entitled *Spinoza and Present Day Politics.* Some sections of the *Conclusion* were published this year in the new *Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy.*

The edition of Spinoza's works referred to has been the two-volume bicentenary edition by Van Vloten and Land, published at the Hague, 1882-3, and their numbering has been followed in referring to Spinoza's

correspondence. For the *Short Treatise,* Dr. Wolf's edition has been used.

I am indebted to Mr. F. H. Roberts for drafting my map in a form suitable for reproduction; to Mr. Stanley Addison, Managing Director of the Press, for arranging to facilitate publication; and to the *Societas Spinozana,* at the Hague (through its English secretarial representative, Dr. Leon Roth, of Manchester), for permission to reproduce the portrait of Spinoza from the second *Chronicon Spinozanum.*

J. A. G.

The University, Melbourne, 1924.

SPINOZA.

C'était un homme doux, de chétive santé,
Qui, tout en polissant des verres de lunettes,
Mit l'essence divine en formules très nettes,
Si nettes que le monde en fut épouvanté.

Ce sage démontrait avec simplicité
Que le bien et le mal sont d'antiques sornettes,
Et les libres mortels d'humbles marionnettes
Dont le fil est aux mains de la nécessité.

Vieux admirateur de la sainte Ecriture,
Il n'y voulait pas voir un dieu contre nature;
A quoi la synagogue en rage s'opposa,

Loin d'elle, polissant des verres de lunettes,
Il aidait les savants à compter les planètes.
C'était un homme doux, Baruch de Spinoza.

—Sully-Prudhomme.

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

THE SPINOZA COUNTRY

CHAPTER I.

SPINOZA: HIS LIFE AND TIMES.

Birth and parentage. Jewish training. Difficulties of "belief." Quits Synagogue. Excommunicated. Isolation, grinds lenses. Philosophy study-circle. Years of keen development at Rijnsburg, among the Collegiants. The *Short Treatise* and *De Emendatione*. Fame. Visit of Oldenburg. Leaves for Voorburg. *Exposition of Descartes*. Work on the *Ethics*. Increasing fame and acquaintances. Jan de Witt. Motives in writing the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*. Consternation and anger of theologians. Leibnitz and Spinoza. Life at the Hague. Ill-health. More work on *Ethics*. Anglo-Dutch War followed by war between France and Netherlands. The De Witt brothers' tragic death. Spinoza affected. Spinoza visits enemy camp. Refuses patronage of Louis XIV. Returns to find mob against him as a spy. Invitation to Professorship at Heidelberg. Prohibition of *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*. Acquaintance with Tschirnhausen. Oldenburg again. Overtures of Leibnitz. Vain attempt to publish the *Ethics*. Begins the *Political Treatise*. Death, 1677. Posthumous Works.

CHAPTER I.

SPINOZA: HIS LIFE AND TIMES.

Motley, in his famous history, *The Rise of the Dutch Republic,* has described for us with great vividness the revolt of the Netherlands from Spanish tyranny, originating in the League of Utrecht, formed in 1579 by the Dutch, making a pledge to defend one another "with life, goods and blood" against the forces of the King of Spain, and decreeing that "every citizen shall remain free in his religion, and no man shall be molested or questioned on the subject of divine worship." While this was happening, other terror-stricken victims of Spanish frightfulness looked on, and gazed wistfully to the sea and towards Holland as to a veritable heaven on earth. These poor victims were the Maranos or Jews of Spain and Portugal, compelled to embrace the Roman religion to save themselves from the ghastly cruelties of the Inquisition. The same year in which the League of Utrecht was formed, Spain conquered Portugal, and the Jews, driven to desperate methods, made overtures to Holland to grant them permission to come and settle in that country. Such a proposal was soon annulled by the fanatical veto of the Calvinistic clergy of Holland. Some years passed, the Jews could endure no longer, and in 1593 a party of refugees set sail from Oporto, and arrived at Amsterdam. Here they settled, and they were not known to be Jews until 1596, when their assembling for the celebration of their Passover Festival excited the wild rumour of sedition and conspiracy. This over, they

became less secret, and, although still merely tolerated, founded a synagogue in 1598, and in 1619 were officially granted liberty of worship.

Among the refugee arrivals of 1593 was Abraham d'Espinoza (or Espinoza, Despinoza, or De Spinoza),[1] of a family belonging to Espinosa, a town in the province of Leon.[2] He brought his son Michael with him. Both were merchants and honoured rulers of the Synagogue. Such was the history of the family into which Baruch de Spinoza, our philosopher, was born, on November 24th, 1632, in Amsterdam.[3] Abraham, the refugee, was Spinoza's grandfather. Michael, his father, was married three times, and had six children, but only two survived beyond youth. Baruch was the child of the second marriage, and had an elder half-sister, Rebecah, the child of his father's first marriage. His mother died when he was about six years old. He was educated at a Hebrew School, and was trained under Rabbi Saul Morteira and Rabbi Manesseh ben Israel. The latter, it is interesting to note, was the delegate who in 1655 crossed to England to interview Oliver Cromwell with reference to the re-admission of Jews into England, and he was on intimate terms with Hugo Grotius, the jurist,[4] and with Rembrandt, the painter, who from 1640 to 1656 lived in Amsterdam. Spinoza's courses of study were in the Hebrew tongue.

1. For a discursion of the exact nomenclature see *Chronicon Spinozanum I.*, p. 272, and *Chronicon Spinozanum II.*, p. 251 (Gebhardt, Warynski, Myslicki).

2. Dunin Borkowski, in his study, *Der Junge De Spinoza*, published in Munster in 1910, appears to have definitely shown that the family were Portuguese Jews.

3. This was the same year in which Locke, the English philosopher, was born.

4. Grotius, the father of modern International Law, published his great work, *De Jure Belli et Pacis*, in 1625.

Spanish and Portuguese he learned from his parents, but with Dutch we are told he experienced difficulty. The study of Latin was discouraged by the Jewish community in Amsterdam. It had such a flavour of Roman Catholicism, and carried with it such memories of the iniquities of the Inquisition, that such a reaction to it need not surprise us. Spinoza, however, realising its great value, managed to receive lessons in it from a German student, and later obtained further instructions in it at the school of a physician, Van den Enden, where he completed his studies. This Van den Enden, who was an ex-Jesuit, ex-diplomat, and ex-bookseller, and now physician and schoolmaster, brought Spinoza into contact with culture outside the narrow limits of Judaism. About this time Spinoza began to feel a growing estrangement from the religion of his fathers. Judaism began to lose its hold upon his critical mind. At any rate, he found the subtleties of the Talmud displeasing and useless, also his study of the Cabbala, which then formed a large part of Hebrew instruction, must have disgusted him, for "it seems," says Sir Frederick Pollock, "to have become by that time the most unmitigated nonsense ever put together by the perverted ingenuity of man." He must have been more and more drawn towards a study of Gentile philosophy, and of the sciences, during his period of study with Van den Enden, who encouraged him in particular to study Descartes. Spinoza's studies, or, more correctly, his school-days, were brought to an end, however, in 1654 by the death of his father, an event which compelled him to earn his own living. This he was able to do at once, for, in accordance with one of the precepts of Rabbinic law, Spinoza had learned a manual trade. "He who teaches his son no craft," said one of the

old Rabbis, "brings him up to be a highwayman." Spinoza, the orphan, was to be no highwayman, for he was a very fine grinder of lenses, and upon this craft he now depended for his livelihood.

After the death of his father, Spinoza's half-sister, Rebecah, now wife of an orthodox Rabbi, disputed the inheritance on the absurd ground that Spinoza, becoming estranged from Judaism, had become slack in his attendances at the Synagogue, and so could not inherit. This being preposterous, Spinoza made a law case of it, and won, of course, because the civil authorities ignored spiteful and irrelevant arguments, such as Rebecah's evidently were. Spinoza, however, on proving his point, delivered his legal share of the inheritance over to his defeated sister, keeping only a bed as a souvenir of the old home and as an article of use.

He had now reached that point in his development where he had learned to think for himself, and his thoughts were not of the kind likely to be approved by his co-religionists. The elaborate ceremonial and subtleties of Judaism were revolting to him. He was frequently absent from the Synagogue, and was often present at meetings for Christian worship held by a body resembling in their simple piety and lack of ritual, their humanitarianism, and their denial of war, the Society of Friends, or Quakers, in England. These were the Collegiants, commonly styled Rijnsburgers.[1]

1. The intolerance of the century was strong in the Calvinistic Clergy of the Netherlands, and they were keenly desirous that all Reformed Clergy should conform to their views. They regarded the Arminians (followers of Professor Arminius, of Leyden, 1560-1609) as their special enemies, because of their difference from them on the question of free-will. In 1610 the Arminians presented a Remonstrance against Calvinism to the civil powers. This resulted in the Synod of Dordrecht excommunicating in 1619 all Arminians and expelling them from Church and State. The banishment of Arminian pastors by the Calvinists gave rise to the Collegiants, an interesting body, who dispensed with clergy and held informal gatherings (*Collegia*) conducted by Laymen.

It being impossible that Spinoza should live with his sister, he became assistant to Van den Enden in his school.[1] Now, Van den Enden was already suspected by the clergy as a very heterodox and dangerous person, and Spinoza's work at the school must have annoyed considerably his fellow-Jews, who did not want trouble with the civil or ecclesiastical powers of the land. Already there had been some scandal of this kind over one Da Costa, who was excommunicated, and in 1640 died by his own hand.[2] The Jewish community felt they must avoid a repetition of this kind of trouble, and Spinoza's free action and liberty of thought alarmed them seriously. It was discovered that Spinoza did not consider the doctrine of personal immortality to be taught in the Old Testament, that he both denied the existence of angels, and asserted that even God Himself was not entirely pure spirit, but corporeal. That they did not understand Spinoza's firm character is quite evident, for they attempted to bribe him by offering him an annuity of 1000 guilders if he would suppress his heretical views, and show at least an outward conformity to the religion of his fathers. This having no effect whatsoever on the mind of the young philosopher, the threat of excommunication was made, and, according to some authorities, his assassination was attempted. In June of 1656 Spinoza was ordered to present himself before a Tribunal composed of Rabbis. Evidence of his heresies was submitted, and Spinoza, far from denying them, attempted some sort of defence of his intellectual position. He was excommunicated

1. Seemingly unfounded reports tell of his forming a romantic attachment to Clara, the daughter of Van den Enden.

2. The *Societas Spinozana* publishes as the second volume of its Bibliotheca Spinozana *Die Schriften des Uriel da Costa*, edited by Gebhardt.

for a month in the hope that he might repent of his abominable perversities. Finally, on the 27th of July in that year, the Jews of the Synagogue of Amsterdam excommunicated their erring brother:—"By the sentence of the angels, by the decree of the saints, we anathematise, cut off, curse and execrate Baruch Spinoza, in the presence of these sacred books, with the six hundred and thirteen precepts which are written therein, with the anathema wherewith Joshua anathematised Jericho; with the cursing wherewith Elisha cursed the children; and with all the cursings which are written in the book of the law; cursed be he by day and cursed by night; cursed when he lieth down, and cursed when he riseth up; cursed when he goeth out and cursed when he cometh in; the Lord pardon him never, the wrath and fury of the Lord burn upon this man, and bring upon him all the curses which are written in the Book of the Law. The Lord blot out his name under heaven. The Lord set him apart for destruction from all the tribes of Israel with all the curses of the firmament which are written in the Book of this Law. . . . There shall be no man speak to him, no man write to him, no man show him any kindness, no man stay under the same roof with him, no man come nigh him." So his church cast him out with the usual language of theological dispute, "they remained children of Israel, and he became a child of modern Europe."[1]

Dr. Wolf remarks in this connection that, "if Judaism alone had been concerned, more leniency would have been shown, the whole thing might have been ignored." "The ban against Spinoza was the due paid

1. Matthew Arnold's remark in his *Essay on Spinoza.*

to Cæsar rather than to the God of Israel." Proof of this is seen in the fact that the civil authorities were immediately informed by the synagogue, and they, in order to appease the joint wrath of the Jewish Rabbis and of the Calvinistic clergy, banished Spinoza from Amsterdam. It is recorded that he wrote a Defence of his views, and submitted it to the Rabbis as a reply to his excommunication. This "Apology," however, is lost.[1] He marked his departure from the Synagogue by substituting for his Hebrew name, Baruch, the Latin, Benedictus.

Cut off from his fellows, and banished from the precincts of the city of Amsterdam, Spinoza found refuge in the village of Ouwerkerke. His sole means of gaining a livelihood was the grinding of lenses. A few months later, things becoming quieter for him, he returned to Amsterdam. He studied much, and was now working out partially his own ideas and system of philosophy. Probably the famous passage of spiritual autobiography at the opening of his unfinished Treatise, *De Intellectus Emendatione,* refers to this period of storm and stress in his development.[2] He made the acquaintance and friendship of a small, select and congenial circle of friends, who were interested in the problems of religion and philosophy. This little circle, including Schuller, Meyer and De Vries, three medical students, approached philosophical problems mainly from the side of religion, and discussed them with specific bearing upon religion, the topics being God, Nature, the Universe, Man and his well-being, Immortality, the Human Intellect and Human Nature. Spinoza contributed to the discussions

1. It is thought to have been embodied in the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* cf. chapters 16 and 17 on *Defence of Freedom of Thought.*

2. This is referred to at the commencement of our third chapter.

in a large measure. He was held in the greatest esteem by these men, and one of them, Simon de Vries, a delicate young medical student, presented him with 2000 florins (about £130) as a token of affectionate regard, but this gift Spinoza declined with grateful thanks.

The year 1660 saw Spinoza "going into retreat," quitting the busy city of Amsterdam for the solitude of Rijnsburg, a quiet village a few miles distant from the university town of Leyden. Spinoza Lane is still to be seen, and the cottage in which he lived is now the Spinoza-Huis, or Spinoza Museum. The village was the headquarters of the religious body aforementioned, "The Collegiants." Occasionally they were styled Rijnsburgers, and probably it was on the advice of some of his Collegiant friends that Spinoza came to the village in search of a retreat in which he might work and set down his thoughts far from the turmoil of the crowd. The years spent here were free from eventful happenings, but were undoubtedly the most fruitful years in his mental development. The notes he had in hand, and the papers contributed to the small study-circle, were here worked up by him into the *Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well-being.* The work was long lost, being recovered only in 1862 in two Dutch manuscripts, which now repose in the Royal Library at The Hague.[1] The title of the older manuscript is by its length and its tone characteristic of the time. It runs:—"Short Treatise on God, Man and his well-being. Previously written in the Latin tongue by B. D. S. for the use of his disciples, who wanted to devote themselves to the study of Ethics and true Philosophy. And now

1. For the interesting history of this discovery see the fullest account in English, that of Dr. Wolf, given in the preface to his edition of the *Short Treatise,* pp. ciii.-cxxvii. See also the note in our Bibliography appended.

translated into the Dutch language for the use of the lovers of Truth and Virtue, so that they who spout so much about it, and put their dirt and filth into the hands of simpletons, as though it were ambergris, may just have their mouths stopped, and cease to profane what they do not understand, God, themselves, and how to help people to have regard for each other's well-being, and how to heal those whose mind is sick in a spirit of tenderness and tolerance after the example of the Lord Christ, our best Teacher." This *Short Treatise* sheds valuable light on the development of Spinoza's thought, and shows that already he was preparing the groundwork of his *Ethics,* for it is mainly, though not entirely, a draft of the later and greater work.[1] It is written in chapters, and not *"more geometrico"* as the Ethics, and consequently proves a more readable work for the general reader, and serves as an introduction to a more intimate study of Spinoza's thought. It marks a quite definite departure from the philosophy of Descartes by its pantheism and its determinism. Meanwhile Spinoza kept in touch with his old circle of friends in Amsterdam by exchange of letters and manuscripts. He was, however, careful about the type of people to whom he communicated his thoughts, and he besought his friends likewise to exercise some little caution in this direction. The Treatise, *De Intellectus Emendatione,* was begun about this time, and it has been suggested that Spinoza may have contemplated combining this with the *Short Treatise,* but he did not proceed far with the *De Intellectus Emendatione,* and it was never completed.

1. It differs from the *Ethics* on a number of important points (such as the view of God as Pure Truth and the acceptance of personal immortality).

Meanwhile the reputation of Spinoza increased, and his fame spread abroad. He took some part in religious conferences held by the Collegiants in Rijnsburg, and he became known to the Professors of the University of Leyden. He came into contact with a Danish physicist, resident in Leyden, by name Steensen. In July of 1661 he was visited by Henry Oldenburg, a German, then acting Secretary for the newly-founded Royal Society of England. Oldenburg was much impressed by his courteous reception. Upon the return of that gentleman to England, a correspondence was kept up, and Oldenburg acted as an intermediary between Spinoza and the English physicist, Boyle. His conversation with Oldenburg turned chiefly on the questions of philosophic method, as, for example, the empirical and inductive method of Bacon and the deductive and geometric method of Descartes. This is interesting and significant, for it was at the time *the* problem for Spinoza. He chose to side on this matter with Descartes.

His popularity and the increasing number of his acquaintances, however, compelled him to consider a removal from Rijnsburg. In April of 1663 he made up his mind to go to Voorburg, near to the Hague. *En route* he took the opportunity to visit Amsterdam, where he was warmly received by the select circle of friends, and remained there about two months. This visit is of special interest, because it was on this occasion that Spinoza published his first book, and the *only book which appeared in his lifetime with his name upon it.* This was a version of Descartes'[1] *Principia,* upon which he had been working, together with some metaphysical

1. The *Essais* of Descartes, including the famous *Discours de la Methode,* appeared in 1637, the *Meditationes* in 1640, and the *Principia philosophiae,* here referred to, came in 1644. He had lived and published his work in Holland.

reflections. This appeared under the title, "*Renati Des Cartes principiorum more geometrico demonstratae per Benedictum de Spinoza Amstelodamensem. Accesserunt ejusdem cogita metaphysica, Amsterdam, 1663.*" A Preface, contributed by one of his friends, expressly stated that the author of the work was far from being in agreement with the principles of the Cartesian philosophy. A Dutch translation was published by another of his friends the following year. Spinoza's friend, Jelles, paid the expenses of publication of both editions. Spinoza himself does not seem to have regarded the work as of great importance, being mostly expository, but doubtless he felt that it might prepare the way for some more original work.[1] It is to be observed that it is written in the "geometrical" manner which he employed in the *Ethics,* and it is more than likely that in or about 1663 he had actually begun to do for his own philosophy, as outlined in the *Short Treatise,* what he had already done for Descartes, that is to say, he had begun his *Ethics.*

Spinoza took up his residence at Voorburg in June, 1663, and during the next few years he was busily occupied with his *Ethics,* with his correspondence, and with interviewing friends. He received a welcome visit from his friend and admirer, Simon de Vries, the young medical student, who earlier had made him the present of 2000 florins. De Vries, whose feeble life was now failing fast, desired to make Spinoza his heir, but to this Spinoza would not consent, because De Vries had a brother. To his brother the estate of Simon was left, on condition that an annuity be paid to Spinoza, suffi-

1. The exposition appears to have originated in notes written by Spinoza for a young man, Albert de Burgh, who was at that time interested in philosophy and freedom of thought, but later became a Catholic and endeavoured (like Steensen) to convert Spinoza.

cient for his support. During the winter of 1663-4 Spinoza had visited Rijnsburg, and we know that the following winter he made an excursion as far as Schiedam (near Rotterdam)[1] to see this brother of Simon de Vries, and also revisited Amsterdam. When, two years later (1667), Simon died, his brother immediately offered Spinoza an annuity of 500 florins (£40), but the philosopher refused to accept more than 300 florins.

It was about this time that he became mentioned in local ecclesiastical circles, and that in not a very complimentary manner. His landlord at Voorburg had taken a stand in a dispute about the appointment of a local minister, and had prepared a petition supporting his candidate. The opposing party accused him of having had the petition drawn up by his lodger, Spinoza, "an atheist, a mocker against all religion, and a dangerous 'Instrument' in this Republic."

During his whole stay at Voorburg, he made frequent journeys to the Hague, which was only about two miles away. He became acquainted with Christian Huygens (1629-1695). This Dutch scientist was a native of the Hague, a mathematician and optician, who had discovered an improved method of grinding and polishing lenses, and had succeeded in inventing a fine new telescope, with which he was able to see Saturn's ring in 1665. He applied the pendulum to regulate the movements of clocks, and in 1657 presented the first pendulum clock to the States-General of Holland. He also formulated the wave theory of light. Huygens was a Fellow of the newly-founded Royal Society of England, of which Oldenburg was the Secretary. Spinoza, whose

1. See the Map of the Spinoza-Country, on which are indicated the places connected with his life-history.

fame as a practical optician was considerable, also met another scientist, Hudde, interested likewise in lenses. He also met Van Beuningen, a man of some political importance at the time, being ex-Burgomaster of Amsterdam and Ambassador of the Netherlands to foreign courts. Further, he was introduced to Jan de Witt, the Grand Pensionary of Holland. Meanwhile Spinoza kept working at his *Ethics;* by June of 1665 he had got as far as what is now Book Four. He was also engaged upon the writing of the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus,* and it seems that he laid aside the *Ethics,* when nearing completion, in order to write the *Tractatus.* Four energetic years were spent in preparing the material for this treatise.

It may seem strange that Spinoza should lay aside his *Ethics,* upon which he was so intent, in order to take up other works, that is, to write his *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus.* We must endeavour to estimate his motives, and to consider the circumstances which induced him to take this course of action. It must be remembered that toleration was no great feature of the religious and political life of those times. Religion and politics were bound together in a union disastrous for the spread of liberty and free thought. Jan de Witt supported and encouraged a more enlightened policy in Church and State, urged toleration, and aimed at the disestablishment of the Church. Various writers had set forth the claims of tolerance and liberty, but the warfare of fanaticism and freedom continued, the pleas for toleration set forth ably on philosophical and humanitarian principles were ignored by the zealous Calvinistic theologians. To them philosophy was rank heresy, the claims of humanism were regarded as blasphemous atheism; their prejudices, bigotry, fanaticism

and intolerance were a disgrace to the name of religion. To these fruits of their spirit was added yet another—the love of power—and they utterly abhorred any attempt to sever Church and State. "Moses and Aaron, the Sword and the Word, go hand in hand, and what God hath joined together let no man put asunder!" This was their characteristic cry and method, to fall back on words cited, however absurdly, from the Bible, and by such quotations they tried to obtain the last word in argument, and "to stop the mouths of them that uttered blasphemy." Now, Spinoza was anxious to defend freedom of thought and of speech, and he knew that the clergy were doing their utmost to suppress such "liberty of philosophising." He determined on a line of "direct action" to deal with the theologians along their own lines, and to turn the guns of his powerful criticism upon the very fortress of their power, the Bible itself. He resolved to make clear that the very writings which these presumptuous fanatics so glibly and piously quoted, did, when examined, destroy their own case and condemn their own actions. He desired to exhibit the fact that the theologians were really ignorant of the Bible, and used it, together with religious prejudice, tradition and dogma, merely as a disguise for their own selfish ends. It was a large undertaking, but it is improbable that any man then living was so well qualified for the task as Spinoza, equipped with his Jewish learning and his philosophic insight, coupled with a nobleness of aim, to vindicate freedom of philosophising. Thus it was that he undertook to write *"A Treatise, partly theological and partly political,"* as the first English translation was entitled. The *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* was published *anonymously* in 1670. This and the afore-mentioned

work on Descartes were the only works of Spinoza published in his lifetime.

Following the publication of this work, Spinoza removed from Voorburg to the Hague. This brought him into closer contact with Jan de Witt, who was in a sense his patron, having given him a pension of 200 florins (£16) annually, and who agreed very heartily with the tone of the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus,* which had raised a great storm in ecclesiastical circles. It was referred to as a wicked book, "forged in Hell by a renegade Jew and the devil, and issued with the knowledge of Mr. Jan de Witt." The Ecclesiastical Council of Amsterdam condemned it. Five editions were published in rapid succession, but the storm was not easily appeased. Orthodox clergy and laity alike denounced it as a godless production, and would have condemned its author if they could. The might of the civil power was frequently invoked against the person of the author, but so long as De Witt lived the fanatics were powerless to achieve the end they desired. Spinoza, however, thought it prudent to stop the preparation of a Dutch translation, as this might, he considered, raise further storm, and bring about the banning of Latin and Dutch versions together.

