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NIETZSCHE IN AUSTRALIA

A Literary Inquiry into a
Nationalistic Ideology

NOEL MACAINSH

James Cook University of North Queensland
Australia

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Department of English
James Cook University of North Queensland
Australia 4811

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"When I mentioned casually how much Nietzsche had meant to me and to others I knew in Australia, I saw your eyes light up and I guessed that my remark fitted in with some theory of yours. And so I promised to explain at more length why Zarathustra found as natural a habitat among the criss-crossing gorges of the Blue Mountains as in the woodlands around Lake Silvaplana, six thousand feet above men and time. The landscape which I invoke in my youth, with pangs inseparable from the crystalline vista and the blue trees of the distance. The pathos of distance: the phrase is Nietzsche's and means much more than a hazy nostalgia or a romanticism of loss. I want to tell you what I make out in that pure distance; not because I think my youthful pangs more important than anyone else's, but because they, like anyone else's, are capable of yielding up a pattern of meaning. And a pattern in question is that which happens to interest you: the pattern of Nietzsche in Australia."

1.
Jack Lindsay

1. An autobiographical fragment for L.L. Whyte, in "Zarathustra in Queensland", *Meanjin*, Vol.7, No.4, 1948, p.211.

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Preface

The purpose of the present study is to consider the role of the German author, Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (1844-1900), in the literary development of a nationalistic ideology in Australia, as expressed principally in the works of William Baylebridge (pseudonym of William Blocksidge, 1883-1941) and P.R. Stephensen (1901-1965). The main line of the inquiry traverses an examination of Baylebridge's thought in its philosophical and biological context, his "practical" doctrine of the New Nationalism, the polemical activity of P.R. Stephensen, the ideology of the Australia-First Movement, and a brief account of the subsequent Commission of Inquiry into this Movement. Some reference is also made to the "Dionysian Aesthetic" of Norman Lindsay, as another line of Nietzschean influence with which P.R. Stephensen was associated. A concluding section reviews this material within a wider context of Australian culture and attempts a general assessment of the role of Nietzschean thought therein.

The ideas dealt with here have been considered in relation to the watershed of thought precipitated by Darwin's *Origin of Species*, published in 1859. The horror and recoil prompted in sensitive minds by the apparently scientifically proven process of natural selection, as described by Darwin, found a wealth of expression in various attempts to raise Lamarck above Darwin and thus construct a theory of purposive development, in which the physical, mental, and even spiritual gains of human effort are biologically conserved and transmitted to future generations as a constantly accumulating capital to be employed for still further gains. Also, evolutionism has prompted a criticism of human values which, initially attended with a certain iconoclastic bravado, has become increasingly tight-lipped in more recent attempts to cope with what is said to be a growing nihilism. In these attempts, evolutionism itself has now largely retreated from the foreground of consideration and has given place to the various therapeutic efforts of phenomenological analysis, existentialist 'commitment' or, say, Karl Jaspers' plea for the ideal of "boundless communication".

Nietzsche's relevance to this complex of problems is rich,

provocative and, to a considerable degree, ambiguous. Erich Heller¹ has said that to answer the question "Do you understand Nietzsche?" is like answering the question "Do you know Rome?" "The answer is simple only if you have never been there." Continuing the simile, one could say that Nietzsche's works are a city from which many fascinated visitors have returned, quickened with what they have seen, eager to incorporate their impressions in their own personal diaries, but inevitably limited by a situation in which, though the general features appear clear enough on first approach, the whole prospect subsequently changes to one of increasingly labyrinthine and Kafkaesque complexity, the more one seeks to find the datum points. This situation has not daunted some writers who have been content to cease their inquiry into Nietzsche's work as soon as they have found inspiration and, or, confirmation of themselves in some partial aspect of Nietzsche's work. Here, one thinks of Darwinian interpretations, of Superman and Life-Force doctrines, such as that of George Bernard Shaw, and of Nazi falsifications.

Additionally, there have been discoveries and controversies about the texts of Nietzsche's writings. Most of this has only recently been revealed to the general public. Nietzsche's sister gained all rights to his papers in 1893 and retained control of them in her Nietzsche-Archiv until she died in 1935. She had married an extreme German nationalist, Bernhard Foerster, and her sympathies lay with her husband's cause. Professor Karl Schlechta has exposed a considerable number of forgeries, which have tended to represent Nietzsche's relations with his sister and her 'Deutsche-Nationale' interests more favourably than the facts warrant. However, the most important point for the present study is that Schlechta has raised controversy over *The Will-to-Power*, a work which was not known to Nietzsche in its present form but which was posthumously compiled by Elisabeth Foerster-Nietzsche and her assistants, principally Peter Gast. This work has been presented as Nietzsche's main philosophical statement and has been prominent in extending his influence. The selection thus made from Nietzsche's unpublished writings was presumptively arranged in accordance with Nietzsche's plan of the 17th March, 1887. There is no doubt that Nietzsche intended to produce such a work.

1. Erich Heller: Ludwig Wittgenstein. *Encounter* 72, Sept. (1959), p.41.

But the plan used is not the only one he made. Neither the plan of *The Will-to-Power*, as issued, nor the selection and arrangement of materials made in accordance with this plan, have been approved by Nietzsche. Schlechta, in his three-volume edition of Nietzsche's works,¹ has dismembered the 'Will-to-Power', as hitherto known, and has presented the various aphorisms etc. in what is said to be their original unclassified sequence, under the general heading of "From the remains of the 80's" ("Aus dem Nachlass der Achtzigerjahre").

Slechta's treatment of *The Will-to-Power* has raised vehement criticism, particularly from Dr Erich F. Podach.² It is not desired to comment on this controversy here; but so far as the present study is concerned, it does raise problems requiring decision before the examination of Nietzsche's influence can be proceeded with. It would be too extreme to exclude the whole of *The Will-to-Power* from a consideration of Nietzsche's philosophy, on the grounds that it is an arbitrary compilation having no approved status in Nietzsche's eyes. This would deprive us, if not of Nietzsche's approved views, at least of a wide range of suggestive material, relevant not only to the interpretation of Nietzsche's works but also to further thought on the class of problems dealt with. Schlechta's work of course does not imply this extreme attitude, but it does very much tend to reduce the status of *The Will-to-Power*, even as literary remains: Schlechta would have the notes largely regarded as rejected materials. On the other hand, it is certainly going too far to accept uncritically the claims of Nietzsche's sister that *The Will-to-Power* as presented by her Archiv stands as the philosophical "main-work" that her brother intended. Apart from the procedure adopted in its compilation, the argument mustered by Schlechta has too much force to allow this.³ Rather, the position adopted in the present study is that of regarding *The Will-to-Power* as a valid production of Nietzsche's, to be referred to like any other of his works, but with a cautionary proviso when

1. Friedrich Nietzsche: *Werke in drei Bänden*. Edited by Karl Schlechta, pub. Carl Hanser Verlag, Munich, 1954-1956.

2. cf. e.g., Erich F. Podach: *Ein Blick in Notizbuecher Nietzsches. Eine schaffensanalytische Studie*. Wolfgang Rothe Verlag, Heidelberg 1963. cf. "Ballyhoo und Wissenschaft", pp.199ff.

3. Karl Schlechta: *Philologischer Nachbericht*, in Vol.III of the same author's edition of Nietzsche's works, op.cit. pp.1403-1404.

matters stand in too obvious isolation, contradiction, or inadequacy of formulation, compared with his other works. This applies, for example, to his views on eugenics. The advantage of adopting this position in the present study is that it enables us to follow Nietzsche's influence in the form in which it was originally presented to the general body of readers and thus to bring it into a more convenient relation with other instances of Nietzschean influence, as well with the general body of Nietzsche exegesis and criticism.

A further procedural difficulty relates to the changes that have taken place in Nietzsche interpretation. Matters would be simplified here if one could simply refer to standard interpretations that embrace those aspects of Nietzsche's thought relevant in the present context. But, as known, the interpretation of Nietzsche has, broadly speaking, passed through stages of Darwinian individualism, Dionysian affirmation, cultural criticism and to a more recent stage of metaphysical and existentialist emphasis. In face of the lack of any final agreement on the interpretation of Nietzsche's works, a choice has had to be made here between experts, on certain points, and occasionally the present writer has felt compelled to argue for his own interpretations. Certainly, there has been no desire to occupy space with yet further comment on "what Nietzsche means". But, though as much use as possible has been made of generally accredited studies, particularly of Kaufmann, the stress that William Baylebridge places on thought "at the philosophical level" makes it highly desirable that Nietzsche's philosophy be brought out clearly and shown in relation to other relevant aspects of nineteenth-century thought, in a way that is not always to be found in the literature readily available. The space allotted to this task is justified, firstly, by the perspective it affords for the understanding and critical control of Baylebridge's doctrine and, secondly, by the way this initial labour facilitates the ready placing and interpretation of Nietzschean responses in other authors.

Not the least interesting aspect of this study is afforded by the consideration that ideas of a highly abstract nature were used in the establishment of a *Weltanschauung* and a nationalistic ideology which, though presented as thoroughly "Australian", in fact paralleled in important features that stream of ideology which led to catastrophe in Europe.

It is hardly possible for me to acknowledge here the many debts of gratitude I owe to those people who have helped me with information

and discussion; a list of such acknowledgements would range widely over Australian poets, novelists, and scholars, as well as over Nietzsche experts in several countries. To Professor A.R. Ghisholm, of Melbourne, and the members of the Nietzsche-Kreis, Munich, I feel especially indebted.

PART I

A. Biology and evolutionary thought in the 19th century.

"Das 19. Jahrhundert sucht instinctiv nach Theorien, mit denen es seine fatalistische Unterwerfung unter das Tatsächliche gerechtfertigt findet."

1

Nietzsche.

It hardly needs more than a cursory perusal of the main theoretical statements of either William Baylebridge or Norman Lindsay to discern that their doctrines have an evolutionary character. Thus, the two main streams of Nietzschean influence in Australia, which may be characterized approximately as the nationalistic and the artistic,² have a common reference to evolution. With Baylebridge, the essential doctrine is of a vast and comprehensive evolutionary movement that is sweeping mankind into the thick of a battle. Yet, just as this emphasis on evolution is certainly present, there is, as might be said of Baylebridge's work in general, no indication of any author we might expect to be mentioned here - such as Nietzsche, Bergson, Shaw, none of whom would appear as irrelevant should their names appear in this context. For it is plain that in essential respects Baylebridge's work is permeated with the Zeitgeist of 19th and early 20th century ideas.

Baylebridge, in the earlier part of his life, travelled extensively. So far as the present study is concerned, the important part of his ideas was formed in the years preceding the First World

1. Schlechta edition of Nietzsche's Works. op.cit., Bd.III, p.511. (The emphasis is Nietzsche's.)

2. Lindsay himself has inveighed against the mere "aesthetic" as being less than the value-creating activity of the "artist". cf. Norman Lindsay: *Creative Effort. An Essay in Affirmation*, pub. Cecil Palmer, London 1924. pp.22ff.

War. Between 1908 and 1919, he was for some time in England as well as on the Continent, including Germany. P.R. Stephensen, in his Preface to Vol. II of the Memorial Edition (p.18), suggests that Baylebridge probably influenced George Bernard Shaw at this time. However gratifying the prospect of this influence may be, there is as yet no evidence for it. In fact, there is proof for the contrary. But there is also a sound basis for this conjunction - and that is the Creative Evolution of Henry Bergson, as well as certain Nietzschean features. Shaw, in his autobiographical remarks,¹ describes how he got "religion", to wit, the gospel of Creative Evolution. The force of his acceptance of this gospel was akin to religious conversion and, as customary with such an experience, it marked a turning-point in his life. This matter of conversion and the new style of activity ensuing upon it is highly suggestive of further connections, and it is proposed to remark upon it again later. Its present relevance lies in the fact that in Baylebridge's work an even more marked "religious" fervour of an evolutionary character is to be detected. To understand this characteristic, as well as the nature of his philosophy, it is essential that the historical *point de départ* be grasped. Similar considerations also apply to the comprehension of Nietzschean influence in other authors. Accordingly, some attention will now be given to the general features of evolutionary views current in Baylebridge's time.

1. cf. Shaw's Preface to *Back to Methuselah*, Worlds Classics, Oxford University Press, pp.xix et passim.

1. Darwinism - shock and recoil in England

By the end of the 19th century, the geological and biological discoveries of the scientists had already been ordered in terms of the evolutionary hypotheses they had prompted. As one writer puts it, "It is a truth universally acknowledged in the textbooks that about a hundred years ago something tremendous happened in the history of thought."¹ That "something" of course, was Charles Darwin's *The Origin of Species* (1859).

Darwin had a classical schooling in Schrewsbury School under the headmaster, Dr Butler,² whose grandson was Samuel Butler - a figure of considerable importance for the literary expression of evolutionism. Darwin's voyaging on the "Beagle", on the high seas, among remote islands and reefs, provided the data and impetus for his subsequent brooding for a further period of some 20 years. He had been impressed, among other things, by the geographical distribution of creatures in South America and by the geology of the continent. His reading of Lyell's *Principles of Geology* had, in conjunction, prompted a momentous idea. In 1844, he wrote to Hooker: "At last, gleams of light have come, and I am almost convinced (quite contrary to the opinion I started with) that species are not (it is like confessing a murder) immutable... I think I have found out the simple way by which species become exquisitely adapted to various ends."

The role of Darwinism here is important, not so much for its own specific doctrine, which probably lends more weight to a mechanistic view of evolution, as opposed to the vitalistic forms of this doctrine, more widely preferred by artistic and philosophical minds, but by the fact that, firstly, it represented a striking criticism and subsequent weakening of the special creation hypothesis, and thus gave a powerful impetus to the concept of organic evolution. Secondly, as part of this process, there arose considerable controversy over the role of natural selection in organic evolution. Earlier views which had been little regarded in their time attracted attention. For example, Lamarck's theory of the inheritance of acquired characters, which, in 1859, had been overlooked for half a century was widely recognized when it was considered to have been supplemented by Darwin's theory of natural

selection. The outcome was that after the initial triumph of Darwinism, increasing criticism set in from around 1890 onwards; its essential characteristic being a controversy on the roles of mechanism and vitalism in evolution, with Darwin generally being considered as deterministic and, in particular, anti-vitalistic.¹

It is not desired to examine this controversy with any more detail than is necessary for our present purpose, particularly as it is properly the province of biology and is widely known. However, it is convenient to recapitulate the essential features of the Darwinian theory, in order to set out all the more clearly the divergent views of those writers more central to our study.²

The main features of Darwin's contribution can be stated as follows:

1. Individuals of a species vary at random in many directions.
2. These variations are transmitted to offspring.
3. Those individuals which vary in a more favourable direction, fitting them to live in changed conditions, survive and multiply in larger numbers.
4. Consequently, in each generation there is a slow but definite approach to complete adaptation to different conditions of life.
5. In secular time, as conditions change considerably, new species evolve and become established, which are adapted to the new conditions, and in this way evolution becomes an orderly procession of species adapted to the varied and variable conditions of life such as we find in Nature.

A common feature of systems in opposition to Darwin, and having some relation to the views of Aristotle, Erasmus Darwin, Goethe and Lamarck, among others, is that variation of species is not held to be indeterminate in many directions but, to the contrary, determinate in definite directions according to the needs of the species. Here, orthogenesis replaces natural selection. There are many orthogenetic theories if account is taken of their details but, in general, they involve some principle of inner development or life-urge, such as

1. Willey, op.cit., pp.11-12.

2. From the extensive literature on Darwinism and related evolutionary theory, the information given here largely follows C.C. Hurst: *The Mechanism of Creative Evolution*, Cambridge 1932.

1. Basil Willey: *Darwin & Butler*, Hibbert Lectures, London 1960, p.9.

2. Gertrude Himmelfarb: *Darwin and the Darwinian Revolution*, London 1959, p.574.

Henri Bergson's "elan vital". From the viewpoint of the biologist, these theories are generally conceded to involve a principle incapable of experimental control and, hence, do not properly form a subject of scientific interest.

This reduced status of orthogenetic theories in the scientific field, however, stands in marked contrast to their status in philosophic and artistic speculation, where it appears that the correspondence sensed by the creative worker between orthogenetic views of evolution and the formative artistic process itself gives these views an appeal far stronger than the more random and mechanistic process described by Darwin. From the orthogenetic standpoint, the artist can consider himself as participating purposively in the work of evolution, can feel himself, not as isolated and prone to domination by environmental demands, but as inwardly united with an activity vaster than he himself is, but which creatively depends on him. At least, the imaginative prospect is open to him. Darwinism has not exerted this kind of appeal. For example, George Bernard Shaw, in his Preface to *Back to Methuselah* (1921), writes:

"...compared to the open-eyed intelligent wanting and trying of Lamarck, the Darwinian process may be described as a chapter of accidents. As such, it seems simple because you do not at first realise all that it involves. But when its significance dawns on you, your heart sinks into a heap of sand within you. There is a hideous fatalism about it, a ghastly and damnable reduction of beauty and intelligence, of strength and purpose, of honor and inspiration, to such casually picturesque changes as an avalanche may make in a mountain landscape, or a railway accident in a human figure. To call this Natural Selection is blasphemy, possible to many for whom Nature is nothing but a casual aggregation of inert and dead matter, but eternally impossible to the spirits and souls of the righteous. If it be no blasphemy, but a truth of science, then the stars of heaven, the showers and the dew, the winter and the summer, the fire and heat, the mountains and hills, may no longer be called to exalt the Lord with us by praise: their work is to modify all things by blindly starving and murdering everything that is not lucky enough to survive in the universal struggle for hogwash." 1

Shaw's preference in the matter was for the views of Samuel Butler who, shortly after arriving in New Zealand to live as a sheep-

farmer, had read *The Origin of Species*, and, as a result, had completely lost his belief in a personal God. Willey¹ cites Butler as contributing an article in dialogue form to the Christchurch Newspaper, *The Press*,² in which there are contained the words: "I believe in Christianity, and I believe in Darwin...both being undoubtedly true....the impossibility of reconciling them must be only apparent and temporary." It is considered that this statement of Butler's is by no means of supplementary interest alone but is indicative of the fact that in the reaction to Darwinism the religious interest was not solely represented by the Bishops and those who spoke of subversion and devilishness. The Bishops would not have approved of this infidel religiosity that rose against Darwin but, in retrospect, there appears little doubt that Butler, with whom Shaw agreed, was nearer to a religious standpoint than those who sought to deal with Darwinism as a scientific phenomenon alone. Butler read Darwin attentively, feeling the power and truth of the evolutionary idea, while finding in fact that Darwin's exposition was incredible. It seems reasonable to conclude from Butler's writings that his attitude to Christianity was similar - he was drawn to a religious attitude but found the Gospels incredible, as shown, for example, in his *The Evidence for the Resurrection of Jesus Christ as contained in The Four Evangelists critically examined* (1865). He wanted religion but not Orthodoxy; he wanted evolution but not Darwin.

Butler asked the question of how human organs came to be made. His answer was that they had been made consciously in past evolutionary times, but that by habit we now made them automatically and unconsciously. Practice makes perfect, and when an activity is perfectly mastered we do it unconsciously. This, he said, is the case with our breathing, digestion, etc. There next arises the question of how we beings now living acquired these habits. The answer is, from our ancestors, our past selves. We are too much influenced by the notion of birth as something abrupt and discontinuous. He says that "a hen is only an egg's way of making another egg," meaning to convey that there is a repetition of actions already done for innumerable generations and passed on by inheritance, which Butler calls "unconscious memory".³

1. Willey, op.cit., p.63.

2. *The Press*, Dec. 20, 1862, Christchurch, New Zealand.

3. *Unconscious Memory* (1880): 1922 ed., p.15.

1. George Bernard Shaw: *Back to Methuselah*, Worlds Classics, Oxford University Press 1945. Preface, p.xliii. First pub. 1921; Revised 1944.

At this stage, he was still not aware that he had deviated implicitly from Darwin. But St. George Mivart, a Roman Catholic, as well as an eminent biologist, had critically examined Darwin too. His *The Genesis of Species* (1871) sent Butler back to Lamarck who had hitherto seemed discredited. Lamarck appeared much more reasonable to Butler - the main ground for this was to be found in Lamarck's teleological spirit, as opposed to the chance variations of Darwin. The point to be considered now was not the "origin of species" but the "origin of variations". How do variations come about, by chance or something purposive? Lamarck held that the origin of species cannot lie in the environmental conditions which determine the preservation or extinction of variations, but must reside in the unknown cause of the variations themselves. Though these questions may seem remote from literary concerns, it is important to note Lamarck's answer: that the causes which have led to variations are to be found in the effort of creatures. It was considered that Darwin had not allowed for this all-important cause, or that, in fact, he had really undermined his own case without realising it by including "use and disuse" among the causes of evolution. The word "effort" here is quite vital (in a philosophical sense also, as will be seen). The word appears frequently and with special significance throughout Baylebridge's works, and is already contained in the title of Norman Lindsay's artistic credo - *Creative Effort*.

The defect in Darwin then, from Butler's point of view, was the lack of any provision for the effort spoken of by Lamarck. Without this, Darwin could not show any real distinction between living organisms and machines. Butler wrote to Darwin's son, Francis, indicating that he was moving back towards Paley's view, of creation as the work of a Designer, with the significant difference that, for Butler, the principle of design was internal to the creature and not imposed from without. The idea of the Christian God designing his creatures from outside was replaced by the notion of a life-force, an intelligent principle incorporated within. It was not long before Butler came to regard Darwin as one of The Seven Humbugs of Christendom; and he put considerable energy into quarrelling with the non-querulous Darwin, because of the great importance he attached to the matter: "It is a battle between teleology and non-teleology." This was a point of considerable importance with Nietzsche also. Butler suspected Darwin of being of fraud, and wrote his *Evolution Old and New* (1879), both to show how much Darwin had been anticipated,

and to refute the common impression that the theory of Evolution and the idea of "purposiveness" were incompatible. He sought to remove the defence of Evolution from Darwin and place it in the hands of earlier writers. In a letter to Mivart (Feb. 27, 1884), something of his motivation may be discerned:

"I see the action of God throughout the universe... I imagine you to see God as something apart from the universe which he has taken and moulded, as it were, in the hollow of his hand, and into which he has breathed the breath of life. I see him as animating the universe - he in us, and we in him; so that the union between God and his creatures becomes closer, more indissoluble, and, at the same time, more literal and bona fide than I can imagine it as seen from any other stand-point;... admitting design, as I cordially do, is it such a very great matter, after all, whether the designer is within the organism or without it? Surely this is a detail in comparison with getting people to see that there is design at all." 1

He also acknowledged his attraction to the Church of Rome, though he could not believe in the miraculous element of Christianity.