In 1671, the philosopher Leibnitz, then a young man of twenty-five, who had read Spinoza's exposition of Descartes when he was twenty-two, and had discovered him to be famed as a practical optician, sent him a copy of his own book on *The Progress of Optics.* Spinoza returned the compliment by forwarding to Leibnitz a copy of his *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus.* Leibnitz already knew the book. He had read it as "an unbearable free-thinking book," and his Professor, Thomas by name, had attempted a refutation of it. It

was not, however, until Spinoza forwarded a copy that either Leibnitz or his Professor knew who was the author of the famous treatise, and Leibnitz deliberately avoided disclosing to his Professor the fact that he had been in direct communication with Spinoza, by substituting for his name the phrase "some of my Dutch friends." This was the commencement of relations between Spinoza and Leibnitz.

Spinoza's income at this time was not large, and he was so busy with his written work that he could not have been making much by the manufacture and sale of his lenses. He had two little annuities, 300 florins (about £25) a year from the brother of his late friend, Simon de Vries, and 200 florins (about £16) from Jan de Witt. He found his landlady at the Hague too dear in her charges for board and lodging, and he removed in May of 1671 to lodge with a painter, Van der Spijck, in an adjoining street, providing his own board in an economical, and, it must be feared, rather stinted, manner. This was his last change of address. He was now very busy. It is probable that he felt his strength failing, owing to the progress of the complaint from which he suffered all his life (phthisis), a trouble no doubt increased by his indoor, studious and sedentary life, and further by the irritation caused by the small particles of glass-dust inhaled in his work of grinding lenses. He must have begun to feel that the completion of all the work he had in hand must involve a race for life against time and death. The little extra money coming from the manufacture of his lenses, for which he had a great reputation, must be foregone. At times he did not leave his room for days, owing to pressure of work, and did not go out of doors for months at a stretch. The *Ethics,* which had been so nearly

finished in 1665, and had been laid aside during the writing of the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus,* now occupied his chief attention, and he was anxious to complete, revise, and publish it soon. As far as can be ascertained, the *Ethics* was not completed, in the form in which we know it, until about four years after this. He contemplated a work on natural philosophy which might supplement his *Ethics,* and he diligently kept up his studies in mathematics and the physical sciences. He wrote essays, one on *The Rainbow,* another on *The Calculation of Chances,* and began a Dutch translation of the Bible and a Hebrew Grammar. These last two efforts were fruits of studies made during the preparation of the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus.* Of more importance, however, than these was his commencement of the *Tractatus Politicus.*

While Spinoza was thus writing on the theory of polities, there were stirring events afoot in the actual field of polities itself. The years 1665-67 had seen a war between the Dutch and the English. De Ruyter, the Dutch admiral, had been up the Thames as far as Chatham, and had made the sound of his guns heard in the English capital. This, coupled with the fact that Louis XIV. made his influence felt against England, brought peace in 1667. (In this year, we may note, Oldenburg was thrown into the Tower of London, and Huygens left Holland for a comfortable post at Paris under the patronage of Louis XIV., not returning to Holland until five years after Spinoza's death.) The "Grand Monarch" then woke up to some forgotten claims he had against the Spanish Netherlands, now the country of Belgium, and promptly invaded it. This alarmed the Dutch, and Jan de Witt managed in 1668

to arrange a skilful treaty between the Netherlands, England and Sweden as a Triple Alliance against France. Louis XIV. did not rest, however, for he, on his side, arranged the notorious secret treaty of Dover with our King Charles II. in 1671; hence the following year England and France declared war upon the Dutch, and a French army, 120,000 strong, invaded Holland and the United Provinces. The surprise of invasion by enemy troops gave impetus to a conspiracy which had been brewing against the rule of the De Witt brothers in favour of William of Orange (later our William III.), his rival for power in the Netherlands. There was a sudden upheaval, a cry for the Prince of Orange as the traditional saviour of his country, and there resulted the brutal and ungrateful murder of which Motley, in his *History of the United Netherlands,* and Dumas, in his novel, *La Tulipe Noire,* have given two vivid accounts. Jan de Witt, who had given twenty years' devoted service to his country, was murdered, or, rather, lynched, together with his brother Cornelius, by a furious mob who broke into the Hague Prison on the 20th August, 1672. This tragic death of his friend and patron affected Spinoza very considerably. Violent grief and no less violent indignation combined to disturb his usual calm, and, had he not been locked in his room for his own safety by Van der Spijck, his landlord, he would have gone out, faced the excited mob, and remonstrated with them, and thus doubtless have shared the tragic fate of the De Witt brothers.

Spinoza had now lost his patron, and, with remarkable generosity and independence, he despatched to the heirs of Jan de Witt the written promise of the pension awarded him annually for life. This act so touched the heirs of De Witt that they determined to continue

Spinoza's pension, although they probably would not otherwise have done so.

The war still dragged on, and in 1673 a division of the French Army, under the command of Prince Condé, was encamped at Utrecht, a distance of over 30 miles from the Hague. Condé had a regiment of Swiss troops with him, under a certain Lieutenant-Colonel Stoupe (later Brigadier), an adventurous and unscrupulous individual, who had at one time been a Calvinistic minister at the Walloon Church of the Savoy, London, in the time of Cromwell, and had, in a published work entitled *La Religion des Hollandois,* taunted the Dutch clergy with culpable negligence in not replying to Spinoza's *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus.* As Prince Condé had a general interest in literature and philosophy, Colonel Stoupe suggested that it would be interesting to get into touch with the author of the geometric exposition of Descartes' philosophy, and the notorious writer of the anonymous *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus,* which had caused such a stir in the learned world. The prince agreed, and despatched Stoupe to the Hague to see Spinoza, and invite him to come to Utrecht.

Spinoza consulted with some of his friends regarding the advisability of such an excursion under the existing circumstances. No objection being made, he set off with the necessary passports, and visited the enemy's camp. Upon his arrival he found that Prince Condé had just been called away unexpectedly, but was due back shortly. Count Luxemburg received him on behalf of the absent commander, made him welcome, and urged him to await Condé's return to the camp. Spinoza remained for some weeks, and had a pleasant time with Luxemburg, Stoupe and other officers. He was offered

a French pension if he would dedicate a book to Louis XIV., but this Spinoza would not do; he was too independent, and he had shown early in his career that he could not be bribed. News arriving that Condé could not return, Spinoza thereupon took his departure from Utrecht.

On his return to the Hague, evil looks and flying stones greeted him, and there were some fears that the house would be attacked. Gossips had been busy during his absence, and rumour had got round that he was a spy and a traitor. Van der Spijck, his landlord, became afraid for his own life and for that of his lodger. "Do not be afraid," said Spinoza, "I am innocent, and some of our leading statesmen know why I went to Utrecht. As soon as the people make any noise, I shall go out to them, even if they should do to me what they did to the good De Witts. I am a good Republican, and my desire is the good of the Republic." Spinoza's frank and fearless attitude evidently saved him from further trouble. Meanwhile Colonel Stoupe showed what manner of man he was by publishing a pamphlet maliciously denouncing Spinoza and his writings.

In the same year, 1673, another invitation reached Spinoza, coming from the Elector Palatine, Karl Ludwig, who, it is interesting to note, was the brother of Princess Elizabeth, the patron of Descartes. This was an invitation conveyed through Professor Fabricius to accept the Professorship of Philosophy at the University of Heidelburg. It took Spinoza six weeks to make up his mind, for the honour had a considerable amount of attraction. Yet he could not bring himself to become a Professor after the years he had spent in retreat. His friends in Holland and his failing health made another difficulty. Then, further, a more important

difficulty presented itself in a statement contained in the invitation, to the effect that the Elector was confident that Spinoza would not misuse his freedom in philosophical teaching to disturb the public religion. Finally Spinoza wrote appreciating the kindness of the Elector, but declining the honour. In the course of his letter we find him saying: "I do not know the limits within which the freedom of my philosophical teaching would be confined, if I am to avoid all appearance of disturbing the publicly established religion. Religious quarrels do not arise so much from ardent zeal for religion as from men's various dispositions, and the love of contradiction which makes them habitually distort and condemn everything. I have experienced these things in my private and secluded life; how much more should I have to fear them after my promotion to this post of honour."[1]

Even in his own country Spinoza was not to enjoy as much freedom of thought as he desired. The Calvinistic clergy had not abandoned their fierce onslaughts upon his book, the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*. Jan de Witt had restrained them, and, even after his tragic death, Burgomaster Hudde defended Spinoza's work from the action of the clerics, so far as the civil power could, by refusing to take any steps against the author or to stop the circulation of the book. Now that William of Orange was in power, however, matters changed considerably. In accordance with his policy of playing to all the galleries of Church and State, the *Tractatus* was strictly prohibited in 1674 by the States-General of Holland and Prince William of Orange (later our King William III.), in an edict which described the book as "overflowing with blasphemies against God,

1. Spinoza's Correspondence, Epistle No. 48, given in Appendix.

His attributes, the doctrine of the Trinity, the divinity of Christ, and our Salvation by Him," and as, in consequence, "a dangerous Poison." Measures seemed likely to be taken against the author himself, for, although the work had appeared anonymously, Spinoza was well known to be its author.

At the end of 1674 news reached Spinoza concerning his old schoolmaster and friend, who had done so much to befriend him and educate him in the early days, Van den Enden. Forced from Holland by his intolerant countrymen, who objected to his free-thinking, he had settled in Paris, and, on the outbreak of war between the French and Dutch, became involved in a conspiracy to aid his fellow-countrymen. This plot was discovered, and Van den Enden was put to death in front of the Bastille in November, 1674. Spinoza's old friend, Schuller, who in his student days had been a member of the study circle, was now at the Hague as a medical practitioner. Through Dr. Schuller, Spinoza was in 1674 brought into correspondence, and then into personal acquaintance with Count Tschirnhausen. This brilliant young Bohemian nobleman, then twenty-three years old, was a science student at the University of Leyden, who subsequently became famous for his mathematical and optical work in connection with lenses, and for his introducing the manufacture of porcelain into Europe.[1] The following year Tschirnhausen visited London, and met Boyle, and also Oldenburg, Spinoza's old correspondent, who was now somewhat dampened in spirits since his imprisonment in the Tower. From there he went to Paris, and, on Spinoza's suggestion,

1. He later proved himself to be the keenest contemporary critic of Spinoza's work, and his correspondence shows a marvellous insight into Spinoza's thought and method, much of which he reproduced, however, without acknowledgment in his book *Medicina Mentis*, 1687.

called on Huygens, comfortably settled under the patronage of "The Grand Monarch." These visits brought about a renewal of Spinoza's correspondence with Oldenburg, which had ceased since the outbreak of war between England and Holland, ten years before, although Spinoza had forwarded him a copy of the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*. This work, however, did not meet with the approval of the orthodox and now timid Oldenburg. We find Spinoza, who had by now finished his *Ethics*, mentioning this fact to Oldenburg in a letter of June, 1675, and saying that he is about to publish this work. Oldenburg, in his earlier days, had written in a very different strain, urging Spinoza to publish the *Short Treatise* in defiance of the "petty theologians." "Come," he had then written, "cast away all fear of exciting against you the pigmies of our time. Long enough have we sacrificed to ignorance and pedantry. Let us spread the sails of true knowledge, and explore the recesses of nature more thoroughly than heretofore."[1] Oldenburg had, however, been severely shaken by his sojourn in the Tower, and, in his reply to Spinoza's announcement regarding the intended publication of the *Ethics*, he pleaded with him "not to insert any passages which may seem to discourage the practice of religion and virtue." So nervous, indeed, had Oldenburg become that, although he said he would not object to receive a few copies of the published *Ethics*, yet he requested that these be sent to him quite secretly.

In the same year Count Tschirnhausen met Leibnitz in Paris. Now Tschirnhausen, it appears, had seen and read Spinoza's forthcoming work in manuscript. He discussed Spinoza's views with Leibnitz, with the natu-

1. Correspondence, Epistles 7 and 11 (contrast Epistle 62).

ral result that Leibnitz desired to peruse the *Ethics* for himself. Thereupon Leibnitz got Tschirnhausen to write to his friend, Dr. Schuller, asking him to obtain permission from Spinoza for Leibnitz to have access to a manuscript copy of the *Ethics*. Spinoza, however, declined to grant the desired permission, for he distrusted Leibnitz, and questioned the motives of his visit to Paris. Spinoza suspected that Leibnitz was in the French capital negotiating for a reunion of Catholics and Protestants, a consummation which Spinoza feared would, if arrived at, result in a suppression of free thought and free speech, and of what little toleration then existed. This was in 1675, when Leibnitz was twenty-nine, and was under the influence of the Elector of Mainz. In the autumn of the following year Leibnitz paid a personal visit to Spinoza, calling upon him at his lodging in the Hague. Spinoza, with his customary characteristic courtesy, received him graciously, and made him welcome, all distrust being put aside. Leibnitz frequently visited his lodging, and, according to his own report, "conversed with him often and at great length." He also had his heart's desire granted by having access to a manuscript of the *Ethics*. This generosity and magnanimity of Spinoza was but ill repaid, for Leibnitz stands accused, not only of having made use of some of Spinoza's thought without any acknowledgment of its source, but of absolute dishonesty, both in his deliberate avoidance of any more than one written mention of Spinoza, and also in the temper of his verbal remarks when he did condescend to refer openly to him.[1] The almost instinctive distrust which Spinoza cherished towards Leibnitz was not unfounded, and his frank and gracious reception of his

1. The written reference is a mention in the *Theodicee* (1710).

visitor only shows to us the pure and generous heart he had.

Indeed, Spinoza's personal character has always been much esteemed. Those who knew him in his own day, however much they detested his philosophy, united in admiration of the man himself. The biography of Colerus, the Lutheran pastor, who at a later date inhabited Spinoza's lodgings at the Hague, and wrote down what he could find out about him, is a remarkably fine testimony in this respect. Spinoza was, we know, gracious, courteous and friendly, alert only with opponents or equals of whom he was not sure. He was valiant in the pursuit of truth, which alone he believed will make men free; bribes he scorned, worldly wealth and position had no attraction for him, comforts and luxuries he put aside in order to have greater liberty. Nothing, we are told, offended him like the insinuation that his works aimed at uprooting virtue. He was very homely in his ways, and Colerus has given us a very delightful picture of his home life with the Van der Spijcks. One time he is discussing religion with his landlady, and tenderly assuring her, in reply to a query, that piety and love are the basis of all true religion. He was too keen a student and lover of human nature to attempt setting forth his own destructive opinions before homely, pious folk, whose religion was pure and undefiled simplicity and love, whatever their theological doctrines might be. Another time we find him by the fireside, chatting with her husband over a pipe, his only luxury. Again he is tenderly chatting with the little ones, listening to their prattle, and questioning them in a fatherly way about their lessons and their Sunday School attendance, about what they remember of the

sermon of Rev. Dr. Cordes (Colerus' predecessor), whose church he occasionally visited, although never a member. Such glimpses are valuable side-lights on the character of Spinoza.

The *Ethics* was still in manuscript form, in spite of Spinoza's announcement to Oldenburg that he had finished it in June of 1675. It would be about a year from this date, and eight months after the visit of Leibnitz, that Spinoza set out for Amsterdam specially to make arrangements for the publication of the work. A short and graphic account of what occurred may be drawn from a letter he wrote later to Oldenburg. "While I was negotiating, a rumour gained currency that I had in the press a book concerning God, wherein I endeavoured to show that there is no God. This report was believed by many. Thereupon certain theologians, perhaps the authors of the rumour, took occasion to complain of me before the Prince and the Magistrates. Moreover, the stupid Cartesians, being suspected of favouring me, endeavoured to remove the aspersion by abusing everywhere my opinions and writings, a course which they still pursue. When I became aware of this through trustworthy men, who also assured me that the theologians were everywhere lying in wait for me, I determined to put off publishing till I saw how things were going." He then remarks: "But matters seem to get worse and worse, and I am still uncertain what to do."[1] Thus was the publication of the *Ethics,* upon which he had been working for so long, postponed indefinitely, to the great relief of poor Oldenburg, but, we cannot doubt, much to the regret

1. Epistle 68, no date, but a reply to Oldenburg's London letter of 20th July, 1675.

of the author himself, who may already have felt that he would not live to see the publication of his life work.[1]

He was not deterred, however, and occupied himself with the writing of the *Tractatus Politicus.* Although a metaphysical thinker of great ability, and an able writer upon religion, yet Spinoza's interests were ethical, and, it may be added, political and social. His political thought is but the applications of his more individual ethics to a broader canvas. For him ethics and politics are fundamentally one, and it was his last wish to set before his countrymen, and indeed all mankind, the governing principles and ideals of true statesmanship. For him, as for Ruskin, that ideal was the perfecting of the individual citizen. "That country is the richest which nourishes the greatest number of noble and happy human beings." For this Spinoza saw that security and freedom were necessary, and the maintenance of both of these was the duty of the State. Upon this task he was engaged when death overtook him. He died in harness, his *Political Treatise* unfinished. It had been evident at the beginning of February, 1677, that his end was approaching, although he was only forty-four, and on Sunday afternoon, 20th February, 1677, he passed away in the presence of his medical friend (Dr. Meyer, according to most authorities, but Wolf says Dr. Schuller). Regarding the actual circumstances of his death we know nothing, but we can surmise from the character of his life that it was peaceful and resigned. The mystery of the event gave ample room for gossip of the most grotesque and foolish sort, appalling lies were circulated which, as they are expressly refuted by Colerus, his biographer, who was far

1. We learn finally from further correspondence that Oldenburg had criticised Spinoza's philosophy for his identification of God and Nature, his non-admittance of miracles, and his disbelief in Christ's atoning power.

from biassed in his favour, need not be here repeated. His sister, Rebecah, on learning of his death, at once put in her claim as heiress. When, however, it was found that the sale of Spinoza's personal estate, mainly books and lenses, only realised the sum of 450 florins (about £35), she promptly abandoned her claim, for this sum just sufficed to cover some personal debts, mostly tradesmen's accounts and the funeral expenses. This event took place four days after his death, the interment being made in a grave of the poorer sort in the grounds of the New Church on the Spuy, in the Hague, not far from the resting-place of his ill-fated friend and patron, Jan de Witt. Spinoza thus passed away before he was able to bring forth, through the press, his *Ethics,* which was practically his life-work. The manuscript, however, lay completed and ready in his desk, and he had left instructions that it should be forwarded at his death to his friend Rieuwertsz, the publisher, in Amsterdam. This last but precious duty was faithfully carried out by the painter Van den Spijck, who held his late lodger in profound veneration. Immediate publication, however, seemed dangerous and financially impossible, but November of 1677 saw the appearance of a quarto volume, *Opera Posthuma,* containing the *Ethics,* the unfinished *Political Treatise,* and the unfinished *De Emendatione,* together with some correspondence and the Hebrew Grammar.[1] Spinoza's name did not dignify the title page, prudence allowing only the initials *B. D. S.* to appear, while all names were most carefully removed from the correspondence, no names of editor, publisher

1. The appearance and general format of this work has been continued by the new *Societas Spinozana* in its two annual volumes *Chronicon Spinozanum,* mcmxxi. and mcmxxii.

or printer were given, and the editorial preparation of the volume was carried on secretly by Spinoza's friends, Schuller, Meyer and Jelles, in an Orphanage belonging to the Collegiants. A few months after the appearance of this volume, it was suppressed by the States of Holland and West Friesland in an edict describing Spinoza's writings as "profane, atheistical and blasphemous, seducing the innocent reader from the true way of Salvation." It was also placed upon the Roman Index. Thus the curtain falls on the life and death of our philosopher and on the publication of his works.

CHAPTER II.

FORMATIVE INFLUENCES.

1. Judaism. Its monotheism. The Old Testament Prophets. Studies Talmud and the theosophy of the Cabbala. Pantheistic and rational Jewish philosophers of the Middle Ages, Ibn Ezra, Maimonides, Kreshka, Gersonides.
2. The New Philosophy. Bruno and Bacon. Great influence of Descartes.
3. Politically indebted to Hobbes, Grotius and Machiavelli.
4. Religious influence of the Collegiants.

CHAPTER II.

FORMATIVE INFLUENCES.

The foregoing chapter has been an attempt to set out the life of Spinoza with special reference to the historical data, and to an understanding of the events which had an immediate bearing upon his life. As we remarked in our Preface, some understanding of these is essential to the student and reader who endeavours to appreciate the difficulties which Spinoza had to face in his fight for freedom of philosophising and in his attempts to publish his own writings. The remaining chapters treat of his thought, but, before embarking upon any examination of this, attention must be directed to the formative influences which operated on the mind of our philosopher, and to the sources from which many of his ideas have been drawn. No thinker can be considered apart from his intellectual environment, and, particularly, must not be considered apart from his intellectual heritage. Such considerations are inevitable and perfectly just, and they imply no insinuations upon the originality of the thinker. What use Spinoza made of the sources he had at his disposal we shall see when we pass on to the examination of the various branches of his philosophy.

Spinoza's thought owed much to the influence of a number of writers, but in the main the formative influences were of two very distinct kinds. There was, on the one hand, the influence of Judaism, and on the other the New Philosophy, mainly Cartesian.

In attempting to estimate the significance of Judaism upon Spinoza, we must remember that, although at the age of twenty-four he was cast out of the synagogue, having already become mentally alienated therefrom, nevertheless, many of the Jewish conceptions of the universe had become parts of the very fibre of his being. The moral intensity of the Hebrew prophets reappears in him, and the characteristic feature of Judaism, its intense monotheism, remained with him in spite of the fact that his conception of God differed mightily from that of his fellow Jews. His monism was partly the fruit of the Jewish monotheism. Belief in *One* God, upon whom nature and man both depend, was the main and vital point of Judaism. This view remained in its essentials with Spinoza, in spite of modifications of it, and in spite of other changes in his attitude as he grew and extended his mind beyond the confines of the Synagogue. Other influences from Judaism of post-Biblical times made their mark upon him. Although we rightly regard Spinoza as the leader, if not the founder, of the rational criticism of the Bible, yet it is undeniable that the mediæval Jewish philosophers exercised considerable influence upon him in this direction. The rationalising criticisms of writers like Ibn Ezra (1092-1167), Maimonides (1135-1204), Gersonides (1288-1344), and Kreshka (1340-1410), he amplified and extended, putting forward his own criticisms with less ambiguity and hesitation. His debt to Judaism, both Biblical and Mediæval, cannot be neglected in any estimate of his philosophy.[1]

1. Joel, in his *Beitrage der Philosophie* (1876), was one of the first commentators to stress the Jewish influences on Spinoza. Dr. L. Roth lays special stress on Maimonides' *Guide to the Perplexed* as a great influence. See his scholarly little volume, issued this year, *Spinoza, Descartes and Maimonides.*

In regard to the other strong influence—the New Philosophy—we must remember that Descartes, the founder of Modern Philosophy, was living when Spinoza was born. The famous *Discours de la Methode,* which laid the foundations of modern Philosophy, was published in Leyden when Spinoza was a child of five. Descartes died in 1650, aged fifty-six, when Spinoza was eighteen years old. Our young philosopher was a diligent student of Descartes, and we have already observed that he wrote and published an exposition of Descartes' philosophy. It has been argued whether Spinoza was ever at any period of his life a genuine disciple of Descartes. Sigwart has suggested that he was not, and Avenarius has positively asserted that Spinoza was never a Cartesian.[1] This is probably true; at any rate, his allegiance, if any, was short, for in his exposition he takes trouble to point out points of disagreement between Descartes and himself, and these are by no means minor issues, as we shall point out in the next chapter. Nevertheless, the influence of Descartes' work was very considerable, and to it Spinoza owed, not only his introduction to the metaphysical thought of his time, but also much of his love and knowledge of physical science. Indeed, it was this aspect of Descartes which attracted him tremendously. Another thinker who undoubtedly influenced him was Bruno, who in 1600 parished as a martyr for liberty of thought.[2] He did not, however, accept Bruno's teleology. Freudenthal, in his work, *Spinoza und die Scholastik,* has shown the

1. See on this Dr. L. Roth's articles in *Mind,* 1923, on Spinoza and Cartesianism republished in *Spinoza, Descartes and Maimonides.*

2. Hale White ("Mark Rutherford") gives a selection of parallel passages from Bruno in his translation of Spinoza's *Ethics.* Both Sigwart and Avenarius stress the influence of Bruno.

influence of the Schoolmen on Spinoza's thought especially in the *Cogitata Metaphysica.* The English writer, Bacon, had also some little influence on him.

On the more special side of his political philosophy, Spinoza stands considerably indebted to Hobbes (1588-1679), his English contemporary. We know he was a student of Hobbes' works, and had his *De Cive* in his library. Hobbes' arguments for the freeing of philosophy from theological barriers appear in the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus,* while the unfinished *Tractatus Politicus,* in its view of natural right and social contract, owes much to the political thought of Hobbes, whose *Leviathan* appeared in Spinoza's youth, being published the year after Descartes' death (i.e., in 1651). Spinoza, however, has considerable merits as a political thinker which are lacking in Hobbes, in spite of that writer's logical deductions. The truer insight which Spinoza had into human nature introduced a psychological element into his political theory of the state which redeemed it from the narrow view which Hobbes took, and saved him from Hobbes' errors. This will be shown in due course in our chapter dealing with the nature of The Commonwealth. Here it suffices to note Spinoza's relation, and debt, to Hobbes. We must note, too, the subtle influence of Hobbes' forerunner, Machiavelli, the author of *The Prince* (1532), as well as that of Spinoza's fellow-countryman, Hugo Grotius, whose important treatise, *De Jure Belli et Pacis* (1625), laid the foundations of the modern discussions of the relations of states to one another.

In any summary of the influences which, both consciously and unconsciously, bore on Spinoza as a thinker, omission must not be made of the Collegiants, a religious fellowship with which he came in contact on quitting

the Synagogue (and even before), although it must be remembered that he never officially connected himself with any religious body, nor embraced Christianity. Of these people Dr. Martineau says,[1] "that small section whose members, from their union in Collegia or fraternal clubs, without any clerical office, were called Collegiants, maintained themselves in Holland till the close of last century, with a quiet patience like that of the Quakers in our own country, and proceeding, indeed, from very similar principles. For they so held to the perpetuity of the Divine Spirit in man as to insist upon dogmatic freedom; they refused to take an oath or to serve in war, and had been released from these obligations by a special law (of 1578); they allowed any brother spiritually moved to speak in their assembly, and, with the exception of baptism by immersion, retained no ritual element in their Christianity. They were rigorous in guarding the moral purity of their community, and remarkable for their frugality, veracity and industry; and, with their simplicity and austerity of habit, combined in an unusual degree an openness of knowledge and love of scientific truth." Such were apparently the first kind of Christians whom the alienated Jew learned to know, and it is easy to understand how congenial to him would be their intellectual and spiritual freedom, their inwardness of religion, their peaceable disposition, and their simplicity of life. Throughout his life they formed the social circle nearest to his feeling, and after his early death his works were edited under the protection of their buildings.

In spite of such formative influences Spinoza is no mere follower of Jewish mystics, or of Bruno, Descartes or Hobbes. He had his own original and peculiar out-

1. In his *Types of Ethical Theory,* p. 240.

look on the world and on humanity. Originality does not imply that a man produce all the data of his work himself, but it does mean that he fashion these in a manner peculiarly his own, impressing upon them the stamp of his own personality, an accomplishment which certainly belongs to Spinoza. It is necessary, however, to bear in mind the work of his forerunners, in order to gain some idea of his relative time-position in the development of human thought, if we are to appreciate the full significance and importance of his work. Having surveyed his life and its historical conditions, and having briefly noted the formative influences which bore upon him, we can now pass to an examination of his work.

CHAPTER III.

THE NATURE OF THE UNIVERSE.

(*Metaphysical Basis.*) Spinoza's aim. Human welfare. Knowledge of the universe and man's relation to it a means to this end. Examination of types of knowledge. Adequate ideas. *De Intellectus Emendatione.* Method of the *Ethics.* Definitions and Axioms. The One Substance. The Attributes. Parallelism of mind and matter. The Modes. Divine and universal Determination. Spinoza's Conception of Cause. *Causa Sui. Natura naturans* and *Natura naturata.* The variety of things. Relativity of moral and æsthetic values. Happiness bound up with the knowledge of the Universe. Man's place in the Cosmos. Spinoza's metaphysic as an advance on that of Descartes. His treatment of the problems of substance, matter and mind, motion and time.

CHAPTER III.

THE NATURE OF THE UNIVERSE.

(Spinoza's Metaphysical Basis.)

Spinoza himself describes to us, in a paragraph of spiritual autobiography in the unfinished *Tractatus De Intellectus Emendatione,* the frame of mind which was a prelude to his philosophising. With reference to his thought as a whole, this fragment stands in a relation similar to that which the treatise *On Method* bears to the work of Descartes; but, while the object of the latter was "Certitude et Vérité," that of Spinoza's thought was rather the *"Summum Bonum,"* "The Good" and true *"Utilitas"* of human life. The confessions of Spinoza concerning his intellectual and spiritual pilgrimage are contained in this treatise. "After experience had shown me that all those things which frequently happen in social life are vain and futile; when I saw that all the objects of my fears contained nothing in themselves good or evil, but only in so far as the mind was moved by them, I determined at last to inquire whether there was anything which was truly good, and which could be communicated, and by which alone, everything else being set aside, the mind might be affected; in fine, whether there was anything, which found, I might have constant and supreme joy for ever."

We find here expressed that longing so profoundly human and so repeatedly voiced by the great thinkers of the world, a desire for an abiding joy amid the eternal

flux of things, an unchanging anchor in the storm and stress of life, the craving for a peace which "the world" cannot give. It is the human cry of restless dissatisfaction which St. Augustine voiced in the Confession, "My soul is restless till it find rest in Thee."

He gives the little treatise a sub-title, "*How the Intellect may best be guided to a True Knowledge of Things.*" But this true knowledge is desired for the sake of action—"il faut savoir notre devoir." We must *know* what constitutes human welfare or blessedness, and to make this clear is the task of all thought, all science, all research and all education. Knowledge is not entirely an end in itself, it is a means to an end. It is of vital importance to understand that Spinoza's main interests were ethical and political, and that his metaphysics are *a basis,* a foundation upon which he builds the rest of his thought. In fact, the whole array of Logic, Metaphysics, Psychology and Biblical Criticism, which he lays before his readers, is ultimately subordinated to the elucidation of the principles of human good, to an enquiry into the perfecting of human nature. Now knowledge is a means to the achieving of this end, more particularly that knowledge which bears on the questions of the nature of the universe and of man's relation to it, and the problems of our human nature, with its intellectual and emotional endowments. Further, anything which is a means of advancing man individually or socially towards such perfection is a good. The "*Summum Bonum,*" or highest good, however, lies in the achievement (in co-operation with his fellows) of this welfare, virtue, good or blessedness, call it what we will. It is thus no merely individualistic moral ideal, it is intensely social, and it is political in the highest sense of that word.

"This, then, is the end to attain which I am striving, namely, to acquire such a nature, and to assist many others to acquire it along with me. That is to say, it is a condition of my own happiness that I take pains that many others may understand as I do, so that their intellect and their desires shall be in complete harmony with my intellect and desires. But if this is to take place, we must understand so much about Nature as will enable us to acquire such a nature; and, besides, we must form such a society (or Commonwealth) as will enable men in general to attain it in the easiest way, and, when attained, to maintain it. To this end we must study Moral Philosophy and the Theory of Education of the Young, and, as health is no unimportant means for securing this, we must cultivate Medicine as a whole. Further, as many things which are difficult are made easy by the arts, thereby enabling us to save much time, and to have at our disposal many conveniences in life, we should on no account neglect the Physical Sciences. But, above all, we must discover some way of improving and purifying the intelligence, that its understanding of things may be free from error, and as complete as possible."[1]

The primary problem to be dealt with is the purifying and strengthening of the intellect by the elimination of error, and this involves an examination of the ways of knowing (Epistemology). This recalls Descartes' fundamental opinion that we shall never err if we assent to nothing except what we clearly and distinctly perceive. Now our ideas may be adequate or inadequate, that is to say, clear or confused; all ideas that are adequate are necessarily and obviously true. But if we are

1. *De Intellectus Emendatione II.*

to have knowledge, by a clear and distinct idea, of anything which is self-caused, we must know its essence, its essential nature. If it be a created thing we must be aware of its proximate cause. The more we know of the effect, the more complete will be our knowledge of the cause, and consequently "we cannot know anything of nature without increasing our knowledge of the first cause or of God."

It is by understanding, by possessing adequate ideas that the mind attains freedom, and the individual attains to happiness. Not all that passes as "knowledge" is to be placed in the same rank. Spinoza has his grades of knowledge. The bare, vague data of sense-experience are merely raw material which he styles "suggestions of experience." This is the lowest type of awareness, and serves as the basis for knowledge. A higher form of knowing consists in the ideas formed or conveyed by symbols. Under this heading are included the perceptions formed when the mind is passive. Such perceptions do not rank as "adequate ideas," but they produce knowledge of the first order. Spinoza's second type of knowledge is based upon reason and involves logic. It is not, however, founded upon inductive methods, nor does it consist merely in the simple enumeration of particular instances; it involves reasoning. This is not all, for there is the third grade of knowledge which Spinoza styles "intuition." He is careful, however, not to oppose the intuitive to the logical. Intuition is allied to reason, and arises out of it. There is no conflict between the two forms of knowing. Reason is concerned with the inter-connection and consistency of propositions or ideas, while intuition is a direct acquaintance with fundamental reality, which perceives ideas and properties as flowing from that perceived

reality. We must not be led into the fallacy of regarding reason and intuition as in opposition. Intuition is a further development from the merely rational, but it is in harmony, not in contradiction with it. Intuition, Spinoza reminds us, is thus superior to rational knowledge, but incorporates it.[1] It is intuition, however, rather than intellect or reason, which gives us a knowledge of the whole. That whole is no mere aggregate of parts, but a real unity whose parts derive their reality from their dependence upon and sequence from it. All finite things are known through their causes and explained by causes. The unity of reality cannot be so explained, as it is self-existent, and can only be conceived, as Spinoza puts it, through its own essence. It can only be grasped, we may say, by intuition, by suprarational perception or insight. Intuition thus becomes the true instrument of philosophy or metaphysics, but we must never forget that intuitive knowledge is, after all, scientific knowledge seen in its relation to the whole or God.

Spinoza having indicated the different orders or grades of knowledge, then proceeds by asking "whether there is any Being (and, if so, what it is) which is the cause of all things, so that its objective essence may be also the cause of all our ideas and our mind, as we have said, may exactly repeat Nature." He here raises the question of the uniformity of Nature, and regards the

1. The importance of the relation of *Ratio* and *Scientia intuitiva* was particularly stressed by Berendt and Freudenthal in their work on *Spinozas Erkenntnisslehre in ihre Beziehung zur modernen Naturwissenschaft und Philosophie* in 1891.
The reader, particularly the student of philosophy, should compare in this connection Bergson's statements regarding intuition and its relation to intellect. "Intuition, although only to be obtained through acquaintance with empirical data, is quite other than the mere summary of such knowledge" (*L'Intuition philosophique*). This important point of the precise nature of intuition is discussed in the writer's volume, *Bergson and His Philosophy*, chapter ix.; *The Gospel of Intuition*, pp. 98-109.

rigid sequence of cause and effect as "*ens.*" At this point the *De Intellectus Emendatione* breaks off, probably a part has been lost, but in any case the work was never completed. It is an interesting fragment, and a valuable introduction to the study of the *Ethics* as a whole, and in particular to its Theory of Being (Ontology), leading up to that study of the whole of nature, that contemplation of the universe and the fixed order of all things which for Spinoza is God.

The most striking feature of the *Ethics* is its plan, "more geometrico." "I shall consider human actions and appetites just as though I were dealing with lines, surfaces and solids." This scheme he carries out precisely. Although entitled *Ethics*, the first portion sets forth Spinoza's scheme of Being, the metaphysical basis upon which his whole system rests. On the threshold we enter a Euclidean atmosphere, the very paraphernalia of the Euclid book meet us in eight definitions and seven axioms. These are such typical examples of Spinoza's geometrical method that we cite them in full:—

The Eight Definitions.

1. I understand that to be Cause of Itself (*causa sui*) whose essence involves existence and whose nature cannot be conceived unless existing.
2. That thing is said to be Finite in its kind (*in suo genere finita*) which can be limited by another thing of the same kind.
3. I understand substance (*substantia*) to be that which is in itself and is conceived through itself; I mean that the conception of which does not depend on the conception of another thing from which it must be formed.

4. By attribute (*attributum*) I understand to be that which the intellect perceives as constituting the essence of a substance.
5. By mode (*modus*) I understand the modifications (*affectiones*) of a substance, or that which is in something else through which it may be conceived.
6. God (*Deus*) I understand to be a being absolutely infinite, that is, a substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence.
7. That thing is said to be Free (*libera*) which exists by the mere necessity of its own nature, and is determined in its actions by itself alone. That thing is said to be Necessary (*necessaria*) or rather Compelled (*coacta*) when it is determined in its existence and actions by something else in a certain fixed ratio (or by fixed and determinate causes).
8. I understand Eternity (*æternitas*) to be existence itself, in so far as it is conceived to follow necessarily from the definition of an eternal thing.

These fundamental definitions are then followed by axioms:—

The Seven Axioms.

1. Everything that exists, exists either in itself or in something else.
2. That which cannot be conceived through another thing must be conceived through itself.
3. From a given determined cause an effect follows of necessity, and, on the other hand, if no determined cause is granted, it is impossible that an effect should follow.
4. The knowledge of effect depends on the knowledge of cause, and involves the same.

5. Things which have nothing in common reciprocally, cannot be comprehended reciprocally through each other, or the conception of the one does not involve the conception of the other.
6. A true idea should agree with its ideal (*ideatum*), i.e., what it conceives.
7. The essence of that which can be conceived as not existing does not involve existence.

These definitions and axioms are the prelude to the Propositions of the *Ethics*.

Spinoza is here again indebted to Descartes for the starting point, but he develops his thought ultimately in a manner far removed from the doctrines of the founder of modern philosophy. He begins, however, by treating of Substance, and by accepting the Cartesian definition—"Substance is that which for its existence stands in need of nothing other than itself." But he does not go further with Descartes than to accept his definition, for Spinoza asserts that there can only be *one* Substance. There can only be, in his view, one self-subsistent Being, and this Being is necessarily infinite and unconditioned by anything outside itself, and exists spontaneously. Now there could not possibly be a plurality of such infinites, there can only be one infinite. Therefore only one substance can exist, and that an infinite substance. A plurality of substances, as suggested by Descartes, Spinoza regards as a contradiction. Moreover, while Descartes from his initial dictum, "*Cogito ergo sum*," arrived at an unreconciled dualism of spirit and matter, Spinoza's metaphysic is a pure Monism. He argues that our finite world presupposes the necessary existence of such a single substance, for it would be contradictory, he argues, that

only the finite and not the infinite should exist—i.e., only the conditioned and caused, and not the self-existent and self-subsistent. The absolute Substance is the real cause of all that is. Nothing is or happens apart from its being. Further, it is not only the cause of all being, but *is* all being, every special existence being but a modification of the One Substance manifesting itself. Such is his Monism, a product, no doubt, in part, of his early monotheism, for he calls this one Substance, God. But he expressly warns us that, by the use of that term, he means not a being, who is spiritual or intelligent or personal, or who exists transcendent above the world of his creation. In Spinoza's opinion God is entirely immanent, for He is the Substance of all things. The dualism involved in the conception "God-and-the-world" does not exist for Spinoza. He cannot re-utter the saying, "The world is the Lord's, and He made it." For him the world *is* God, being an emanation of the creative being of God, which is in its nature infinite. It is pure monism of a pantheistic type, for to him the statements, "There is only One God," and "The Substance of all things is one," are absolutely identical.

Spinoza, however, has to overcome the difficulty involved in the Cartesian dualism of matter and mind. Descartes had regarded these as two created substances which he termed Extension and Thought. Substances, of course, Spinoza could not call them, because for him there is but One Substance, God, but he styles them "attributes." So keen is he, however, on maintaining the infinite grandeur of his One Substance that he expressly says we are not to treat extension and thought as *the* two attributes of the Divine Substance, but as only the two attributes which are known to us, out of,

may be, an infinite number. This being so, we are led to inquire more precisely into the relation of the attributes to the Substance. He finds himself in rather a difficulty here, and fails to supply any principle of union between the One Substance and its manifestation in the two attributes known to the human understanding. The difficulty is due to the fact that he is unwilling to say that Substance appears *wholly* manifested in Thought and Extension, for that would at least to some degree limit and determine Substance.[1] He therefore maintains that Thought and Extension neither exhaust Substance, nor give us any idea of Substance in itself; they are only particular determinations relative to a subjective and human point of view, and they are the only two notions expressive of reality looked at from that standpoint. For the human mind in its empirical outlook, substance is Thought, and it is also Extension, but these are purely empirically derived determinations. Substance stands beyond them, and cannot be identified with either or both of its attributes, and neither of these explains its nature to us, and they appear as contingent in their relation to it.

We must pass now to consider the relation of these two attributed to each other, mind and matter. Although Spinoza has attempted in his monistic conception of Substance to overcome the fundamental dualism of Descartes, and speaks of the two as attributes of one Substance, yet he asserts with Descartes their mutual independence. Matter cannot influence mind, nor mind matter, for what is material can have only material causes, and what is spiritual (or mental) must have

1. Cf. Webb's remarks in *God and Personality*, p. 69, and Joachim's *Study of the Ethics of Spinoza*, p. 41, also Spinoza's Epistle 66 and the *Cogitata Metaphysica* II., 8, 1.

spiritual (or mental) causes. But, Spinoza is quick to remind us, both of these as referred to the One Substance are in perfect harmony. For the two are related in that they are essentially the same, but viewed now under the attribute of Thought, and again under the attribute of Extension. A circle and the thought of a circle are in the light of this statement the same for him. It is thus we see the world as the product of the One Substance, and are to look upon the universe as involving a unity of spirit and matter, a unity which appears in varying degrees of perfection throughout nature. In man, body and soul are indeed different, but they are not isolated, they are together, and are inseparable. (In man, of course, "thought" embraces not only feeling and perception, as in the lower animals, but also self-consciousness and reason, but this makes no difference to Spinoza's point here.) The soul is the consciousness that has as its objects the body associated with it, and, through the medium of that body, the material world in so far as it affects that body. The human body is an organ whose states consciously reflect themselves in the soul. There is, however, no cross-influence whatever, no interaction, and really, says Spinoza, soul and body are one and the same thing, expressed on the one hand as Extension, and on the other as Thought.

Spinoza's reference to both sides of a shield is beside the point. The two sides of a shield are both material, and we understand their relation because we know the shield as a whole. Matter and mind appear different in Nature. On the other hand, there is this to be said for the monistic view of the two-aspect theory, that it has a real epistemological basis. Our experience is never purely mental or purely physical, but always a

unity of subject and object. Mental and physical do imply each other. Spinoza's theory is based on the unity of this dualistic experience we know so well.

Such is Spinoza's doctrine of the One Substance, and the doctrine of the Attributes. He completes his metaphysical division by his theory of "Modes," by which term he implies the various individual finite forms in which Substance manifests itself or individualises itself. His theory of modes, or we may style it of individuality, is utterly overshadowed by the sublimity and grandeur of his One Substance. The "modes," of whom man himself is one, have not much individuality, nor, indeed, reality. They stand in exactly the same reference to the One Substance as the waves on the vasty deep stand in relation to the ocean itself. They never "are" in any ultimate sense; they come into being and they pass away again, their existence solely determined by the great marine influences of which they are victims. So it is with men, for they bear the stamp of their finite nature at all times, and are subject to the great chain of causation, of universal law, which runs through all things. All are in the bonds of firm necessity. An individual being is not free, save in the measure in which it has a natural "power," and therefore (as we shall later see) "right" to assert itself against other beings, and to preserve its own existence and its own peculiar nature.

Thus Spinoza expounds his doctrine of the Divine Trinity of Substance, Attribute and Mode. God is the immanent and not merely transcendent cause of all that is and happens; that is to say, He is not to be regarded as a cause producing something different from itself, but as manifesting itself in the manner which is in strict accord with its own nature. "You maintain," he makes

Reason argue in one of his dialogues, against Desire, "that a cause in so far as it produces its effects must be outside of them, but you assert this because you only know a transitive and not an immanent cause." The latter in no way produces what is outside itself. God is an immanent cause, and is the only "*causa sui*," a free cause, not in the sense of having an undetermined will, but in the sense of having nothing outside it which might constrain or influence it in any way. In reply to the question how there can be a cause which is one with its effects, Spinoza replies that there can be no other causality. We regard cause and effect as separate because we are ignorant of some of their relations; if we knew all we should see them to be the expressions of a deeper unity.

Spinoza speaks of Nature from two different points of view. "*Natura naturans*" is the term for "That which exists in itself and is conceived of itself, or such Attributes of Substance as express infinite and eternal essence, i.e., God as '*libera causa*,' while *natura naturata* covers all that follows from the divine nature or attributes, i.e., all modes of God's attributes considered as things which exist in God, and without God can neither exist nor be conceived."[1] The universe is the self-revelation of the One Divine Substance, and could not be other than it is. "It would constitute a great imperfection in God if anything happened against His will, or if He desired anything which He did not obtain, or if His nature were so biassed that, like a finite creature, He felt sympathy with some things and antipathy to

1. *Ethics I.*, 29 Sch. The terms "*natura naturans*" and "*natura naturata*" are from scholastic philosophers.
These expressions occur in work of the Schoolmen, the Renaissance thinkers and Eckhart, the mystic. According to Siebeck (quoted by Hoffding) they were introduced into Latin about the thirteenth century, being translations of the Greek Phusis as Phuon and as Phuomenon.

others.''[1] From the Divine Nature infinite things follow, but God does not *ad lib.* create some things and not others. Everything which He can do is being done, for everything that is follows from the nature of God, as it follows from the nature of a triangle that the sum of its angles equals two right angles. Moreover, we must ''accept the universe'' by endeavouring to see all things *''sub specie aeternitatis'';* we shall not then lament the wickedness or error or ugliness we see. As well it were to lament the fact that, in a circle, all radii are equal, for to God there is no good or bad, beautiful or ugly. These are purely human values; they are purely relative, and are due to our parochial view of things. ''I would warn you,'' he writes to a correspondent, ''that I do not attribute to nature either beauty or deformity, order or confusion. Only in relation to our imagination can things be called beautiful or ugly, well-ordered or confused.''[2] In addition, Spinoza denies will or intellect to God. ''God (said an old Hebrew dictum), the intellect of God, and the things which are the object of that intellect, are one and the same things.'' God exists for no end, and has no end or purpose before Him. ''Nature has no fixed aim in view, and all final causes are merely fabrications of men.'' ''I confess that the theory which subjects all things to the will of an indifferent God, and makes them dependent on His good will, is far nearer the truth than that which states that God acts in all things for furthering of good. This seems to place something beyond God, to which God looks in His actions as to an example, or strives after as an ultimate end. Now this

1. Letter to Blyenbergh, January 5th, 1665, No. 19.

2. Letter to Oldenburg, November 20th, 1665, No. 32.

is nothing else than subjecting God to Fate, a greater absurdity than which is difficult to assert of God, who is the first and only free cause of the essence of all things and their existence.'' Moreover, it is one of Spinoza's chief principles that, in the understanding of the nature of the universe and our own nature in relation to it, we arrive at a knowledge of God which involves harmony, peace and blessedness.

> Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas
> Atque metus omnes et inexorabile fatum.

It is important for a proper appreciation of Spinoza's metaphysics to realise that it marked an unmistakable advance upon Cartesianism. Descartes had indeed begun a new era in the history of human thought by his rejection of the vague subtleties and vast assumptions of the mediæval schoolmen, but his thought, heroic in its kind, left certain problems to be solved which were inherent in it. For example, Descartes spoke of two distinct substances, *Res cogitans* and *Res extensa,* Thought and Matter. Yet this postulation of two substances was in itself inconsistent with his own definition of substance as self-sufficing. It is this which explains the emphasis laid repeatedly by Spinoza upon his own principle, that there is and can only be *one* substance. We may note, however, that Descartes at least did the service of giving mind the rank of substance. This was an important point, for he was writing at a time when the mechanical and materialistic conceptions of nature were growing, and many thinkers gave to those a much wider and more thorough application than Descartes would allow. His English contemporary, Hobbes, simplified the problem by abolishing the difficulty of dualism by taking the view that all reality was mate-

rialistic in character. Descartes avoided the simplicity of this crude assertion by giving mind an existence along with matter. He tended, however, to consider mind in abstraction from matter. We must remember that we only know mind in association with matter, and that a special variety of matter, *living* matter.