If these remarks on Butler appear to be something of a diversion, their relevance to the viewpoint of George Bernard Shaw and as a conditioner for the reception of subsequent influences should serve to clarify their necessity. They should also serve to hint at the relevance of a religious standpoint in a context in which it at first may seem incongruous.

Also, it should be stated that though the authors so far mentioned, including Butler, may give the impression that the theory of Evolution is predominantly an English affair, this, of course, is not so.

1. *Memoirs*, Vol. I, p. 407, cited Willey, op.cit., p. 81.

2. Darwinism and Evolution in Germany

For the state of research prior to the publication of the first edition of Darwin's *The Origin of Species* in 1859, one can refer to the same author's *An Historical Sketch*, which includes a footnote concerning anticipation of the views of Lamarck: "It is rather a singular instance of the manner in which similar views arise at about the same time, that Goethe in Germany, Dr Darwin in England, and Geoffrey Saint-Hilaire...in France, came to the same conclusion on the origin of species, in the years 1794-5."¹ Later, in the introduction to *The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex* (1871), we find a special acknowledgement of the German naturalist, Ernst Haeckel:

"The conclusion that man is the co-descendant with other species of some ancient, lower, and extinct form, is not in any degree new. Lamarck long ago came to this conclusion, which has lately been maintained by several eminent naturalists and philosophers; for instance, by Wallace, Huxley, Lyell, Vogt, Lubbock, Beuchner, Rolle, etc., and especially by Haeckel. This last naturalist, besides his great work, *Generelle Morphologie* (1866), has recently (1868, with a second edition in 1870) published his *Naturliche Schöpfungsgeschichte*, in which he fully discusses the genealogy of man. If this work had appeared before my essay had been written, I should probably never have completed it. Almost all the conclusions at which I have arrived I find confirmed by this naturalist, whose knowledge on many points is much fuller than mine."

Additionally, Darwin gives the titles of works by other authors, and there is no doubt at all that, by this time, Darwin was far from alone in his views and, as hinted by himself above, may not have even been the best informed worker in their advocacy.

In Germany, *The Origin of Species* had at first been received with caution. Du Bois-Reymond and Count Keyserling had accepted it, and the first German translation by H.G. Brown was published in 1860.² Valuable support was given by *Fuer Darwin*, a book written by Fritz Mueller, a German living in Brazil. Certain of Mueller's own views were taken up by Darwin in later editions of the "Origin".³ The most

1. Charles Darwin: *The Origin of Species and The Descent of Man*, Modern Library Ed., New York, 1936, p.4.

2. Sir Gavin de Beer: *Charles Darwin*, Nelson, London, 1963, p.170.

3. *ibid.*, p.178.

influential and enthusiastic support, however, was given by Ernst Haeckel.

Haeckel was born in Potsdam in 1834, the son of a ministerial counsellor. In 1852, he had studied botany at Berlin, and subsequently passed on to the study of medicine at Wuerzburg. From there, he had come under the influence of Johannes Mueller, zoologist and physiologist, at Berlin again in 1854. Mueller's influence was decisive in determining Haeckel to devote his life to zoology. At first, however, he graduated in 1857 as Doctor of Medicine and, after clinical experience in medicine, travelled to Italy where, under the influence of the landscape, he almost gave himself up to landscape-painting, which was a life-long interest of his.

Darwin's *The Origin of Species* had already appeared while Haeckel was in Italy, and Haeckel immediately became acquainted with it on his return to Berlin. It had a powerful effect on him, and he at once proclaimed himself as a supporter of the new theory of evolution. In September 1863, he gave, before a naturalists' meeting in Stettin, the first public lecture in Germany on the theory of evolution, and from that time on became the uncontested leader of the new movement in Germany. He was referred to as "der deutsche Darwin".¹

Haeckel also developed a Weltanschauung radically different from that prevailing at the time. His views in this regard are to be found in *Die Weltraetael*, 1899, (once well-known in various English versions² under the title of *The Riddle of the Universe*) and *Die Lebenswunder*. His doctrine is, in essence, a monist position based on natural science.

Haeckel's world-view is set out clearly in his *Monism - as connecting Religion and Science - The Confession of Faith of a Man*

1. The biographical data, which is generally available, was taken in this case from Dr Wilhelm Breitenbach's Appendix to *Die Natur als Kuenstlerin*, Vita Verlag, Berlin, 1913. This Volume contains a full-page photograph of Haeckel under the words of Schiller:

Nur durch das Morgenthor des Schoenen
Drangst du in der Erkenntnis Land.

2. Perhaps the best known being Joseph McCabe's translation.

of Science.¹ This was originally an informal address delivered extemporaneously on October 9th, 1892, at Altenburg. Certain aspects of his views are of interest here, as illustrative of the way in which a whole-hearted disciple of Darwin felt impelled to develop a world-view which, while ostensibly in harmony with the Darwinian theory of evolution by Natural Selection, nevertheless exhibits an interesting bias, even a recoil, from the true implications of the Darwinian position as expressed, for example, by George Bernard Shaw.

Haeckel observed the small difference between "dead matter" and living things, how, as we go down the scale of living creatures, we approach closer to what is supposedly non-living matter or, conversely, how, if we observe higher forms of crystal structure, the resemblance to living things becomes striking. The problem of the transition from living to dead matter, he claimed is solved in Monism: living and dead are not antithetic but are a unity, though we see this unity in nature at different stages of its development. We observe, say, a crystal, a cell, a plant, an animal; but, historically, these are all subject to the same laws. Haeckel, on this basis, could speak of the "life" of crystals.² Having thus erased the customary sharp distinction between living and dead, he felt entitled to state its implications further: "Similarly, we regard the whole of human knowledge as a structural unity; in this sphere we refuse to accept the distinction usually drawn between the natural and the spiritual."³ He feels an affinity with the views of the universe as expressed by various authors, from Empedocles to David Strauss (the subject of

1. Title of English version pub. 1894 by Adam and Charles Black, London. The translation is by J. Gilchrist, M.A., B.Sc., Ph.D. Naturally, it is not implied here that the references to Darwin or Haeckel represent the full scope of influence of the Theory of Natural Selection at the time, or address themselves to the strictly biological side of the matter. For a convenient survey of Darwin's European influence there is a chapter on "The Reception of the 'Origin'" in de Beer, op.cit., pp.157-179. A large number of references, from which some idea of the national distribution of relevant biological research at the time may be gathered, is to be found collected at the end of Darwin's *Biological Work - Some Aspects Reconsidered*, by Bell, Challinor, Haldane and others, Cambridge, 1959.

2. Wilhelm Boelsche: *Haeckel: His Life and Work*, translated from German by Joseph McCabe, Fisher & Unwin, London, 1906.

3. Ernst Haeckel: *Monism*, op.cit., p.4.

Nietzsche's barbed analysis in his (*Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen*) and, oddly enough for a Darwinian, the outlook of Lamarck. It becomes plain that we are dealing with a pantheist view:

"Ever more clearly are we compelled by reflection to recognize that God is not to be placed over against the material world as an external being, but must be placed as a "divine power" or "moving spirit" within the cosmos itself....Ever more irresistibly is it borne in upon us that even the human soul is but an insignificant part of the all-embracing 'world-soul'." 1

It is also interesting to observe the acceptance of the idea of the inheritance of acquired characters: "The inheritance of characters acquired during the life of the individual, is an indispensable axiom of the monistic doctrine of evolution", and "Those who with Weismann and Galton, deny this, entirely exclude thereby the possibility of any formative influence of the outer world upon organic form" (*Anthropogenia*, 4th Ed., pp.xiii, 836).² This idea was not rejected by Darwin but was regarded as playing a small role only. It is often supposed that Darwin did not accept it at all, or that its acceptance is a weakening concession on Darwin's part.

Having thus seen how the essentially mechanistic, random variations of Darwin have fared in the hands of his chief continental supporter it is not altogether surprising to read of Joseph McCabe's account of "The International Congress of Freethinkers" which, in 1904, decided to hold its annual gathering in Rome, and to learn from this rather enthusiastic English supporter of Haeckel's works that, at the centre of one long-established religion, another religion was to be set up. As McCabe puts it:

"We met, seven thousand strong, in the heart of Rome, and Rome - the jade - smiled prettily as we marched up the Via Venti Settembre, as it had smiled on processions of Cybels, and then on processions of Catholics. Haeckel was greeted with a wild demonstration as he stepped on to the platform in the great Cortile of the College. Straight and proud, white with age but pink with more than the freshness of a young man, he adjured them in futile German, in his thin, inaudible voice, to form themselves into a new Church, the great Association of Monists. Few

1. *ibid.*, p.16.

2. *ibid.*, cited p.96, where there is also a reference to Ludwig Wilser's: *Die Vererbung der geistigen Eigenschaften*, Heidelberg 1892.

heard and less understood him, but his name was on every heart and his reception superb."¹

The relevance of Haeckel in the present context is based on several grounds. There is, firstly, his exemplification of yet another religious reaction, albeit unorthodox, to what Driesch had termed the "chance theory" of Darwinism - betraying a reluctance, seemingly not properly conscious, to accept the notion of chance and its entailed regard of the entropy, even absurdity, participant in human evolution. This reaction is all the more interesting in that Haeckel is commonly referred to as being "atheistic"² and "mechanistic" - despite the religious connotations clearly set out in his "Monism", and alluded to in the quotations given above.

Secondly, there is the relevance of Haeckel as a popular influence in intellectual life in England around the turn of the century.

Haeckel's books are read in large numbers and discussed with intense feeling. In 1900, as McCabe remarks, Haeckel was then only "entering upon the period of vast popular influence". By 1906, he was read by hundreds of thousands in Germany, England, France and Italy "...the thoughts of this professor of zoology in an obscure German town are discussed eagerly by bronzed and blackened artisans in the workshops of London, Paris and Tokyo, as well as throughout Germany."³ He was certainly not the only person to associate Darwinism with a non-orthodox world-view having religious overtones, but he was important as a popular formative influence having a high scientific standing.

Thirdly, the influence of Haeckel is useful as illustrative of the reception of Darwinism in Germany, and of the more popular and scientifically oriented accompaniment of other evolutionary ideas. As Wheeler states, "From 1860 or so German biology was again dominated by the excessive cult of a philosophic idea, this time 'Darwinismus'... This is also illustrated by the whole history of German Kultur and politics from about 1860 till the Great War."⁴

1. Joseph McCabe's supplementary chapter VIII to Boelsche, op.cit., pp. 318-319.

2. L. Richmond Wheeler: *Vitalism: its history and validity*. London 1939, p.79. Wheeler, of course, acknowledges the "mass or erroneous doctrines" that Haeckel added, including the provision of cells with psychic properties and the endowment of all substances with "soul". Nevertheless, he regards Haeckel as "anti-vitalist". It is not desired to comment on this here beyond indicating the religious direction of Haeckel's doctrines.

3. Boelsche, op.cit., McCabe's remarks p.294.

4. Wheeler, op.cit., p.220.

The reaction to this in biology was most prominently represented in the vitalist criticism and theory put forward by Hans Adolf Driesch. But, on a broader front, there was a linking up of the materialist conception of history of Karl Marx, the atheism of Ludwig Feuerbach, and the positivism of the natural sciences as influenced by Darwin and Haeckel. The world was coming to be regarded as an interplay of dialectical contraries, essentially composed of matter and force, unfolding in a merciless struggle for existence. The dynamic tempo of industry and the growth of state-power since the 'Reichsgründung' of 1870/71 was in itself highly unsettling to those who longed, as did the middle-classes, for the preservation of human values, as they saw them, enduringly based on the legacy of German idealism. However, the pragmatism of industry, nationalism, the rise of the masses, and the crass optimism generated by material success, militated against the best traditions of the "Bürgerertum". There was progress, clearly in the ascendent, and, for those who could not stomach the kind of progress it was, pessimism remained. The outright expression of this pessimism, or the tendency to it, hangs over German literature of the latter part of the century, in the work of such authors as Keller, Raabe, F. Th. Vischer, Fontane, and that of Burckhardt's old age.

The example of *The Origin of Species* was prompting the historians to seek for a more consistent rationale of the rise and fall of States than the Romantic historians and exponents of "Historismus" had attempted. The Romantics had developed a sense for the richness and variety of the past, for what was unique to a people in each time and place. They had turned to folk literature, traditions, laws, and language development. Wary of simple, general solutions, they had been impressed by the metaphor of growth, the organic complexity of institutional unfolding. However, with the new example of explanation in biology, a common factor in the organic growth and decay of nations was sought - and found to reside in the struggle for survival; certain nations at certain times were most fitted to survive at the expense of others. An examination of the situation at the time would show wherein the advantage lay, what, in fact, the weapons were - just as some historians attributed Britain's success to liberalism.

Concomitant with this approach, there appeared the notion, contrary to frequent romantic supposition, that the past was less than the present, that history, like biological evolution, moved one-

way and upwards. The Marxists sought to clarify the whole of history, forwards as well as backwards, in these terms. Nor were they the only ones.

At this stage, it should be brought to mind again that evolution in a wider sense than that of the strictly biological sciences was no new idea in Germany. As well as the notion of organic development and struggle in the life of nations, there had long existed still wider notions of development. Herder, for example, in the latter decades of the 18th century had set out his greatest work, *Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit* (1784/91), the idea of history as a progressive education of humanity. Lessing had set out this idea too in his *Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts* (1780), but with Herder, it was combined with Leibniz's idea that change is the evolutionary emergence under an inner force of powers originally implicit in existence. Herder considered religion, history, climate etc. as the expression of organic forces of growth uniting mankind and nature in accordance with natural laws of development. The first part of his "Ideen" dealt with the history of the earth, the second gave a survey of the variety of peoples in their geographical, climatic, physical and other uniqueness. A third part of the "Ideen" depicted the history of mankind up to the Middle Ages. Although the history of peoples is described by Herder in terms of time, place and "genetischem Nationalcharakter", the leading idea is that of a theologically oriented education of mankind, combining humanism and christian morality, towards the achievement of the finest crown of humanity. "...zur Erreichung des schoensten Kranzes der Humanitaet und Menschenwuerde."

With Leibniz and Herder, there was an emphasis on harmony as an essential factor in the working of the inner laws of existence. But with Hegel, we find that the working of the evolutionary organic forces proceeds by the overcoming of opposites; thus the notion of the struggle for existence is to be found at a philosophical level in German thought well ahead of Darwin.

It is not desired at this stage to elaborate further on this matter, other than to say that, at the time of Darwin's reception in Germany, and the spread of his ideas by Haeckel and others, there already existed a substantial philosophical development of evolutionary ideas. This was not the case in England.

3. Nietzsche, the new biology and evolutionism

It is rather surprising, when attempting to grasp the intellectual temper of Nietzsche's formative and productive period, as well as the temper prevailing in the early period of his growing influence, to discover the extent of the role played by biological theory, especially if one's approach to Nietzsche is made under the common if cursory impression that his thought is largely some kind of "Auseinandersetzung" with Wagner and Schopenhauer.

As against this impression, however, most authors do in fact acknowledge the importance of biological theory in Nietzsche's works, but later writers usually do so in a way that does little justice to its historical setting or to its basic role as the stimulant to Nietzsche's later development. For example, Kaufmann plainly declares: "The problem of the old faith and the new, the challenge of Darwin, and the sanction and derivation of moral values: these are the themes of most of Nietzsche's later works."¹ And it is the later works that are the more important ones in this present inquiry. It is true that Kaufmann refers to this aspect of Nietzsche's work, citing, in particular, Nietzsche's preference for Lamarckian doctrines, but there is little other material that Kaufmann advances to support and expand this view directly in its relation to current scientific thought at the time.

In order to regain a more faithful perspective on Nietzsche's reception in its early stages, some change in emphasis is necessary here. Nietzsche's thought, in its essential movement, has some affinities with that of Samuel Butler, in that, in differing ways, the two thinkers have sensed a common enemy and have sought a counter-vailing power in whatever transcendental mode thought could justifiably attain to. In this case, the emphasis should first be placed on the natural science of the times, as the prime mover of the response engendered. This is not to depreciate the unique role of Nietzsche's own thought here (although others have advanced the view that Nietzsche's uniqueness lies in his style of presentation, rather than in the ideas he advanced), nor is it enough to warrant a sociological, even Marxian, explanation, since the shift of emphasis made here falls

1. Kaufmann, op.cit., p.II6

too short for this.

Opinions on the extent of Nietzsche's knowledge of natural science vary - some authors such as Riehl and Raoul Richter are of the view that his knowledge in this regard was inadequate; others take a contrary view, as for example Professor Alexander Tille in his *Von Darwin bis Nietzsche*.

Elisabeth Foerster-Nietzsche, despite the doubt that has been cast upon her reliability, particularly in the matter of letters and other matters that touch upon her personal relationship to her brother, describes the influence of Darwinism on his thought and that of his time, without suggesting anything that is improbable or contradictory to passages we can find in Nietzsche's works themselves. Elisabeth Foerster-Nietzsche denies that the "Uebermensch" of her brother is properly to be conceived on the lines of the Darwinian development of a higher species. However, she states that it is another thing when we question "what influence that great movement of natural science of the second half of the previous century, in which the teaching of evolution stood at the centre, has had on my brother." She goes on to say that one can hardly realise how great was the influence of this teaching on the minds of the time, for more than 30 years. "Man macht sich jetzt kaum eine Vorstellung, wie sehr vor etwas mehr als dreissig Jahren die Gemuether davon erfuellt waren."¹ Her brother took the liveliest part in this struggle of opinions, already as a student, and particularly as the young professor at Basle.

It appears that Nietzsche had made the acquaintance of Darwinism at some time prior to September 1866, for it is at the end of August in this year that he recommends Lange's: *Geschichte des Materialismus*,² in a letter to his friend Gersdorff. This book had appeared in 1866 also, and Nietzsche was impressed by the way in which, to his mind, it justified the philosophy of Schopenhauer. George Bernard Shaw, it may be noted, was also to regard Schopenhauer later as the metaphysical complement to natural history, particularly to Lamarck.³ Nietzsche recommends the book again to Gersdorff in February, 1868,⁴ and, on this

1. Elisabeth Foerster-Nietzsche: *Das Leben Friedrich Nietzsches*, Naumann, Leipzig 1895, Vol. II, 2, p. 521.

2. This book is also listed as being in Nietzsche's library. cf. Berthold op.cit., p. 432. Nietzsche's letter is reproduced in Schlechta, op.cit., Bd. III, p. 970.

3. George Bernard Shaw: *Back to Methuselah*, op.cit., p. xxxi.

4. Schlechta, op.cit., Bd. III, p. 991.

second occasion, draws his friend's attention to that part of the book that treats of Darwin. He takes the view that by the reading of this book his friend will discover a veritable treasure:

"Wenn du Lust hast Dich vollstaendig ueber die materialistische Bewegung unserer Tage, ueber die Naturwissenschaften mit ihren Darwinischen Theorien...so weiss ich Dir immer nichts Ausgezeichneteres zu empfehlen als *Die Geschichte des Materialismus* von Friedr. Alb. Lange (Iserlohn 1866), ein Buch, das unendlich mehr gibt als der Titel verspricht und das man als einen wahren Schatz wieder und wieder anschauen und durchlesen mag."

This assertion shows that his admiration was surely excessive, though Lange's exposition of Darwin is not generally held to be inferior to the majority of expositions of Darwin published at the time.

However, it was at Basle that the influence of Darwin became most tangible for Nietzsche, for here he met, as colleague, Ludwig Ruetimeyer, Professor of Paleontology, a man much esteemed by Nietzsche.¹ This scholar, at the start, took a rather important part in the Darwinian movement in Germany. His relationship with Darwin had already existed for some time, at this stage, because in 1895 Darwin had shown a lively interest in "the admirable researches of Professor Ruetimeyer."² Relations between the two naturalists were very cordial.

In view of Nietzsche's high regard for Ruetimeyer, it is worthwhile to consider that the latter's acceptance of Darwinism was not entirely orthodox - the point of divergence being, not the concept of evolution as such, but the theory of selection. In a review of the German translation by I.V. Carus of the first volume of Charles Darwin's *The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex*,³ Ruetimeyer writes of Darwin's attempt to apply the historical method to the field of psychological history, intellect and morals, in an analogous manner to the way Darwin had earlier dealt with physical characteristics, and he feels obliged to register his misgivings about this attempt, by giving several detailed objections directed particularly against Darwin's views on sexual selection. In general, it was Ruetimeyer's

1. Elisabeth Foerster-Nietzsche, op.cit., p. 521. Ruetimeyer: *Gesammelte kleinere Schriften*, I, p. 21.

2. Charles Darwin: *The Origin of Species*, Modern Library Edition 1936, p. 22.

3. Ruetimeyer: "Referate ueber 'Die Abstammung des Menschen und die geschlechtliche Zuchtwahl'", Stuttgart 1871, in *Archiv fuer Anthropologie*, 1870, Vol. 304, pp. 335-337.

view that the theory of selection did not explain changes in species, although he had already come to accept the idea of evolution, before Darwin had stated it. He was not alone in this, for, quite apart from the philosophical expression of the idea, there were a number of other German naturalists, such as Carl Ernst von Baer and Naegeli, who had also done likewise.

The influence of Ruetimeyer on Nietzsche is shown by the latter's sharing of Ruetimeyer's antipathy to Haeckel. For, in a trenchant attack on Haeckel,¹ Ruetimeyer deplores Haeckel's popular lectures based on his *Generelle Morphologie der Organismen* (2 Vols. 1866), not because of their concessions to common understanding, but because they are so unscientific as to form a kind of "phantasy-literature" clothed in a medieval style of presentation.

The significance of Ruetimeyer's criticism of Haeckel is that it demonstrates Nietzsche's support for Ruetimeyer and his views, together with his strong dislike of Haeckel. Nietzsche, we are told, stood on the side of Ruetimeyer, Baer and Naegeli, and the "entire armament" necessary for this was present in his library.² The 'armament' (Ruestzeug) included Ruetimeyer's own writings, Naegeli's *Entstehung und Begriff der Naturhistorischen Art*, 1865, and the writings of Ernst von Baer, of which Elisabeth Foerster-Nietzsche has lively recollections of her brother reading out aloud. Besides reading of these matters, Nietzsche must have had occasions for personal discussion of them. Bernoulli mentions the "Dozentenspietage" which regularly brought together the professors of the different faculties of the University of Basle, offering favourable occasions for the exchange of views on questions of current importance.