It is the peculiar merit of Spinoza that he realised the crude dualism involved in Descartes' views, but did not proceed to a simple solution by asserting a "monism" of matter or of mind alone. For Spinoza reality was not to be summed up in Materialism or Idealism, nor in a Dualism referring to both. For him reality was a Unity. His philosophy was monistic, not dualistic. The universe, as he viewed it, was not simply material, but at one and the same time mental in character. We must admit that Spinoza is difficult to follow on the relation of the two attributes, and he must have felt the difficulty of the problem himself. He never flinched, however, from the assertion that mind and matter are not two substances (as in the Cartesian philosophy), but enunciated the view that they are attributes of *one* substance, manifestations of one reality.

There were in the Cartesian system certain assertions arising from the dualistic view of mind and matter, which had certain implications of a kind which Spinoza readily saw. On the view of Descartes there were grave difficulties involved in the treatment of the problem of the precise relation of matter and mind in the case where those two phenomena appeared together. The behaviour of matter alone could be explained simply by a reference to mechanical principles. The outcome of this difficulty was the enunciation of the principle of parallelism. Psycho-physical parallelism is a doctrine which has given rise to considerable discussion and con-

troversy ever since. Descartes' statements appeared crude and fantastically theological. The Occasionalists offered their explanations, again bringing in the Deity as a kind of *deus ex machina* to conceal their ignorance. Leibnitz later hazarded the suggestion of the two clocks keeping the same time independently.

For Spinoza, with his monistic view of mind and matter, the problem does not present itself in the same manner. He has his own peculiar difficulties, however, which arise from his doctrine that there is one fact which we break into two aspects, calling one mental and the other material. This view puts theories of correspondence, parallelism or interaction out of court. However much parallelism has appeared useful as a method of investigation or study, it is most certainly not the final word on the problem of mind and matter. It accepts the difficulty, and leaves it very much where it was in the time of the Cartesians, with the theological references, those refuges of ignorance, deleted. Reality for Spinoza is both material and mental. He is obliged, however, to notice certain points about these two aspects of reality. On the one side we have the thought aspect, on the other the material aspect. We may say we have thought and extension. Below this we can write in a further item, the thought of a thought or consciousness having thought or itself as object, but we cannot carry this out in regard to the material aspect. Any increasing of the items on that side would give us nonsense. There is no sense in the "extension of extension," as there is in "consciousness of consciousness." This reveals a fundamental difference. Thought or consciousness can not only have extension as an object, but can also have thought or consciousness (itself) as its object. Consciousness can be self-conscious, but matter cannot

be self-extended. This leads to the recognition of consciousness as superior to matter in man. Through it he masters body. By adequate ideas he masters passion.

Yet we find Spinoza speaking of mind as equivalent to the idea of body, as if consciousness cannot envisage reality under thought, but only under extension.[1] Nevertheless, by his insistence on the mental and material being aspects of one fact, he considerably advances philosophical thought from the dualism in which Descartes left this problem.

It remains for us to note another line of advance on a metaphysical question beyond Descartes. This is in regard to the problem of motion. In the Cartesian metaphysics motion is a mode or state of matter imparted to matter by God. Empty space was nothing, and matter was, of course, conceived as existing in three dimensions. Spinoza looked on matter, not as a substance, but as an attribute of reality, and he conceived of motion and rest as universals or infinite modes. Descartes began with his *res extensa,* and was unable to get motion introduced save by the hand of God, thus making the Deity serve again as a mere *deus ex machina* in the Cartesian drama. Spinoza made a great advance in science and metaphysics by denying that motion was "put into" immobile matter externally by a creative act of God, and affirming in place of this the doctrine that matter is motion and rest. Here again he purged from philosophical speculation the unnecessary theological impositions of the schoolmen, from which even Descartes, revolutionary as he was, had been unable or unwilling to rid himself.

1. He also refers to an emotion as an idea of a modification of a body. This is passivity of mind, while he shows, as we shall see, that activity of mind produces adequate ideas, and hence control of the emotions.

Tschirnhausen pertinently asked Spinoza how we can deduce the figure and motion of corporeal things from the general conception of extension. For Descartes, as Tschirnhausen says, this difficulty did not exist, for God created matter in motion, but for Spinoza extension is a divine attribute, and lacks the concept of force included in theological form by Descartes, Spinoza agrees that the definition of matter as extension is inadequate, but was unable, owing to illness, to deal further with this interesting point.

The age was an age of geometrical methods, and the view of motion taken by thinkers of that century was from the standpoint of geometry rather than that of physics. That is to say, they conceived of motion rather too simply as change of place. Change, however, implies time, and of this factor Spinoza has very little to say. His material world is summed up in three dimensions. Professor Alexander has shrewdly suggested that Spinoza should have included time as a fourth dimension and as an attribute of the Deity.[1] The importance of the idea of time in metaphysics is, however, a relatively recent development in philosophical thought.[2]

In the history of the development of philosophy Spinoza must be ranked with those who assert with Plato the eternal aspects of the universe. For Spinoza change is but an aspect of reality, a reality which abides. Behind all changes there lies a permanent reality of which change is a manifestation. The main difference between such two contrasting philo-

1. In his published lecture on *Spinoza and Time.* For a discussion of the difficulties bound up with Descartes' view of motion see Kemp Smith's *Studies in Cartesian Philosophy.* See also Alexander's *Space, Time and Deity.*

2. A full discussion of this important problem is contained in the writer's volume *Time: a Philosophical Study.*

sophies as those of Plato among the ancients, and Bergson among the moderns, lies precisely in the attitude adopted to the problems of time and change. These two thinkers represent clearly conflicting points of view on a question which is of vital importance for philosophy. Spinoza has his place on the side of "the Platonists." He begins with the Infinite and Eternal, and not with the things which are temporal and finite, and he returns to look on all things from the standpoint of eternity.

CHAPTER IV.

HUMAN NATURE, PASSIONATE AND RATIONAL.

(*Psychology and Ethics.*) Use of Metaphysical Basis. Passions and inadequate ideas. His scientific and impartial inquiry. The Problem of Freedom. No opposition of Necessity and Freedom. Men not born free. Self-determination the only Freedom. Obedience and morality. Will and Desire. The *Conatus Sese Conservandi.* Good and evil. The emotions, Love and Joy. No asceticism. Suggestion. Altruism and egoism. Hatred. The good a common good. The ultimate good the Intellectual Love of God. Freedom and Immortality. Virtue and Blessedness. Value of Spinoza's psychological analysis.

CHAPTER IV.

HUMAN NATURE, PASSIONATE AND RATIONAL.

(Spinoza's Psychology and Ethics.)

It is one of the features of Spinoza's system that he establishes his psychology and ethics upon his "metaphysical basis," which we have examined in the previous chapter. The doctrine of adequate and inadequate ideas, which we met in his epistemology, appears again in the statement that, in so far as the human mind possesses adequate ideas (that is to say, in so far as it is truly rational), then it is active, but in so far as it has merely inadequate ideas, it is the victim of emotion or passion. We *act* when we ourselves are adequate cause of what we have done. We *suffer* or are affected when anything is done within us, or when anything follows from our nature of which we are only partially the cause. Man's passions are a proof of his dependence upon the rest of the Cosmos. These passions frequently indicate the weakness of human nature when it is unable to master them, and they master it, but nevertheless they display the power of Nature as a whole. They are as "natural" as are generosity, kindness and chastity.

Spinoza is intolerant of those thinkers and preachers "who regard the passions which trouble men as vices into which they fall by their own fault, and are wont, therefore, to laugh at them, to weep over them, to carp

at them, and those who make greater pretensions to piety seek to hold them up to abhorrence.''[1] By satire and depreciation of man, and by atrocious doctrines concerning original sin, they have led men to think meanly of themselves, and so to become mean, and consequently unwilling and unable to raise themselves to the true dignity of their nature. The consideration of the emotions is Spinoza's chief task in approaching the Nature of Man. His method is that of the clinical lecturer or operating surgeon. He strips away the swaddling garments of convention, closes his spirit against sympathy or feeling, and ignores pity as an irrelevance, in order that he may examine without bias what is in man, curious, passionate and rational creature that he is. ''I have laboured carefully,'' we find him saying in the Introduction to his *Tractatus Politicus*[2] ''not to mock, lament or condemn human actions, but to understand them: and to this end I have looked upon passions such as love, hatred, anger, envy, ambition, pity, and the other perturbations of the mind, not in the light of vices of human nature, but as properties just as pertinent to it, as are heat, cold, storm, thunder, and the like, to the nature of the atmosphere, which phenomena, though inconvenient, are yet necessary, and have fixed causes, by means of which we endeavour to understand their nature.'' It is in this spirit that Spinoza commences his psychology of the moral self. His view is akin to that which Taine expressed in his positive and naturalistic manner by remarking that vice and virtue were products just as vitriol or sugar. Taine did, of course, observe and note

1. *Tractatus Politicus I.*, 1.

2. *Tractatus Politicus*, par. 4.

a difference between chemical and moral products, but he pointed out that, just as it is essential to know the chemical elements which compose vitriol if we wish to make it, so, in order to produce in man the hatred of a lie, it is necessary to search for the psychological elements which by their union will produce truthfulness. Such a view did not, for Taine any more than for Spinoza, imply moral indifference.[1] We do not excuse a wicked man because we can find the causes of his evil-doing. The criminal is not less hated as an immoral creature because we are beginning to realise that certain environments are conducive to the production of a criminal class.

Passion, Spinoza maintains, is connected with a confused idea, and he points out that, once we try to form a clear and distinct idea of a passion, it ceases to be a passion, hence a true knowledge of the passions is the best safeguard. To *think* the passions is to overcome them! We are subject to emotions because, being only a part of nature, we encounter circumstances of which we are not the cause. Any emotion can only be adequately and permanently conquered by another emotion stronger than itself, and hence reason and knowledge will only lift us above the fevered sway of passion in so far as that knowledge of the mind or our reason is itself suffused with a noble emotion. He does not consider a merely intellectual ''sublimation'' to be permanently possible or sufficient. Spinoza here prepares us for the climax to which he finally leads us, a consideration of the highest emotion of which he thinks man capable, namely, his *''Amor intellectualis Dei,''* or intellectual love of God.

1. See the discussion of freedom in the author's *Modern French Philosophy*, chap. iv.

The cause of human unhappiness Spinoza finds in the devotion given to objects which cannot satisfy the self as a whole, and in a misconception of freedom. Freedom is not caprice and it is not license. Liberty to obey passion is not freedom, but bondage of the worst sort; when we give free play to our inclinations and lusts we are then miserably enslaved, the more miserably since we, "unconscious of the causes of our actions," think ourselves free. In accordance with the principles laid down in his Metaphysical Basis, Spinoza denies freedom of the will. We are in the bonds of firm necessity or Divine Determination. There is no opposition between freedom and necessity. The opposite of freedom is compulsion, and the opposite of necessity is contingency or chance. In Spinoza's view men are not born free, as Rousseau was to declare with sentimental enthusiasm in the following century, but they may become free. We are never more free than when we are impelled to a thing, because we judge it to be true and good. There is no contradiction in the doctrine that if we act rightly we shall act freely and yet be determined, for we shall be self-determined. Our salvation lies in such self-determination, for only the man who is self-determined can be called free. "I call that free which is determined by itself alone." Thus we avoid license and preserve freedom, not being at the beck and call of every external excitation, desire, passion or temptation.

Freedom being self-determination, the life of freedom and the pursuit of goodness do not involve us in a life of obedience to commands, as that implies subjection to something alien to ourselves. Popular theology holds this view of reward and punishment after death for obedience or disobedience of commands, and fears that if there were no such punishment, or, rather, no fear of

such punishment, the yoke of morality would be cast off by many. This, he says, is absurd. Certainly it is not moral, for in so far as we are rational, we cannot seek what is good through fear of what is bad, but rather we avoid the bad because we find in the good a realisation of our nature. Morality is thus self-realisation in the highest sense, rather than obedience, at least to anything outside us. If there is any obedience it is to oneself, that is, to the dictates of one's own reason or conscience, or to God, in so far as He expresses or reveals Himself in and through our own mind.

"To thine own self be true"

is the only obedience demanded.

There is no such thing, Spinoza maintains, as an absolute faculty of willing. Will extends beyond intellect, but only if by intellect we mean our clear and distinct ideas. It does not extend beyond conceptual power. Further, there is no distinction between will and desire, volition and conation. The reasons for this are, in the first place, that Spinoza is opposed to the division of human nature into abstract "faculties," and, secondly, that he denies any faculty of will, while maintaining particular volitions which he regards as merely desires in which the mind realises itself. For him all longings, desires, volitions, are essentially the same, namely, manifestations of the innate and divine impulse to fuller self-realisation.

One of Spinoza's fundamental principles is that of the "*conatus se conservandi.*" Modern readers must be cautioned against seeing in this more than is meant, and warned against reading into it forecasts of Darwinian phraseology. It is simply the endeavour of each individual thing to maintain its existence merely by per-

sisting in being what it is. For example, in the physical world a material object in motion or at rest expresses its *conatus se conservandi* by resisting and reacting upon whatever would tend to change its state of motion or rest. In man the principle expresses itself in an impulse to the realisation of all human nature's powers, in a "will to live," and man is unique in that he alone is conscious of the possession of the *conatus*. It is the fundamental principle of all life, and life involves appetite; but appetite, when it is accompanied by consciousness, is desire. This is important, because what we desire determines our notion of what we call good, for we deem a thing good simply because we desire it; we do not desire a thing because we think it good. What is good, then, is what is desirable and useful to us. Evil is what we know hinders us from attaining the good. He wisely points out that a good thing which hinders us from attaining a greater good is to be regarded as evil. Whatever adds to our power of activity, of body or of mind, is pleasure-giving, but whatever does the reverse is painful. From these psychological data, desire, pleasure and pain, Spinoza deduces a catalogue of the gamut of the emotions which is one of his finest performances. No more comprehensive and analytic study of the emotions was made until Ribot devoted himself to the task in the later part of the nineteenth century.[1] Joy Spinoza regards as the pleasurable emotion accompanying a passage to greater perfection, while sorrow (or pain) arises when the reverse takes place. Love, he says, is joy accompanied by the idea of an external cause, while hatred is sorrow accompanied by the idea of an external cause. Love is not a primary effect, but

1. Cf. *Ribot and His Contribution to Psychology.* Article by the writer in *The Monist,* Jan., 1924.

is the consequence of attainment of greater perfection through contact with another being—the realising of oneself in and through an "alter ego." This is another statement which we shall see more fully amplified later in the "*Amor intellectualis Dei.*"

Spinoza did not regard the "good life" as one of asceticism. "It is the duty of a wise man to make use of things, and to get as much enjoyment from them as he can (not, indeed, to enjoy them *ad nauseam,* for this would not be enjoyment of them). It is the duty of the wise man to refresh and recreate himself with moderate and pleasant food and drink, with the sweet smells and attractions of growing plants, with ornamentation, music, games, plays of the theatre, and of other things of this kind of which anyone can make use without doing harm to another."[1]

He knew the power of suggestion. "He who desires to assist other people . . . will avoid in common conversation referring to the vices of men, and will take care only sparingly to speak of human impotence, while he will talk largely of human virtue or power, so that men, being moved, not by fear or aversion, but solely by the effect of joy, may endeavour as much as they can to live under the rule of reason." The above remark recalls Paul's similar injunction with regard to auto-suggestion. "Whatsoever things are honourable, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report, think on these things."

Each individual must necessarily and rightly seek his own preservation, interest and advancement. Power to do this is identical with virtue. This sounds like

1. *Ethics,* Book iv., Sch. 45.

unalloyed egoism. But his own interest is not along the path of selfishness, for nothing is more useful to man than his fellow-men, and he is always in need of the co-operation of his fellows, hence the individual can only achieve his true well-being in a community of individuals co-operating in social efforts. This is the *raison d'être* of the State or Commonwealth, and the good of man is essentially a common good. The reasonable man will desire nothing for himself which he does not equally desire for his fellows, and he will therefore strive to maintain whatsoever is just, faithful and honourable. Further development of this point will be seen in a later chapter dealing with political ideas.

Meanwhile we note that Spinoza insists that the good is a "common good," no merely individualistic ethic will do. Yet there is really no question of altruism *versus* egoism. The contrast between my good and that of others is irrelevant and meaningless. I cannot desire anything other than my own good, and I cannot desire the good of others unless I judge it to be my good. The good is essentially a common good. A disinterested devotion to the good of others, as opposed to a devotion to our own, Spinoza regards as an illusory idea, fatal to the others as well as to ourselves. No one is so useful to other men as he who knows his own advantage and seeks it. The welfare of "others" can only be secured when each man does his best. Social unrest is not due to the fact that each man is seeking what is best for himself, and is neglecting the claims of others, but rather because the individuals concerned do not know what is good. Human beings cannot unite in the peace and concord of a social order or commonwealth if they are victims of passion. Men are social in so far as they are rational, and their sociality is in proportion to the

insight they have into their common good. The hatred which leads us necessarily to destroy what we hate can never be good if the object of the hatred is another man, for to hate and seek to destroy a human being is at once to aim at his impotence, and we therefore are seeking to deprive ourselves and our fellows of the power or "virtue" which he, as well as ourselves, enjoys as part of the cosmos, and as expressing God in a particular manner by his personality. Thus Spinoza endeavours to bring out the essential solidarity of men in the light of their moral nature, and to emphasise the fact that they cannot unite through passion, but only through reason.

The free man, that is, the truly rational, self-determined man, knows what is good and bad for both himself and his fellow-men, and is guided by reason to esteem truth, honour and justice in the advancement of the common good. In so far as he does this he can repeat the words of Horace,

Non omnis moriar.

His mind is at one with the Eternal, and to this extent partakes of eternal life. But reason, it was previously stated, dominates some passions, only because it calls into play nobler ones, for only a passion can adequately and permanently subdue another passion, and of these passions or emotions the greatest is joy. When a man is rational, that is to say, has clear and distinct ideas of his passions, thus changing them from mere animal excitements, and making them virtuous by proceeding from reason, he rejoices in his knowledge, and, as all knowledge of ourselves and the universe is knowledge of God, his joy is accompanied by the idea of God. Now, it was previously stated that joy, accompanied by

the idea of its cause, is or gives rise to love. This love of God to which Spinoza finally brings his discussion of human nature is based on the Socratic maxim, "Know thyself," and upon a knowledge *de Rerum Natura,* of the universe, and man's relation to it. It is a synthesis of feeling and intellect which he styles *Amor intellectualis Dei,* the intellectual love of God, and it is an emotion which must fill the mind pre-eminently, and is superior to all others.

Finally, virtue is not bondage, but true liberty and freedom, involving, as it does, self-determination and control of passions and lusts; moreover, it is its own reward. Beatitude is not the reward of virtue, but is virtue itself. The only punishment of the wicked lies in their wickedness of mind, and the condemnation of fools is their folly. He points out in the *Short Treatise on God, Man and his Well-being* it is not the case, as is commonly represented, that we must first subdue our passions before we can attain to the ideal of the rational man, and thereby to the love of God. This would be like saying that a man who is ignorant must first get rid of his ignorance before he can attain to knowledge." In the 42nd Proposition of the Fifth Book of the *Ethics* he remarks: "The more the mind finds its joy in this divine love or blessedness, the more does it understand, that is, the more power does it have over the emotions, and the less does it suffer from emotions which are bad, and so it has the power to restrain the passions. Because man's power for restraining his emotions consists in his intelligence alone, no one therefore finds joy in blessedness, because he has restrained his emotions, but, on the contrary, the power of restraining the passions springs from blessedness itself."

In the psychology upon which Spinoza bases his

ethical considerations, it will be seen that he avoids the fallacious attitude of the Stoics. They had, like him, spoken much concerning human passion, and had lamented deeply its sway over human life. Their error, which was a fundamental one, lay in their opposing reason to passion absolutely. Spinoza, with deeper and truer psychological penetration, insists that reason must not be divorced from the passions. It must not turn away from them, it must endeavour to understand them. Following him, we should be able to distinguish between a healthy, constructive, emotional outburst and an insane, destructive, emotional wave. In an age as keenly emotional as the present these sayings of Spinoza have not lost, but rather gained, in significance. To-day, such is the sensationalist pitch to which so-called civilised peoples have been brought, that suggestion plays upon the emotional cords of human nature to an extent which would have caused Spinoza to shudder. Passion and crude demonstrations of herd-instincts and mob mentality do but show the workings of that passive emotion of which Spinoza spoke so warningly. They proceed, as he told us, from inadequate ideas, from deficient education, or a training which has been misapplied, and has failed in its functions. Such passive emotion is always dangerous, destructive and disastrous. If our modern democratic communities are to be saved from disaster, then we must bestir ourselves, as Spinoza shows, to remove the obstacles to adequate ideas. We must seek salvation by education, by replacing inadequate ideas by ones which are adequate and true. These ideas will then show themselves to be real forces in the social order. Spinoza, in his concern for the welfare of mankind, politically and socially, does not, it should

be noted, encourage us to look for hope in social programmes for social improvement. He knows that these, although highly important, are in a sense secondary; they will come, provided that a different mental outlook can be obtained in men themselves. Ideas will be the real and permanent forces in changing the social order. The main and primary improvement must be mental. Economic and political programmes will not alone soothe the radical ills of human society. They may endeavour to relieve it, to purge it, but communal health can only be based upon that activity of mind which, coming from an education based on and fostering adequate ideas, produces emotional *control* in the individual and in society.

CHAPTER V.

LIBERTY, RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL.

Spinoza's intolerant age. Experience of Locke. Fanaticism of the clergy. Bibliolatry. Spinoza takes up line of "Direct Action." Biblical criticism. His aims. Lays the foundation of modern Rationalist views. Plea for Humanism and deliverance from the letter. Prophecy. Miracles. God and the Operations of Nature. The Real Religion of the Bible. The prophets. True piety. The doctrines of faith. Religious faith and philosophy. Religious quarrels. Toleration, freedom of thought and speech necessary for the good of the Commonwealth.

CHAPTER V.

LIBERTY, RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL.

Before passing on to examine Spinoza's views upon the nature of the Commonwealth or State, some mention must be made regarding the significance of his work in the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus,* for the writing of which he laid aside his *Ethics.* His motives for so doing have already been mentioned.

It is worth while to note that Locke, his English contemporary, was occupied with the same question. Locke published his *Epistola de Toleranta* in 1685, eight years after Spinoza's death, but both works were translated into English in the same year, 1689, which was the year following the English Revolution. Locke's Latin and English versions were both anonymous, and so, of course, was the work of Spinoza. In neither case was the fact of their authorship kept as a secret. Although Locke did not publish his *Epistola* until 1685, his papers show drafts of it as early as 1660. He was experiencing similar feelings on the matter to those prompted in the mind of Spinoza. Both men were of the same age, and in Holland and England alike religious fanaticism and intolerance were threatening the civil order. We have remarked in our first chapter on the intolerance in Holland (to which country, be it remembered, Descartes had come from France, as to a haven of refuge). In England Locke grew impatient and angry at the intolerance of the Puritans, particularly the Calvinistic clergy. His hopes of improvement

after the Restoration were doomed to disappointment, no better state of things followed. Hence his letter on Toleration.

Similarly, Spinoza, in an intolerant age, wished to work out a political theory, having toleration and "freedom of philosophising" as its basis. The full title of the work reads—to quote an early English translation—"A Treatise, partly theological, partly political, in which are set forth certain discussions to show that freedom of thought and speech not only may, without prejudice to piety and the public peace, be granted; but also may not, without danger to the same, be withheld." The bibliolatry of the Calvinistic clergy and their adherents necessitated his approaching such political problems through the domain of theology, more particularly that of Biblical criticism.

In approaching the Bible, Spinoza was prepared to profess to take Scripture as it stood, and from its own witness to show that it could not bear many of the orthodox opinions held regarding it at that time. He is not attempting to criticise the Bible from a general historical, or from a philosophical, standpoint. We must observe that he starts with an hypothesis, and does not tell us absolutely what he himself thinks of the Bible. In effect, he says to his readers: "I shall leave aside my own personal views on the matter, and I shall not argue on philosophical grounds, but merely from your own premises, and shall show that your interpretations of it are absurd, and your habit of asserting a rigid belief in the letter is inconsistent with the whole tone of Scripture itself." His own view was too advanced to find acceptance in the day in which he wrote. In his own mind he undoubtedly viewed the Bible reasonably as a vast collection of miscellaneous documents,

many of them quite disparate and not at all harmonised with others, documents of history, books of religious poetry and exhortation, of unequal value and varying applicability.

It is Spinoza's merit that he anticipated the whole trend of the modern rational criticism of the Bible; indeed, he gave such considerable impetus to that movement that he may with some justice be deemed the founder of it. This is not the place to enter into any elaborate discussion showing the details of Spinoza's criticisms. Even when they appear to us mild and obvious, they were intensely suggestive to the men of his day, and, indeed, revolutionary. Nineteen years before this Hobbes had thought he was taking a great step in criticism by remarking, in his *Leviathan,* that "the Pentateuch seems to be written rather about Moses than by Moses."[1] Much more definitely Spinoza asserts that the Pentateuch could not have been written by Moses, for it includes an account of Moses' own death. He then examines the so-called miracles of the Old Testament, and attempts their explanation by referring them to purely natural occurrences. We find Spinoza soundly opposed to that bibliolatry which has done so much to mar the cause of just and pure religion, and which at times is as manifestly absurd as it is mischievous, e.g., the spirit of literal verbal inspiration, coupled with the snatching of isolated passages from various parts of Scripture, to the utter neglect of context, and circumstances of utterance. This is the pernicious spirit which reads into a glorious love-poem like that known as *The Song of Solomon,* absurd and far-fetched references to Christ and His church, thus depriving the book of its entire meaning, significance

1. *Leviathan,* chapter 37. On Miracles.

and beauty, while at the same time placing the New and the Old Testaments on the same moral basis, ignoring all context, references and qualifications, it urges the modern Englishman to go and sell all his goods to the poor, or quotes to him the injunction, "Be fruitful and multiply!" Portions of his *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* were actually made use of in England, being circulated in pamphlet form in the interests of rationalist propaganda against the upholders of "verbal inspiration." This view of the Bible has been the main vice in the Protestant churches. Belief in an infallible church was replaced by belief in an infallible book. Lessing on one occasion remarked, "O Luther, thou hast delivered us from the bondage of the Papacy; who will deliver us from the slavery of the letter!"

Spinoza insists on the essential humanism of the Bible; we must read it as a book written by men who were writing for men. The writers were not omniscient, nor perfect, and not free from the prejudices of those for whom they wrote. The Bible is literature and not dogma, to quote Matthew Arnold's phrase. Each verse must be interpreted as any other literature would be taken, with reference to context and historical connection. The various books must be studied separately and with reference to their time of composition. Competent historical and literary criticism is needed, not futile harmonising of contradictory passages written with centuries between, with different ideas of the Deity, and of religion and morality in the minds of the writers.

Prophecy is merely imagination, and is truthful only when, by clearness of perception and an insight into the heart of things, it divines the tendency of events, or perceives the principles of right or profitable action. What God promises to a people is what they covet, and are able

to attain for themselves. "The Jews," he says, "if they make money by a transaction, say God gave it to them; if they desire anything, they say God has disposed their hearts towards it; and if they think anything, they say God told them." The spirit of God is the spirit of genius in man. To say that the mind of God was revealed to Moses, or the prophets, or Christ, is not more than saying that the spirit of music was revealed in Beethoven, or the spirit of poetry in Dante. "I say," asserts Spinoza, "it is not in the least needful for salvation to know Christ according to the flesh, but concerning that Eternal Son of God, of which philosophers have spoken, that is, God's eternal wisdom, which is manifested in all things, and chiefly in the mind of man, and most particularly in Christ Jesus, the case is far otherwise. For without this no man can arrive at a state of blessedness, inasmuch as nothing else can teach him what is true or false, what is good or evil." For Spinoza, Christ is not a synonym for the historic Jesus; it is a name for the Divine Wisdom or Logos, which is "the light that lighteneth every man that cometh into the world;" it is the soul of all religion, and is the true Saviour of mankind. "As for the proposition added by sundry churches, that God Himself took on the nature of man, I have distinctly stated that I know not what they mean. To speak plainly, they seem to me to speak as improperly as if one should tell me that a circle had assumed the nature of a square."[1]

Miracles are to be looked upon rationally as happenings, the immediate causes of which we do not know. The popular idea of miracles he attacks as conclusively as did Hume at a later date. The popular division of natural and supernatural he shows to be shallow and

1. *Epistle to Oldenburg*, No. 73.

appears as the true descendant of the prophets of old, Amos, Hosea and Micah, in their scorn of the popular religion, a mere matter of ritual, and their insistence on the essence of religion as based on justice and love, as involving character and social service, resting upon a humble walk with God. The religious view of the universe, and the philosophical view appeal to two different types of mind, or, rather, to minds at different stages of development or enlightenment, and, consequently, each must lead in its own way to "salvation," for that "salvation" depends, not on correct opinions, but in the moral value of the life lived. "It follows," he then remarks, "that faith does not require opinions that are in themselves true, but such only as shall best incline a man's heart to obedience." To this end, he says, there must be taught doctrines of a universal faith, which can reasonably be regarded as of social necessity for the maintenance among the populace of a common good. These doctrines he enumerates. "First, that there is a God or Supreme Being, who is most just and merciful, by whose example every man ought to regulate his life; secondly, that this God is One, which opinion is absolutely necessary to make a man adore, admire and love God—for devotion, admiration and love are caused by that excellency which is in one above all others; thirdly, that He is everywhere present, or that all things are known to Him, for if anything were hidden from Him, or if men did not think that He seeth all things, we might doubt of His equity and justice whereby He governeth all things; fourthly, that He hath supreme power and dominion over all things, that He doth nothing by compulsion, but of His own good will and pleasure; fifthly, that the worship of God and obedience to Him consist only in justice and charity

towards our neighbours; sixthly, that only they who obey God by such a course of life will be saved; and others who are slaves to their lusts and pleasures will be condemned; lastly, that God pardoneth the sins of those that repent, because there is no man living without sin; therefore, if this were not an article of faith, all would despair of salvation." Now, it is perfectly obvious that these are not statements with which Spinoza, *qua* philosopher, would agree. They are not his own opinions at all. He speaks here *qua* politician, and is considering, given human nature as it is in the popular unenlightened mind, what are the precepts of religion, or necessary beliefs which are guarantees of civil order. Religion is here performing the dangerous duty of being an upholder of the civil order of society.[1]

Spinoza is now reaching his goal, and makes clearer the aim of his whole work, the defence of freedom of thought and speech. The reasons for his writing the *Tractatus* were fundamentally ethical and political reasons. It may seem a quaint development to come to the arena of politics through the field of biblical criticism, but no other course was open to Spinoza, in view of the dogmatic and tyrannical attitude adopted by the theological politicians of his day. "It follows," he remarks, "even from the words of Scripture that they are anti-Christs, who persecute the opinions of the just men who differ from them in opinion, and do not maintain their doctrines. They that love justice and charity are thereby only found to be believers, and whoever persecutes such believers is anti-Christ."

1. It is useful to note here that Locke argued like Spinoza for the principle of non-interference of the civil power in religion, and showed the folly of such interference. Locke, however, desired one church to embrace all sects, and he denied the application of his tolerant principles to atheists or Catholics, as these were both, in his opinion, enemies of the State,—the latter because they acknowledge a temporal authority other than and external to the State.

These remarks were called forth by the very intolerant and unchristian happenings in religious circles in Holland. Such epithets as "Anti-Christ" had already been used regarding Spinoza himself before the publication of his *Treatise;* afterwards, of course, stronger words were used to describe him. Moreover, these practices were rife between parties themselves. Spinoza was disgusted at the religious warfare of the period, and at the intolerance of the Remonstrant Controversy, when the Calvinists turned out the Arminians. "How these Christians love one another!" He wishes to commend a spirit of toleration, both to civil governments and to religious sects themselves, based on the combined authority of Scripture and of reason. The Bible itself, which they so fanatically and glibly, yet ignorantly, quote, really urges toleration, since it commands us to loving-kindness, peace and forgiveness of our enemies. Moreover, as religious fanaticism is dangerous to the whole fabric of civil society, toleration, then, is in the interests of the commonwealth. These liberal views Spinoza advocates with remarkable force and insight. "What greater misfortune for a state can be conceived than that honourable men should be sent like criminals into exile, because they hold diverse opinions which they cannot disguise? What I say can be more hurtful than that men who have committed no crime or wickedness should, simply because they are enlightened, be treated as enemies, and put to death, and that the scaffold, the terror of evil-doers, should become the stage where the highest examples of tolerance and virtue are displayed to the people with all the marks of ignominy that authority can devise."[1] "If acts only," he says in his Preface, "could be made

1. *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus,* chapter 20.

the ground of criminal prosecutions, and words were always allowed to pass free, sedition would be divested of every semblance of justification," and would be separated from mere controversies by a hard and fast line. "Schisms proceed, not from the study of truth, that fountain of meekness and moderation, but from an imperious humour of prescribing to others, and therefore they are rather to be accounted schismatics who damn other men's writings and stir up the waspish multitude against them than those that write to learned men, and call nothing but reason to their aid, for they are truly disturbers of public peace, who in a free commonwealth would take away the liberty of men's judgment, which ought not to be suppressed." A commonwealth's greatest safety is to place religion and piety in the practice of justice and charity, and to make things sacred as much subject to the supreme power as things civil, and to take notice of nothing but men's actions, allowing every man to think what he will and speak what he thinks.

CHAPTER VI.

THE COMMONWEALTH.

(*Spinoza's Sociology and Politics.*) Co-operation of men. Spinoza under-estimates difficulties. Positive view. Men not rational or social, but only in process of becoming so. The State necessary for this reason. The morality of coercion. The State of Nature. *Jus Naturae.* Co-operation again. Spinoza and Hobbes. The doctrine of absolutism. Spinoza does not repeat Hobbes for us. Differs very considerably. The power of the State. How and why limited. Free thought. General Will, not force, the basis. Law and Order v. Revolution. The price of Revolution. Peace is not absence of war. Kinds of Government. Is the State an end in itself? States in a state of nature or war between themselves. Suggested development of Spinoza's thought. A League of Nations. The State to promote true freedom.

CHAPTER VI.

THE COMMONWEALTH.

(Spinoza's Sociology and Politics.)

Spinoza founds his political theory upon ideas which have already been referred to in the chapter dealing with human nature. "The good is essentially a common good." "Nothing is more useful to man than his fellow-men"—not tools or domestic animals, but his fellow-men. On the notion of co-operation, as essential to the pursuit of the good, Spinoza rests his social ethics. "Men are united by their need of one another." "The commonwealth is of the highest utility, not only for securing one's life against enemies, but also for making the accomplishment of many things easier. Indeed, it is in the highest degree necessary. For unless men are willing to afford one another assistance, both the skill and the time required for supplying their needs and for preserving themselves would be wanting to them. For all men are not equally well fitted for everything; nor would any man be sufficient to himself for securing those things of which even a man in solitude has the utmost need. The strength and the time would, I say, be wanting to any one man if he had to do his own ploughing, sowing, reaping, etc., and all the manifold things which the sustenance of our life requires."[1] "Men would, without mutual help, necessarily spend

1. *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, chapter 5.

their lives in the utmost wretchedness and without the development of reason."[1]

In his political philosophy, Spinoza appears more markedly as a child of his time than in the other branches of his thought. For example, it is clear that he under-estimated very considerably the complex difficulties of political life and thought. His, however, was an age which regarded knowledge as much less complex than we do, because they deemed all knowledge capable of simple and almost mathematical formulation. Moreover, he held that no new experiment of any consequence in political operations remained untried; the multitude of types of existing constitutions seems to have assured him that all varieties of government had already been exhausted in experiment!

Just as he endeavoured in his study of human nature to view it exactly as it is, positively, rather than normatively, similarly, in his study of the nature of the Commonwealth, he assures us that he bases his thought, not upon ideal men in an ideal form of society, but upon the average human "raw material" in the world as it is, material which is not at all likely to be amenable to the dictates of reason under all circumstances, and at all times. On the contrary, if all human beings were perfectly reasonable, there would be no *raison d'être* for the State at all. While some argue that the State is a proof that man is a social being, we must remember that it likewise is a proof of the very opposite. If men were naturally social there would be no State, and if they ever become completely "socialised," then the State would be no longer. In the one case it would never have to be born, and in the other it would have ceased

1. *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, chapter 16. (Cf. Hobbes' remark, "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.")

to be needed. "If human nature," he says, "had been so fashioned that men most desired that which is for their welfare, no devices would be required for making men live in harmony and trust; but, as it is evident that human nature has been constituted in a very different way, the State should necessarily be arranged that all, rulers as well as ruled, may, *nolens volens*, do what the common welfare demands."[1]

A State or Commonwealth is a society living under laws which define and maintain against aggression certain specific rights belonging to individuals as members of the whole, or to the society itself as a whole. The maintenance of such rights by law is the duty of the State. Now, the law with its attached penalties for infringement is an ever-present reminder that some men will not do the right and just thing unless there is some such negative inducement; indeed, more, it is a reminder that no man is perfect, and, consequently, no man can be absolutely trusted to do the right thing at all times and under all circumstances. The very existence of the State and its laws is sufficient evidence that men are *not* altogether social, but are only now *in process of becoming so.* Of course, it is preferable that men should will the good act for its own sake, and not merely avoid the bad act because death, imprisonment, or a fine is attached to the doing of it. The end of the State is to make men free, that is, rational. The force which the State uses to coerce the disobedient would lose its moral sanction, were all men now morally perfect, but not until that consummation arrives. In itself force is simply non-moral, not immoral. It has moral value just in so far as it subserves a moral purpose, as it does when wielded by the Commonwealth

1. *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, chapter 6.

for the maintenance of civil order and the furtherance of the good life.[1]

There was a pre-civil stage which was social, although not civil. This was "the State of Nature, in which everyone lives as he lists, but in great peril of his life."[2] "In the *status naturalis* each man is his own master so long as he is able to guard against oppression by another. But it will be in vain for a single man to endeavour to protect himself against all. Hence, so long as human natural Right is determined by the power of each man, and belongs to each, so long will there be none at all. It will exist rather in theory than in fact, seeing that there is no security for maintaining it."[3] It is owing to this lack of security, a condition in which everybody stands to lose, that men come to desire the *status civilis,* to unite together, seeing that from the common social life of men many more advantages than disadvantages arise. "If two men agree together, and unite their forces, they have, together, more power, and consequently more right, over nature than either has alone, and the more men there are who are thus united by their need of one another, the more right will they have as one body."[4]

The Civil Order or Commonwealth is, Spinoza maintains, the conscious and deliberate creation of man's thought and endeavour. It came into being because of the essential need of co-operation, because men recognised that by having settled customs and laws, which would be equally binding on all, each of them would

1. See note in Bibliography on interesting new manuscript of Spinoza's *Tractatus Bellico-Pacificus,* wherein he maintains that, human nature being what it is, peace can only be maintained by force.

2. *Tractatus Politicus,* chapter 5, par. 2.

3. *Tractatus Politicus,* chapter 2, par. 15.

4. *Tractatus Politicus,* chapter 2, par. 13.

gain more than he could possibly lose. The individual, therefore, resigns his *Jus Naturæ* in favour of a ruling power, which has likewise at its disposal the *Jus Naturæ* of all other individuals in the community. All right which he may now enjoy is that which the community allows him. He is no longer a law to himself, and has no rights against the State, but is to guide his conduct, not by his own personal will, but by what the general will judges best for all, and therefore for him too.

It is very frequently stated that Spinoza's theory of the State is merely a repetition of that set forth by his English contemporary, Hobbes, whose famous *Leviathan* was published in 1651. "Hobbism" is the gospel of "state absolutism," and is the most logical statement of that doctrine which has been made. Now, Spinoza, it is true, owes much to Hobbes, although he only mentions him in a letter and in a note to chapter sixteen of the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus,* but he is far from being a disciple of the English thinker, and parts company from him on several occasions. So far from his theory of the State being merely a replica of that of Hobbes, it begins to appear, when examined, to be of a distinctly different colour. The points upon which he differs from Hobbes cannot be regarded as minor ones. For both thinkers the State may be said to be absolute, but the sense in which the word is understood is not the same in the two cases.

In the sixteenth chapter of the Treatise (*Theologico-Politicus*) Spinoza lays down the theory of absolute sovereignty based on a concurrent cession of individual rights. He does not even make the single reservation in this respect which Hobbes stipulated, namely, the inalienable right to personal defence. This at first glance gives his thought an air of being more absolute

than that of Hobbes himself. This, however, is not really the case, for in the following chapter Spinoza points out very explicitly that, although such an absolutism follows *logically* from the transference of *Jus Naturæ,* and from the transition from the *Status Naturalis* to the *Status Civilis,* yet such absolutism is only, and can only be, theoretical—in practice it cannot be maintained. Now, his reasons for this, his *practical* qualification of the theoretical absolutism, are the most vital and illuminating points in his political thought. His chief reason is that the right of any government over those whom it governs is strictly determined by *the power* which that government possesses of commanding the obedience of its subjects. To many, such a statement seems the essence of "Prussianism." But the whole position here turns on how we define "power." No man, says Spinoza, can ever put himself body and soul at the disposal of another. Therefore, there are some things inalienable from the individual, which can never be transferred by him to any government. This sets limits to State absolutism of a most important kind. There are some things which the State with all its "power" cannot do, cannot in the sense of "is not able," owing to the nature of the things themselves. The restriction is not external, it is rather a restriction from within. In the former chapter we dealt with Spinoza's defence of religious toleration and of freedom of thought and speech. Over these the State has no "right," simply because it has really no "power." A government cannot force its subjects to think as it may wish them to do, for they are not machines; they have minds and wills of their own, demanding self-expression, and not entirely amenable to coercion. Just because of this the mightiest governments have stood

sometimes in fear of their subjects. Spinoza realises that there is continually an internal struggle going on, either openly or secretly, or both openly and secretly, in all States for increased authority by the governors, and for increased liberty by the governed. The basis of the State is therefore in the last resort a general will, not merely force, for it rests ultimately upon the consent of the governed. They may, of course, obey from various motives—hope or fear, or various compounds of both—but that does not alter the fact of their obedience. The obedience, however, need not be merely the outcome of force or threats of force. In fact, Spinoza maintains strongly that the more force, the more punishment of offenders, which goes on in a State, the less powerful it is—not the more powerful. He does not regard a show of brute force as a show of power; it is rather a show of weakness, of failure in the State. He is well aware that "confidence in the government" will do more in a crisis than a display of tanks in the streets, or gunboats in the harbours. When, therefore, Spinoza equates the "rights" of a State over its subjects as equal to its "power" over them, we must remember that "power" means infinitely more than physical force, including, as it does, the mental power of will. "The ruler," he remarks, "who has most dominion, is he that reigns over his subjects' minds." But this he can only do if they of their own will give him their confidence. He cannot force them to think as he does. "A man's power of free judgment cannot be transferred to another." At the same time, although governments cannot do much to influence the minds of their subjects, and control their thoughts or feelings in any direct way, he points out that much can be done indirectly. Were he alive to-day he would find his

statement more applicable than in his own time, the influence of the press, national education, and, at times, direct propaganda, being used by governments to influence the minds of their citizens.

The strength of the State, then, depends upon the loyal will of its citizens, and hence, on the rational and unifying element in its government. "Such matters are not within the right of the State as excite a general opposition." The loyalty may depend on the fear of the State's sanction, or on the love of law and order which is the chief motive for obedience in the mind of the average citizen. And here Spinoza would say that the average citizen was very wise. Civil war, and revolution, are evils to be avoided. There are, of course, some things which men cannot, and should not, tolerate. Under these circumstances revolution is inevitable. The blame for it he lays, however, on the heads of the rulers who risk political suicide by raising hate and indignation, or both, against their acts. "Such deeds turn fear into indignation, and the state of civil society into a state of war." But Spinoza would have us be clear as to the price of revolution. It involves the destruction of civil society, a return to the state of nature, when everyone is outside the sway or protection of law. To the remark of hotheads that objections to revolution arise from mere quietism, sluggishness and indifference, and a desire for "peace at any price," Spinoza has replies ready.

Law and order are in themselves valuable, for they are means by which we are able to live a good life. Reason exhorts us to maintain them, for the advantages of living as a citizen in a State utterly outweigh in his opinion any individual hardship which may arise from obedience to a law deemed by our own will and con-

science to be unjust or pernicious. At the same time he urges all citizens to do their utmost to amend laws they feel unjust, and to promote just legislation by every peaceable means in their power. He even urges the sovereign power itself to alter the fundamental laws of the commonwealth if this will better things, and if it can be done without a revolution or in order to avoid one. He would support in these days a Labour Party in Parliament, and an intelligent use of the vote, while condemning revolutionary politics. But he does not wish his objections to revolution to be made into an apology for despotism or absolutism. Revolutions may sometimes be necessary if the State urges intolerable or inhuman acts upon its citizens. The recurrence of riot, tumult, discord and law-breaking is the fault of the institutions of the State, its organisation and social system, rather than of particular offenders or bodies of agitators. The primary object of the State is the ensurance of peace and protection to its citizens. Any State which promotes internal trouble by intolerable laws or a mischievous social system is heading to suicide by asking for revolution. Spinoza is no State-absolutist nor "peace-at-any-price" man. By peace he means cheerful acceptance of a righteous social order as just, and not a mere submission which is coercive. "That commonwealth," he says in his unfinished book,[1] "whose peace depends on the sluggishness of its subjects, that are led about like sheep, to learn but slavery, may more properly be called a desert than a commonwealth. When, then, we call that dominion best, where men pass their lives in unity, I understand a human life, defined, not by mere circulation of the blood, and other qualities common to all animals, but, above all, by reason, the

1. *Tractatus Politicus*, chapter 5, par. 4 and 5.

true excellence and life of the mind." "A commonwealth, whose subjects rise not in arms because they are overcome by terror, is rather to be spoken of as being without war than as enjoying peace. For peace is not mere absence of war, but an excellence proceeding from nobleness of mind."

Spinoza is somewhat sceptical of the success of a revolution, even when it has been carried out. This is largely due to lack of stability and power to maintain itself. He had examples of revolution at hand, in contemporary history, of which England was the most notable example. In 1649 he heard the tidings of the English revolt against their king and of his execution, of the establishment of a Republican Protectorate under Cromwell. Three years later came the revolt in his own country against the De Witt brothers, and their tragic end, in a manner less dignified than that of King Charles of England. This was followed by the rule of William of Orange. But Spinoza saw the English Protectorate fail to maintain itself, and the consequent restoration of the Monarchy in 1660. He did not, however, live to see the English Revolution of 1688, when his own sovereign, William of Orange,[1] swept into still greater power on the tide of a second revolution.

Spinoza's theory of the State effected just those improvements upon Hobbes' views which were necessary, and the qualifications made to absolutism are so vital as to rob Spinoza's *Politik* of the "Prussianism" which characterises Hobbes. Moreover, while Hobbes is distinctly an advocate of Monarchy, Spinoza points out that "It makes for slavery—not peace—to deliver all power to one man." He gives an examination of the

1. William married Mary, daughter of James II., in the year of Spinoza's death.

various forms of government, monarchy, artistocracy and democracy, in his unfinished *Tractatus Politicus*. He favoured a democracy in principle, but felt that in practice it might not be sufficiently enlightened, and that an aristocracy is preferable. Government by the "best" men is the ideal form of government, but no infallible means of discovering, or, indeed, defining, the best men has been arrived at. Consequently, each nation must work out its own political salvation in the form best suited to its own character and practical needs. His aim is not to set aristocracy in comparison with democracy; his endeavour is to give us general principles applicable to either kind of State.

One question remains: "Can the State do wrong?" Spinoza replies that this depends on what we mean by wrong. A government cannot sin against civil law (which is its own making), but it may sin against natural law. The State is no Absolute beyond good or evil or moral values. It is not an end in itself; it is a means to human well-being, a servant of "The Good." In so far as it promotes the good life it serves its end and justifies its existence; in so far as it does not do this it fails in its vocation and works out its own ruin.

When Spinoza remarks that the State does wrong if it urges its citizens to do what is contrary to human nature, this is surely admitting that there is the conception of humanity as an ideal above the State, whether such a conception have any embodiment or not, in the rulings of International Tribunals or in the articles of International Law, as laid down and enforced by a League of Nations. Indeed, it is the need for the embodiment and enforcement of International Law by such a League which Spinoza's own statements dimly foreshadow. For when we turn, after his description of

the State itself, to ask what are the relations of States themselves to one another, we find ourselves back to the State of War. "They are of the type of individuals in the state of nature, i.e., of war." "Freedom and strength of mind are virtues in private men, but the virtue of governments is safety." The discrepancy is a large one, and seems the more striking after Spinoza's excellent exposition of the State as based on co-operation in a common good. He says that between States there is always war, or at least what H. G. Wells has styled "war smouldering." Peace is by consent, but the obligation of treaties lasts only for the duration of the reasons and conditions under which they were made. This is a point over which Spinoza is quite definite, and it is one which has raised much controversy. A Covenant is valid, he argues, so long as its basis of danger or of advantage is in force; no one enters into an engagement or is bound to stand by his compacts unless there be a hope of some accruing good or the fear of some evil; if this basis be removed the compact thereby becomes void, and this he assures us has been abundantly shown by experience. Sir Frederick Pollock remarks in this connection that "it seems impossible, on any political or ethical principles whatever, to lay it down as an absolute proposition that the obligation of treaties is perpetual. Whence can governments derive the right of binding their subjects and successors for all time by improvident undertakings?" The important word here is successors. Should new generations observe a contract entered into by a different set of people under probably different circumstances? The only solution would seem to lie in the establishment of a time limit for each treaty, not exceeding at most the lifetime of those who made it, and having, at the time limit,

all such contracts reviewed by a tribunal of the League of Nations.