We have already mentioned Ruetimeyer's views, his acceptance of Darwin's evolutionary doctrine in general, but with reservations, nevertheless, on the theory of natural selection. For Ruetimeyer, it was essential to stress the importance of adaptation to the

environment, and though he was a little sceptical of the doctrine of the inheritance of acquired characters, he declared that the animal was the product of two essential conditions: heredity and adaptation.¹ This, of course, is a position that deviates from Darwin, in the direction of Lamarck.

At this stage of our account, we might, for lack of sufficient space to demonstrate the matter, invoke the view of Nietzsche's sister, who states that her brother was inclined to allot the main roles in the development of evolutionary theory, not only to Lamarck, but to German savants, principally those we have already mentioned above, and to Goethe.² Above all, he believed that the overall theory of evolution would have gained entry into the scientific world only with difficulty, if it had not been for Hegel's preparatory work:

"Nehmen wir den erstaunlichen Griff Hegels, der damit durch alle logischen Gewohnheiten und Verwöhnungen durchgriff, als er zu lehren wagte, dass die Artbegriffe sich auseinander entwickeln: mit welchem Satze die Geister in Europa zur letzten grossen wissenschaftlichen Bewegung praeformirt wurden, zum Darwinismus - denn ohne Hegel kein Darwin. Ist an dieser Hegel'schen Neuerung, die erst den entscheidenden Begriff 'Entwicklung' in die Wissenschaft gebracht hat, etwas Deutsches? - Ja ohne allen Zweifel... Wir Deutsche sind Hegelianer, auch wenn es nie einen Hegel gegeben haette, insofern wir (im Gegensatz zu allen Lateinern) dem Werden, der Entwicklung instinctiv einen tieferen Sinn und reicheren Werth zumessen als dem, was 'ist' - wir glauben kaum an die Berechtigung des Begriffs 'Sein' -; ebenfalls insofern wir unsrer menschlichen Logik nicht geneigt sind einzuräumen, dass sie die Logik an sich, einzige Art Logik sei." 3

Here, we find, as others have noticed, a conviction that, to the German mind, development, unfolding, becoming, is instinctively felt to be of more importance than what exists at the moment. Without Hegel - no Darwin! All Germans are Hegelians. But are all Germans Darwinians? Certainly not. Hegel and the unfolding of the World-Spirit

1. *Archiv fuer Anthropologie*, Bd. 3, pp. 301-302, a review by Ruetimeyer of 2 publications containing popular lectures of Haeckel: *Ueber die Entstehung und den Stammbaum des Menschengeschlechts*, Berlin, 1868, and *Naturliche Schoepfungsgeschichte. Gemeinverstaendliche wissenschaftliche Vortraege ueber die Entwicklungslehre im Allgemeinen und diejenige derselben auf den Ursprung des Menschen und anderer mit zusammenhaengender Grundfragen der Naturwissenschaft*, Berlin, 1868.

2. Elisabeth Foerster-Nietzsche, op. cit., p. 522.

3. Bernoulli: *Prima Overbeck und Friedrich Nietzsche*, I, 279.

1. *Gesammelte kleinere Schriften*, I, 323.

2. Elisabeth Foerster-Nietzsche: *Das Leben Friedrich Nietzsches*, zweiter Band, p. 522. It is to be mentioned that similar material, as in this biography, is to be found also in the English version, *The Lonely Nietzsche*, by Elisabeth Foerster-Nietzsche, but that Lamarck is twice referred to there as a German scholar - an error not made by Elisabeth Foerster-Nietzsche in the German version.

3. Elisabeth Foerster-Nietzsche, loc. cit.

have a prior and more comprehensive significance than Darwin. England might have trouble accommodating Darwin philosophically, but not so Germany.

There is one other point to be noted at this stage. Nietzsche's sister has written of the importance of Darwin to her brother. She also introduces a moderating view, which others have also accepted and which recalls Nietzsche's respect for Burckhardt, namely that Nietzsche's enthusiasm for Greek culture is really of more importance than his interest in natural science. She writes:

"Es liegt bis jetzt noch nicht klar vor Augen, welche Fäden von jener grossen wissenschaftlichen Bewegung der Entwicklungstheorie zu meines Bruders Theorie der Hoherzuechtung der Menschheit fuhren. Will man durchaus einen Einfluss der einen auf die andere Theorie annehmen, so muss man ihn jedenfalls in die letzten Jahre vor und die ersten Jahre nach 1870 zuruecklegen, da sich der Gedanke der Hoherzuechtung bereits in den Niederschriften jener Jahre findet. Man darf aber nicht vergessen, dass diese Hoherzuechtung von Anfang an allein in den Willen und die Hand der hohergearteten Menschen gelegt wurde und dass der Kampf um's Dasein, den mein Bruder stets als hoechstens zum Thier zurueckbildend ablehnte, in einer andern und verlaerteten Gestalt erscheint, naemlich als Kampf um hoeheres, staerkeres Dasein und als Wettkampf um Sieg und Uebermacht. Hierbei bemerken wir auf das Staerkste den Einfluss der Griechen, wenn sich auch der Begriff und das Ziel des Kampfes weder mit dem griechischen noch mit dem Darwin'schen vollstaendig deckt. Sicherlich erscheint der Einfluss von naturwissenschaftlicher Seite gering im Verhaeltnis zu dem des Stadiums seiner geliebten Griechen. Der Anblick dieser erhabenen, in ihrer Culturhoehe und Schoenheit nicht wieder erreichten griechischen Welt ist ihm sein ganzes Leben hindurch eine Bestaetigung seiner hoechsten Hoffnung geblieben, dass eine Hoherbildung, ein Idealzustand der Menschheit, naemlich: eine Verschwisterung von Cultur und Natur, kein leerer Traum, sondern eine zu verwirklichende Moeglichkeit sei."¹

To this view, that Nietzsche throughout his life found that his studies of the Greeks gave confirmation of his highest hopes for the elevation of mankind to an ideal state, we wish only to add that this does not materially affect Nietzsche's reception within the context of his time. The essential thing, as shall be explained later, is that Nietzsche had his own view-point on evolution and was concerned with

the attainment of a higher human, or even super-human state. Wherever he may have found confirmation of his hopes, whether it be with the Greeks or the Renaissance or in his own intuitions of what was still to come, he was brought by the necessity of meaningfully relating his hopes to the knowledge of his times, to enter into relations with Darwinism and thus become relevant to other minds troubled with the horrors of a meaningless process of random selection overlaid with the struggle for existence.

However, it is not proposed to elaborate further on this aspect of Nietzsche, for the present. Rather, it is intended that Nietzsche now be seen in terms of his reception in England at the time, that is, in terms of what he frequently meant to readers around the turn of the century. Later, there will be a need to return in more detail to Nietzsche's own standpoint.

1. Elisabeth Foerster-Nietzsche, op.cit., pp.524-525.

B. The reception of Nietzsche's works in England

Apparently, the first mention of Nietzsche in an English work is in George Egerton's "Keynotes" (1892). This work, written in fact by a woman, Mary Chavelita Bright (nee Dunne), was a rather "advanced" collection of short stories, which, relative to the times, daringly expressed a woman's reflections on various relations between the sexes. A point to notice here is the association of Nietzsche with a movement for sexual emancipation, with those who had the novelty and daring to question morals, and those who, perhaps more clearly than they could specify any new morality, were concerned to join in the excitement of smashing the propriety of establishing ways. It was a time when English publishers were issuing what Holbrook Jackson¹ called "excellent translations of modern masterpieces from many European idea-centres, and in this way writers such as Tolstoy, Ibsen, Zola, Nietzsche, D'Annunzio and Turgenev became familiar aids to advanced thought in this country."² The barrier of language had hitherto been a difficulty. But translation led to what Jackson calls "the opening up of a new country to be immediately settled by ardent colonists. Their ideas were eagerly absorbed and, what is more interesting, used in a vigorous criticism of life."³ There are some qualifications that could be made here, such as about the quality of translations of the works of Nietzsche, and on the applicability of the word "immediate" to Nietzsche's reception in England. Time has led to a more sober view of Nietzsche's work, and the sometimes strident accentuation practised, probably unwittingly, by earlier translators, under the spell of the novelty and iconoclasm of their material, is now being seen in another perspective.

Nietzsche's works, however, did not meet with rapid acceptance when first introduced. At the start of the decade, he was known only to the few who read German, including presumably, "advanced" authors such as George Egerton. The next known reference to Nietzsche is to be found in the *Sentences and Paragraphs* (1893) of the poet, John Davidson, who appears to have been the first writer in England to have adopted a Nietzschean viewpoint.

1. Holbrook Jackson: *The Eighteen Nineties*, London 1913.

2. *ibid.*, p. 155.

3. *loc. cit.*

The fact that Davidson, like William Baylebridge, was a poet, and that he became "a philosophic missionary using literature as a means of propaganda"¹ and that, furthermore, he adopted a standpoint which, again like Baylebridge, was related to Nietzsche, makes it of interest to briefly review his career.

We have it from Jackson that, of the Eighteen Nineties, there was "no more remarkable mind and more distinctive poet than John Davidson...he was noth an expression of and a protest against the decadent movement, and in his personality as well as in his tragic end he represented the struggle and defeat of his day in the cause of a bigger sense of life and a greater power over personality and destiny."² He was born in 1857, and thus would have been about 26 years senior to Baylebridge. He was the son of a minister of the Evangelical Union, as Nietzsche was the son of a pastor. His upbringing and education was in Scotland, including the Highlander's Academy at Greenock, and Edinburgh University. He became a tutor and teacher, then went to London to try to live as a writer. He produced, in his earlier career, novels, poems, plays and short stories. But it was his poetry that made a reputation for him. He himself, however, set more store by the books of his last phase, which, like Baylebridge's work, are "a designed attempt to co-ordinate and restate his ideas upon life and art."³ In Baylebridge, we find the highest level of his doctrine expressed in "Life's Testament",⁴ the work that stands first in *This Vital Flash*. Davidson published four "Testaments": *The Testament of a Vivisector* (1901), *The Testament of a Man Forbid* (1901), *The Testament of an Empire Builder* (1902) and *The Testament of John Davidson* (1908). There were also some plays belonging to this period, including *The Triumph of Mammon* (1907) and *Mammon and His Message* (1908). The use of the word "Testament" in both Baylebridge and Davidson may be coincidental but the essential content of the doctrine in both cases has basic similarities. It is not proposed to take up space by a comparison here, but from the following brief sketch of Davidson's view it is possible to recognise a kindred spirit to William Baylebridge.

1. Jackson, *op. cit.*, p. 215.

2. Jackson, *op. cit.*

3. *ibid.*, p. 217.

4. Vol. I of the *Collected Works of William Baylebridge*, 1961. *Life's Testament* was first published in 1914.

Davidson was convinced that he was bringing to the world a new form of poetry. "It is a new poetry I bring, a new poetry for the first time in a thousand years." In writing it, he believed that he spoke for the universe and that the aim of his work was "to change the mood of the world". Old values were to go, and new ones were to take their place. There is even something of Baylebridge's tone in these passages of high seriousness; for example:

"These are times

When all must to the crucible - no thought,
Practice, or use, or custom sacro-sanct
But shall be violable now."¹

Jackson contends that it was Davidson's early association with the ideas of Nietzsche that directed his innate pessimism into channels of creative inquisitiveness and speculation. "He learnt more from Nietzsche than did any other poet of his time."²

Davidson repudiated Darwinism and wished to substitute purposive direction by man - for man to have the power to determine his own evolution, and to establish the values that would forward this. So far as one can speak of a goal in Davidson's view, it is that of utmost consciousness, which will be capable of the highest ecstasy and all knowledge. There is a considerable emphasis to be found on the need for courage and high endeavour, on the will to power over everything that militates against awareness.

It is not to be thought that Davidson considered himself here to be solely the poetic executor of Nietzsche. Also, it would take considerable space to show the critical divergences and plain misunderstandings of Nietzsche to be found in Davidson's work.

That Davidson himself was, at heart, much afflicted by the state of doubt he imputed to Nietzsche is suggested by his death. On the 23rd March, 1909, he left his home and did not return. Nearly six months later, his body was discovered by fishermen in Mount's Bay. In accordance with his known wishes, he was buried at sea. It is assumed that he took his life, as this is consistent with what is known of his state of mind, shortly prior to his death, and also with his

attitude to suicide which he regarded as a legitimate human prerogative.¹

According to Dr Oscar Levy,² it was in the year following Davidson's references to Nietzsche in his *Sentences and Paragraphs* of 1893, that a group of German, English and Scottish admirers of Nietzsche arranged to bring out an authorised version of Nietzsche's works, and he states that three volumes were actually published in 1896 and 1897. Oddly enough, Levy gives no further information about this group of admirers, nor any details of the publication he is referring to. However, in the course of reviewing his own attempts at publication of Nietzsche's works in translation, he lets his glance stray back over his own hardships while enigmatically dilating upon the opposition to, and the trials of the "older Nietzscheans".

Levy, presumably having in mind the 1907 success of his publication of *Beyond Good and Evil*, adds as a factor against any expectation of success at this time that,

"We were really a beaten crew, that England had stated before she would have nothing to do with Nietzsche. Remember that we were likewise a terribly decimated crew. Of the older Nietzscheans, of those who stood sponsor for the first edition, only two, Mr Thomas Common and Mr William Haussmann, have remained faithful to the cause. Some have left the flag, others have disappeared, one has become a Catholic. John Davidson, a true Nietzschean likewise, though one more intoxicated than inspired by Nietzsche, has even taken his own life. What wonder! The battlefield of thought has its dead, its wounded, and its deserters...." ³

It is a Mr Thomas Common who, rather more explicitly, tells us of the earlier attempts to get Nietzsche's works started in England. In the "Correspondence" columns of the American periodical *The Nation*, for March 29, 1906, there appears a letter over the name of Thomas Common, of 6 Whitehouse Terrace, Corstorphine, Scotland. Mr Common, in reference to a leading article in *The Nation*, of January 18, states

1. Jackson, op.cit., p.219.

2. Dr Oscar Ludwig Levy (b.1869) ed.: *The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche*. The first complete and authorized English translation (Edinburgh and London, T.N. Foulis pub., 1909-1913.) After several volumes had been issued, the publishers re-numbered the set in the order of original composition; the earlier volumes have been changed to correspond with the later arrangement. Reference to the various translators involved in this edition is to be found in the Bibliography to this study. Levy's views above are taken from his essay: "The Nietzsche Movement in England: A Retrospect, a Confession and a Prospect" - contained in Vol.18 (1913), p.xxi.

3. Levy, loc.cit.

1. Davidson: *A Woman and Her Son*. cf. also an unsigned review, under the title of "A Prophet of Nietzsche", of Davidson's *The Testament of an Empire Builder*, in *The Academy and Literature*, 7th June 1902, p.572.

2. Jackson, op.cit., pp.230-231.

that he "had something to do with the introduction of Nietzsche to the English-speaking world from the very first".

It is made apparent here that the first edition referred to by Dr Levy is that of Dr Alexander Tille, German Lecturer in the University of Glasgow, who, as the anonymous reviewer states, in the *Times* for Friday, July 31, 1896, "is already known by his translation of some of Huxley's books into German". The same reviewer remarks that the publishers evidently think that Nietzsche has a message for English-speaking peoples, "since a translation of his complete works, carefully made, well edited, and finely printed, is now beginning to appear, and is to extend to no less than eleven octavo volumes".

As Levy remarks, the reception of these books was discouraging. The publishing firm, Henry and Co., lost money on the edition and gave up business after the publication of only three volumes in 1896 and 1897. The Macmillan Co. also entered into publishing arrangements. Levy states in the next six years, from 1897 to 1903, it was impossible to get a hearing for Nietzsche either with the public, the Press, or the publishers, and this "in spite of various endeavours by some indefatigable defenders of the faith".¹

It appears from Mr Common's letter of 1906 that Dr Tille had prepared "very careful translations of about half a dozen more volumes of Nietzsche's works, which we have not got published...."² Mention is also made therein of the publication of a book of selections, *Nietzsche as Critic, Philosopher etc.* which was equally unfortunate and unremunerative owing to the bankruptcy of a Mr Grant Richards. This bleak outlook for Nietzsche's works in England is seen by both Levy and Common as partly attributable to the character of the Anglo-Saxon peoples, who are "less ripe for the best thought than the French", or are regarded as "silently, sullenly, instinctively" opposed to Nietzschean thought.³ Additionally, there is mention by Common of unfavourable auspices under which the books were published, and a confession that the English issue of Nietzsche's works had not been too well managed: the books had been printed in Germany after a final revision at the Nietzsche-Archiv "where imperfect English was too often substituted when an alteration was made".⁴

With regard to "unfavourable auspices", Levy confesses that the

1. Levy, loc.cit., pp.ix-x.

2. *The Nation*, (U.S.A. periodical) 29th March, 1906.

3. *ibid.*

4. *ibid.*

manner of the Nietzscheans' campaign in England has very often been blamed in private conversations as well as in public utterances and, Levy adds,

"not without some shadow of justice. Our publications have been very loud, our lectures aggressive, our conversations 'conceited'. I myself have openly indulged in sneers and sarcasms of a most hearty calibre, as the Preface to this very edition and all the prefaces I wrote to the books of my friends will prove....And we have certainly helped our cause by all possible means, open or secret, lawful or unlawful, moral or immoral..."¹

Something of this heartiness may be gathered from a journal entitled *The Eagle and the Serpent*, which was started by the "older Nietzscheans" in 1898, having under this title the following words from Zarathustra: "The proudest animal under the sun and the wisest animal under the sun have set out to reconnoitre" - then follows the statement:

"Dedicated to the Philosophy of Life Enunciated by Nietzsche, Stirner, Thoreau and Goethe, THE EAGLE AND THE SERPENT labours for the recognition of New Ideals in Politics and Sociology, in Ethics and Philosophy, Literature and Art.
A Race of Altruists is Necessarily a Race of Slaves.
A Race of Freemen is Necessarily a Race of Egoists.
The Great are Great Only Because We Are on Our Knees.
Let us Rise."

This small paper was published at first bi-monthly, and then occasionally and fitfully;² the last number appearing in 1902.

There are a number of other witnesses to Levy's contentions, apart from the voluble affrontery and ebullience of his own writings. For example, H.L. Stewart, in his *Questions of the Day*, devotes a chapter to the "Cult of Nietzsche" and deals scathingly with the "Nietzscheans" as pretentious devotees of their master. They are depicted as egoists who seek to have the authority of Darwin for an anarchical individualism and a revival of the days of pre-Christian inhumanity.³ There is an ample supply of similar critical material to be found for this period. In general, it links Nietzsche with Darwin, and forms part of

1. Levy, op.cit., pp.xx-xxi.

2. Jackson, op.cit., p.156.

3. H.L. Stewart: *Questions of the Day*. Chapter on "The Cult of Nietzsche", pp.269-272.

a current of criticism which later associates Nietzsche with responsibility for German militarism in the First World War. As an example of this kind of criticism, taken from a later stage, one can refer to a sermon delivered in 1915 by an E. Griffith-Jones, B.A., D.D., Principal of Yorkshire United College, Bradford:

"Seven years ago, when I was spending a happy summer Semester in the German universities, and studying the main currents of thought among the gebildeten or cultured classes, I was struck by the considerable emphasis laid by several of the leading men with whom I came in contact on the extent to which the cult of Nietzsche was in the ascendant among the ruling and official people - We are now reaping the consequences of that movement in a harvest of blood and tears. For the German attitude in this war is the translation into action of the theories of that bold and unscrupulous thinker; and it is against Nietzsche that the rest of the world is instinctively under arms....During the 'seventies and 'eighties when he wrote his chief works, two influences gave this revolutionary thinker his foothold - the one in the world of thought, the other in the world of affairs. The first was Darwinism, with its theory of 'the survival of the fittest' (i.e. the strongest), which furnished him with his philosophical basis; the second was Bismarckism...."¹

Reverting to the earlier period, however, Nietzsche's works were being noticed in other ways. In 1896, Havelock Ellis contributed an article examining Nietzsche's work to *The Savoy*,² and, in 1898, Ellis brought out his *Affirmations* containing, among other studies, an influential study of Nietzsche's life and ideas. Other critical and review material also began to appear.

However, the *Dawn of Day*, a translation by Johanna Volz of Nietzsche's *Morgenroets*, and published by T. Fisher Unwin in 1903, still met with a poor reception by the public. It was now plainly not attractive financially to risk the publication of any further volumes. Mr Common, who thinks that the loss of Nietzsche's works to the English-speaking world is "a far greater loss than the lack of half a dozen average universities and a hundred Carnegie libraries...."³ is

1. E. Griffith-Jones, B.A., D.D.: "The Cult of Nietzsche and what it has led to", published in *Kaiser or Christ*, London 1915, pp.30-31.

2. *The Savoy*, (1896) Vol.I, pp.79-94, cf. also Vol.2, pp.57-65, 68-82.

3. *The Nation*, March 29, 1906, p.259.

of the opinion that their publication should be endowed. But the Clarendon Press and the Royal Society of Literature which are suitably endowed will not have anything to do with Nietzsche - "His originality frightens the narrow-minded delegates and trustees who have the management of these institutions."¹ As against this, he advances a list of prominent men who vouch for the importance of Nietzsche's works: H. Alexander, M.A., Professor of Philosophy, University of Manchester; William Archer, Esq.: S.H. Butcher, L.L.D., Emeritus-Professor of Greek, Edinburgh University; H. Havelock Ellis, Esq.: Edward Garnett, Esq.; the Rev. John Glasse, D.D.; Edmund Gosse, L.L.D., Librarian to the House of Lords; W.S. McCormick, L.L.D., Secretary to the Carnegie Trust; W. Romaine Patterson, Esq. (Benjamin Swift); J.G. Robertson, Ph.D., Professor of German Language and Literature, London University; G. Bernard Shaw, Esq.; and Arthur Symonds, Esq.² And, for the future, it appears best to do as Mr Bernard Shaw has suggested - "to publish the work ourselves". Shaw's support here is held to be shown by his reading of the manuscript of the book of Nietzsche extracts, with approval, and by his subsequent carrying of the manuscript himself to the publisher's office where he recommended that it should be issued.

The volume that Mr Common mentions in 1906 as due to appear next was Miss Zimmern's translation of *Jenseits von Gut und Boese*, under the title of *Beyond Good and Evil*. This appeared at private risk in 1907 and was a small success. Encouraged by this, "the few inmates of the Nietzschean ark"³ made new arrangements with the Nietzsche-Archiv and, in May of 1909, the first four volumes of the Levy edition of Nietzsche in English translation left the press and were favourably received "though yet by a small and none too enthusiastic public".⁴ Towards the end of the same year, three more volumes were published. In 1910 and 1911, the remaining ten volumes of the translation appeared while most of the previously published volumes went into a second and even a third edition. All in all, 18 volumes were published - which Levy claimed was "the most complete and voluminous translation of any foreign philosopher into the English language".⁵

1. *The Nation*, op.cit., p.259.

2. *The Nation*, loc.cit.

3. Levy, op.cit., p.x.

4. *ibid.*

5. Levy, loc.cit.

It appears, from the present writer's discussions with a number of Australian writers of the older generation, that these blue-covered volumes were the principal agent in conveying the influence of Nietzsche to Australian writers in the early part of this century.

Having briefly sketched the history of Nietzsche publication in England, it is now necessary to give some indication of the way in which Nietzsche's thought was understood.

The anonymous reviewer of the Tille edition of *Thus spake Zarathustra*, in *The Times* for 31st July, 1896, speaks of this work as a prose poem and as

"...a melancholy performance, as every masterpiece of pessimistic philosophy must be, but the most melancholy thing about it is the fact that the man who wrote it, though apparently he still lives, has already disappeared in the past".

The reference here is, of course, to the eclipse of Nietzsche's sanity, which occurred in 1888, Nietzsche still being alive. More pertinently, however, the same reviewer, writing of Nietzsche's readers, states that

"Not many English readers, we suspect, will enrol themselves in that inner circle, but for all that there will be more than a few who will feel the curious spell of this book, as sincere as it is strange, and who will recognize the peculiar beauty of Nietzsche's style, even in the form of a translation. It has at least the double interest of being the work of a man whose life-story is one full of tragedy, and of carrying further than any other writer has carried them the philosophical doctrines which modern biological speculations have suggested to a certain high order of minds." 1

This reference to "philosophical doctrines which modern biological speculations have suggested" finds some accord, in the following year, with Mr Thomas Common's view, as set out in the journal *Natural Science*.²

Mr Common maintains that Nietzsche has, as it were,

"put the capstone on the Darwinian edifice, by explaining the evolution of morality - a problem which remained unsolved until Nietzsche's *Genealogy of Morals* appeared. Though he speaks somewhat slightly of Darwin, his philosophy can, nevertheless, be best understood from the Darwinian point of view - indeed it forms the last and most important chapter of the Darwinian system."

1. *The Times* newspaper, London, 31st July, 1896.

2. *Natural Science*, June, 1897, p.394.

Although there is not space to do so here, it is proper to raise objections to this interpretation of Common's, as altogether lacking in recognition of the fundamental issue raised by Darwinian thought and the nature of Nietzsche's reaction to it. However, Common's interpretation is representative of what was probably the general understanding of Nietzscheans around the turn of the century and for some time after. Stewart, in his "Cult of Nietzsche", understands the supporters of Nietzsche in a similar way:

"The admirers of Nietzsche claim on his behalf that in the idea of the Superman he has merely worked out the implications for morals of natural selection and the survival of the fittest, and they suppose that their master's ethic is entitled to the authority that is conceded to the doctrine of evolution in general." 1

Stewart raises doubts about the correctness of this implied relation between Darwin and Nietzsche but does so in a polemical fashion that excludes any close examination of texts. Stewart, and he may be taken as probably representative of the majority of educated opinion, is not much impressed with Nietzschean morality or the hopes entertained for it in England.

There is one matter, however, in which Stewart apprehends a positive danger in the "Cult of Nietzsche", and that is in its relation to the "new-born" science of Eugenics. This aspect is important for later developments, particularly in connection with William Baylebridge's doctrine of race-breeding.

As is generally known, Eugenics is concerned specifically with the application of biology to the biological welfare of the human species. The Eugenics movement was founded by Sir Francis Galton during the latter half of the 19th century and named by him in 1885. Galton coined the term from the Greek, in which it literally means "good-race", and he defined the science of Eugenics as "the study of the agencies under social control which may improve or impair the racial qualities of future generations physically or mentally."

The ideas of Eugenics were well received in diverse places. For example, the same churchman who was quoted earlier as denouncing the influence of Nietzsche is brought to soften his attack when Nietzsche appears in relation to Eugenics:

"It is true that there is an element of idealism in the theory of the Superman - the supernatural

1. H.L. Stewart: "The Cult of Nietzsche", in op.cit., pp.271-272.

Being who is some time to evolve out of the struggles and competitions of average humanity; and it has its scientific factor in the peril which unquestionably besets the path of an exaggerated humanitarianism in giving too free an opportunity for the decadent elements of the race to multiply unduly." 1

Stewart² also notes with approval that Eugenics is beginning to force itself upon the attention of social reformers and thinks it a healthy sign that schemes for remedial legislation are being taken up. Eugenics Societies are springing up over the country, and what Stewart calls "the open sore of our social life" is being probed for the first time.

However, he is perturbed that there is a tendency in some quarters to speak of Nietzsche as a kind of patron saint of this reforming enterprise and he earnestly hopes that the Eugenics Societies will not allow their movement to be confused with Nietzschean fanaticism as he understands it.³ Levy had, indeed, more than looked at "that young and promising Eugenic Party"⁴ and had decided that "one day it will be known that the greatest and truest advocate of Eugenics was not Sir Francis Galton but Friedrich Nietzsche." Ironically, from the viewpoint of later history, Oscar Levy, the Jewish advocate of Nietzsche, is vigorously enthusiastic for selective breeding. But he is scathing for the values of the scientific Eugenicists. Values are all-important as breeding-criteria. And since Christianity has had from its very beginning "a low type of man in view"⁵ the deplorable virtues of our ancestors are now terribly visited upon us - "The fathers have eaten sour grapes and the children's teeth are set on edge" (Jeremiah, xxxi.29).⁶ It is essential, in Levy's eyes, that the Eugenic Party understand the cause of the predominance of the "low type of man in our midst", and that our belief, our morality, our Christianity, has driven us towards "the abyss of a humanity growing more and more worthless." The successful "breeding" of men can only be brought about by religious or philosophic faith. Eugenicists "must learn to know the type of man, or the type of man they

1. Griffith-Jones, op.cit., p.31.

2. H.L. Stewart, op.cit., p.280.

3. H.L. Stewart, op.cit., p.281.

4. Levy, op.cit., p.xxix.

5. p.xxx.

6. p.xxxi.

do want."¹ If the Eugenist does not know this, then he will "sterilise in the dark." Science, by itself, is not adequate to the task of selection; it requires guidance and reinforcement from philosophy - and this "all the more so if it is an important science, the science of the future, as the Science of Race and Eugenics promise to become one day." The men who "cultivate this most important branch of knowledge, must be equipped with the highest current wisdom."² Levy lets it stand in no doubt where this "highest current wisdom" resides:

"Are we to be held responsible for the foolhardiness of scientific Boetians who know nothing of Nietzsche, nothing of our work in England, a work that was done specially for them and their instruction, a work of twenty years assiduous labour, done under the most adverse of circumstances by a little band of outsiders?"³

Recapitulation

The main features that emerge from the preceding survey are:

1. The impact of Darwinian biological science on orthodox religious views of the world and, seemingly, on any transcendental view of human life.
2. A recoil from the bleak outlook engendered by Darwinism, and the subsequent attempt to assert some form of transcendence in human affairs. This attempt ranged, at the one extreme, from rigid rejections of evolutionism while upholding existing orthodoxy in religion and, at the other extreme, to a rabid advocacy of "immoralism" and the force of personal assertion. The general centre of this reaction though appears to lie with attempts to formulate rational and scientifically acceptable syntheses of evolutionism and religion, albeit in a highly unorthodox form.
3. The two major terms of these syntheses involve, by and large, two subsidiary endeavours:
 - (a) The endeavour to justify Lamarckian type doctrines in biology, that is, doctrines which support ideas of the inheritance of

1. Levy, op.cit., p.xxxii.

2. p.xxxiv.

3. p.xxxv.

acquired characters.

- (b) The endeavour to take the explication of the human spirit and its development out of the hands of religionists and place it with a philosophy of an evolutionary kind, allowing some scope for transcendental features normally associated with religion.

4. The English philosophical tradition was not as convenient in assisting towards such evolutionary syntheses as was the tradition of the Continent, notably Germany. With Hegel and Schopenhauer, there already existed a wealth of suggestible ideas for association with the latest science and for the synthesis of overall world-views of an evolutionary kind. In England, Butler and Shaw are indicative of the problem, but it is Haeckel's monism and his influence in England that are indicative of where the synthesis was most likely to come from.

5. In Germany, Nietzsche too was brought to consider the complexus of biological theory in the context of German philosophical and historical studies. It was not until the 1890's that his work began to be tentatively received in England, its first appreciable influence appearing in the work of the poet John Davidson.

6. After the initial hesitancy of its reception, Nietzsche's work gained increasing attention, being commonly interpreted from a Darwinian point of view. But Nietzsche's standpoint was in fact of an essentially Lamarckian kind, and it was the prospective element in his philosophy, related to Lamarckian transformism, that began to attract the interest of thinkers of a literary and creative kind. The Levy edition of Nietzsche's work greatly facilitated this process.

7. In consequence of the implications of biological science at the time, a Eugenics movement had arisen. This movement was commonly seen as the practical expression of a wider evolutionary outlook. Among such outlooks, the views of Nietzsche too came to be associated with Eugenic proposals.

Having indicated these general features of thought at the time, it is now appropriate to consider the work of William Baylebridge.

PART II THE VISION OF WILLIAM BAYLEBRIDGE

A. General Introduction

William Baylebridge was born Charles William Blocksidge, on 12th December, 1883, at the home of his parents in Wellington Road, East Brisbane. He was the son of George Henry and Kate (nee Bell) Blocksidge. This information, simple in itself, has proved difficult to obtain. Hugh Anderson,¹ from whom it is taken, records that Morris Miller, when seeking information for his biography of Australian authors, found the poet most evasive when asked for this information; and others have had similar experiences.² But it is not only in the matter of origins alone that difficulties are to be found. The whole style of Baylebridge's life has involved concealment, both of his personal affairs and of those aspects of his work not expressly intended for publication. Whatever the justification for this attitude, it is more prone to facilitate the growth of legend about the author's name, than the kind of understanding which unites him with the foibles and excellences of men generally. It is possible, even probable, that the author himself desired this.

An instance of his care in fostering a claim on the future is shown by the fact that he is known to have considered that the name that a poet bears ought to comprise a collocation of syllables suggesting "the stuff that wears". He had, of course, changed his own name. Not long before Baylebridge died, he wrote in a statement accompanying a letter to P.R. Stephensen, 27th July, 1941:

"We have the author's works and the name attached to the best of them, Baylebridge. He is Baylebridge in real life, Baylebridge to the law, and Baylebridge to readers everywhere. To me that

1. Hugh Anderson: "Books of Baylebridge", *Southerly* 3 (1955), p.131.

2. cf. R.G. Howarth: "William Baylebridge", *Southerly* 3 (1955), p.122.

seems final and entirely satisfactory. No one would thank us for the non-essentials, if there are any; and we are not likely to increase our standing as critics, or even as cataloguers, by looking for them."

This change of name apparently took place not long after 1923; for up till then he was known to have signed his letters as "W. Blocksidge."¹ The name of William Baylebridge was adopted both in private life and for his books. The earlier books, of which there were not a few, appeared with the name of Blocksidge.

If the new name may be regarded as an adjustment of the persona, yielding a two-fold advantage of improved presentation of the self, together with a better defence of more private, inner concerns, then one may point to further instances of this kind. For example, he conducted his correspondence from a post-office box-number only, and although he had the telephone connected, his name was not in the directory. He avoided photographers and refused invitations from portrait-painters to sit for them. There is, however, a portrait done posthumously by his niece, Garren Brown.² His personal appearance, in later life at least, could also be construed as defensive or misleading. He had little resemblance to the conventional idea of a poet's appearance. Here, P.R. Stephensen, who knew him personally, states that "the style was not obviously the man". He was well-tailored, robust, handsome, self-assured, courteous and kindly. He could have been considered by anyone meeting him casually, as a successful business man or professional man but not, at first glance, as a poet.³ John Kirtley, another personal associate, is said to have stated that Baylebridge in later life looked rather like a prosperous sheep-farmer, with an easy sociable manner.⁴

He had been educated at the East Brisbane State School (then known as Woolloongabba State School) and afterwards at the Brisbane Grammar School. He had also been tutored privately by a Mr David Owen, who

1. Serle: *Dictionary of Australian Biography*, p.465. It may be added that a letter written to Professor A.R. Chisholm, possibly as late as 1934, preserves the ambiguity of signature by the author's initials alone - characteristically, the address is a P.O. Box number (Box 1826K, Sydney) only, and the year is omitted from the date.

2. Reproduced as frontispiece to *An Anzac Master*, Vol. II, Collected Works op.cit.

3. P.R. Stephensen's Preface to *An Anzac Master* (1962), op.cit., p.23.

4. Reported in R.G. Howarth: "William Baylebridge", *Southerly* 3 (1955), p.122.

has been described as an accomplished classical scholar.¹ At the age of fifteen, he had a poem printed in the *Bulletin* in 1898; and in 1907, he had verses in the *Australasian* and in the *Red Pinnal*. Apart from this, there is practically nothing known of any publication of his in periodicals. But it is clear that his literary production began early in life.

In 1908, he went to London, travelled in Europe, was apparently associated with military forces² in the Middle East during the 1914-18 war, and returned to Brisbane in 1919. As may be expected from what has been said already, there is very little information available about the details of his travels. Prior to his return to Australia, he had published the books containing his main philosophical statement: *The New Life*, 1910, no publisher or address being indicated in this volume, and *Life's Testament*, 1914, also published privately. His *National Notes*, which contains a subsidiary statement, on his nationalist principles, appeared in 1913. A full account of Baylebridge's successive publications would be tediously involved, mainly because of the variations he introduced into subsequent publications. There were also references to books which never appeared. An account of the details of Baylebridge's publications is given by Hugh Anderson.³ An account of Baylebridge's literary remains, prepared at the request of the Trustees of his Estate, is given by R.G. Howarth.⁴

In 1939, there appeared under the title of *This Vital Flesh*, a book containing the main philosophical and nationalist statements made earlier in separate publications. This collective volume includes "Life's Testament", followed by "The New Life", "National Notes" and

1. Taken from an address given by Mr Firmin MacKinnon at a monthly meeting of the Queensland Author's and Artist's Association, Brisbane, as reported in *All About Books*, November 10, 1937, p.174.

2. R.G. Howarth, for example, states that Baylebridge served with the Australian Forces. cf. R.G. Howarth: "William Baylebridge", *Southerly* 3 (1955), p.122. This has generally been assumed. But Frederick T. Macartney, in a personal communication to the author, doubted this. cf. also his chapter on Baylebridge in Frederick T. Macartney: *Essays in Australian Literature*. P.R. Stephensen, in his Preface to *An Anzac Master* in the *Collected Works* 1962, op.cit., states that Baylebridge did not enlist in the Australian Armed Forces.

3. Hugh Anderson: "Books by Baylebridge", *Southerly* 3 (1955), pp.151ff.

4. R.G. Howarth: "Baylebridge's Literary Remains", *Southerly* 3 (1955), pp.147ff. The report was originally made in 1947.

other material. It was awarded the Gold Medal of the Australian Literature Society for 1939.

Baylebridge died on 7th May, 1942. He had been a sound man of business, interested in the Stock Exchange, and had directed that one-third of the income from his estate, sworn at £18,000, be spent on providing an annual poetry prize and on the publication of his works. P.R. Stephensen was nominated as editor, and a six-volume Collected Works was put in hand. The first volume, *This Vital Flesh*, appeared in 1961, and it was stated that the remaining volumes were to appear at the rate of at least one per year. Four volumes have appeared so far: *This Vital Flesh* (1961), *An Anzac Muster* (1962), *The Growth of Love* (1963) and *Salvage* (1964). A further volume edited by the present writer will complete the set. *This Vital Flesh*, in its 1961 edition, is identical with the earlier 1939 version, except for minor emendations mentioned by Stephensen in his Preface. It is the work which Baylebridge himself considered as the most important, and which will be the chief reference here.

So far, there has been no disputing the relevance of Nietzsche to Baylebridge's thought. But, though this influence is generally agreed upon, there is an equally general lack of tangible evidence of influence. The case for a Nietzschean influence in Baylebridge's writings has been based on the consideration of certain features of the books contained in *This Vital Flesh*. There is certainly no explicit reference to Nietzsche to be found in Baylebridge's work - or, for that matter, to any other relevant thinker either. Nevertheless, H.M. Green, for example, states that Baylebridge was undoubtedly influenced by Nietzsche.¹ Other critics, Judith Wright, Frederick T. Macartney and T. Inglis Moore, have all acknowledged the relevance of Nietzsche to Baylebridge's thought. Judith Wright extends a very wide sphere of influence to Nietzsche in Australian writing.² Frederick T. Macartney, who recalled³ how much interest "those blue-covered books" of the Levy edition aroused among Australian writers in the early years of the Commonwealth, finds that Baylebridge's "National Notes" is "a loose

1. H.M. Green: *A History of Australian Literature*, pub. Angus & Robertson 1962, Vol. I, p. 489.

2. Judith Wright: *Preoccupations in Australian Poetry*, pub. Oxford University Press, Melb. 1965, pp. 47ff. cf. also the same critic's: "William Baylebridge and the Modern Problem", *Southerly* 3 (1955), pp. 139ff.

3. Personal Communication.

Nietzschean pastiche".¹ T. Inglis Moore calls Baylebridge "an Australian Nietzsche".² Vincent Buckley, as mentioned previously, finds a marked Nietzschean influence in Baylebridge.³ There is ample opinion available on the matter. But no close examination has been made, with the exception perhaps of T. Inglis Moore.⁴ Although assumption is highly probable, there is no positive evidence that Baylebridge actually possessed Nietzsche's works, or on whether he read them in German or English. The evidence, of necessity, must remain circumstantial. In view of Baylebridge's travels, his particular style of living, and the distance in time, there are not enough personalia to confirm the influence. Indeed, one can readily understand the attitude of T. Inglis Moore who, in his chapter on William Baylebridge, in *Six Australian Poets*, introduces his subject with the words: "An enigmatic, teasing figure, Baylebridge has indulged in reserves that have provoked commentators to pluck out the heart of his mysteries - or his mystifications. Inevitably, they begin their comment with the explanation that Baylebridge, in fact, is an adopted and not a baptismal surname, and go on to relate, correctly or otherwise, certain biographical items. Yet these facts about the man are, I hold, irrelevant to an understanding of the poet." And Professor Inglis Moore takes several pages to justify his attitude of not concerning himself with "personalia". However, the present writer cannot accept this view, particularly not in the present context, which involves the identification of ideas in the poet's work and their relations with the thoughts and action of others. In these circumstances, it is not desirable to forego any additional information that may facilitate understanding - particularly with an author such as Baylebridge, who as T. Inglis Moore himself admits, is often far from being explicit. P.R. Stephensen in his Preface to *An Anzac Muster*, 1962, regrets the lack of biographical material (despite the fact that he himself knew Baylebridge for the last ten years of his life) and makes an appeal for personalia, pointing out there is provision in all Australian Public Libraries for

1. Frederick T. Macartney, in a review in *Southerly* 2 (1957), p. 115.

2. T. Inglis Moore: *Six Australian Poets*, pub. Robertson & Mullens, Melbourne 1942, p. 138.

3. Vincent Buckley: "Utopianism and Vitalism in Australian Literature", *Quadrant* 18.

4. T. Inglis Moore, op.cit.

preserving such material, with safeguards for living persons. There is doubtless a field of inquiry here that will advance with desultory finds for many years.

Another approach to Baylebridge which must, understandably enough, appear attractive in the circumstances, is that of devaluing his ideas, relative to his "poetry". For example, Mrs Robyn Claremont states:

"It is interesting but not especially fruitful, to track Baylebridge's steps through the work of Nietzsche, Bergson, Maekel and even through the Marxian doctrine of history, and to place him among such doctrinaires as Swinburne, Shaw and D.H. Lawrence. What is important is his success or failure in embodying his 'truths', and in giving them the special immediacy and imaginative colour which would justify calling the result 'poetry'." 1

Mrs Claremont has personally assisted P.R. Stephensen in his edition of the 'Collected Works', but her critical approach, as proposed above, stands in contrast with the publisher's statement that *This Vital Flesh* contains "a matured statement in prose and verse, of Baylebridge's philosophy of Vitalism as applied to Australian Nationalism..." 2 But a critical approach directed to "poetry" alone is fraught with difficulties, such that Mrs Claremont, for one, is brought to writing on what the poetry is "about", in this case, its ideas, rather than on the poetry "itself". But as the ideas have been deprived of importance in advance, the net result is not very satisfactory.

Erich Heller 3 has asked himself similar questions about the relationship of poetry to ideas, in his consideration of Nietzsche and Rilke. He considers the matter carefully and states that the absurdity of the negative proposition, that any prosaic and outlandish idea can form the material of great poetry leads him to accept that there is an intimate positive relation between belief, thought and poetry. He suggests, and the present writer agrees with this, that the enjoyment of poetry despite the wrongness of its beliefs, or without any concern for what its thought may be, implies superficiality of acceptance. The attempt to regard

1. Robyn Claremont: "William Baylebridge: Man's Voice Proclaiming Man", *Australian Literary Studies*, Vol. I, No. 3, June, 1964, p. 157.

2. vide the description of Vol. I given on the dust-jacket of Vol. III. But the recognition of Baylebridge as philosopher-poet or prophet-poet, whatever his merits, is acknowledged generally.

3. Erich Heller: *The Disinherited Mind*, Pelican edition 1961, p. IIIff.

Baylebridge's work solely as "poetry" would be contrary to Baylebridge's own intentions and imprudent in view of the potentialities his ideas have for practice.

However, with regard to our present interest in Baylebridge, there is a small amount of circumstantial background material that should be pointed to. In 1908, Baylebridge left for England. He was then 25 years old. In England, he published seven small volumes of his poetry between 1908 and 1914. Baylebridge tells us that the books of *This Vital Flesh* were written between 1909 and 1913. 1

The main features of the climate of ideas at this time have already been described earlier in this study. P.R. Stephensen states: "It is chronologically possible that Shaw, H.G. Wells, and other 'advanced' writers in England of the period 1908-16 were influenced by Baylebridge's ideas..." 2 There is no evidence of this. But, to the contrary, there is positive proof that Baylebridge did read Shaw's *Man and Superman*, and has incorporated passages from it in his "National Notes". This will be shown later. Also, the nature of Baylebridge's works, principally the variety of ideas brought together in this synthesis, argues far more for his acceptance of influences from other men, rather than the reverse. Apropos of "National Notes", he refers to illustrative sources which were drawn upon, but states that it is impossible to be explicit about them. 3 He also states that "National Notes" may, in some measure, be regarded as an assessment and interpretation of contemporary thought. 4 There appears to be no valid reason why much the same could not be said of the more "major" statements, "Life's Testament" and "The New Life".