Such inferences would seem to follow from Spinoza's own political theory. He has ably depicted for us that reason bids man live in unity and co-operation with his fellows. Does it not follow from this that reason bids States live in unity and co-operation with one another? The good is a common good. Nothing is more useful to man than his fellow-men. Nothing, it might be added, is more useful to a nation than the other nations. All States and all individuals have their place in humanity, to whose well-being as a whole they must co-operate.

The State, then, is not an end in itself; its end is just what each man, if he could know and will his own greatest welfare, would endeavour to achieve of his own accord. "The end of the State is not dominion, nor the restraining of men by fear, and subjecting them to a foreign yoke. On the contrary, its end is to deliver each man from fear, so that he may be able to live with the utmost possible security, that is to say, that he may maintain in the best way his own natural right to exist and to act without doing harm either to himself or to his neighbours. The end of the commonwealth is not to make rational beings into brute beasts, or into automata. It is to lead men to live by, and exercise, a free reason, that they may not waste their strength in hatred, anger and guile, nor act unfairly towards one another. Thus the end of State is really *Libertas* or Freedom."[1]

1. *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, chapter 20. Since writing the above I note with interest the reference to the value of this aspect of Spinoza's work by Dr. Wolf, in his article, *Spinoza the Conciliator*, contributed to the *Chronicon Spinozanum*, mcmxxii.

CHAPTER VII.

CONCLUSION.

Spinoza denounced, but not understood. Contrast Descartes' attitude to religion. Bayle and Voltaire. Poets, Lessing and Goethe, Coleridge and Wordsworth. The bi-centenary celebrations. His influence. Scientific view of law. Determinism. Man not the measure of all things. Teleology. Individuality lost in substance. Ethics. Knowledge and moral worth. Utilitarianism. Co-operation. Value of political theory. A moral preacher. The charge of atheism examined. Religious spirit. His love of God. Some ultimate questions which the study of his philosophy raises in the modern mind.

CHAPTER VII.

CONCLUSION.

Spinoza belongs to the company of those who, during their lifetime and for years afterwards, have been ignored or misunderstood by their fellow-men. His daring thought was not in harmony with the general trend of speculation at the time, either in philosophical or religious circles. Owing no allegiance to any ready-made body of doctrine, he sought truth with a free soul and with steadfast aim. His predecessor had not been so brave. Descartes, after professing to take the greatest pains to free himself from pre-suppositions, remarked that he did not wish to criticise revealed truth. "We ought to prefer the Divine authority to our perception; what God has revealed is incomparably more certain than anything else." It is true that much of this submission was tinged with irony, but it was submission. Descartes was deferential to the dogmas of established religion and to the theological doctrines of the Sorbonne. For example, he assumes God's wisdom and goodness and His transcendent nature. Spinoza's independent attitude stands in marked contrast to this. He does not yield an inch of ground, and is uncompromising in his statement of what he conceives to be the truth, which will make men free. In the storm raised against Spinoza's thought, we really see the bursting of the thunder-cloud which had been hanging over the whole Cartesian philosophy. Delayed from bursting over the head of Descartes owing to his not

going the full length of his premises, it broke with full fury on Spinoza when he, with fuller and deeper insight into these principles, bore them to their logical conclusion. We have noted in our third chapter the great advance Spinoza made upon Descartes' metaphysics. Spinoza's contemporaries regarded his moral character as admirable, his manual work as the best of its kind, but, on account of his philosophy, they assailed him as a blasphemer and an atheist. Feeling reached a high pitch even during his lifetime, as we have seen. After his death it abated nothing, and dignitaries of the Church visited his grave in order to spit upon it. Bayle's article in his Dictionary was a wretched libel, but it set the tone for contemporaries, and it established the conventional attitude adopted to Spinoza's work for many years. Consequently Spinoza was more scorned than read, and was violently denounced by many who would not take time or trouble to understand him. This is revealed in remarks by Voltaire and Hume, which serve to show the prevailing temper of the time. Voltaire suggests it strange that a man of such an admirable character as Spinoza could hold opinions as vicious and abominable as they were maintained to be. Hume, in his *Treatise on Human Nature*,[1] published in 1739, refers—no doubt with a hidden irony—to his "hideous hypothesis" and to "all those sentiments for which Spinoza is universally infamous." Indeed, we find that not a single writer of the century which followed the death of our philosopher even attempted to deal with him in any serious manner. Theologians in all countries (e.g., Howe, the light of English Nonconformity at the time) assailed him in wordy but worthless volumes, but it is doubtful if any of them had even

1. IV., 5.

read the *Ethics* in full. Even the philosophers, Locke, Berkeley and Hume, take no great notice of Spinoza; they just mention him. Leibnitz, as we have seen, preserved a culpable silence. Even Kant himself missed his influence, although he has a word or two concerning him. Spinoza had not come to his own, and it is somewhat strange to observe that, when he did, it was not through the appreciation of philosophers as such. It was to poets and literary men that his appeal won home.

The first man who seems to have realised the value of Spinoza's thought was Lessing (1729-1781), the reviver of literature and criticism in Germany. Then we know that Goethe (1749-1832) was considerably influenced by Spinoza.[1] "How boundless," he remarked, "is the disinterestedness conspicuous in every sentence, how exalted the resignation which submits itself once for all to the great laws of existence, instead of trying to get through life with the help of trivial consolations, and what an atmosphere of peace breathes through the whole book!" Since the time of Goethe Spinoza has been widely read and extensively studied in Germany.[2]

His introduction into England was the work of Coleridge. Wordsworth came, like Goethe, under his spell, and, if we accept the laughable "Spy-Nosy" story, then the earliest discussions in this country which attempted

1. Robert Hering: *Spinoza im Jungen Goethe.* A German thesis in the collected volume, *Abhandlungen uber Wieland, Goethe und Schiller.* Boisseree remarks that Spinoza was the first to exercise a great and lasting influence upon him. "Goethe told me about his philosophical development and philosophical mode of thought, without a real philosophical system. Spinoza was the first to exercise a great and lasting influence upon him."—Quoted by Turck: *The Man of Genius.* For other influences on Goethe see *Goethe—Jahrbuch fur* 1891 (p. 3): "The ideas of reality or existence and of perfection are one and the same." "The idea is one and eternal; nor is it proper that we should use the word in the plural. All things of which we become cognisant and are able to speak, are but manifestations of the idea." — *Criticisms, Reflections, and Maxims by Goethe,* Ronnfeldt.

2. This is shown by our Bibliography appended.

to bring out the value of Spinoza's work took place between Coleridge and Wordsworth.[1] Much in the latter's history carries in it a re-echo of Spinoza's pantheism. Maurice brought him to the notice of English theologians, while Froude and Matthew Arnold contributed to his increasing popularity.

Spinoza was by this time coming to have his merits recognised. The bi-centenary of his death in 1877 witnessed scenes which offered a marked contrast to the events of 1677. At the Hague public international celebrations were held in his honour, one of the Princes of Orange presiding. A monument was unveiled, and an inspiring address, entitled *Spinoza, 1677 and 1877*, was delivered by Ernest Renan, who was then at the height of his fame at the Collège de France. This was followed three days later by a special lecture at the University of Leyden by Professor Land, of the Chair of Philosophy in the University. This now constitutes a valuable introduction to Spinoza. This was not all. An international Committee was constituted to erect a statue to his honour. In 1880 this was finished and unveiled, an oration being delivered on the occasion by Dr. Van Vloten.[2] The surplus of international subscriptions was devoted to the publication of a standard

1. In view of this curious story we may assume that Coleridge was pronouncing the name as Spi-nosa.
(The story goes that when England was in fear of French spies and the spread of the French Revolution to her own people, the village policeman on his beat overheard the conversation of the poets about the arch spy, "Nosa" or "Nosey" with amusing consequences. In view of his name having been mistaken for (1) the name of a race-horse, (2) the name of a new dance a few weeks ago, we must not be too hard on that village policeman.)

2. Prof. Santayana in his Preface to Bayle's Transation of the *Ethics*, refers to Renan's address at the dedication of the statue to Spinoza at the Hague in 1882. This statement is erroneous in several ways. The statue was dedicated not in 1882, but 1880. The address was then given, not by Renan, but by Dr. Van Vloten. Renan's address was given at the bi-centenary, 1877, when a monument was unveiled. See Prof. Knight's volume.

edition of his works, under the joint editorship of Professor Land and Dr. Van Vloten.[1]

Thus Spinoza's merit has after long delay become recognised. "In spite of his seclusion, in spite of the shortness of his career, in spite of the hostility of the dispensers of renown in the 18th century—of Voltaire's disparagement and Bayle's detraction—in spite of the repellent form which he has given to his principal work, in spite of the exterior semblance of a rigid dogmatism alien to the most essential tendencies of modern philosophy, in spite, finally, of the immense weight of disfavour cast upon him by the long-repeated charge of atheism, Spinoza's name has silently risen in importance, the man and his work have attracted a steadily increasing notice, and bid fair to become soon what they deserve to become in the history of modern philosophy, the central point of interest."[2] We do not care to say with Arnold that Spinoza's problems have become *the* central point of interest, yet it is obvious that his influence has been extremely important. His fellow-Jew, Heine, coupling a witty reference to Spinoza's method of livelihood with the influence of his work on subsequent thinkers, says: "All our modern philosophers, though often perhaps unconsciously, see through the glasses which Baruch Spinoza ground."

At the present day we find the study of Spinoza making an increasing appeal to the scientific mind. There are various reasons for this. It is one of Spinoza's chief merits that, at the time when Physical Science herself was but groping after the conception of law as a working hypothesis, he clearly stated and developed this notion of the universality of law, the relation of each object to Nature as a whole as the fundamental principle of all existence and of all knowledge of the uni-

1. See Bibliography.
2. Matthew Arnold in his Essay on Spinoza. (*Essays in Criticism I.*)

verse. Man himself must not be regarded as apart from that universality of law which constitutes the nature of the universe. To isolate him from the operation of such law would be to take him out of his place in the cosmos, and away from God, thus involving, not man's freedom, but his annihilation. Nature, moreover, is the whole of reality, not merely the material universe. All dependence is necessitated, but not all dependence is mechanical. There is no ground for regarding the necessity which makes physical objects to be what they are and to act as they do, as the exemplar of all necessity whatever. Rather the greater the necessity which characterises any thing or creature, then the greater degree of reality does it possess. The more real it is, the more freedom does it enjoy, the more power it has to act, and not merely to suffer. Thus Spinoza claims that the highest type of necessity is not in the physical world, but in rational beings, especially free men, because they "cannot help" loving virtue and loving God. Thus freedom is not opposed to necessity.

Spinoza is thoroughly opposed to the view that man is the end of nature. The world and man do not stand in the relation to one another of means and end. This is another of the points in Spinoza's doctrine which has endeared him to modern scientists, who have shown us that man is not the end of nature, that the stars were not made to be a lamp for his feet, nor the darkness to lull him to slumber. The criterion of nature is not the comfort or convenience of human beings. The universe as a whole has no moral significance or character, ethical predicates we cannot apply to it, it cannot be praised or blamed. To speak of it as the best of all possible worlds would be as meaningless as calling it the worst. In his denial of teleology, that things have been made for an end, his point is that all things have been made for one

another, and that any particular thing is only relative to and intelligible in relation to the whole cosmos, with its universal laws, which make it and keep it part of that whole. In refusing to admit that God acts with any end in view, he says "other than himself." All determination with him must be self-determination. Spinoza revolted really from that external type of teleology, too narrowly centred in man. His own self-realising system, however, has not emancipated itself from teleology, but it is of a kind which might well be styled, as Mr. Joachim remarks, "immanent teleology." Moreover, his insistence on the perfecting of man as free and rational involves the adoption of a teleological point of view.

His one Substance is really nothing but the principle of causality in another form. It is highly abstract, and he is unable to relate the attributes to it. The remark has been made that in its swallowing up of all differences and distinctions it resembles the den of the lion, to which many steps lead, but from which none lead away. The truth is that in Spinoza's system there is no room for one vitally important thing—Spinoza himself. In it human individuality is at a discount. Here we face the old problem of the One and the Many. The chief defect of Spinoza's philosophy is that it fails to do justice to the many, who are in danger of losing their distinct individuality in the unity of the one Substance, or God. It was this defect, we may remark in passing, which Leibnitz endeavoured to remedy. The French thinker, Charles Renouvier, a great champion of "personality," and a severe opponent of Pantheism and kindred views, well sums up this aspect of Spinoza's doctrine. *"C'est la plus belle des doctrines de la Chose. Mieux que dans l'antiquité le stoicien, le Spinosiste vise à cette personnalité contradictoire, la contemplation de*

l'individuel et du temporel sous l'aspect de l'universal et de l'eternel, en consentant au sacrifice de sa conscience individuelle. Mais il n'y a de conscience qu' individuelle, l'extinction de l'individualité serait celle de la representation, même en Dieu, Dieu ne pouvant connaître sa creation qu'autant qu'il s'en distingue.''[1]

In reference to Spinoza's *Ethics*, it has been argued that his doctrine involves the reduction of all virtue to intellectual virtue, the identification of the good will with clear intelligence, and the subordination of both moral and political obligation to the apprehension of truth. It has further been objected that Spinoza's synthesis of intellectual love is nonsensical, since intellect and emotion are not one and the same thing, and that really his ''Love'' is only another name for a purely intellectual knowledge, and his ethic is one which only appeals to philosophers or intellectual people. In answer to this it can be said that Spinoza realises no other absolute good than the knowledge or intellectual love of God; this knowledge is the essence of virtue, and neither moral duty nor political obligations have ultimate value, unless they serve and foster the development of free intelligence in men. We must not overlook the important fact that for Spinoza will and intellect are one and the same. We cannot really *know* the better and do the worse. All genuine knowledge is practical as well as theoretical. We cannot really know and not act on our knowledge. Moreover, the knowledge which is virtue includes knowledge of ourselves, as we are by ourselves and in relation to the whole of reality. It is rather an attitude of soul or spirit, a religious temper, than an aggregate of intellectual attainments. For Spinoza, as for Socrates, virtue is knowledge, but its supreme value lies in the fact that it makes virtue possible. It is the intellectual vision of all things in the cosmos, *sub specie æternitatis*, in the light of their divine unity and necessity, that renders man free from the bondage of passion. All knowledge, however speculative, has a moral value. This is a contrast to the English tendency to diminish the ardour of the pursuit of truth, by appeals to faith in the moral life, and by reliance on the general ''common sense'' of mankind for the solution of speculative problems.

1. *Histoire et Solution des Problemes metaphysiques*, p. 410. On Renouvier and his views see the author's *Modern French Philosophy*.

From the standpoint of social ethics his insistence on co-operation as the basis of the life of man socially and no less politically is valuable. Green, it is true, quarrels on technical grounds with his doctrine of *Jus*, but that is not of much importance, for Spinoza was less interested than Hobbes in speculating on the origin of government. What concerned him more was its existence, and, above all, its maintenance. His political doctrines have an important place in the development of political theory from the Renaissance to Rousseau. It is remarkable that Spinoza's theories have not supplemented the study of Hobbes to a greater degree. He is really much more English than the English thinker, paradoxical though this statement may sound. His view of the State is one which appeals much more to Englishmen than the absolutism of Hobbes ever can do, and it is truer to political history and to psychology.[1] Spinoza is no blind worshipper of the State; while, on the other hand, his objections to Revolution bring him into line with the characteristically English liking for a freedom slowly broadening from precedent to precedent.

In his plea for toleration, for humanism and rationalism, he stands related on the one hand to Erasmus and

1. Given certain premises regarding human nature, Hobbes is perfectly logical and convincing. His premises are based on a narrow and erroneous psychology of selfishness. Spinoza realised this and took a broader and truer view.

the Humanists of the Renaissance, and on the other to critics like Baur and Strauss. He attacked that professional theology which has been styled "a pretended science of teaching God Almighty His own business," by insisting that God Almighty knew His own business best, and he was consequently denounced as a blasphemer, an atheist, and a scoffer at religion. It must be remembered that the term atheist is relative to a conception of God. Socrates and the early Christians were deemed by their accusers "atheists." The applicability of the term is dependent on our definition of Theism. We may, for the purpose of discussion and an elucidation of Spinoza's exact position, recall Kant's dictum on this point. He says in his *Critique of Pure Reason*[1]: "We are wont to understand by the term 'God,' not merely an eternal nature, the operations of which are insensate and blind, but a Supreme Being, who is the free and intelligent author of all things, and it is this latter view alone that can be of interest to humanity." He goes on to say that "in strict rigour" we should deny to the man who styles himself a "Deist" any belief in God at all, and regard him merely as the maintainer of the existence of a primal being or thing, the supreme cause of all other things. But, as no one ought to be blamed, merely because he does not feel himself justified in maintaining a certain opinion, as if he altogether denied its truth and asserted the opposite, it is more correct, as it is less harsh to say, "the Deist believes in a God, the Theist in a *living* God."

In the light of such a statement what are we to say of Spinoza? It will be evident that we cannot term his thought that of a Theist. For instance, although he maintains God to be the cause of all things in both their essence and their existence, we cannot ascribe to Him

1. Meiklejohn's Translation, Bohn, p. 388.

either "intellect" or "will," and there can be nothing whatever in common between His nature and that of His creatures, and if we do employ such terms as "intellect" or "will," they have as little relation to their real meaning as the term "dog," when applied to the star Sirius, bears to the barking animal.[1] He does not allow us to ascribe Life to God, and he vehemently opposes all teleology, for of the *Natura naturans* no characteristics of mind or self-consciousness can be predicted. A divine creator or a divine providence, as conventionally understood, are both ruled out. He expressly states his divergence from the Cartesian view that mathematical truths owe their certainty to the will of God—a refuge which he regards as "the asylum of ignorance."

The Divine Nature acts because it exists and as it exists, and it can neither be other than it is nor act differently. Everything is pre-determined. Moreover, it has no alternatives, and knows no better nor worse, nor right nor wrong. Values as of good or evil, beauty or ugliness, order or chaos, are entirely relative to our narrow limited human standpoint, and are without meaning in relation to the universe as a whole or for God. Yet, in spite of his attack on anthropomorphism, it must be recognised that the attributes of Extension and Thought with which he credits God are themselves essentially human, and he is unable to name or indicate the nature of other divine attributes, but postulates them as infinite in number.[2]

The fact is, however, that there is far less theological significance in Spinoza's use of the term God than is

1. On this point there is an interesting discussion by J. Handyside in his *Essay on the Absolute and Intellect*, in the volume, *The Historical Method in Ethics and Other Essays* (1920).

2. On the infinity of the attributes see the article in the Second Chronicon of the *Societas Spinozana*, Petersdorff, *Spinozas Unendliche Attribute Gottes;* also in the same volume, Schmitt, *Zur Problematik der Unendlichen Modi.* The Hague, 1922.

often supposed, and we must beware of giving to his language a theological meaning which he did not intend. While remembering this, and not classifying Spinoza among the Theists in the Kantian use of that term, we need not entirely empty his words of religious significance, nor style him an atheist because he does not fulfil Kant's criterion of Theism. Spinoza's was a mind and temperament profoundly religious, using that term in the broader and deeper sense. His conclusion to the *Ethics* justifies this statement, and, although he could no longer believe in the God of Abraham, of Isaac and of Jacob, nor of the Prophets, nor yet accept the Christian view of a loving Father controlling the destinies of His erring human children, yet his love of God, although intellectual, is not devoid of meaning and value, or of religious significance. Many students of his works have realised this, theologians included, such as Dorner (1809-1884) and Schleiermacher (1768-1834), that upholder of religion as implying essentially dependence and acquiescence, whose words on Spinoza we may quote: "The sublime spirit of the world penetrated him, the infinite was his beginning and his end; the universal his only and eternal love; living in holy innocence and profound humility, he contemplated himself in the eternal world, and saw that he, too, was for that world a mirror worthy of love; he was full of religion and full of the Holy Spirit."[1]

Nothing hurt him like the mean insinuations of those who disagreed with his metaphysic, urging that his philosophy was dangerous to morality and religion. "Is it, I ask, to cut off religion, to acknowledge God as the supreme Good, and thence to conclude that He must be loved with a free soul? To maintain that all our felicity and most perfect freedom consists in that love

1. In his *Rede uber die Religion*, 1799, p. 47.

—that the reward of virtue is virtue, and that a blind and impotent soul finds its punishment in its blindness —is this," asks Spinoza, "a denial of all religion?" Spinoza began the revolt, which was accelerated by Goethe, against the orthodox dogma of a fallen human nature and the deist conception of an absentee God.

Man, with "the undying fire" of idealism, faith and hope in his own nature, must work out his own salvation, working his way through errors and suffering. No external redeemer can help him. He will find happiness in so far as he places his attention on things which are high and noble, not mean and sordid, which are eternal and not transient, and the only eternal object is God. Novalis, the German romanticist, styled Spinoza *ein Gott betrunkener Mann* ("a God-intoxicated man"), while Hegel, realising Spinoza's point that God is entirely immanent in the Universe, said that Spinoza was to be convicted, not of atheism, but of acosmism, for he denies, not the existence of God, but the existence of the universe as being other than God. Hence those who like to label the thoughts of philosophers have termed his doctrine Pantheism. This, however, means little or nothing, for widely differing systems have been so labelled. Better it is to leave labels, whether they be Theist, Pantheist or Atheist. Call him just Spinoza; abandon the fruitless attempt to fit his unique views into pre-arranged moulds of thought, and endeavour, instead, to understand him and appreciate his message as a whole.

His conception of Divine Determinism is one which is not revolting to the deeply orthodox religious consciousness for which

> "God nothing does nor suffers to be done
> But thou wouldst do thyself if thou couldst see
> The end of all events the same as He."

The absolute determinism of a Spinoza is more acceptable to the religious consciousness than the other extreme in modern philosophy, the absolute contingency of a Bergson. But the very comfort of the Calvinist in accepting a doctrine of determinism is bound up with the belief that all has been determined by the highest wisdom and goodness. It is the fact that no such belief is bound up with Spinoza's determinism which makes his "Free man's worship" appear all the nobler and more heroic. He will love God, like Job, "even though he slay him," for his love of God demands and expects no love in return. He rises to an intuition in which he sees God in all things and all things in God. His love for God is part of the infinite, divine love wherewith God loves Himself. There was undoubtedly something of the mystic about Spinoza, and this led to his giving a religious expression to most of his ideas. It was this which endeared him to spirits such as Goethe and Lessing, Coleridge and Wordsworth. "Woe to him," said Renan in his bi-centenary address, "who, in passing, should hurl an insult at this gentle and pensive head! He would be punished as all vulgar souls are punished, by his very vulgarity, and by his incapacity to feel what is divine. This man from his granite pedestal will point out to all men the way to blessedness which he found. . . . The truest vision ever had of God came, perhaps, to him." We, at a still greater distance of time, can feel that his mouth has been touched with a live coal from off the divine altar. However intellectual he seems, a roseate hue of noble feeling stains the white radiance of the eternal truths he endeavours to grasp and to make clear to us.

In Spinoza's thought we find a combination of the attitude of the keenly scientific temper, the deeply philosophical view, and also that of the religious soul.

His work glows with a mystic fire, which colours all his thought, metaphysical and political. If we may not call him, as Dr. Wolf has well remarked, a priest of the most high God, yet we may find in him a prophet of the power that makes for righteousness.

Pantheist he has been styled, but his pantheism, if we permit the name at all, is not that superficial doctrine of a vague divine spirit pervading all things, but a clearer doctrine that all things are in God and are manifestations of Him.

Some criticism can be turned upon his conception of *amor intellectualis Dei*, his "intellectual love of God." The union of the terms *amor* and *intellectualis* may well appear a dangerous attempt at a union of opposites, or at least of things which are essentially different. The word "amor," we may recollect, had such a passionate, sensual meaning that Jerome was unable to use it for his Latin translation of St. Paul, and employed instead the more sober term "caritas." Spinoza, however, is concerned with an expression which will unite at once the passionate religious ardour of the mystic with the severe and sober attitude of the philosopher and scientist.