So far, it is clear that Baylebridge's formative period is largely terminated before the First World War. This is made definite by the dates of publication of his works. It is probable that the main ferment of ideas occurred with him after his arrival in England in 1908. There is nothing to contradict this assumption. His work is certainly redolent of ideas ambient in England at the time, as will be shown. Nevertheless, there remain a few hints that may, circumstantially, strengthen the relevance of German thought in understanding his work.

First, John Kirtley, 5 one of the few people to know Baylebridge

1. Baylebridge: *This Vital Flesh*, Collected Works 1961, p. xxvii.

2. Stephensen's Preface to *An Anzac Muster*, op. cit., p. 18.

3. Baylebridge: *This Vital Flesh*, op. cit., p. xxiv.

4. *ibid.*

5. John Kirtley: "My Friend Baylebridge", *Southerly* 3 (1955), p. 136.

personally, states that Baylebridge told him he had spent some time in Munich. What Baylebridge did there was not explained. Kirtley says, "I think he may have been studying philosophy." A further small point is that, according to Kirtley, Baylebridge acquired the habit of a tankard of beer in Munich and that, in Australia, he preferred the large vessel, presumably the liter "Mass" because of the dramatic effect of its size as experienced by him in Germany.

Secondly, there is some further evidence of Baylebridge's being in Germany, and the probability of his being acquainted to some degree with the German language. This is to be found in an early volume of his verse *A Northern Trail* by William Blocksidge, published as "A Private Imprint, Made in the Tenth Year of the Australian Commonwealth." From its title and contents, it appears to be a record of the author's European travels, though hardly an explicit one. But there are a number of clues to places presumably visited. On page 15, for example, there is a poem entitled "Lines to a Girl/Seen in the Market Place at Mainz". Then there is a "Sonnet/On approaching the Stubai Range, Tyrol, in Winter" (p.17). There is a poem "To the Moon/(From the German of Goethe)" (p.22); and a "Brewery Cellar Song/Written, on a day in Salvatore Week, in the Paulaner Keller, Munich" (p.31), then a "Sonnet/(On Hearing some Boys Singing at a Monastery in the Inn Valley, Tyrol)" (p.46). There is "A Lament/(From the German)" (p.61), "The Three Lovers/(Partly Imitated from Uhland)" (p.72), and two renderings "From the Early German (pp.38, 62).

The same book also contains a sonnet written at the graves of Keats and Shelley in the Protestant Cemetery at Rome. Other places mentioned are Venice and Versailles.

This material virtually exhausts the significant evidence from the period important for Baylebridge's thought, that is, apart from the evidence of his works themselves.

Accordingly, attention is next given to the work itself, principally to the books contained in *This Vital Flesh*.

B. "The Philosophical level"

One of the salient features of Baylebridge's work is the care which he took in its presentation. This applies not only to his concern over technicalities of book-production such as typography and format, exemplified in the private editions of the Tallabilla Press, but to the supporting texts, prefaces, notes, appendices etc. in which he comments on his own work.

However, it could be considered that his care in these matters works against his own interests - at least initially. For the wealth of qualifying matter at times inserted into his sentences makes difficulties for the reader. These difficulties are augmented by the fact that until the reader has immersed himself sufficiently in the general body of Baylebridge's work, he is not likely to be sure of what these supporting statements are about - their degree of generalisation is so high. Baylebridge, it appears, is exceedingly conscientious in his presentation, but at the same time he is so close to his ideas that the differing standpoint of his reader is overlooked. His solitary position in relation to the general body of intellectual discourse, the lack of adequate criticism and discussion, were probably contributing factors here. It is this characteristic, presumably, that leads, for example, to Frederick Macartney's¹ characterisation of the preface to *This Vital Flesh* as a "pompous muddle" - a judgment which is not supportable in either of its terms if this preface is approached carefully.

In the General Preface to *This Vital Flesh*, and in other prose passages, we find a style loaded with circumlocutions. The author is hesitant and careful. He reminds his reader in various ways that, whatever the truth he may include in his work, it is but conditional and relative to a wider truth.² He sees his work as time-bound; "how slight it must always be in life's illimitable, life's variform, endeavour."³ But he dares, like other authors who believe their subject is important, to hope that his conception may be "worthy to be remembered, however modestly, for the effort it made to give sufficiently where it had taken."

1. *Southarly* (2), 1957.

2. Baylebridge: *This Vital Flesh*, Collected Works Vol.I, op.cit., p.ix, pp.xiff.

3. *ibid*, p.xii.

There is virtually no explicit engagement with other writers to be found in his work, no acknowledgements of sources, hardly a name of any other person, contemporary or past. Whatever the origin of the ideas present in his work, Baylebridge has made them his own. Besides, his view of the mental life of the individual as resulting from "a various web of influence" would hardly place much store in personal proprietorship of ideas. His approach is essentially synthetic - he is concerned with the best possible ordering and presentation of a view of life which he has already arrived at. We are shown the finished product in as final a form as the author is capable of. But the path by which this product has been arrived at is not disclosed. Though we may, after investigation and analysis, draw our own conclusions, the author himself gives us no explicit hint of a traumatic experience, intellectual engagement or personal influence that prompted his thinking out in search of its goal. Yet the fervour of his thought, the consistent conviction with which he presents it, argues for the existence of an intense and problematic experience which preceded it.

From the General Preface to *This Vital Flesh*, it may appear that the reader is to be inducted into a 'Weltanschauung'. But later experience will show that it is really more appropriate to consider here the distinction that Professor R.H. Samuel¹ has drawn between the terms 'Weltanschauung' and 'ideology'. This writer points out that the Concise Oxford Dictionary defines the term 'ideology' as 'visionary speculation', and he goes on to state that while the term 'Weltanschauung' is to be placed with philosophy and the search for truth, the purpose of an ideology "is not the search for truth but the attainment of power and more specifically of political power which it claims to base on certain ideas." In this sense, it is proper to regard Baylebridge's work as expressive of an ideology, since it is certainly a visionary speculation presented in a form inappropriate to the search for truth, but directed to the attainment of power.

In the General Preface, we find a generalised depiction of the world as it now stands (i.e. relative to 1939), the sense of momentous events impending, and the posing of a choice. "Perhaps never till our own day has the world seen so great a travail of the spirit of man; perhaps never before has that spirit been so threatened by forces

pregnant for its destruction."¹ Man, it appears, has been supported by facts which were long thought immutable but which are no longer so. Man has found liberation from the power that these facts once had to restrain him, but this liberation is precarious and is less productive of contentment than of chaos. Out of the chaos, "something sinister is now emerging..."² Forces, seemingly destructive of all that man at his best has considered good "are taking definite shape."³ Indeed, "More than one of those forces has proclaimed itself, established itself, and is now making its way through the world." At this stage, the reader may well feel inclined to remember that Baylebridge is referring to the world up to 1939 and then proceed to speculate on what specific "forces" Baylebridge is referring to. Communism appears to be a reasonable inference, and, from the use of the plural, "forces", the fascist or Nazi movement or both, might also be included. However, further acquaintance with Baylebridge's works suggests the view that the generalised statement is the preferred form here since this would be in accordance with his long-term view of life as partaking of different levels of abstraction, of manifesting at differing stages of individuation. From this standpoint, the "forces" are such that they might appear in various particular instances, of which Communism and Fascism could be examples. Suffice it to say, for the present, that Baylebridge sees the world as the scene of struggle between certain forces that are not exhausted by the particular instances of their appearance. In particular, he speaks of a "spirit" which has "moved the great thinkers, that founded religions and built churches, that has set its hand, in stone, and paint, and the symbols of pure sound, and the written word, to the fashioning of beauty...." etc.⁴ He wishes that his books in "however slight a degree" would serve this same spirit, the "Holy Spirit of Man", as these other works have done. He is set against "the destruction of the loveliness, the tarnishing of the delight, of man's earth and works..."

Somehow, this spirit has reached a point of crisis, and man, for whose delight and betterment the spirit "has been active in a thousand ways", is in danger of annihilation. "All who value that spirit must strike now the strongest blow for it that their powers permit." The word "value" it soon appears, is of particular significance since the

1. Richard H. Samuel: "The Origin and Development of the Ideology of National Socialism." Pub. in the same author's *Selected Writings*, University of Melbourne (1965), p.138. Prev. pub. in *The Australian Journal of Politics and History*, Vol.9 (1963), pp.59-77.

1. Baylebridge: *This Vital Flesh*, op.cit., p.x.

2. loc.cit.

3. p.x

4. Baylebridge, pp.x-xi.

values which have sustained life hitherto have apparently lost their earlier relevance and no longer refer positively to the "truly good". To bring man into proper relation to this forsaken goal, it is necessary to effect an iconoclastic revaluation - a task which is attempted in the books of *This Vital Flesh*.

Thus, in highly generalised terms, we are yielded a perspective of an historical, evolutionary character, in which a state of crisis has now been reached. This crisis threatens to annihilate man. The active principles of this evolution and crisis are characterised as "forces", the chief of which is a spirit that has "given man that magnificent heritage by which he lives..." and which must now be fought for. "Values have in some way contributed to the present crisis. Consequently, an iconoclastic revaluation is necessary. But not all past values are to be destroyed - conservation is necessary too. Baylebridge is at pains to point out that he in no sense subscribes to the view "that man has followed a false light from the beginning"¹ - or that matters are "to be put right in a day". The works of man are to be seen in perspective and, since Baylebridge regards his work as relevant to the crisis, he would like to see his own books too, "as a phase in the long sequence of human endeavour".

This is the vital hub of Baylebridge's work; the human spirit is not something derivative of the individual but transcendent and prior in value. The local name and habitation of the human spirit is manifold and mortal, but the spirit itself is "one and indivisible", and its force "enables us to interchange our names, our places, and even our seasons with the approved".² In the interests of the spirit, there are "vast and necessary immolations of what is mortal".³

The highest value for the mortal human being is to strive to share in "that long, and that magnanimous communion".⁴ The sole way to do this is to forward the spirit. This is not easy, since there is opposition, due to the forces alluded to before. There is the need to do battle - and this point is made again and again in Baylebridge's work - there is the need to be 'resolute', 'fearless', 'strike blows', 'wage war', 'push the battle' etc. These, and similar expressions, abound in Baylebridge's writings.

So far, we have remained at a high level of abstraction. There is a battle in progress but, as yet, there is no specific target for the

1. Baylebridge, op.cit., p.xi.

2. pp.xii-xiii.

3. loc.cit.

4. loc.cit.

troops to fire at. What is the nature of the enemy?

We are told that the enemy is not social justice.¹ Baylebridge's books are concerned

"not at all with class. Under most modern political systems, for good or ill, there is nothing to constrain any man, within the limits set, to be less than his fellows. Everything, within those limits, is open to the brains and to the enemy of each of us; and to push that battle further - an intention not likely to be assigned to anything in the present volume - would be to wage it, surely, for chaos and the brute."

It appears that no further democratisation is desirable - we have gone far enough. That battle, the battle of riches and poverty, is "seemingly finalised". The battle now coming is for the human spirit, and

"All the lesser differences must finally be resolved in this one. This is the most tremendous battle that has yet been given to man; and the respective forces seem to be falling into place now to urge it, and perhaps determine its issue."²

But we still do not possess sufficient criteria to clearly recognise the participants in the battle, to be clear if our own intuitions match what in fact Baylebridge means. However, it is to be remembered that Baylebridge's approach is deliberate. The high level of abstraction is intentional, since it accords with his view of man's position in the universe. This view involves three levels of abstraction. Baylebridge apparently does not regard these three levels as the only ones but as a convenient form for his presentation. It is important to have some knowledge of them because they facilitate classification of Baylebridge's works and their relationships to each other. We are thus warranted to seek for illustration and explanation in seemingly disparate places.

The first level of abstraction, the least generalised, is that of man as an individual - "When using this first category we deal frankly in the simple and common stuff of humanity, in the everyday life of the world about us."³ Baylebridge assumes that the values of this category do not vary much, but persist over the ages. For those people who have this common standpoint, philosophy and scientific problems are of no concern, since true wisdom for them resides with the majority.

1. loc.cit.

2. Baylebridge, loc.cit., pp.xiii-xiv.

3. ibid.

They have no interests beyond what is immediate. However, they form the "primal stuff of poetry and literature", though Baylebridge sees no reason why these arts should not concern themselves with masses as well as with individual men. For poetry and literature, generally speaking, our conception of the individual must be sharpened and "enormously enlarged". In consequence, man as an individual will fill the entire picture, at the expense of considering the significance of his place in the Universe. Philosophy deals with immensities, but literature and poetry accentuate the individual, they properly belong to the treatment of man in the first category.

The second category concerns men in groupings; in which the significance of the individual is necessarily qualified by laws, morals, religions, and "similar inhibitions". As Baylebridge sees it, this is "the natural point of emergence for the preacher, the jurist, and the statesman, and, if conditions favour this, for the demagogue."¹

The third category is that of man envisaged "as a part of the life force or principle, whatever called, to which we refer his meaning."² This is the field of the philosopher.

Baylebridge conceives of man as having his being in all three categories, and states that he has accordingly attempted to make three approaches in his writings. In fact, his books may, from his own statements, be classified in this way. The tales recounted in *An Anzac Matter*, together with certain of his poetry volumes such as *Moreton Miles* and *Love Redeemed* may be clearly placed in the first category. "National Notes" and "Political Verse" is likewise clearly of the second category, while "Life's Testament" and "The New Life", the most generalised statements, belong to the third. Naturally, the author cautions us about neglecting the categories which are not the special focus of attention at the time; life is a unity and one cannot properly isolate it in parts. We are given grounds for seeking among the various works for a more generalised, or individualised, statement, as the case may warrant.

It would be appropriate, in the order of generalisation specified by Baylebridge, to start with an examination of "Life's Testament". However, before doing so, it appears desirable to make use of what other fundamental generalisations Baylebridge has made elsewhere, as these may assist in establishing a prior and useful framework within

1. Baylebridge, op.cit. p.xv.

2. p.xvi.

which to view the generally more concise and at times enigmatic poetical statement.

Baylebridge clearly states in the General Preface of *This Vital Flash* that he is not much concerned to pronounce about metaphysical aspects of the Universe, which he contends are properly beyond man's knowledge. To argue by analogy from that part of the Universe we do know, to that part which is beyond our knowledge, is inadmissible. The nature of ultimate reality is an enigma that must remain obscure for a being of limited intelligence.

Nevertheless, in considering "the old contention between the monists and the realists", Baylebridge is of the view that the Universe must ultimately be a unity. "Nothing is till it is a unity; and therefore the Universe, the thing which in the supremest sense is, must be a unity also."¹ A pluralist position he suggests is perhaps only an admission that we cannot proceed to a higher reconciliation of seemingly disparate elements. It appears that we can only grasp reality in pluralist terms. Yet, behind all the diversity, united for us only by "a few pluralist threads", there must be an ultimate unity. It appears certain that we can have no knowledge of this ultimate principle, yet "if we can take anything at all one trust, we can have faith in that ultimate unity".

There does not appear to be any argument involved here. Argument based on analogy from what is known to what is unknown is rejected. The nature of knowledge, epistemological matters, is not entered into. What can be known appears in pluralist terms. What is not known must ultimately be monist in principle. Yet, being by definition outside of knowledge, the unitary nature of the unknown is an assertion of faith. It could be viewed more tentatively, but Baylebridge appears to really believe that he is compelled to his faith by an ontological principle - "Nothing is till it is a unity". When unity is lacking there is "nothing". Additionally, there is to be found the view that what we can know of the Cosmos as a whole "we must know mystically".²

However, it is more satisfactory to Baylebridge to remain as close to Earth as possible and at least figuratively to conceive of man as "true Earth, and knit of Earth". He does not accept that human progress is wholly an accidental matter which man cannot influence. Life, though

1. p.xviii.

2. p.xx.

primarily a vital principle and thus self-sufficient, may use lesser means for its advancement. Human understanding could be instrumental for the life-principle, the Spirit, in its progress.

Life, or the Spirit - these terms appear to be largely interchangeable with Baylebridge - it is not an emanation of the material world, it is innately creative. But creation, here, is not understood as taking place *ex nihilo* but as a development of something which has already existed - "A transmutation to a higher term of life". For, in a special sense, everything which can exist in life does so already. There is no "special creation" such as that of the Christian doctrines, which had been attacked by the proponents of evolutionism. All manifestations, past, present, and future, are already implicit in the whole of man's life.

Since there is no creation, in the *ex nihilo* sense, there is really no death. Life is inextricably bound up with renewal. Death, as the total annihilation of everything manifested as life, is a fiction.

To this setting of unceasing transmutation, man, according to Baylebridge,¹ stands related to two forms of the will. On the one hand, the conscious will, which is to be exalted, is of use mostly in the external and material world, whereas the other form of the will, the subconscious, is for use in the world of ourselves. The subconscious will should be subordinate to the conscious will so that we may play our part in the external and material world - otherwise, the dominance of the subconscious will would deliver us to chaos there.

Thus, we sum up this preliminary survey of general principles by saying that for Baylebridge the Universe in all its diversity is the manifestation of a monistic principle variously referred to as "Life", the "vital-principle", the Spirit, etc. The transcendental principle is unceasingly transformative, without beginning or end, and bears all manifestations either actually or potentially within itself. Man, by implication, is not ultimately separate from this principle but essentially related to it. In his individuated form within this evolutionary process, he is subject to a subconscious form of will and has at his disposal a conscious form of the will. To avoid chaos in his activities in the external world, consciousness must have prior right. Evolution is not an accidental matter beyond the power of human influence but human consciousness is a manifestation of the evolutionary principle and may serve for its advancement. Effort is emphasized as "cardinal to life".²

1. pp. xxi-xxii.

2. p. xvii.

Here, there is plainly a good deal that is open to question; the matter of "advancement", for example, plainly begs for some specification of the poles of its movement. But, at this stage, these remarks will help to more quickly identify the significance of the generally terser statements to be found in "Life's Testament" and "The New Life".

C. "Life's Testament"

"...wenn der Geist einen Ruck macht,
da sind wir Philosophen auch dabei."
Hegel.

Intended by its author to be a unity in itself, "Life's Testament" is also to be understood as bearing an essential relation to the other works of Baylebridge. It deals with the third category, that of the life-force or vital principle, wherein "the philosopher finds employment".¹ This book, as with the others of *This Vital Flesh*, was written between 1909 and 1913,² though it was apparently not published until 1914. It comes after "The New Life", first published in 1910, which also deals with the third category, though in a more detailed manner. Baylebridge writes³ of "The New Life" as the first of his attempts at "revaluation", and states that in some respects the work was tentative, adding that some readers may find the chief interest of these earlier speculations to lie in showing how the author arrived at his final views. And these final views are to be found in "Life's Testament", in which the author had "finished with experiment". Accordingly, we may find justification at times in looking to the earlier speculations of "The New Life", for guidance on the development of a thought, since "The New Life" speaks more in specific terms; it descends more to the detail and to the polemic incident to this.⁴

"Life's Testament" is a sequence of 49 poems grouped into 16 numbered sections. The sections themselves contain various numbers of individual poems, generally three or four poems per section; these poems being of various verse-forms, from free-verse to relatively tightly structured forms. (For convenience of reference, the individual poems will be indexed in Baylebridge's manner, that is, L.T.II.iv, will be taken as referring to "Life's Testament", Section II, poem iv, and so on.)

The opening vision is that of the Earth being hurled into the "keeping" of the sun. The immense powers, times and spaces of the primal past are invoked. It is the time of preparation:

1. p.xvi.
2. p.xxvii.
3. p.xvii.
4. p.xvii.

... Thus and thus
Prepared for me my dwelling was;
Till, tempered in the waste of time,
It put off spasm, and fire and slime;
And I, through further aeons vast,
Was worked, whole, into flesh at last. (L.T.I)

The author identifies himself as specifically implied in the early formation of the earth, and then goes on to ask of he does not only inherit the past, but, "mastering its idea", transcend to it. That is, we are presented with an evolutionary view of man's origin, in which, having grasped the idea of the evolutionary movement, man is no longer the blind outcome of this movement but is now competent to act consciously in relation to it.

According to Baylebridge, man is not isolated from the primal evolutionary and universal powers that fashioned him - he is still borne by primal forces that, coming from primal times, live on in brain and blood -

And shall, till they shall drop within
The shattering whirlwinds of the sun. (L.T.II,i)

These primal forces are complex and pervasive. They transcend the individual. The milk that succours the child shall never sour though it pass an "eternity of nipples on - /A trick it hath already done." (L.T.II,ii). Here, there is broached the idea mentioned previously, of there being no special creation but an unending sequence, past and future. This idea is now stated more clearly in the next poem - "Behind, before, Infinitude" (L.T.II,iii). To this, there is added the notion of necessity in the evolution of man; that is, man is intended, preordained. He is bound to move onwards, without end. His origins are lost in an infinitude; his future likewise lies beyond his knowledge. Man is a link, a copula between immensities:

The bridging flame I am that broods
Between my twin infinitudes..... (L.T.II,iii)

One could proceed in this manner with a detailed analysis of each poem, and identify those elements in "Life's Testament" which, according to Baylebridge, deal with life at the third and most abstract level; but for reasons of space it is appropriate simply to summarise these elements here and consider their significance before later examining their expression on the less abstract planes of nationalism and political activity.

Placing these elements in an order corresponding to the sections of Life's Testament, we obtain;

1. An initial statement of the evolutionary process which man is part of, inheriting and transcending the past.

2. The idea that man is a being continuous with the past and future, endlessly involved in a struggle for self-transcendence.
3. The gains made in the life of the individual are passed on via biological linking from one generation to the next.
4. The Vital Principle is freed (or redeemed) by endless transmutation into new forms.
5. Since the Vital Principle is a unity, death pertains only to the transient forms of individuation and, from a higher viewpoint, is thus illusory. What is essential to the Whole is immortal.
6. Everything that incarnates, however briefly, leaves an influence which endures.
7. The individual act is complex in origin, part of a web of influence that extends back into the past before the birth of the individual body, and also participating in future life after the body dies.
8. Past, present and future are fictions. All that we are recurs eternally.
9. There is no creation, no death. All that is left to man is his will, out of which comes energy which, in turn, is the source of everything. This is the godhead in man. The will in man has two forms, a known form and an unknown form.
10. Men are the immortal means for the redemption of the Earth, which is attended with the birth of everlasting joy.
11. The doctrine of Heaven is a fiction that hinders man's true task of assisting the Cosmic Spirit in its evolutionary redemption on Earth.
12. False gods shackle man's freedom to develop and thus hinder the evolution of the Spirit which has only found consciousness of itself on Earth in the human mode. Man's self-awareness is that of the Spirit of the universe.
13. The body is an instrument, and the conscious part of man should pay homage to and co-operate with the unconscious wisdom of the body. The guiding, regulating activity of the body is divine and linked with all mankind to meanings beyond our knowledge. God and man fashion each other dialectically in the evolutionary process.
14. The mind of man spans the abyss of infinitudes till it achieves godhead.
15. The Unguessed God has come to the Earth and fashioned the

instrument whereby man may struggle and deify the universe by his will. Man will struggle to his Utmost Self and through battle hail the "Unguessed One".

16. The soul of man seeks to expand. Its source of value is its "Greater Self". To achieve this, it struggles against hindrances and undergoes transmutations. Energy and will are vital.

It is plain, on considering these points listed, that a number of philosophical precedents is invoked. The general impression gained is that we are in the presence of a philosophical scheme variously derived from 19th century evolutionary thought with something of later times, represented by Bergson. The dominant structural feature, however, shows a strong affinity with the evolutionary "Geist" of Hegel, and since this fact involves some quite basic paradoxes in Baylebridge's thought as well as in his relations to other thinkers, notably Nietzsche, it will be of value here to briefly recall certain basic features of Hegel's philosophy and of 19th century monism in general. Nietzsche, we may remember from earlier remarks, regarded Hegel as the necessary precursor of modern evolutionism - "Without Hegel, no Darwin".

D. The monist heritage in Baylebridge's thought

1. Hegel-Baylebridge

The monist position holds that the universe is a unity, that the apparent plurality it exhibits is illusory. The universe, accordingly, is constituted by a network of relations which are determining features of its individual components. The being of anything is only determined fully by the totality of its relations to the whole. To change a thing is to change its relations to other things, and thus in the final reckoning, to change everything in the universe. From this point of view, Baylebridge's poetical illustrations of influence, in "Life's Testament", of the infant dying before its grief-stricken mother, of the young man taken before reaching manhood, etc., find support in abstract argument.

In the monism of Hegel we find an emphasis on the logical priority of the whole to the parts. The appearance of separateness of the parts is illusory, and as knowledge increasingly recognizes the interrelatedness of things, progressing to more comprehensive "wholes" of relations, thus it ascends through degrees of reality towards what is absolutely real, the all-containing Whole. This Whole is identical with the much disputed "Geist" of Hegel and though, in Hegelian terms, it is not possible to properly define the World-Spirit or Geist, for reasons which are a necessary part of the Hegelian system, we are nevertheless supplied by Hegel with numerous indications of its general nature.

For Hegel, Geist is not a thing in nature, such as an animal, for then it would simply be a part and not the whole. Rather it is that which produces the animal, the things of nature, making them what they are. Therefore, for it to be real, it must be operative, be continually active; otherwise it would be non-existent. Also, since it is the whole, it must, in the final analysis, produce itself, putting itself into act continually, individuating into a countless manifold of forms. Thus the ultimate nature of being is not static but is an absolute process:

"Sein Sein ist Aktualität, kein ruhendes Dasein, sondern dies, sich hervorgebracht haben. Dass er wahrhaft sei, dazu gehört, dass er sich hervorgebracht habe; sein Sein ist der absolute

Prozess." 1

The Whole, the World-Spirit, is equated by Hegel with God. Thus God is construed as an absolute process, unceasingly individuating itself in accordance with a dialectical logic. Furthermore, it is a remarkable feature of Hegelian thought that, in contrast to orthodox theistic conceptions, there is no abyss of objectivity between man and God, for with Hegel the Spirit of God is a unity in the sense already described. The Spirit is both being-in-itself and being-for-itself. Yet man is conscious of separation from God. This apparent break in the unity of the Spirit is accounted for by Hegel in his view of the development of the Spirit. The Spirit necessarily develops and reveals itself in freedom since there is nothing other than itself. It is its own object of knowledge and must objectify itself in order to know itself:

"Indem so das Ziel Bestimmt ist, dass der Geist zum Bewusstsein seiner selbst komme oder die Welt sich gemäss mache - denn beides ist dasselbe: man kann sagen, dass der Geist die Gegenständlichkeit sich zu eigen mache, oder umgekehrt, dass der Geist seinen Begriff aus sich hervorbringe, ihn objektiviere und so sein Sein werde; in der Gegenständlichkeit wird er sich seiner bewusst, auf dass er selig sei: den wo Gegenständlichkeit entsprechend ist der inneren Forderung, da eben ist Freiheit - indem er also das Ziel bestimmt hat, so erhält das Fortschreiten seine nähere Bestimmung, nämlich nach der Seite, dass es nicht als ein blosses Mehrwerden gefasst ist. Wir können sogleich dies anknüpfen, dass wir auch in unserm gewöhnlichen Bewusstsein zugeben, dass das Bewusstsein, um sein Wesen zu wissen, Stufen der Bildung durchzugehen habe." 2

In the early part of the Spirit's development, man is as Adam before the Fall, and as the animals still are - innocent, unaware of separation from God. The Fall of man is the consequence of the Spirit's development, of the progressive self-revelation of God; it arises, as in biblical legend, from eating of the tree of knowledge. The paradisaical lack of guilt is animalistic - Paradise being a park where the animals may remain but from which man is driven forth. The animals are one with God, but in man God becomes conscious as man, as being-for-itself in contrast to being-in-itself.

1. Hegel: *Vorlesungen ueber die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte. Der Endzweck.* cf. also Herbert Marcuse: *Hegel's Ontologie und die Grundlegung einer Theorie der Geschichtlichkeit*, Frankfurt (1932), pp.43ff. on "Sein als Bewegtheit".

2. Hegel: *Vorlesungen ueber die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte: Der Endzweck.*

"Nur der mensch ist Geist, dass heisst, fuer sich selbst. Dieses Fuer-sich-sein, dieses Bewusstsein ist aber zugleich die Trennung von dem allgemeinen goettlichen Geist." 1

The spirit, attaining to consciousness in man, at the same time attains to consciousness of separation from the "general divine Spirit". Therefore, the Fall from Grace is the eternal myth of man, whereby he indeed becomes man. This state is felt as a painful evil and filled with longing for reconciliation, for redemption - a word often met with in Baylebridge. Hegel cites the psalm of David: "Herr schaffe mir ein reines Herz, einen neuen gewissen Geist."

Eternal profit and joy is to be gained from the reconciliation of the World-Spirit and the Spirit in man, through consciousness of God in man, of man as God. But this is only to be achieved through struggle and destruction of what is external and foreign to consciousness. There is already here a considerable resemblance to Baylebridge's doctrine.

The Old Testament associations of the Hegelian viewpoint are to be seen from the above mentioned myth of the Fall of Man. The subsequent dialectical progression towards reconciliation of the divided Spirit is brought into the sphere of the New Testament and provides the occasion for Hegel's interpretation of Christ as the God-Man. We are told that neither the sun nor the planets have consciousness; it is only in man that the World-Spirit has attained consciousness of itself. But this consciousness, wherein the World-Spirit experiences itself as a human, finite Spirit, is attended with the painful feeling of separation.

The further stage of reconciliation is revealed in the Christian religion in the Son of God. To paraphrase Hegel: the identity of the subject and God comes into the world when the time is due; the consciousness of this identity is the knowledge of God in his truth. The content of the truth is the Spirit itself, the living moment in itself. The nature of God, to be pure Spirit, is revealed to man in the Christian religion.

Hegel takes care to emphasize that this unity is not to be taken lightly, "flach", as if God is only human and man is likewise God; but, for Hegel, man is only God in so far as he overcomes the naturalness and finiteness of his Spirit and lifts himself up to God. For the man who knows that he is capable of participating in truth, and knows that he himself is a moment in the divine idea, it is posited that he

1. Hegel: *Das Christentum: Das Morgenlaendische Prinzip*.

2. Hegel: *Vorlesungen ueber die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte: Die Vernunft in der Geschichte*.

3. *ibid.*

give up his naturalness. In recollection of Baylebridge's "battle" against what would impede man in his struggle, it is relevant to note that for Hegel, naturalness is associated with that which is unfree and lacking spirit, hence with that which cannot develop. In the idea of God there is now also contained the reconciliation of the pain and unhappiness of man. For the unhappiness itself is now known as necessary for the mediation of the unity of man and God.

There is a quality of necessity in the development of the World-Spirit, from the chaos of the unformed, leading through successive stages to the attainment of godhead. Yet, the spirit is freedom for and in itself, developing towards self-knowledge, through successive historical stages. The aim of the spirit and hence that of world-history is that the spirit become aware of that which it is and objectify this knowledge in the world it produces:

"Das Ziel der Weltgeschichte ist also, dass der Geist zum Wissen dessen gelange, was er Wahrfafte ist, und dies Wissen gegenstaendlich mache, es zu einer vorhandenen Welt verwirkliche, sich als objektiv hervorbringe." 1

World-history is the presentation of the divine, absolute process of the Spirit in its highest forms, of phases whereby it attains to its truth, self-consciousness of itself. These phases, the various peoples, their constitutions, art, religion and science are realised by the Spirit in its unceasing drive to self-consciousness. History shows the Spirit gradually attaining to consciousness; it is tentative at first, then finds cardinal points, and at the end attains full consciousness:

"Die Weltgeschichte zeigt nur, wie der Geist allmaehlich zum Bewusstsein und zum Wollen der Wahrheit kommt; es daemert in ihm, er findet Hauptpunkte, am Ende gelangt er zum vollen Bewusstsein." 2

It is to be remarked that the Spirit in its finite individuations as national-spirits results in nations which are regarded as terms in the process of the Spirit's self-knowledge. But, in so far as we are dealing with an individuated form of the Spirit, we are dealing with a specific spirit, a concrete whole which is not the same as the Spirit in itself but which has its own "natural" existence. The

1. Hegel: *Vorlesungen ueber die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte: Der Endweek*.

2. *ibid.*

relevance of this viewpoint may be seen in connection with Baylebridge's treatment of the Spirit at the "national level". The task of a nation is to realise, to objectify the principle which it embodies initially in the form of an obscure drive. Each nation has its own principle which it strives to realise; when it has objectified its principle it no longer has anything to do in the world, it goes down, gives way to another phase in the Spirit's unfolding. The individual nation fulfils itself in making possible the transition to the higher principle of another nation. In such transitions, however, there arises a separation of the subjective Spirit from the general, arising through self-knowledge of its own national principle as a particular principle. This leads to turning back inwards and striving after personal aims, each man setting his own aims according to his passions. This is the decay of the nation. At the same time, according to Hegel, thought itself appears as a particular, separate activity and the sciences appear. Thus we have a conclusion, anticipating Nietzsche, that the rise of the sciences and national decay are always paired with each other. For Hegel, of course, this represents both a negative moment in world-history and at the same time the start of a higher reconciliation.¹

At the start of the higher phase of development, the Spirit awakes to its new stage of self-awareness in "heroes" to whom the contemporary world is as a shell containing the kernel of a different world - such heroes are the growth-points of a new stage. Hegel, in sympathetic response to the historical thinkers of the German middle-ages, views the development of the World-Spirit as bitter and even unjust to the individual. Hildegard von Bingen, for example, preferred to conceive God as steel; steel-hard are his judgments on the history of the world and the cosmos.² For Hegel, world-history is cosmic history too, but furthermore it is, as we have mentioned above, a theogonic process - and in this process there is much rubbish and waste; worn-out nations, worn-out ages and individuals who have proved irrelevant to world-history. Injustice can be done to individuals but that is of no concern to world-history which has individuals serve it as means to its own progress. Furthermore, all this travail is really the self-travail of the Spirit since it is the Whole.

As noted before, there are varying degrees of reality in Hegel's monism. The Spirit as a whole has the highest reality, the finite

1. *ibid.*

2. *ibid.*

individuations of the Spirit have successively less reality as they embody less of the Spirit in a "concrete whole". Nature is Spirit alienated from itself, "Die Natur ist der sich entfremdete Geist".¹ Matter is not recognized by Hegel, it is subsumed wholly in the process of formative development. The resistance of what is rigid is overcome without remainder, broken, destroyed; it is only a transit-station. The entire realm of space and time is common, "gemein", transitory; it is that mass of common empirical reality. Before a thing has been fully described it has decayed, it carries the germs of dissolution in it, "the hour of its birth is the hour of its death". The realm of the empirically concrete is illusory, its essence is nothing.

The human individual is seen under the same aspect. For the most part, the individual is whipped forward by passions that take fire from illusory aims; man is viewed as an instrument, a tool of world-history, of the World-Spirit, God, on its course to consciousness of itself. The death of the individual is but a moment in the divine process. God dies in front of man thousands and thousands of times in the "production-process" of the cosmos, of world-history. The dialectical movement with its phases of being, negation, becoming, necessarily includes the giving-up of separate existence, that is, includes death. For there is no other death, in the Hegelian monist system, no death in the sense of absolute destruction of being. Death here pertains to the form of individuation, and in relation to the absolute reality of the general Spirit, the finite expression has only an instrumental, even illusory status. God himself contains the negative, finite moment within himself; death is a necessary phase of the Spirit. God has also died on the Cross, and this is cited by Hegel² as the highest act of love; for it is the essence of love to consciously give oneself to the Other. Love is the identity of the divine and human and this entails sacrifice of the finite human consciousness: death is the reconciliation of the finite and the infinite Spirit. Love, self-sacrifice and death are incumbent on the human being in his struggle to achieve godhead.

On reviewing these aspects of Hegelian philosophy, it is understandable that Hegel should have been reproached with pantheism and with obliterating the proper difference between good and evil. It is

1. *ibid.*

2. *ibid.*

also easy to see the justice of Berdyaev's remark that the Hegelian philosophy of spirit is a secularised version of German mysticism, adapted to the needs of the nineteenth century consciousness, and that it reflects the monophysite¹ basis of that mysticism.² Hegel acknowledges the middle ages and invokes the mystical writers of these times. He cites Meister Eckhart and the famous, if heretical, statement of Eckhart's on the mutual dependence of man and God: "Wenn Gott nicht waere, so waere ich nicht; wenn ich nicht waere, so waere Gott nicht."³ Eckhart met with bitter resistance from church circles; Hegel started out against Protestant orthodoxy, not from anti-religiosity but, according to Emil Staiger,⁴ with nothing less than the will to reshape the world from the ground up. According to Staiger, it is difficult to grasp the passion of the eschatological hope and decisiveness of Hegel's generation, Karl Barth speaks of its religious titanism. Barth⁵ says, "I am necessary for God. That is the ground of the Hegelian trust in God, the reason why, immediately and without further ado, it can also be understood as trust in self, and as it has in fact understood itself..." And elsewhere he observes that the true note of the Hegelian philosophy of self-trust is "hoechster Titanismus, indem sie zugleich hoechste Demut ist."⁶ That is, the highest titanism together with the highest humility.

Why has it been necessary here to review the monistic and secularized Christianity of Hegel? Firstly, there is the general circumstance of Hegel's place at the head of modern developmental philosophy and his seminal influence on biological theory itself; for as Nietzsche has said: "Ohne Hegel, kein Darwin."

Secondly, certain features of these world-views, including that of Baylebridge, become more readily apparent and significant when seen in the context of a broader development of thought. Of particular relevance here is Hegel's transformative connection with the Christian theological tradition. Here, the elements of the earlier, medieval tradition are seemingly disengaged from the expressions of revealed theology and

1. That is, the doctrine that Christ had but one composite nature.
2. Nicholas Berdyaev: *Spirit and Reality*. Translated from the Russian, pub. Geoffrey Bles, London 1939, p.26.
3. Lasson's edition of Hegel's *Saemtliche Werke*, Leipzig 1905-1925, XII, p.257.
4. Emil Staiger: *Der Geist der Liebe und das Schicksal*, Schelling, Hegel und Heidegger, Frauenfeld und Leipzig 1935, p.13.
5. Karl Barth: *Die protestantische Theologie im 19. Jahrhundert*, Zurich 1947, p.377.
6. p.204.

rendered in a way more suitable for later non-orthodox thinkers. The more obviously religious and mystical aspect of Hegel's thought in relation to the middle ages has already been mentioned, but lest this aspect be thought of as being merely an interpretive overlay of purely rational principles distinct from any inherent religious import, it is worth pointing out that Hegel's concept of being as an infinite process, a concept basic to Baylebridge and virtually all evolutionary monists, is itself a creative transformation of a theological concept. This may perhaps be best illustrated by reference to Marcuse.¹ This author quotes Hegel as stating, in the *Enzyklopadie*, that

"Wenn wir von den Dingen sagen, sie sind endlich, so wird darunter verstanden, dass sie...nicht bloss begrenzt sind,...sondern dass vielmehr das Nichtsein ihrer Natur, ihr Sein, ausmacht...: die Stunde ihrer Geburt ist die Stunde ihres Todes."

Marcuse comments on this passage as follows:

"...es geht hier nicht mehr um die 'kritische' Endlichkeit menschlicher Erkenntnis oder des menschlichen Daseins etwa gegenueber der Unendlichkeit des intuitus originarius, Gottes, - es geht um die Endlichkeit als Seinsbestimmung des Seienden ueberhaupt! Und noch mehr: diese Bestimmung der Endlichkeit ist erwachsen aus einer konkreten Interpretation des begegnenden Seienden ueberhaupt. Das will aber sagen: der Begriff der Endlichkeit wird hier zum erstenmal herausgenommen aus der theologischen Tradition und auf den Boden der rein philosophischen Ontologie gestellt! Es ist nicht mehr die Endlichkeit des Seienden als ens creatum gegenueber dem Schoepfergott, sondern diese Endlichkeit hat ueberhaupt kein gegenueber mehr, - auch nicht die Unendlichkeit des Seienden selbst (welches Gegenueber Hegel als die 'schlechte' Unendlichkeit gerade abweist). - Von hier aus hat Hegel eine voellig neue Dimension aufgebrochen: die universale Geschichtlichkeit des Seienden." 2

Thus, it is possible to discern in this survey of Hegel's thought an anticipation of certain fundamental features of Baylebridge's system. These are:

1. The universal historicity of being (des Seienden), of which Marcuse speaks in Hegel. This is to be matched with

1. Marcuse, op.cit., pp.62-63.

2. pp.62-63.

Baylebridge's monistic principle of unceasing transmutation.

2. The dialectical relationship of God and man in the evolutionary process. It will be recalled that Samuel Butler in his criticism of orthodox Christianity demanded a view in which God was not apart from the Creation but was animating it - "he in us, and we in him." Such a view is contained in Hegel. The abyss of objectivity between man and God is eliminated, in principle. This is also an essential part of Baylebridge's view.
3. The idea of 'struggle'. In both Hegel and Baylebridge, the dialectical principle involves ceaseless striving to achieve godhead. 'Strife' is endemic.
4. The importance of the Earth. For both Hegel and Baylebridge the Earth is unique as the site of the coming to consciousness of the World-Spirit in man.
5. National-spirits as part of the evolutionary development of the World-Spirit. "Heroes" as growth-points in the travail of the nation and the Spirit. This aspect pertains to Baylebridge's "National" doctrine.
6. The instrumental value of the individual in relation to the Spirit's evolution, including its national expression. This, too, appears more clearly in relation to Baylebridge's nationalist ideology.
7. Death as pertaining to individuation and not to the essence. For both Hegel and Baylebridge, love, self-sacrifice and death are incumbent on the human being in his struggle to achieve godhead.

With these general features of Baylebridge's system thus brought into relation with Hegel, who may properly be regarded as the main precursor of evolutionary philosophy in modern times, it is now appropriate to consider the views of Nietzsche.

2. Hegel-Nietzsche

It is well known¹ that there is a direct link between the left "young Hegelians" who met in the Berlin "Doctorklub", and Marxism, and that the left Hegelians sought to purify Hegelian titanism of its "religious additives". The young Karl Marx promised Ruge an essay for his journal, on Hegel's "atheism". Subsequently, as we know, Marx is said to have stood Hegel on his feet, or on his head (to take, say, Strausz-Hupé's² view), and the dialectic of the coming to self-consciousness of God became the dialectical materialism of the coming to self-consciousness of the working-class, as socialist-consciousness and then as communist-consciousness. In these consequences, Hegelianism is very much present in the 20th century.

However, there is another line of influence which more immediately concerns the present inquiry. Walter Kaufmann in his study of Nietzsche has stated that Nietzsche's position is best elucidated, not by comparing it with Schopenhauer, as is often done, but with Hegel

"...for there is a truly amazing parallel. Each of the two men found a single word which epitomized his entire dialectic; and the two words, though not identical, have literally the same meaning and can be analysed into the same three distinct connotations."³

It is not proposed to take up this matter directly here but to treat it as it more naturally emerges in the course of following Baylebridge.

With reference to the essential philosophical element of "Life's Testament", we have noted at the start that Baylebridge sees man as part of an evolutionary process, in which he inherits the past. We have also been told in the General Preface that this process has brought man to a momentous present. Apart from the particular nature of this present, it can be said that the present moment always has a unique significance in the Hegelian system or in any system of a kind where the present, inheriting the strivings of preceding history, must bear the whole responsibility of accepting and furthering historical destiny. This is something different to the Schopenhauerian world-view

1. e.g., Karl Loewith: *Von Hegel zu Nietzsche*, Zurich/Vienna (1941), pp.198ff.

2. R. Strausz-Hupé: *The Estrangement of Western Man*, pub. Gollancz, London (1953), p.137.

3. Kaufmann: *op.cit.*, p.204.

in which there is no meaningful direction to the strivings of the Will, and in which the events of history are not rationally ordered in stages of struggle upwards but are essentially responses to blind, irrational desires. The Schopenhauerian view of history does not regard the present as intrinsically more valuable than the past but simply sees it as yet another exemplification of the abiding features of existence. Indeed Burckhardt, sympathetic to Schopenhauer's view in the matter, thought that historical studies were best pursued in relation to periods remote from the present, in order that their features might be more instructively revealed to us without the distraction of the seemingly momentous issues of the day.