Hence his attempt at the synthesis of "love" and "intellect." It can be objected that passion can never be merely an intellectual love, any more than individual lovers can find entire expression for their feelings in merely so-called Platonic friendship. We love an object, and hence consider it lovable or lovely. We know the emotion by feeling it. We know God by our loving, and not vice-versa. The religious consciousness demands from the intellect a constructive idea of God, it is true. But we do not love the idea. It is rather that we demand the idea to be constructed because we already love. Modern psychology is showing

that many of our conceptions are reached by a rationalising process which *succeeds* the emotional experience in point of time, but is thereafter put forward as a reason for the emotion or desire, not as it really is, a product created by the intellect, subsequent to the experience of the emotion, as an attempt at rational explanation.

These considerations raise the further question as to whether Spinoza's view of the emotions is not too intellectual, and his intellectual love of God resolves itself into a supreme æsthetic and intellectual satisfaction, as a frankly scientific passion, but not one to be equated precisely with the religious passion. In speaking of religion, Spinoza had stated that "whatever we desire to do of which we are cause in so far as we have the idea of God or know God, I set down to religion." Bearing in mind this short definition of a subject which has always presented grave difficulties of definition (at any rate of a *unanimous* kind), we ask whether the God for whom we may conceive the *amor intellectualis* (intellectual love) is the same as, or other than, the object of religious worship? This is an interesting and vital question for the student of Spinoza's philosophy, and it must be faced. We have already pointed out that the reader of Spinoza must beware of reading into the terminology more theology than is really intended. Also the chief defect in Spinoza's system has been commented upon, namely, the fact that, strictly speaking, there is no room in it for Spinoza himself as a personality. The danger of the absorption of all personalities into a vast and impersonal Totality is a real one. Now in Spinoza's view personality is a finite mode; God is a totality, but not a Personality.

We have two courses open to us in this connection,

two possible points of view, from which we must select one. Either we shall say that our highest category is that of Personality, and that we must not only love the highest when we see it, but must ascribe that highest category to the All-Highest itself. Then we assert a belief in the existence of a personal Deity. Or, on the other hand, we may take the line that the ground of personality need not be and is not itself personal. Spinoza's view is certainly the latter; for him personality is a finite mode. We must be clear on the issue of these two divergent lines of thought. If we follow out the former, then God for us will be the object of reverence and worship. We may love Him, and He us. Our love of God, however intellectually expressed, will be a relation to the object of worship. This is not Spinoza's view. For him the Deity is not personal, and we cannot equate "God" in his sense with the object of religious worship. Whichever we choose, whether we go with Spinoza or his subsequent antagonist, Renouvier,[1] we must be clear on the issue, and must realise that we cannot have it both ways; we must choose between the one line of thought on this point and the other.

God for Spinoza is a term synonymous with reality. His use of the word makes it co-extensive with reality. On closer examination of his phraseology, however, an interesting distinction arises. He uses two terms, *natura naturans* and *natura naturata*. The first expresses God operating as a free cause, while the second is employed for the universe considered as the effect of God's causality. We may recall here his early belief which caused difficulty at the Synagogue. This was his asser-

1. Renouvier strongly maintained the Personality of the Deity. He was obliged, however, to admit the truth of Spinoza's argument that personality was essentially a finite quality. Hence Renouvier conceived of God as personal, but finite.

tion that God had a material body, that body being, so he showed himself to mean, the universe. This corresponds to *natura naturata.* The mind or soul of God, the essence of His deity lies in the *élan vital,* the *nisus* or *conatus, natura naturans.* We may, if we care, regard this divine element of dynamic force as worthy of reverence or worship while refusing to worship "the thing that is," *natura naturata.* The use of the term God to cover both, as in Spinoza, is distinctly confusing for modern theology and philosophy. It covers a point which is apt to be lost or overlooked. God Himself may be only realising Himself or creating His divinity in the process of the universe.[1]

Spinoza speaks deliberately of one *substance,* not one *cause.* For he desires to stress, not a single link, but a totality. The universe is not a mere aggregate of parts; it is a whole, which is self-existing, self-sufficing, and self-determining. Finite things are modifications of the one substance. All things which are, are in God, and He is infinite. Spinoza, characteristically enough, begins with the Infinite, not with the finite. His difficulty is not to reach the Infinite, but rather to get from the Infinite to finite things, and he passes over *the* question of metaphysics, par excellence, that ultimate question, which for us can only be answered speculatively, if at all, the question, "Why *are* there finite things?" His *Conatus* is too mechanical, too physical. There is an *élan* of the universe, a growing, developing force, so well brought out in our modern biology and psychology, which is much more than a mere conserving force.

Spinoza gave little attention to the problem of the reality and significance of the Time-process. He

1. Compare on this point Renan, *Feuilles et Fragments Philosophiques;* Bergson, *Evolution Creatrice;* Alexander, *Space, Time, and Deity,* Vol. 2.

neglected History and Evolution in Time. In contrast to spatial extension he stressed, not temporal extension, but thought. This accounts for some of his main difficulties. "Since time," as Alexander says, "is not regarded by him as an essential part of God's constitution, no satisfactory account can be given of how finite things come into existence. We understand why they are resolved into God, but not how they issue from Him."[1]

Spinoza looks upon Time as merely a mode of thinking things. Duration is the attribute under which we conceive the existence of created things. Duration, therefore, is definitely related to existence, but not to the ultimate nature or essence of reality. There is, however, as Mr. Joachim points out at the end of his *Study of the Ethics of Spinoza,* some inconsistency involved in Spinoza's employment of the term Duration. We see this when we investigate carefully some of his pages on the relation of Eternity and the Mind.

Eternity as Spinoza uses the term is not mere indefinite length of time. As we have said, Duration cannot be a feature of the Eternal, as the Schoolmen maintained. Elsewhere Spinoza speaks of Time as a cutting up of Duration; as a picture or image of persistent duration. In one place he uses "duration" in place of "eternity." In another he explicitly excludes time and duration from the Eternal. Eternity is not Infinite Duration, nor can it be expressed in terms of Duration, for Duration is merely existence, and not essence or ultimate reality. If God had duration He would be creating Himself, and becoming more real as time goes on. We cannot even say with correctness that He has existed "from all eternity," for this is to confound eternity with what is merely indefinite duration. Eter-

1. Alexander, *Space, Time and Deity,* Vol. 2, p. 401. Cf., similarly, Joachim's *Study of the Ethics of Spinoza,* p. 226.

nity is not a long Time; it involves timeless necessity of being. This is the sense in which Spinoza employs the term Eternal Life. He has no intention of postulating an immortal or future life for the individual person.[1] The human mind is "eternal" in so far as it becomes (through adequate ideas and through the intellectual love of God) a mind which can glorify God and enjoy Him. The attainment of this eternal life is "the chief end of man."

Further, Spinoza stresses exclusively the bliss of knowing, but forgets that *amor* has its æsthetic and also its practical side. He overlooks the bliss of enjoying, and, above all, the bliss of doing.

Nevertheless, his thought remains one of the classics of philosophy, and offers a contrast on a fundamental point to the modern "philosophy of change." For Spinoza change is but an aspect of reality, a reality which abides. Behind all changes there lies a permanent, enduring Reality of which change is a manifestation. Spinoza will not tolerate the paradox that the only permanence is change. He stands much nearer to Plato than to Bergson, and those two thinkers represent most clearly contrasting points of view. These contradictory standpoints are consequent upon diverse attitudes towards the problem of Time and its Reality. This is a problem with which we have dealt in a separate work; sufficient is it here to say that it is one which is of vital significance for contemporary philosophy.

Spinoza deserves particular notice to-day because he drew attention to the fact that all reality is causally connected, and to the fact that all reality is dependent on God. He sees no conflict between the strictly scientific inter-connection of all things and the vision of their unity in God.

1. This is his position in the *Ethics;* in the *Short Treatise* he rather accepts personal immortality.

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2. English Translations of Spinoza's works.

II. LITERATURE ON SPINOZA AND HIS THOUGHT.

1. Early Contributions (mainly Continental). Colerus, etc.
2. Modern Literature.
   (a) English (chronologically arranged to 1924.
   (b) German.
   (c) Other foreign writings—French and Dutch.

SECTION ONE.

SPINOZA'S WORKS.

Only two books appeared in his lifetime, and of these only the first bore his name.

1663—*RENATI DES CARTES PRINCIPIORUM PHILOSOPHIAE,* PARS. I. et II., *more geometrico demonstratae per Benedictum de Spinoza Amstelodamensem. Accesserunt ejusdem* COGITATA METAPHYSICA, *Amsterdam, 1663.* (An important appendix, showing the trend of Spinoza's own thought at an early stage.)

1670—*TRACTATUS THEOLOGICO-POLITICUS, continens dissertationes aliquot, quibus ostenditur libertatem philosophandi non tantum salva pietate et reipublicae pace posse concedi: sed eandem nisi cum pace reipublicae ipsaque pietate tolle non posse.*

Published also at Amsterdam, but anonymously, and with the name of a fictitious printer at Hamburg. Later editions bore absurd false titles to escape detection, when circulation was prohibited by law.

1677—The year of his death saw the publication in November (he had died in February) of a volume,

OPERA POSTHUMA, containing:

Ethica.

Tractatus Politicus (unfinished).

Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione (unfinished).

Epistolae doctorum quorundam virorum ad B.D.S. et auctoris responsiones.

Compendium Grammatices Linguæ Hebræ (incomplete).

PUBLICATIONS OF EDITIONS AND THE DISCOVERY OF THE SHORT TREATISE.

A "Complete" Edition of Spinoza's works did not appear until the 19th century, when Dr. Paulus, a German, issued his

Benedicti de Spinoza Opera quae supersunt omnia. 2 vols. Jena, 1802-3.

In the same country appeared the second "complete" edition of his works, part of a large uncompleted publication undertaken by Gfrörer, under the title, *Corpus philosophorum optimae notae,* Stuttgart, 1830-43. The third volume contains Spinoza's works. The third "complete" edition was also German, coming from the famous Tauchnitz Press, of Leipzig, under the editorship of C. H. Brüder, a stereotyped edition in three small volumes, dated 1843-46.

In 1852 Professor Boehme, of Halle, found some outlines of an hitherto unknown work at the end of a Dutch copy of Colerus. These were published the same year, along with some of Spinoza's notes on the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus,* as:—

Benedicti de Spinoza Tractatus de Deo et Homine ejusque Felicitate Lineamenta atque Annotationes ad Tractatum Theologico-Politicum edidit et illustravit Edwardus Boehmer. Halae. ad Salam, J. F. Lippert, 1852.

(This, it is interesting to note, is the work which brought forth Froude's essay in the *Westminster Review* a couple of years later.)

Then Müller, an Amsterdam bookseller, found a Dutch copy of the *Treatise* appended to a Dutch translation of Spinoza's *Exposition of Descartes,* and evidently written out about 1750. Search made at the Collegiants' Orphanage in Amsterdam, where the philosopher's works had been secretly edited, revealed a quantity of hitherto lost correspondence. A copy of the Essay on the Rainbow," *Steekonstige reeckening van den Regenboog,* was also found. This had not been included in the volume, *Opera Posthuma,* but had been printed at the Hague ten years later. Under the editorship of Dr. Van Vloten, this and the *Short Treatise* were translated into Latin, and published with some additional letters. (Contains false portrait of Spinoza; really one of Tschirnhausen.)

1862—*Supplementum ad B. de Spinoza Opera.* (*Tractatulus de Deo et Homine ejusque Felicitate; Tractatus de Iride.*) Dutch version and Latin Translation both given. In 1869, however, another Dutch MS. of this Treatise was discovered, one which had certainly been written out in the previous century, and probably in Spinoza's lifetime. Professor C. Schaarschmidt, of Bonn, thereupon issued:—

1869—Benedicti de Spinoza *Korte Verhandeling van God, de Mensch en deszelfs Welstand.* The older Dutch MS. and Latin Translation, with an Introduction. Amsterdam.

He also made an excellent German Translation, 1869, and Sigwart made one also, with Introduction and notes. A modern Dutch Translation by

W. Meyer appeared in 1899. It was not translated into English until 1907, when it was done by T. G. Robinson. This has been followed in 1910 by Dr. Wolf's version, with elaborate introduction, notes and commentary.

Both the older and later Dutch MS. of this discovered Treatise are now in the Royal Library, the Hague. Their title pages are of interest.

(Older) *Short Treatise on God, Man and his well-being.* This we have given in full in Chapter I., pp. 10, 11, and in the original Dutch in Appendix.

(Later) *Ethica* or Moral Science, composed in two parts, which treat:—

I. Of God's Existence and Attributes.

II. Of Man, with reference to the character and origin of his passions, the use of his reason in this respect, and the means whereby he is educated to his happiness and supreme freedom. Also an Appendix, containing a brief account of the nature of substance—as well as that of the human Soul and its union with the body. Composed by Benedictus de Spinoza.

Then Dr. Hugo Ginsberg issued an edition of Spinoza's works at Leipzig in four small octavo volumes, 1875-1882, in Kirchmann's *Philosophische Bibliothek.*

None of these editions (Paulus, Gfrörer, Brüder, or Ginsberg), however, were exactly "ideal," since they were not based upon a revision of the text. Consequently, the Central Centenary Committee for the erection of the Statue at the Hague resolved to devote the balance of funds which remained to the publication of a fine standard edition of Spinoza's works. This was undertaken by Dr. van Vloten and Dr. Land. All the available original material was carefully collected and

revised, assistance being rendered willingly by various students of Spinoza, and in 1882-3 Nijhoff, the publisher at the Hague, issued the complete and standard edition in two volumes. In 1895 these were re-issued in a cheaper and more convenient "format" in three volumes. This standard edition contains, with one exception, all the known writings of the philosopher, which, collected together, are:—

Ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata.

Tractatus Theologico-Politicus.

Annotationes in Tractatum Theologico-Politicum post librum editum adscriptae.

Tractatus Politicus (unfinished).

Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione (unfinished).

Renati Des Cartes Principiorum—Cogita Metaphysica.

Korte Verhandeling van God, de Mensch en deszelfs Welstand (*Tractatulus de Deo et Homine ejusque Felicitate*).

Steekonstige Reeckening van den Regenboog (*Tractatus de Iride*), Algebraic Calculation of the Rainbow.

Reeckening van Kanssen (On the Calculation of Chances).

Compendium Grammatices Linguae Hebrae (incomplete).

Epistolae doctorum quorundam virorum ad B.D.S. et auctoris responsiones.

Epistolae Johannis a Wullen, De Obitu Cartesii.

DISCOVERY OF A NEW SPINOZA MANUSCRIPT.

In September of 1915 there appeared in the *Revue de Hollande,* pp. 285-9, a translation by Emile Herzog, under the title of *Ce qui dirait Baruch,* of the first pages

of an unpublished work by Spinoza, dealing with the problem of the ethics of war. The title as given there reads:—

TRAITÉ BELLICO-PACIFIQUE, où l'on explique que la guerre résulte nécessairement de la nature humaine et que par conséquent la paix ne peut être maintenue que par la force. MS. inedit de Spinoza.

TRANSLATIONS.

Translations of Spinoza's works have been done:—

In German by Auerbach, 5 vols. Stuttgart, 1841.
In French by Emile Saisset, 2 vols. Paris, 1842.
Revised ed. 3 vols. 1861.
By J. G. Prat. Paris, 1863.
In Polish by Dr. Ignacy Halpern. 1914, vol. 1.
1916, vol. 2.

The list of English Translations is here given in full:—

ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS.

Spinoza's Chief Works.

Translated from the Latin by R. H. M. Elwes, with Introduction. Bohn's Library, 2 vols., 1883-4. Revised edition, 1906.

Vol. 1. *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus.*
Tractatus Politicus.

Vol. 2. *De Emendatione.*
Ethics.
Correspondence (considerably abridged).

Note.—No complete English Edition of Spinoza exists.

ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS OF SEPARATE WORKS.

ETHICS (Seven Translations apart from Elwes).

1. *Ethics* (with Life and Correspondence). Translated (rather unsatisfactorily) by Dr. Willis, 1870. Trubner & Co.
2. *Ethics by D.D.S.* 1876. American Translation pub. New York. D.D.S. are the initials of the translator, Daniel Drake Smith. Re-issued in 1888.
3. *Ethics of Benedict de Spinoza.* Translated by Hale White ("Mark Rutherford"). Trubner and Co., English and Foreign Philosophical Library, 1883. Elaborate Introduction (99 pages). Revised by Amelia H. Stirling, and re-issued in 1894 and 1899. Oxford University Press.
4. *Ethics of Spinoza.* Translated by Hy. Smith, Cincinatti, 1886.
5. *Ethics,* another American Translation from Latin. New York, 1888.
6. *Ethics* (Books 1, 2 and 5). Translated and edited by Fullerton, New York, 1892. Revised Ed., 1894.
7. *Ethics of Spinoza.* Translated by A. Boyle. Edited with Intro. by Prof. Santayana, Everyman's Library, 1910. (Includes *The Improvement of the Understanding.*)

SHORT TREATISE. (Two Translations. This work is not in Elwes' Edition.)

1. *A Short Treatise on God, Man and Human Welfare.* Translated by T. G. Robinson, 1907.

2. *A Short Treatise on God, Man and His Well-being.* Translated and edited by Dr. A. Wolf, with elaborate Introduction and Commentary, together with a Life of Spinoza. A. & C. Black, 1910.

TREATISE ON THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE UNDERSTANDING. (Two Translations apart from Elwes.)

1. *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione.* Translated by W. Hale White and A. M. Stirling.
2. *Treatise on the Correction of the Understanding.* Translated by A. Boyle. Everyman (with Ethics in one vol., with Introduction by Professor Santayana).

TRACTATUS THEOLOGICO-POLITICUS (Three Translations apart from Elwes).

A Treatise, partly theological, partly political, 1689. The date is interesting. This is the first English Translation of any work of Spinoza.

Other Translations, 1737, 1862. Revised 1868 (Willis).

TRACTATUS POLITICUS. (Only one translation apart from Elwes.)

A Treatise on Politics. Translated by W. Maccall, 1854.

Rand's Volume, *Modern Classical Philosophers,* gives some sections of the *Ethics,* by direct quotation, 1908. 50 pages (pp. 148-198).

Chapters of the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* were circulated separately.

SECTION TWO.

LITERATURE ON SPINOZA.

I.—EARLY WRITINGS ON SPINOZA.

MORUS: Demonstrationis duarum propositionum quae præcipuæ apud Spinozium Atheismi sunt columnæ, brevis solidaque confutio. *Opera philosophica.* Londoni, 1679 (vol. 1).

KUFFELAER: *Principia pantosophiae.* 1684, Holland; fictitious publisher in Hamburg given.

This work is of note as being the first which showed any open enthusiasm for Spinoza's teachings. It refers to his *Ethics* as *liber aureus.*

BAYLE'S Dictionnaire, 2 vols., 1695-97, contained an article on Spinoza and his philosophy, and referred to it as "a monstrous opinion, surpassing all conceivable absurdities." It had considerable influence in giving Spinoza an unpopular name.

HOLMA translated this article by Bayle into Dutch in 1698.

COLERUS (Kohler), Lutheran minister at the Hague from 1693-1707, who occupied Spinoza's lodging 20 years after his death, and, although he loathed his philosophy, was so impressed with what he heard about his life and character, that he set down very faithfully an account of Spinoza, which is one of our chief authorities for his life, and an excellent testimony to his personal character. Published 28 years after Spinoza's death. *Life of Spinoza, with a Sermon against Spinoza's doctrines* (in Dutch, 1705). This important little book was translated in the following year into Latin, French and English (Eng.

Tr. a vol. of 92 pages, poorly printed. Abridged Ed. appeared 1720. A thoroughly revised and full reprint is appended to Sir Frederick Pollock's book, *Spinoza, His Life and Philosophy, 1880*).

It circulated mainly in the French translation, which read, "*La vérité de la réssurection de Jésus Christ defendue contre B. de Spinoza, avec la vie de ce fameux philosophe tirée, tant de ces propres Ecrites, que de la bouche de plusieurs personnes dignes de foi qui l'ont connu.*" Par Jean Colerus, Ministre de l'Eglise Lutherienne de la Haye. 1706. This was published at the Hague.

1711.—*Rencontre de Bayle avec Spinoza dans l'autre monde.* A curious anonymous publication.

LUCAS.—In 1719 a volume was published by Sauzet, of Amsterdam, in Vol. 10 of his *Nouvelles Litteraires,* purporting to be by one Dr. Lucas, entitled *La Vie de Spinoza par un de ses disciples,* 2nd Ed., 1735.

TRAITÉ DES TROIS IMPOSTEURS. A work then appeared with this title, said by most authorities to deal with Lord Herbert of Cherbury, with Hobbes and Spinoza, although Pollock asserts that it has nothing to do with Spinoza.

LA VIE ET L'ESPRIT DE M. BENOIT DE SPINOZA. Under this title both of the above were issued together, the Traité and Lucas's Biography.

BOULAINVILLIERS, Monsieur le Comte de. The foregoing work was then combined with considerable additions from that of Colerus, and published by the Comte de Boulainvilliers in a work purporting to be against Spinoza's doctrines, but in reality a popular exposition of them.

Réfutations des Erreurs de Benôit de Spinoza par M. de Fenelon, Archevêque de Cambray, par le Père Lami, Benedictin, et La Vie de Spinoza écrite par M. Jean Colerus augmentée de beaucoup de particularités tirées d'une vie manuscrite de ce philosophe par M. le Comte de Boulainvilliers (ostensibly published at), Bruxelles, 1731.

An English Translation appeared in 1811.

II.—MODERN WRITINGS ON SPINOZA.

(a) ENGLISH

(including English Translations of foreign works) chronologically arranged from 1682 to 1924, with the more important works starred.

*1682—DUBOIS DE LA COUR (pseudonym). *An excellent discourse, proving the divine origin of the Five Books of Moses, to which is added an examination of Père Simon's critical history of the Old Testament, wherein all his objections with the weightiest of Spinoza's are answered.*

It is interesting to note this as the first English book dealing with Spinoza, being a reply to his *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus,* prior to its English Translation, which appeared 1689.

1702—HOWE, J. (of Oxford), leading Nonconformist Divine. *The Living Temple* (Pt. 2 entitled *Animadversions on Spinoza*).

*1705—CLARKE, Dr. S. *Demonstration of the being and the attributes of God, more particularly in answer to Spinoza.*

1705—GILDON, C. *The Deists' Manual, with considerations of Spinoza.*

1705—CARROLL, W. *A dissertation on Mr. Locke's Essay on Human Understanding, wherein that author's endeavours to establish Spinoza's Atheistical hypothesis are confuted.*

1706—COLERUS, John, Minister of Lutheran Church, The Hague. *Life of Benedict de Spinoza.* Done out of French, London. Bragg. Small oct. vol., 92 pages (British Museum). (Reprinted by Pollock as appended to his book, 1880.)

1720—*An Account of the Life and Writings of Spinoza,* to which is added an abstract of his Theological Political Treatise, pp. 16. Pub. W. Boreham, London. (The Treatise had already appeared in England in full in 1689.) This is an abridgment of Colerus' work.

1811—FENELON. *Demonstration of the Existence and the Attributes of God.* Translated from a French work which appeared in 1731. (Boulainvilliers.)

1839—HALLAM. *Introduction to the Literature of Europe in the 17th century.* The earliest writing which deals with Spinoza by an Englishman of any importance.

1845—FROUDE, J. A. *Short Account of Spinoza's Thought.* An early article, not the famous one.

1846—HITCHCOCK (General). *Doctrine of Spinoza and Swedenborg Identified.* By General Hitchcock, of the United States Army, Boston, 1846.

*1854—FROUDE, J. A. *Spinoza.* An essay contributed to the *Westminster Review,* based on Boehmer's *Outlines of the Short Treatise,* which had been published in 1852. Re-issued in Vol. 1 of his *Short Studies on Great Subjects* (see below).

1855—*A Refutation of Spinoza,* by Leibnitz, recently discovered. (Translated from a French volume issued by M. Fourcher de Careil in 1854.)

1858—(H.) E.A. *Swedenborg,* with a chapter on the comparison of Spinoza and Swedenborg.

1862—MAURICE, F. D. *Modern Philosophy,* pp. 377-388.