Concomitant with Baylebridge's notion of inheriting the historical past, we find the notion of transcending the past. This notion is also associated with that of an endless struggle for self-transcendence. We have seen that the dialectical monism of Hegel involves a basic principle of self-transcendence in the Universe and that this principle is essentially identical with the finite expression of the Spirit in man. Nietzsche, too, after an initial period of interpreting the Universe in terms of the dualism of Apollo and Dionysos, arrived at a basic dialectical principle in which the Apollonian and Dionysian forces are united in a self-formative and self-transcending drive. For Nietzsche, this principle is necessarily operative in all life. Thus in the second part of *Also Sprach Zarathustra*, in the section that bears the heading, "Von der Selbst-Überwindung", the notion of self-overcoming is associated with the will-to-power, of which it is indeed another expression - the essential character of which is perhaps best rendered by Heidegger's "über-sich-hinaus-greifen"¹ which has connotations of reaching, striving over beyond oneself, and so on. Nietzsche's view which is presented as the outcome of empirical generalisation, not only in this section but elsewhere, refers to this characteristic of life as being a mystery: "Und dies Geheimnis redete das Leben selber zu mir: 'Siehe' sprach es 'ich bin das, was sich immer selber überwinden muss.'"² (The emphasis in the last phrase is Nietzsche's.) Life is that which must always overcome itself. And the apparent multiplicity of human strivings is really expressive of the one mystery:

1. Martin Heidegger: *Nietzsche*, 2 Vols. pub. Neske, Pfullingen 1961, Vol. I., pp. 70ff.

2. Schlechta edition of Nietzsche's Works, op.cit., Vol. II, p. 374.

"Freilich, ihr heisst es Wille zur Zeugung oder Trieb zum Zwecke, zum Höheren, Ferneren, Vielfacheren: aber all dies ist eins und ein Geheimnis."

The will to generation, or the purposive drive to what is higher, further, more manifold, is essentially the one mystery.

And in view of the difficulties that have been encountered in understanding the nature of the Hegelian "Geist", with its apparent affront to Aristotelian logic, it may be opportune to briefly pause here in consideration of the "one mystery" emphasized by Nietzsche; for the problem raised in both cases is identical with the basic problem of a dialectical monism. It also constitutes the basic problem in understanding Nietzsche's later philosophy. Essentially, it is the question of how a principle which is said to be one can in fact overcome itself; for the notion of self-overcoming posits division into parts, which conflicts with the statement that the principle is one. On the other hand, a basic principle which is indeed one with itself offers no explanation of change and development: such a monism would be static. It would seem that in view of this difficulty it would be more appropriate in a changing Universe to discard monism in favour of dualism or a plurality of principles. Indeed, in his *Geburt der Tragödie aus dem Geiste der Musik*, Nietzsche has advanced the twin principles of Apollo and Dionysos. But, as already mentioned, Nietzsche subsequently abandoned this dualism, and in the statements of Zarathustra we find that the will-to-power is advanced as the sole principle of human behaviour. However, as Fink¹ observes, the basic ontological significance of the will-to-power is not expounded on in "Zarathustra". Rather, this idea is used there to characterise "life" which, as Fink adds, is not to be equated with a mere biological category in which the "living" is contrasted with the "lifeless"; for, though Fink does not explicitly state it here, this is a term which Nietzsche elsewhere shows to include the cultural and spiritual activity of men as well. This matter will later become relevant to a consideration of the so-called vitalism of both Nietzsche and Baylebridge.

At the stage of development shown in "Zarathustra", the will-to-power is extended from particular instances of its operation in human activity to a general principle.

Later, there is to be found in the collection of notes posthumously

1. Eugen Fink: *Nietzsche's Philosophie*, Kohlhammer Verlag, Stuttgart 1960, p. 80.

ordered and published under the title of *Der Wille zur Macht*, a section dealing with Nietzsche's views on the will-to-power in Nature.¹ These notes were mostly written in 1885 and 1886. Nietzsche protests against the then seemingly victorious mechanistic world-view which would attribute the apparent intentionality in the destiny of a plant or animal to 'pressure' and 'push', thus honouring what Nietzsche calls "the principle of the greatest possible stupidity". He rejects the ideas of pressure and push, and of *aetio in diatana* as themselves inexplicable.

All talk about laws of nature, causes and regularity, is an erroneous "hineindichtung" of the subject, a reading-into on the part of the would-be observer who in fact is unwittingly seeking to make nature amenable to his own will and who thus invents the very phenomena he purports to describe.

For Nietzsche, the essence of all being is characterised by the will-to-power. And we observe that for Nietzsche, being equals life: "Das Sein - wir haben keine andere Vorstellung davon als Leben. - Wie kann also etwas Totes sein?"² We thus note, parenthetically at this stage, that for Nietzsche, "life" is not exhausted by the biological concept of this name.

It has been a popular response to Nietzsche's idea of the will-to-power to construe it in an obvious everyday manner as the will-to-power over some particular object or, more vaguely, over an indefinitely large range of people and things. It has been construed as a would-be spur to military conquest, as the slogan of a rampant Darwinism in international relations, or, less sensationally, as indicative of romantic strainings on the part of the impotent for the very thing they lack. Thus the will-to-power is seen both as a lack of power and a striving towards power which, in this popular interpretation, is construed as a desirable objective external to the desiring will. Such an interpretation carries connotations of romanticism, weakness and unscrupulousness.

However, the previous discussion of the Hegelian "Spirit" has shown that an absolute monist principle necessarily bears all individuations within itself. In the absolute sense, there is nothing outside of the one principle. Hence, in the final analysis, however paradoxical it may

1. Nietzsche: *Der Wille zur Macht*, Selected and arranged by Peter Gast in co-operation with Elisabeth Forster-Nietzsche, pub. Kroener, Leipzig 1959 (First pub. 1906), pp. 420ff.

2. Nietzsche: *Der Wille zur Macht*, op.cit., Note 582.

seem, the will-to-power is a will to itself. In this light, the title of the section of *Also Sprach Zarathustra*, in which Nietzsche states his views on the will-to-power, is highly relevant: it is called "Von der Selbst-Überwindung", which may be variously rendered as "On Self-Overcoming" or "On Self-Transcendence", since the term "Überwindung" has both these meanings, at least. This notion, in turn, is equivalent to that of power-over-oneself; and indeed, even in the notion of power over another, there is implied the notion of power-over-oneself. To command another, one must first command oneself.

Hence, power is not something outside of the will-to-power, toward which the will moves as towards an object. The Nietzschean will, just as the Geist in the Hegelian system, is not constrained by anything other than itself, nor has it any aim outside of itself. The will does not strive towards power as towards something other than itself, but it is the willing power that wills to overcome itself. However difficult and even tautologous the nature of this concept may seem to be, both Hegel and Nietzsche appear to mean an unceasing tension towards self-transcendence. The ultimate principle in both cases is inherently unstable, unable to remain static at any stage of its transcendental striving, for this would be to desist from its own nature.

At this juncture, it is appropriate to contrast the notion of the will-to-power in Nietzsche with the concept of will employed in Schopenhauer's *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, since certain critics, for example, T. Inglis Moore,¹ have seen fit to bring Baylebridge into relationship with Schopenhauer's ideas.

As is known, Schopenhauer, in critically examining the views of Kant, questioned the idea of the *ding-an-sich*, the unknowable noumenon which, according to Kant, is the ground of our phenomenal experience, while being necessarily unknown to us, since the categories of our experience can only pertain to the phenomenal expression of the noumenon. For Schopenhauer, it was agreed that the *ding-an-sich* was not to be grasped conceptually, in the order of rational knowledge. But he claimed that, nevertheless, the *ding-an-sich*, the universal ground of all phenomena, was directly within our experience and was

1. T. Inglis Moore: *Six Australian Poets*, Melbourne (1942), p. 129.

in fact prior to all rational operations of the mind. In our experience of the will, we are, according to Schopenhauer, given access to the innermost essence of the world. The will-to-live is the "ground-note" of nature. The will-to-live expressed throughout nature is identical with the human will experienced on the side of the subject. Schopenhauer is given to repeating the Vedic saying, "Tat twam asi" - "that art thou". The will-to-live objectifies itself in the various presentations of itself in nature. Our experience is twofold; on the one hand, "the world is my idea", it appears to me as the 'Vorstellung' or individual presentation of the will and, on the other hand, I experience it directly in its innermost nature as will-to-live. Everything drives towards existence, to "being-there", and if possible, to organic existence, that is, to life and, still further, to the greatest possible increase of this:

"Jeder Blick auf die Welt, welche zu erklären die Aufgabe des Philosophen ist, bestaetigt und bezeugt, dass Wille zum Leben, weit entfernt eine beliebige Hypothese oder gar ein leeres Wort zu sein, der allein wahre Ausdruck ihres innersten Wesens ist. Alles draengt und treibt zum Dasein, womoeglich zum organischen, d.i. zum Leben, und danach zur moeglichsten Steigerung desselben: an der tierischen Natur wird es dann augenscheinlich, dass Wille zum Leben der Grundton ihres Wesens, die einzige unwandelbare und unbedingte Eigenschaft desselben ist." 1

To this, it might be added that the will-to-live, being a non-rational principle, does not exhibit the same features as the Hegelian Geist which is pre-eminently rational. That is, it does not unfold in accordance with an inner dialectic, but is essentially a blind striving without purpose and is incapable of supporting the kind of historical ascension posited by Hegel.

It is sometimes considered that Nietzsche's attitude to Schopenhauer's doctrine of the will is essentially a matter of reacting positively to something that Schopenhauer thought it better to deny. That is, Schopenhauer regarded the strivings of the will-to-live as being so productive of human misery that it were far better for the wise man to quieten the strivings of the will within himself as much as possible - ideally, it being best to deny the will altogether. Nietzsche, on the other hand, with his declaration of "amor fati", is said to have accepted the basic doctrine of the will, while also being

willing to accept all its consequences in actual living. However, in connection with Baylebridge, it is useful to see Nietzsche's reaction to the doctrine itself.

In a note to be found in the *Will-to-Power*,¹ Nietzsche asks if the "will-to-power" is a kind of "will" or if it is identical with the concept of "will"? Is it the "will" which Schopenhauer meant as being the "in-itself" of things? In answer, Nietzsche states that the will of previous psychology is an unjustified generalisation, that in fact this will does not exist and that, instead of comprehending the forming-out of one specific will in many forms, the character of the will has been eliminated by subtracting out the content, the direction of the will. And this, he claims, is to the highest degree the case with Schopenhauer: "das ist ein blosses leeres Wort, was er 'Wille' nennt". It is merely an empty word that Schopenhauer calls will. We are even less concerned with a "will-to-life" says Nietzsche, since life is merely an individual case of the will-to-power. He adds that it is quite arbitrary to assert that everything strives to pass over into this form of the will-to-power.

In view of Schopenhauer's notion of "Steigerung", of will to increased life, mentioned in the quotation above and elsewhere, it seems possible that Nietzsche's criticism is somewhat excessive and that Schopenhauer has erred, if at all, more in lack of precision in defining his principle, than in what he infers for it in the various contexts of its use. Be that as it may, Nietzsche presses the specification of a monist "will" to a point of logical compression and precision against which the views of Schopenhauer still appear to imply a residue of unpurged dualism.

In relation to Baylebridge, there are differences to be observed relative to both Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. Baylebridge's concept of the will as expressed in "Life's Testament" has been noted earlier in this study, and it was shown that with Baylebridge the will is properly directed to the realisation of an indefinitely higher stage of divinity. In the present context, however, it is perhaps more useful to refer to the earlier book, "The New Life", which, according to Baylebridge, may be referred to in relation to the ideas contained in "Life's Testament". Thus, we find:²

1. Note 692.

2. Collected Works, op.cit., Vol.I, p.118.

1. Schopenhauer: *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, In Grossherzog Wilhelm Ernst edition, Vol.II, pp.1108-1109.

What is or shall be? All is but becoming.
 Let Man, his next eternally upsumming,
 Employ the undated eye, the prescient skill,
 At one with the Perpetual Will.

Such a "Perpetual Will" may possibly be construed as equivalent to the Schopenhauerian will, as T. Inglis Moore appears to suggest, but it is not sufficiently well specified here to justify this. Another poem in the same book, and bearing the title, suggestive of Vaughan or Crashaw, "The Blight Super-subtlety in Effect Declares Itself",¹ speaks of a man's "will-to-power". But it is in the "Envoy" of "The New Life" that Baylebridge has put his conception clearly:

Not will to "live", not will to strive, alone -
 Too soon by circumscription overthrown -
 But will to godward, with no last degree ...

In terms of the preceding discussion, this statement distinguishes Baylebridge's conception of the will from that of Schopenhauer. It might also be added that the pessimistic aspect of Schopenhauer's description of the practical consequences of the will as it operates in human affairs, the associated extremes of misery and boredom, and of "der Nichtigkeit des Daseins" in a world where all is constantly becoming and never being, finds no parallel in Baylebridge's writings.

Also, one cannot properly say that Baylebridge's conception of the will is the same as Nietzsche's, since it is not specified as a will-to-power but as a "will-to-godward". In this formulation, and recalling certain other aspects of Baylebridge's system already discussed, it still bears more resemblance to the Hegelian "Geist" than to Nietzsche's concept.

In the Hegelian system, logic belongs with phenomenology, since "phenomenology" is the self-presentation and unfolding of the "logos", the creative reason, in its unconditional drive to know itself. This is identical with the Spirit or "Geist". Its nature, as distinct from Nietzsche's 'Will-to-Power', is that of active reason presenting itself to itself in order to know itself. Being the sole ultimate principle, its activity is self-determining and free. It has the characteristics of willing, that is, it is active and self-determining but its decisive feature in the process of individuation is rational, in that it individuates in order to know itself. This places an emphasis on consciousness, which is commonly found in evolutionists, including,

1. p. 120.

2. p. 144.

for example, John Davidson, Bernard Shaw,¹ and Baylebridge. However, this does not apply to Nietzsche, as will be discussed.

With Nietzsche, the subjectivity of the ultimate principle appears to be taken to the limit:

"Dass die Dinge eine Beschaffenheit an sich
 haetten, ganz abgesehen von der Interpretation
 und Subjectivitaet, ist eine ganz muessige
 Hypothese: es wurde voraussetzen, dass das
 Interpretieren und Subjekt-sein nicht
 wesentlich sei, dass ein Ding aus allen
 Relationen geloest noch Ding sei." 2

Nietzsche's ultimate principle has a dialectical tension inherent in it in the manner of Hegel, but reason is now no longer the essential feature of things - rather, reason is subordinate to the will, which, in the manner discussed above, is construed as the will-to-power. This should not be understood as in any sense expressive of a desire on Nietzsche's part to reject reason in favour of some non-rational or instinctual claim. It is concerned only to deny the autonomy of reason, to place reason in perspective, as a means. With Nietzsche, reason remains as the pre-eminent means of the will-to-power in man.

There are some interesting consequences to be drawn from Nietzsche's work in view of the preceding developments in Kant and Hegel.

With Hegel, existence is rational, and in this respect is subject to the judgment of the Spirit in its unfolding. Reason, in the Hegelian sense, is the freely creating and ordering Spirit. In this respect, it is analogous to God the Creator. Existing things are the creation of that One which truly is, the absolute Spirit - the Creation has only a relative truth and being. The divine Reason creates the infinite variety of creatures that participate in the unfolding of its own subjectivity. This contrast in the ontological status of the One and the Many leads with Hegel to a relative devaluation of the personal as compared with larger "wholes", such as the nation, the race and world-history. History is the presentation of the divine, absolute Spirit in its progress upwards through ascending stages of its self-development. The temporal forms of these stages are peoples and nations through which the Hegelian God experiences pain, death and

1. The emphasis on consciousness in George Bernard Shaw is critically discussed by C.E.M. Joad in his book, *Shaw*, pub. Gollancz, London 1949, pp. 230ff.

2. Nietzsche's Works, Schlechts ed., op.cit., Vol. III, p. 555. The emphases are Nietzsche's.

resurrection. The individual derives his significance from his rational place as an instrument in this process. The attribution of the Kantian categories to the Objective Spirit has opened the way to the reduction of the human individual to an "accident" in relation to the "substance" of world-history: "Gegen die ewige Gerechtigkeit bleibt das eitle Treiben der Individuen nur ein anwogenes Spiel."¹

Baylebridge's conception is essentially similar to this also, as will be shown more clearly when considering his doctrine of nationality. A large part of human activity is depreciated by Baylebridge because, in his view, it does not conduce to the forwarding of the Spirit. Death has a function here in sorting out the "accidental" characteristics of human beings from what is vital for the larger purpose, for example:

In Death's exact demand: the halt, the blind,
The spent, the leprous, then were cast behind - 2

The "substance" of world-history for Baylebridge is the nation: the Spirit is to be expressed and "forwarded" by means of the nation. The ultimate aim for men is the achievement of godhead, but its temporal means is the nation. Thus, in considering "The Goal", Baylebridge states:

What glimpse we, for these indefatigations?
A nation - first among all nations! 3

It is clear that men are considered instrumental in the achievement of this nation. The national reference is useful here because it helps to clarify the notion of self-sacrifice, which might remain ambiguous if confined to the formulations of "Life's Testament". Life has a price, and this may properly be paid to the nation:

They said: To do thus puts us first among nations,
among men; but the price!
And this answered: Have ye, then, so much in hand
to pay with that in this, niggards that ye are, ye
would think to lose much? And Harken! to pay
prices, if ye but reckon it as men would, is all
your meaning. 4

This doctrine of Baylebridge's stands in radical contrast to Nietzsche.

With Nietzsche, the final step in the completion of the subjectivity of the monist principle brings with it a radical shift in

1. Hegel: *ibid.*

2. 'Political Verse', Interpretations, II, "Power in Nature", Collected Works, op.cit., Vol.I, p.214.

3. *ibid.*, "The Goal", p.224.

4. *ibid.*, "Life and its Price", p.214.

valuations. The absolute principle which is now seen as willing itself, expressed in the formula, "will-to-power", replaces the unconditional subjectivity of Reason and changes the status of the individual as instrumental for the purposes of the absolute Spirit, into an unconditional will to self-transcendence. With Hegel, as in general with mystical doctrines, the individual qua individual is painfully separated from God but overcomes this dichotomy in the *unio mystica*, in which the "old Adam" dies. Indeed, with Hegel, death is the appropriate instance of love and reconciliation - human death is the identity of the Divine and Human: "Dem Gott gegenueber sind die endlichen Menschen; der Mensch, das Endliche, ist im Tode selbst als Moment Gottes gesetzt, und der Tod ist das Versöhnende. Der Tod ist die Liebe selbst; es wird darin die absolute Liebe angeschaut. Es ist die Identität des Göttlichen und Menschlichen, dass Gott im Menschlichen, im Endlichen bei sich selbst ist und das Endliche im Tode selbst Bestimmung Gottes ist. Durch den Tod hat Gott die Welt versöhnt und versöhnt sich ewig mit sich selbst."¹ The will of the Creature dies in the love and knowledge of the Creator.

In contrast, the consequences of the absolute principle as formulated by Nietzsche can be seen in their enormity from the Christian viewpoint. For, by displacing the purpose of the absolute principle from conscious knowledge of itself involving the reconciliation of all its parts in love and knowledge, and the transcending of each part as such by this reconciliation, so that the purpose of the absolute principle is now that of self-overcoming as will-to-power, in which conscious knowledge is allotted an intermediate role only, Nietzsche has placed the individual human being in the very heart of reality, in the place hitherto accorded to God. Now, in place of the unconditional subjectivity of the Divine Reason, there is placed the unconditional subjectivity of the will-to-power. In each instance of its individuation, the will-to-power seeks to develop itself further in the dialectical process of conservation and self-overcoming. The will of the individual is not subsumed in love and knowledge of the Whole but is the driving principle of existence; it is its own aim.

God as the Other, to which the finite spirit of man is to be sacrificed in the reconciling union of knowledge, is seen in Nietzsche's view as a monstrous distortion of truth, as indeed a

1. Hegel, *ibid.* The emphasis is Hegel's.

device expressive of the will-to-power in certain groups of men. It is this displacement of value in the ultimate monist principle, as described above, that constitutes the metaphysical basis of Nietzsche's assertion that "God is dead". With the establishment of a principle of complete subjectivity there is nothing outside of the will-to-power, nothing to which the will might subordinate itself, no Christian God or heaven. The essence of being, wherever it may be, is self-development.

For the individual, this implies that his view of the world, that is, his system of values, is based on his will-to-power. Nietzsche is careful to follow this aspect of his principle over a wide range of applications, interpreting examples of apparent self-effacement as in reality stratagems of the will-to-power. However, the will-to-power is not, as Kaufmann¹ discusses, necessarily bound up with direct power over others. In fact, its essence is self-overcoming and it is much more related to the concept of sublimation, of binding one's so-called instinctual drives into higher forms of expression, than in the mere assertion of oneself over others, which may in fact be expressive of personal weakness.

In reviewing these features of philosophical thought as developed through Kant, Schopenhauer and Hegel, it is apparent that Baylebridge's system finds important precedents here, particularly with Hegel. But it is at the point where Nietzsche contributes his own critical thought to this philosophical stream that Baylebridge begins to lag. For, while Baylebridge appears to accept much of Nietzsche's cultural criticism, notably his anti-Christian polemic, he at the same time discloses a philosophical position that remains much closer to those positions that Nietzsche attacks. An attempt will be made to demonstrate this in what follows.

1. Kaufmann, *op.cit.*, pp. 243ff.

3. Evolutionary monism and the will-to-power.

So far, in contributing this explication of Nietzsche's basic principle, it has been contended that the will-to-power, as viewed by Nietzsche, is a completely subjective principle positing itself as its own aim. There is yet another important corollary of this - and that is Nietzsche's idea of the 'Ueberschensch', which though it is commonly rendered in English as the idea of the "Superman" is not properly conveyed by the popular use of this term at all.