*1865—ARNOLD, MATTHEW. *Spinoza and the Bible. Essays in Criticism,* Vol. 1.

*1867—FROUDE. *Short Studies on Great Subjects.* Vol. 1, pp. 339-400.

*1870—WILLIS, Dr. R. *Benedict de Spinoza, Life, Correspondence and Ethics,* pp. 648. A volume clumsy in form and matter. Useful discussion of Spinoza's influence on modern thought.

1873—LINTER, J. C. *Spinoza.*

1876—CAIRD, Edward. (Article) *Cartesianism* in the *Encyclopædia Britannica.* Revised 11th Ed., 1911.

1877—COHN, T. *Spinoza's Life.*

*1880—POLLOCK, Sir Frederick. *Spinoza, His Life and Philosophy.* Duckworth. pp. 427. Second Ed. 1899.

The standard work on Spinoza in English. (Out of print now.)

1881—THOMPSON, James. System of Spinoza in *Essays.* London. 1881.

*1882—KNIGHT, Prof. Wm. Edited a vol. of Collected Translated Essays under the title, *Spinoza: Four Essays.* pp. 170.

1. *In Memory of Spinoza.* Prof. J. Land. A lecture delivered on the occasion of the bicentenary of Spinoza to the class of philosophy at Leyden, Feb. 24th, 1877.
2. *Life and Character of Spinoza.* Kuno Fischer, Prof. of Philosophy at Berlin.
3. *Spinoza: Herald to Mankind of the Good News of Its Majority.* An oration delivered at the unveiling of his statue at the Hague, 18th Sept., 1880. By Dr. J. Van Vloten.
4. *Spinoza, 1677 and 1877.* Ernest Renan. Address delivered at unveiling of monument at the Hague, 21st Feb., 1877.

1882—BROOKS, C. T. Translation of Auerbach's novel, *Spinoza.*

*1882—MARTINEAU, Dr. J. A. *Study of Spinoza.* Macmillan. Pp. 393. Other Ed., 1883, 1895. A valuable work, one of the best books we have on Spinoza, but very weak on the political doctrines of the philosopher. Martineau devotes pages to Spinoza's discussion of Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy, the least valuable part of his political thought.

*1883—HALE WHITE ("Mark Rutherford," the novelist). Elaborate preface to his Translation of the *Ethics.* Deals with Spinoza's Life and Thought. pp. xciv.

1883—ELWES, R. H. M. *Life and Thought of Spinoza.* Preface to English Translation of his Works, Bohn's Library (Rev. Ed. 1906).

1884—HUNT, Dr. John. *Essay on Pantheism.* Isbister & Co.

1885—MOSS, A. B. *Bruno and Spinoza.*

1885—MARTINEAU. *Types of Ethical Theory.* Chapter on Spinoza. Vol. 1. pp. 234-369.

1886—RENAN. *Studies in Religious History.* Authorised English Translation. (Bentley and Son.) Spinoza address. pp. 453-481.

1887—SETH, Prof. A. Article on *Spinoza* in *Encyclopædia Britannica.* Revised 1910. 11th Ed.

1887—FRIEDLANDER, M. H. *Spinoza's Life and Philosophy.*

*1888—CAIRD, Dr. John. *Spinoza.* Blackwood's "Philosophical Classics" (now out of print). A valuable contribution to the study of Spinoza by an acute mind. But represents Spinoza from the metaphysical and ethical standpoint only, and His Life and Practical Doctrines are omitted, but the influences bearing upon the formation of his thought are rather fully discussed.

1889—COLLINS, W. J. *Spinoza.* Short Account of his Life and Philosophy.

1891—POLLOCK, Sir Frederick. *Spinoza.* A lecture in the collected Vol., *Religious Systems of the World.* (A collection of Addresses delivered at South Place Institute, 1889-91.) Swan and Sonnenschein; pp. 709-723.

1892—NASMITH. *Makers of Modern Thought.* 2 vols. London.

*1901—JOACHIM, H. H. *A Study in the Ethics of Spinoza.* Oxford University Press; pp. 316. An acute and thoughtful work (by the author of *The Nature of Truth*). It abounds in subtleties, and is consequently more difficult to read than Spinoza himself, but constitutes an excellent and penetrating analysis.

*1903—DUFF, Robert A. *Spinoza's Ethical and Political Philosophy.* Maclehose, Glasgow; pp. 516. Ethics, pp. 1-145. Politics, pp. 146-512. A large work of extreme value in setting forth Spinoza's Principles. The exposition of the Ethics is very helpful, while the treatment of Spinoza's political philosophy is by far the best in English.

1904—IVERACH, Dr. *Descartes and Spinoza.* (World's Epoch Makers.) T. & T. Clark. *Spinoza,* pp. 130-242. A disappointing account, lacking in proportion, due mainly to lack of space to deal with Spinoza. The *Ethics* are rushed in, and the book finishes prematurely. Contains a few awkward misstatements, both historical and geographical.

1904—PICTON, J. A. *The Religion of the Universe.* Macmillan.

1905—PICTON, J. A. *Pantheism.* Its story and significance. Constable (Religions, Ancient and Modern), pp. 93.

1906—POWELL, E. E. *Spinoza and Religion.* Chicago.

1907—PICTON, J. A. *Handbook to the Ethics.* Constable & Co., pp. 257. Stress laid upon Spinoza in relation to modern liberal religious thought.

1907—ROBERTSON, J. M. *Spinoza* (Pioneer Humanists).

1908—NEUMARK, D. *Crescas and Spinoza.* Year-Book of Central Conf. of American Rabbis. Vol. XVIII., 1908, pp. 277-318, in celebration of Fifth Centenary of the "Or Adonai."

*1910—WOLF, Dr. A. *Life* of Spinoza, prefaced to English Version of the Short Treatise. A. & C. Black. This work brings out well Spinoza's relation to Judaism.

1911—RABENWORT, W. L. *Spinoza as Educator.* Columbia University Contributions to Education, No. 38. New York, 1911.

1917—DURANT, W. *Philosophy and the Social Problem.* New York. Macmillan. (Chap. IV., "Spinoza.")

1918—BALZ, A. G. A. *Idea and Essence in the Philosophies of Hobbes and Spinoza.* Archives of Philosophy (No. 10). Columbia University Press, U.S.A.

1918—SORLEY, Prof. W. R. *Spinoza.* Henriette Hertz, Lecture on a Master-Mind. (British Academy.) Published in Proceedings of the Academy, Vol. VIII., or separately. Oxford University Press, 1918.

1920—HANDYSIDE, J. *The Absolute and Intellect,* in the volume, *The Historical Method in Ethics and Other Essays.*

1921—ALEXANDER, Prof. Samuel. *Spinoza and Time.* Arthur Davis Lecture to Jewish Historical Society, 1921. With Afterword by Viscount Haldane. Allen & Unwin. (See also Alexander's Gifford Lectures on *Space, Time and Deity*).

1921—*Chronicon Spinozanum.* Tomus I. (Societas Spinozana.)

1922—*Chronicon Spinozanum.* Tomus II. (Societas Spinozana.)

1924—ROTH, Dr. L. *Spinoza, Descartes and Maimonides.* Oxford University Press, 1924.

(b) GERMAN LITERATURE ON SPINOZA.

The German Literature on Spinoza is very extensive. The chief works:—

ALTKIRCH, E. *Maledictus und Benedictus (Spinoza).* Leipzig, 1924.

AUERBACH (German Translator of Spinoza's Works, and an enthusiastic disciple). *Spinoza: ein historische Roman,* 1837. Re-issued as *Spinoza: ein Denkerleben,* 1855.

"Although professedly a romance, is well worth reading as a successful and sympathetic attempt by a Jew, thoroughly acquainted with Jewish customs, to make Spinoza and his surroundings real to us."—Hale White.

Of this work an English Translation (by C. T. Brooks) appeared in 1882.

*AVENARIUS, Richard. *Ueber die beiden ersten Phasen des Spinozischen Pantheismus,* &c. Leipzig, 1868.

*BALTZER, A. *Spinozas Entwickelungsgang.* Kiel, 1888.

BERENDT (and FREUDENTHAL). *Spinozas Erkenntnisslehre in ihrer Beziehung zur modernin Naturwisserschaft und Philosophie.* Berlin, 1891.

BOEHME. *Spinozana* I. Vol. 36, Fichte's *Zeitschrift.*
II. 1. Vol. 42.
II. 2. Cont. in Vol. 57.

*BOLIN. *Spinoza,* 1894.

*BORKOWSKI, Dunin. *Der Junge de Spinoza.* Münster, 1910.

BUSOLT, Dr. Georg. *Die Grundzuge der Erkenntnisstheorie und Metaphysik Spinozas,* Berlin, 1875.

BUSSE, L. *Beitrage Zur Entwickelungsgeschichte Spinozas,* 1888.

CAMERER, Theodor. *Die Lehre Spinozas.* Stuttgart, 1877.

ELBOGEN, Dr. Ismar. On *Tractatus de Intellectus Emend.* Breslau, 1898.

ERDMANN, Dr. J. E. *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie.* Vol. 2, Berlin, 1878. Vermischte Aufsatze, Leipzig, 1846.

*FISCHER, KUNO. *Spinoza.* 4th Ed. Heidelberg, 1898.

*FREUDENTHAL, J.—

Spinoza und die Scholastik (in *Philosophische Aufsatze* dedicated to Zeller). Leipzig, 1887.

Spinozastudien, Zeitschrift für Philosophie. Vols. 108, 109. 1896.

Die Lebens Geschichte Spinozas in Quellen Schriften, Urkunden und nichtamlichen Nachrichten—Nerausgegeben, 1899.

Das Leben Spinozas. Stuttgart, 1904.

Uber die Entwickelung der Lehre vom Psychophysischen Parallelismus bei Spinoza. Archiv. für Gesamte Psychologie IX., 1907.

GEBHARDT, C. *Spinozas Abhandlung über die Verhesserung des Verstandes.* Heidelberg, 1905.

*GINSBERG. *Leben und Characterbild.* Leipzig, 1876.

*GRUNWALD, Dr. Max. *Spinoza in Deutschland.* Berlin, 1897.

GRZYMISCH, Dr. Siegfried. *Spinozas Lehren von der Ewigkeit und Unster blichkeit.* Breslau, 1898.

*HOFF. *Die Staatlehre Spinozas.*

*HERDER, Von. *Einige Gesprache uber Spinoza's System,* 1787. Re-issued 1808 as *Seele und Gott.*

HERING. *Spinoza im Jungen Goethe.*

*JACOBI, F. H. *Uber die Lehre des Spinoza in Briefen an den Herrn Moses Mendelssohn,* 1787-9. This work laid the foundation of German study of Spinoza.

*JOEL, Dr. M.—

Zur Genesis der Lehre Spinozas. Breslau, 1871.

Spinoza's Theolog. Politischer Tracktat auf Seine Quellen gepruft, 1870.

Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophie, 1876 (shows Jewish influences on Spinoza).

LEHMANN, J. B. *Spinoza, sein Lebensbild.* Wurzburg, 1864.

LOEWE, Dr. J. H. *Die Philosophie Fichtes.* (Appendix on Spinoza's Conception of God.) Stuttgart, 1862.

MENZEL. *Naturrecht und Sociologie.* 1912. Wien (Fromme), Chap. III.

REHON, Dr. Karl. *G. E. Lessings Stellung zur Philosophie des Spinoza.* Frankfurt-am-Main, 1877.

RICHTER. *Spinozas Philosophische Terminologie,* Leipzig, 1913.

*SCHAARSCHMIDT, Prof. *Descartes und Spinoza,* 1850.

SCHINDLER. *Ueber den Begriff des Guten bei Spinoza.* Jena, 1885.

SCHLERATH. *Spinoza und die Kunst,* 1920. (Hellerau bei Dresden.)

*SIGWART, Dr. Christoph. *Spinozas neuntdeckter Tractat von Gott.* Gotha, 1866.

Der Spinozismus. Tubingen, 1839.

STEIN, Dr. *Leibnitz und Spinoza.* Berlin, 1890.

Neue Aufschlusse uber d. Herausg. v. op. posth. Spinoza in Arch. für Gesch. d. Philos. Ba. 1, Heft 4. Dr. Stein here asserts Schuller (not Meyer and Jeller) to have been real editor of the Posthumous Works. He also adds that the Preface was composed by Meyer in Latin, and was not a mere translation by Meyer of a Dutch preface by Jeller.

THOMAS, Dr. Karl—

Spinoza als Metaphysiker, Konigsberg, 1840.

Spinozas Individualismus und Pantheismus, 1848.

TONNIES. *Studie zur Entwickelungs-geschichte des Spinoza.* Viertelsjahrschrift für wiss. Phil. 1883.

TRENDELENBURG. *Uber die aufgefundenen Erganzungen zu Spinozas Werken.* (Historische Beitrage, Vol. III.) Berlin, 1867. pp. 277-398.

VAN DER LINDE. *Spinoza. Seine Lehre und deren Nachwirkungen in Holland.* Gottingen, 1862.

*WINDELBAND. *Zum Gedachtnis Spinozas,* V. J. Sch. f. wiss. Phil., 1877, pp. 419-440.

BULAWSKI, Dr. Jerzg. *Das Problem der Kausalität bei Spinoza.* Bern, 1899.

OTHER FOREIGN PUBLICATIONS.

FRENCH.

ADELPHE. *La notion de la Souveraineté dans la politique de Spinoza,* 1910.

*BELLANGE. *Spinoza et la pensée moderne.* Didier. Paris. pp. 397.

BORRELL. *Benôit Spinoza.* Series "Philosophes et Penseurs." Bloud, Paris, 1911. 68 pp.

BOUILLIER. *Histoire de la Philosophie cartesienne,* 1854.

*BRUNSCHWICG, Prof. Leon. *Spinoza.* Paris, 1894. Alcan, 2nd Ed., 1906, 236 pp. Essay for Prix Bordin. Ouvrage couronné par l'Académie des Sciences morales et politiques. The best French work on Spinoza.

CAREIL—

Réfutation de Spinoza par Leibnitz precedé d'une mémoire par M. Foucher de Careil. Paris, 1854.

Leibnitz, Descartes et Spinoza. Paris, 1862.

CHARTIER. *Spinoza.* In series "Les Philosophes." Paris. Delaplane. p. 122.

COUCHOUD. *Benoît de Spinoza,* in series "Les Grands Philosophes."

*DELBOS, Victor—

Le Problème moral dans la Philosophie de Spinoza et dans l'histoire du Spinozisme. Alcan, 1893.

Le Spinozisme, 1916. An excellent work.

HUAN. *Le Dieu de Spinoza.* Alcan, 1914.

JOUFFROY. *Cours de Droit Naturel.* Lectures 6 and 7.

LASBAX. *La Hiérarchie dans l'Univers chez Spinoza.* Alcan, 1919.

RAPHAEL-LEVEQUE. *Le Problème de la Verité dans la Philosophie de Spinoza.* 1923.

*RENAN. *Spinoza.* Commemorative Bi-centenary Address delivered at Hague, 1877. Issued in *Nouvelles Etudes d'Histoire religieuse,* Paris, 1884. English Translation of this book published by Bentley, and, of the Spinoza address only, in Knight's volume.

RIVAUD, A. *Les notions d'Essence et d'Existence dans la philosophie de Spinoza.* Paris, 1906.

SAINTES—

Histoire de la Vie et des ouvrages de Spinoza. Paris, 1842.

Precurseurs et disciples de Descartes. Paris, 1862.

SAISSET. *Spinoza et la Philosophie des Juifs.* Paris, 1862.

DUTCH.

BLASE. *Johannes Colerus en de Groote Twisten in de Nederlandsche Luthersche Kerk zijner Dagen.* Amsterdam, 1920.

COHEN. *Spinoza en de Geneeskunde.* Amsterdam, 1920.

HUGENHOLZ, P. H. *Ethisch Pantheusme.* Amsterdam, Van Holkema en Warendorf, 1903.

*LAND, Dr. J. *In Memory of Spinoza.* A lecture delivered on the bi-centenary to the Class of Philosophy, Leyden University, Feb. 24th, 1877, by J. Land, Prof. of Philosophy at Leyden. (English Translation in Knight's vol.) An excellent monograph, pp. 74, with very learned notes appended.

MEIJER, Dr. W. *Spinozana,* 1923.

*MEINSMA, K. O. *Spinoza en Zijn Kring's.* Gravenhage, 1896. A highly critical work on sources for study of Spinoza's Life and Times.

SEVERIJN. *Spinoza en de gereformeerde Theologie zijner Dagen.* Utrecht, 1919.

VAN DER LINDE. *Benedictus Spinoza Bibliografie.* Gravenhage, 1871.

VAN ROOIJEN. *Inventaire des livres formant la Bibliothèque de Spinoza.* Hague, 1889.

*VAN VLOTEN, Dr. J.—

Baruch d'Espinoza zijn leven en schriften. Amsterdam, 1862.

Spinoza. An oration at the unveiling of the statue at the Hague, Sept. 18th, 1880. E. T. in Knight's Volume.

WIJCK, Dr. *Spinoza.* An address.

DANISH.

BROCHNER. *Benedict Spinoza,* 1857.

*HOFFDING, Prof. H.—

Spinozas Liv og Laere, 1877.

Spinoza's Ethica Analyse og Karakteristik, 1918.

VOLD. *Spinozas Erkendelsestheorie,* 1888.

ITALIAN.

SOLMI. *Benedetto Spinoza e Leone Ebreo studio su una fontana Italiana dimenticata dello Spinozismo.* Modena, 1903.

. . . . .

There are also works by Wahle, Friedlander, and Leon.

Two interesting books which contain chapters on Spinoza of some importance are Türck's *Man of Genius* and Kemp Smith's *Studies in Cartesian Philosophy.*

APPENDIX.

I. Letters regarding Heidelberg Chair.

II. Title of the *Short Treatise* in Dutch.

III. Note on the *Societas Spinozana* and its publications.

IV. Note on the *Spinozahuis.*

APPENDIX.

I.

EPISTOLA XLVII. (OLIM LIII.).

Philosopho Acutissimo ac Celeberrimo.

B.d.S.

J. LUDOVICUS FABRITIUS.

Celeberrime Vir,

In mandatis mihi dedit Serenissimus Elector Palatinus, Dominus meus Clementissimus, ut ad Te, mihi quidem hucusque ignotum, Serenissimo vero Principi commendatissimum, scriberem, ac rogarem, an in Illustri sua Academia ordinariam Philosophiae Professionem suscipere animus esset. Stipendium exsolvetur annum, quo ordinarii Professores hodie fruuntur. Non alibi invenias Principem faventiorem eximiis ingeniis, inter quae te aestimat. Philosophandi libertatem habebis amplissimam, qua te ad publice stabilitam Religionem conturbandam non abusurum credit. Ego sapientissimi Principis mandato non potui non obsecundare. Quapropter te rogo quam impensissime, ut quamprimum mihi respondeas, tuamque ad me responsionem vel Serenissimi Electoris Residenti Hagae Comitis D°. Grotio, vel D°. Gilles vander Hek, ad me in fasciculo literarum, quae in aulam transmitti solent, curandam tradas, vel alia denique commoditate, quae opportunissima videbitur, utaris. Hoc unum addo, te, si huc venias, vitam Philosopho dignam cum voluptate

transacturum, nisi praeter spem et opinionem nostram alia omnia accidant. His Vale et Salve,

Vir Clarissime,

a Nominis tui Studiosissimo

J. LUDOVICO FABRITIO,
Acad. Heidelb. Professore,
et Electoris Palatini Consiliario.

Heidelb. 16 Febr. 1673.

EPISTOLA XLVIII. (OLIM LIV.).

Amplissimo Nobilissimoque Viro.

Dº. J. LUDOVICO FABRITIO,

Acad. Heidelbergensis Professori et Electoris Palatini Consiliario,

B.d.S.

Responsio ad praecedentem.

Amplissime Vir,

Si unquam mihi desiderium fuisset alicujus facultatis professionem suscipiendi, hanc solam optare potuissem, quae mihi a Serenissimo Electore Palatino per te offertur, praesertim ob libertatem Philosophandi, quam Princeps Clementissimus concedere dignatur; ut jam taceam, quod dudum desideraverim sub Imperio Principis, cujus sapientiam omnes admirantur, vivere. Sed quoniam nunquam publice docere animus fuit, induci non possum, ut praeclaram hanc occasionem amplectar, tametsi rem diu mecum agitaverim. Nam cogito primo, me a promovenda Philosophia cessare, si instituendae juventuti vacare velim. Cogito deinde, me nescire, quibus limitibus libertas ista Philosophandi intercludi debeat, ne videar publice stabilitam Religionem perturbare velle: quippe schismata non tam ex ardenti Religionis studio oriuntur, quam ex vario hominum affectu vel contradicendi studio, quo omnia, etsi recte dicta sint, depravare et damnare solent. Atque haec cum jam expertus sim, dum vitam privatam et solitariam ago, multo magis timenda erunt, prostquam ad hunc dignitatis gradum adscendero. Vides itaque, Vir Amplissime, me non spe melioris fortunae haerere, sed prae tranquillitatis amore, quam aliqua ratione me obtinere posse credo, modo a publicis Lectionibus abstineam. Quapropter te enixissime rogo, ut Serenissimum Electorem ores, ut mihi hac de re amplius deliberare liceat, deinde ut favorem Clementissimi Principis cultori devotissimo conciliare pergas, quo magis tibi devincias,

Amplissime Nobilissimeque Domine,

Tuum ex asse

B.d.S.

Hagae Comitis 30. Martii 1673.

II.

KORTE VERHANDELING VAN GOD, DE MENSCH, EN DESZELFS WELSTAND.

Voor deze in de Latijnse taal beschreven door *B.D.S.* ten dienste van zijne leerlinge die zig wilde begeven tot de oeffeninge der *Zeedekonst* en *waare Wijsbegeerte,*

En nu in de Neêrduytse spraak overgezet ten dienste

van de Liefhebbers van *waarheid en deugd*: op dat die daarvan zo breed opgeven, en hun drek en vuyligheid aan de eenvoudige voor amberdegrys in de vuyst duwen, een maal de mond gestopt mogten worden, en ophouden te lasteren, dat zy nog niet verstaam; *God, hun zelven, en malkanders welstand helpen in agt neemen,* En die krank in't verstand zijn door den geest der Zagtmoedigheid en Verdraagzaamheid geneezen, naa't Voorbeeld van de Heer Christus, onzen besten Leermeester.

III.

SOCIETAS SPINOZANA.

The Society was formed in 1921, with the assistance and patronage of such international scholars and authorities as Höffding, Pollock, Brunschwicg, Gebhardt, Meijer, and Van der Tak. Its permanent Headquarters are at The Hague (Archimedes-straat 109). It has published:—

CHRONICON SPINOZANUM. Tomus Primus. Hagæ Comitis. Curis Societatis Spinozanæ. MCMXXI. pp. xxiv. 326.

The volume is reminiscent in its format of the original *Opera Posthuma.* It is a polyglot symposium, and contains among other papers:—

HOFFDING. *Die drei Gedankenmotive Spinozas.*

BRUNSCHWICG. *Sur l'interpretation du Spinozisme.*

POLLOCK. *Spinoza's Political Theory.*

CARP. *Naturrecht und Pflichtbegriff nach Spinoza.*

WOLFSON. *Spinoza's Definition of Substance and Mode.* (Note.—This writer promises a volume soon, entitled *Spinoza, the Last of the Mediævals.*)

MEIJER. *Drie ambtelijke stukken betrekking Lebbende op Spinozas levensgeschiedenis.*

BORKOWSKI. *Der erste Anhang zu Spinozas Kurzer Abhandlung.*

GEBHARDT. *Spinoza und der Platonismus.*

The second volume has appeared, and, like the first, contains valuable papers on Spinoza from international contributors. The third has been issued.

In addition, a *Bibliotheca Spinozana* has been published, containing:—

I. *Spinozana, 1897-1922.* Dr. W. Meijer.

II. *Die Schriften des Uriel da Costa, mit Einleitung, Ubertragung und Regesten von Carl Gebhardt.*

IV.

HET SPINOZAHUIS.

This is the cottage in which Spinoza lived at Rijnsburg and now the Spinoza Museum. (Dr. Wolf's edition of the *Short Treatise* contains a photograph of the *Spinozahuis.*)

This institution issues a brochure which reviews annually Spinoza literature, and issues Bibliographical matter and other announcements of interest.

INDEX.

References given only in the Bibliography are not included in this index. Those in footnotes, however, are included.

Brown, Prior & Co. Pty. Ltd., 430 Little Bourke St., Melbourne.

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(*To be published shortly*).