The nature of the will-to-power, as essentially a dialectic process of self-overcoming, necessarily involves the idea of transcending itself in the direction of something indefinitely more valuable, that is, as exercising far greater power. In every case, the particular form of the will-to-power stands in the relation of a means to itself. For man, this implies that man as such is not the aim of the will-to-power but is regarded as a stage in the development of the will-to-power. The notion of a more developed man on present lines is thus an improper limitation of the concept. In particular, the not uncommon muscular versions of the Superman idea are a travesty, since Nietzsche regarded reason and knowledge as far more effective in the service of the will-to-power than mere physical prowess. Thus the concept of the will-to-power contains the notion of self-unfolding to an indefinitely higher stage than that existing at the moment. For the individual instance of the will-to-power, this implies not service in the development of mankind, or of the State or any other abstraction, but the will to realise one's innermost nature as pure subject. More generally, the proper value of man, in Nietzschean terms, is beyond-man, that is, to have power over man, over oneself. This does not mean (and here we recall Baylebridge's remarks in the General Preface)¹ that the past is an error to be rejected, to be denied nihilistically, but it means that the past too must come under the changing perspective of the will-to-power. The past must be reinterpreted, revalued, as a phase in its overcoming. The will-to-power necessarily involves the past in the present, as the dialectic of the will-to-power requires that its gains be consolidated to provide the necessary resistance to its further will-to-power: "Der

1. Baylebridge: *Collected Works*, *op.cit.*, Vol.I, p.xi.

Will-zur-Macht kann sich nur an Widerstehenden äussern...¹

From Nietzsche's point of view, conscious selection is to facilitate the advent of the "Ueberschensch". This concept has already been discussed in the more metaphysical context of the will-to-power, but, of course, it also occupies a key position in Nietzsche's biological considerations as well. Kaufmann has already discussed some aspects of the history of the term "Ueberschensch", directing attention to as far back as Lucian's use of the equivalent term "hyperanthropos" in the second century A.D.² But Kaufmann gives little indication of how this idea was represented in the more biological aspects of Nietzsche's reading and appears to consider that the idea was hardly present to Nietzsche before the composition of *Also Sprach Zarathustra*. Thus, in speaking of a passage in the *Fröhliche Wissenschaft*, he says: "This aphorism is significant because it contains one of the few references to the overman before 'Zarathustra' and was written just before that work".³ But the idea itself must at least have crossed Nietzsche's attention when reading Dühring's *Der Wert des Lebens* in 1875.⁴ This latter author states, for example, that the whole course of evolution indicates a constant development: "...welche die Menschheit einst, anstatt sie zu einem Leichnam zu machen, in eine veredelte, erheblich anders ausgestattete Gattung überleiten wird."⁵ Close to this time, one finds in the third part of Nietzsche's *Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen* the view that the transition to a higher type is the aim of development of a species:

"Wie gerne moechte man eine Belehrung auf die Gesellschaft und ihre Zwecke anwenden, welche man aus der Betrachtung einer jeder Art des Tier und Pflanzenreichs gewinnen kann, dass es bei ihr allein auf das einzelne hoehere Exemplare ankommt....Eigentlich ist es leicht zu begreifen, dass dort, wo eine Art an ihre Grenze und an ihren Uebergang in eine hoehere Art gelangt, das Ziel ihrer Entwicklung liegt..."⁶

1. Nietzsche: *Der Wille zur Macht*, Note 656.

2. Kaufmann, op.cit., p.266.

3. Kaufmann, op.cit., p.267.

4. Berthold, op.cit., p.429; cf. *Der Wille zur Macht*, Note 792.

5. Eugen Dühring: *Der Wert des Lebens*, p.190. Dühring is also mentioned in Nietzsche's letter to Gersdorff, of 16th Feb. 1868.

6. Nietzsche: *Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen*; Part III, "Schopenhauer als Erzieher", 6, Schlechta ed. Vol.I, p.327.

This idea is linked to more specifically human and artistic concerns in the last part of this work where Nietzsche, in praising Wagner's art as properly addressed to the future, says of Wagner:

"...dass er an den jetzigen Menschen Eigenschaften wahrnimmt, welche nicht zum unveränderlichen Charakter und Knochenbau des menschlichen Wesens gehören, sondern wandelbar, ja vergänglich sind und dass gerade dieser Eigenschaften wegen die Kunst unter ihnen ohne Heimat und er selber der gornausgesandete Bote einer andern Zeit sein muesse."

It is made clear that this is not mere Utopianism, that is, it does not refer to the final attainment of an ideal state:

"Kein goldenes Zeitalter, kein unbewölkter Himmel ist diesen kommenden Geschlechtern beschieden ... Auch die ueberschenschliche Gulte und Gerechtigkeit wird nicht wie ein unbeweglicher Regenbogen ueber das Gefilde dieser Zukunft gespannt sein. Vielleicht wird jenes Geschlecht im ganzen sogar boeser erscheinen als das jetzige - denn es wird, in Schlimmen wie im Guten offener sein..."¹

In *Also Sprach Zarathustra*, the idea of the "Ueberschensch" is more sharply emphasized. But, as mentioned previously, it is erroneous to conceive of this doctrine as implying a general evolutionary aim. Nietzsche's view is that, here and there, individual development does, more or less fortuitously, surprise us with examples of superior men, but these are exceptions and are not maintained. Nietzsche, from very early in his work on, is an emphatic advocate of conscious experiment in the interests of less fortuitous production of superior men. The purpose of culture, of education, is the production of genius, and in place of any evolutionary "obscure drive" in this direction, Nietzsche wants "conscious willing".² He dislikes any idea of reliance on a "world-process" since this becomes all too easy a cover for "Philistertum", for a sophistical justification of complacency. Baylebridge, too, would oppose complacency and demands conscious willing, but he nevertheless has his own relation to the "world-process". For both writers, any ideal state must be consciously fought for by individuals if it is to come into existence.

In Nietzsche's view, it is the individuals who form a bridge over

1. Nietzsche: *Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen*; IV, "Richard Wagner in Bayreuth", 11, Schlechta ed. Vol.I, p.431.

2. Nietzsche: op.cit., Part III, 6, Schlechta ed. Vol I, p.330.

the "wondering stream of becoming". These individuals do not promote a process but live timelessly or simultaneously, as the "republic of genius", thanks to history: "One giant calls to another through the barren and intervening space of ages - and, undisturbed by the arrant, noisy multitudinous dwarfs that creep away beneath them, the high converse of spirits continues on."¹ The emphasis in the early work, as in the later works also, is on the individual. The "Uebermensch" is a concept expressed in the singular. It is the inherent aim of the concrete will-to-power in individual men. If the individual man is inadequate in terms of this aim, he should, nevertheless, live to the advantage of the rarest and most valuable examples of men, not to the advantage of the majority.² Or, as Nietzsche elsewhere puts it:

"...ich weiss keinen besseren Lebenszweck
als am Grossen und Unmöglichen, *animas*
magnas prodigia zu Grunde zu gehen." 3

Any association of the Uebermensch concept with Darwinism is expressly repudiated by Nietzsche.⁴ Likewise the idea that the Uebermensch is a kind of hero, on the lines of Carlyle's idea that it is the great men who make history, is repudiated because this would make the Uebermensch of instrumental value, whereas the Uebermensch himself is the embodiment of the highest value: he represents the embodiment of the highest value: he represents the embodiment of that state of being implicit in the self-transcendent nature of the will-to-power.⁵

Here, it must be said that Nietzsche's emphasis on the individual as such is in clear contrast with Baylebridge. For Baylebridge, the individual is of lesser reality compared to the God or Spirit of which he is an expression. For Baylebridge, the world is ultimately a unity which men, because of limited understanding, comprehend as a plurality. For Nietzsche, it is the reverse: the world is a chaos which man because of his limited understanding and development presents to himself as more or less unified. For Nietzsche, the individuals form a bridge across the chaos; for Baylebridge, it is the Spirit that

1. *Unzeit. Betracht.*, Part II, 0, Schlechta ed. Vol. I, p. 270.

2. *Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen*; Part III, 6, Schlechta ed. Vol. I, p. 328.

3. *ibid.* Part II, 9, Schlechta ed. Vol. I, p. 272.

4. Nietzsche: *Ecce Homo*; *Warum ich eo gute Bücher schreibe*, 1, Schlechta ed. Vol. II, p. 2202.

5. Kaufmann, *op. cit.*, p. 272; *Goetiaendawerung* ix, 44; Schlechta ed. Vol. II, p. 1020.

forms a link between individuals. Particular instances of human development, great men, are of interest to Nietzsche, not as instrumental for the species, the race, the nation or the goals of the Spirit, but because of the state of being they represent. With Baylebridge, there is virtually no reference to individual great men to be found. When referred to by implication, they are regarded not as unique in themselves, but as prominent in forwarding the Spirit. Though it could be argued that Baylebridge too is concerned with the conditions that make for the appearance of genius, the major emphasis in his writing about human selection is on the development of a population fit for national purposes, a step on the way to the next goal of the Spirit.¹ His main emphasis, concerning outstanding types of men, is on the leader, and is more in line with Carlyle's idea of 'great men' than with Nietzsche's concept. The difference becomes even more marked when Nietzsche's other main doctrine is considered - the eternal recurrence of all things.

1. Baylebridge: *Collected Works*, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, "Democracy and Nationalism", p. 254.

4. The Eternal Recurrence, and Nihilism.

From what has been said so far, it is apparent that Nietzsche placed no value on the doctrine of indefinite progress but that he was much concerned with the possibility of what the individual might make of himself. It is important to make this point clear because of its relation to that other doctrine which Nietzsche held to be of equal and paramount importance in his world-view: namely, the doctrine of the eternal recurrence. This doctrine, which is prefigured in the supra-historical conception of the will-to-power, and which has already been discussed in this study, with reference to Nietzsche's early essay, *Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie für das Leben*, has been regarded by most writers as of subsidiary importance and even as contradictory to Nietzsche's main doctrine - hence worthy of little or no attention. This appears to have been the common attitude of Nietzscheans in Baylebridge's time. And, indeed, if Nietzsche is construed as an evolutionist of the type who might put "the keystone on the Darwinian edifice", then the doctrine of eternal recurrence could well appear as an extra speculation "thrown-in" but not essential; it might limit the evolutionary vision but only in a way that could hardly be relevant to any practically foreseeable human concern.

A more recent example of devaluation of this doctrine is to be found in the work of Erich Podach.¹ Podach is inclined to attribute Nietzsche's acceptance of the doctrine of eternal recurrence to a *déjà-vu* experience said to be symptomatic of schizophrenia. The evidence, which is not given directly, is derived from the views of specialists in psychiatry, including Karl Jaspers, and is taken to indicate the probability of Nietzsche's having suffered for some years from an endogenous mental disturbance, independently of the paralysis to which he later succumbed.² However, this approach, which seeks to

1. Erich Podach: *Ein Blick in Nietzsches Leben*, Heidelberg 1963, p. 192.

2. It may also be of interest here to note that for many years Jaspers in his seminars give it as his view, that Nietzsche, independently of his final paralysis, was subject to schizophrenia. Jaspers included this view in the manuscript of his book, *Nietzsche, Einführung in das Verstandnis seines Philosophierens*, but his publisher in 1936 held this material to be unsuitable for publication. Later, after the war, Jaspers declined to alter the original text of his book as published. cf. Podach, loc. cit.

view Nietzsche's doctrine (and even to discredit it) as a clinical symptom, is not decisive in the present context, where our prime concern is to elucidate, if possible, the meaning of this doctrine as it appeared to Nietzsche, from the evidence of his work. One could add the general observation, that the status of a doctrine as a rationalisation, whether it be of an underlying psychosis or anything else, has no necessary bearing on its value as a philosophical or literary statement.

As discussed above, Nietzsche's view of human development is not properly consonant with evolutionary doctrine as generally understood. Consequently, any interpretation of his "eternal recurrence" on these lines is prone to error. Here, Kaufmann writes: "...only the common evolutionary misconception of the overman involves an inconsistency with the doctrine of eternal recurrence."¹ The doctrine of eternal recurrence was not envisaged by Nietzsche as of peripheral interest but as central to his life's work: "Ihr Platz in der Geschichte, als eine Mitte."²

The development of the doctrine of the eternal recurrence is described by Kaufmann but, as previously with the will-to-power, it is preferred to describe this doctrine here in somewhat different terms so as to bring it more clearly into relation with Baylebridge's philosophical position.

In *Ecce Homo*,³ there is to be found the well known account of Nietzsche's overwhelming experience of this doctrine while in the open air near Sils Maria, "6,000 feet beyond man and time". This was in August, 1881. In *Ecce Homo*,⁴ too, the doctrine is described as "of the unconditional and infinitely repeated circulation of all things." In *Die Frohliche Wissenschaft*, of 1882, there is to be found a statement⁵ of a view of life in which the eternal hour-glass of being is ever again reversed. The note is entitled, "Das grösste Schwergewicht" and, from the following text, the notion of the unending recurrence of being is depicted as a heavy burden akin to the greatest gravitational force. This burden will crush some men, but others may accept it like a revelation of divinity.

1. Kaufmann, op. cit., p. 276.

2. A note in the 'Nachlass' of the 80's, Schlechta ed. Vol. III, p. 873.

3. Nietzsche: *Ecce Homo* II, 10.

4. Nietzsche: *Ecce Homo* - "Geburt der Tragödie", 3.

5. Nietzsche: *Die Frohliche Wissenschaft*, IV, n. 341.

In a previous criticism of Baylebridge's monism from Nietzsche's point of view, occasion was also given to remark on Baylebridge's apparent acceptance of unifying principles in evolution, such as that of an evolutionary purpose in which man collaborates; and it was shown that Nietzsche regarded such doctrines as attempts to abridge the complexity of reality by means of unifying principles of human origin. Baylebridge too, appears to accept the doctrine of "Hineindichtung", at least as it concerns religious and moral doctrines. He, too, thinks that the time is right for a "revaluation", for the overthrow of seemingly sacrosanct objectivity based on doctrines which are really the product of human minds opposed to the forwarding of the Spirit. But in his own attempt to do "battle", he has not, in principle, escaped from the state of affairs Nietzsche describes and criticises. He, too, has unifying principles to which he submits. The question arises, of how, with a criticism as devastating as Nietzsche's it is possible to find any firm ground at all. For Nietzsche asks us to protect ourselves from the idea that there are any laws in nature, any purposes, or even any chance - all these categories are of human origin.

Nietzsche states that all things recur eternally;¹ and this means that the individual experience of life is without end. For, just as consciousness is abridged in sleep so that the passage of certain hours has no "existential" significance, so the passage of time which is required to bring about a return to the precise conditions for repetition of a particular life is also abridged. Thus, the view of Nietzsche, that the eternal recurrence is at the centre of things has the meaning that, subjectively, the individual man is the centre of his universe and will never leave it for anywhere "beyond" his present life. "Alles wird und kehrt ewig wieder, - entschluöpfen ist nicht möglich!"² In this sense, the man who lives on Earth will always live on it, whatever the fate which the physicists may calculate for the Earth. For Nietzsche's doctrine is not based on physical science but, so far as it appears to be based on argument at all, and is not just a more or less aesthetic attempt to express the overwhelming experience that came to him near Susei in 1881, it is related to the concept of the will-to-power. The main point here is that this very concept implies limitation. The "pure nature" of the world is will-to-power, and in the dialectical

1. Nietzsche: *Die Froehliche Wissenschaft*, n. 109, Schlechta ed. Vol. II, p. 116.

2. Nietzsche: *Der Wille zur Macht*, Note 1058.

expression of the power-quantas, involving the phases of overcoming and consolidation; the world, like the Ouroboros Serpent, lives on itself: its excrements are its nourishment; "Sie lebt von sich selber: ihre Exkremente sind ihre Nahrung."¹ But this necessarily involves limitation. The world, as power, cannot be thought of as unlimited; indeed, unlimited power is properly a contradiction of the concept of power. Thus, concludes Nietzsche, the world lacks the capacity for eternal novelty.² Also, the world cannot remain in a state of equilibrium of the power-quantas, otherwise it would have reached such a state and now be in it, which it plainly is not. One might be tempted to view the totality of the world in accordance with this view, as being, from a mathematical aspect, a type of stochastic process in statistical equilibrium; but this would imply mutual independence on the part of the quantas, and this would have to face apparent contradiction by Nietzsche's idea of a power-struggle between the quantas. In Note 1067 of *The Will-to-Power*, Nietzsche denies that this doctrine of the recurrence is mechanistic, because such an assumption would imply the attainment of a final state, which would have been reached already with infinite elapse of time.

For the purpose of comparison with Baylebridge, it is not necessary to consider the above type of argument for the eternal recurrence further. Rather, it is of interest to consider the possible effect of this doctrine on those who accept it, for Nietzsche was much taken with the practical possibilities of his doctrine as an instrument of selection of human beings. In this regard, it is mentioned that his doctrine finds justification as a "Schwergewicht", not only because it may be heavy to bear but because it transfers the gravitational centre of life from "beyond" to the Earth.

Life otherwise would have no centre of gravity:

"Wenn man das Schwergewicht des Lebens nicht ins Leben, sondern ins 'Jenseits' verlegt - in Nichts -, so hat man dem Leben ueberhaupt das Schwergewicht genommen."³

Baylebridge, too, places emphasis on the Earth, and speaks of a "recurrence" but, in view of his conception of evolution, this similarity with Nietzsche is apparent only.⁴

1. Note 1066.

2. Note 1062.

3. Nietzsche: *Der Antichrist*, 43, Schlechta ed. Vol. II, p. 1205.

4. Baylebridge, e.g., L.T. XI, i, Collected Works, op.cit., Vol. I, p. 36.

5. The Overman and Baylebridge's "faith in faith".

The doctrine of eternal recurrence is seen as both a dangerous ordeal and the initiator of a new phase in which the sufferer now invents his own comfort. One now exists out of oneself, posits one's own values. Again, one is reminded of existentialist doctrine, of how, through the crises of absolute despair, man attains to authenticity (Eigentlichkeit). Helmut Kuhn, speaking here in an existentialist context, says:

"Viewed in the light of authenticity, life under the dispensation of incipient despair (and that means, the whole of human life this side of the healing crisis) is sheer existence (Uneigentlichkeit, mauvaise foi). The individual is on the flight from despair, taking shelter behind empty pleasures, aimless activities, hollow traditions and reassuring myths. But the masquerade is of no avail. Despair, tracking down its quarry, will force him to turn round and stand at bay. The kinship to stoicism is unmistakable..."¹

This view appears to be applicable to Nietzsche and, in the last analysis, to Baylebridge as well, since he too is reduced to a stoical inventing of his own "comfort". But the concept of Stoicism is by no means exhaustive of attitudes possible in the post-crisis period. Faced with pure choice, the free invention of one's own comfort, it is easy to imagine a variety of attitudes which may include violent movements of hysterical affirmation and even lapses, perhaps permanent, into the precipitating crisis itself. Baylebridge, for example, places much emphasis on faith, which he defines as "a choice between beliefs..."² But, for Baylebridge, mere choice is not enough - it must be choice with assertion. In the matter of "National Resurgence", it is finally "...faith itself that must answer for everything else..."³ and "faith is the fire that gathers the disparate souls of men into one flame, and gives them a meaning..."⁴ "Faith gives significance to things. Beyond other agencies, it is the begetter of significance."⁵

1. Helmut Kuhn: *Encounter with Nothingness*, pub. Methuen, London 1951, p.110.
2. Baylebridge: *This Vital Flesh*, Collected Works, op.cit., Vol.I, p.248.
3. p.249.
4. p.250.
5. loc.cit.

And the further possibilities of "faith" are shown in the question: "Are not most great social movements - civil, economic, and religious - of 'fanatic' birth?"¹ In the absence of any objectively grounded certitude, faith of the invention of one's "comfort" becomes an arbitrary act of will. Here, Baylebridge's use of the word "faith" stands in contrast to the more traditional use of this word, which refers essentially to a belief in "things unseen"; that is, it implies that, independently of the subject, things are "really so". One may feel borne up by a faith, by the conviction that the order of being, external to oneself, justifies belief in that which one has not seen, as, say, a religionist may deem that all things point to God, though God is not directly to be seen. The faith that Baylebridge speaks of it not, in this sense, properly faith at all, for the word as Baylebridge uses it refers, not to a belief in the nature of things as it appears they may be or most probably are, but to a choice of what one invents for the nature of things. One is placed, in this kind of faith, in the position of choosing between the various kinds of invention; or, reducing the matter to its simplest terms, it appears that Baylebridge's "faith" comes down to making an aggressive choice with no clearly specified criteria for so doing. Whereas one may have previously chosen between, say, serving God in his Church or serving the King in his Army, or assisting the proletarian revolution, because one believed these things were objectively grounded independently of one's choice, the position here is that both the object of choice and the choice itself are known to be acts of human willing. This situation is well known in the criticism of existentialist doctrine. This doctrine tells us to "make ourselves". What we make of ourselves is generally held to be of less importance than the vigour and decisiveness we put into the making. The inventing of our comfort, the choice between beliefs, appears to be characteristically made, in doctrines of this type, with a high intensity - as if one's "comfort" or belief must be transformed from something provisional to something which prevails. Thus, Baylebridge asks us: "Has not the milder type of existence had its day?"² and he states additionally that "...what we can do, we are..."³

One wonders what Baylebridge would have replied if confronted

1. "National Notes", p.152.
2. Baylebridge: "National Notes", in Collected Works, Vol.I, p.153.
3. p.156. The emphases are Baylebridge's.

with Nietzsche's own words on faith:

"...Conversely: the need for faith, for some kind of unconditional Yes or No, this Carlylism, if one will forgive me this word, is a need born of weakness. The man of faith... is necessarily a dependent man - one who cannot posit himself as an end... does not belong to himself, he can only be a means; he must be used up, he requires somebody to use him up. His instinct gives the highest honour to a morality of self-abnegation... The man of faith is not free to have any conscience at all for questions of "true" and "untrue": to have integrity on this point would at once destroy him. The pathological condition of his perspective turns the convinced into fanatics..."¹

It is presumed, in all fairness to Baylebridge, that his reply would probably entail pointing out that these words are applicable to those who submit themselves to previous and, in particular, Christian moral values; that is, to those values which have led to the impasse which Baylebridge's own concept of nobility and faith would surmount. Nevertheless, Nietzsche's points concerning the man of faith's employment of himself as a means, and this same man's lack of conscience in the face of questions of truth, do not find any adequate counter in Baylebridge's system. Baylebridge exemplifies² that submission to an evolutionary purpose, a teleological alignment of the self, which Nietzsche repeatedly criticises and rejects.

Also, the question of truth nowhere finds in Baylebridge anything to parallel the treatment it finds in Nietzsche's works. Rather, Baylebridge shows a desire to hurry past such matters, in the interests of what is "practical". The scholar, it seems, would get short shrift from Baylebridge, as being engaged in "Nice inquiries that no jot amend".³ Baylebridge makes a plea for expediency here. He argues that the most inspired theories can claim only a "brief uncertain certitude", and then asks, are we not at liberty, at least in the matter of national theory, to select "the theory that seems most expedient for the end proposed?"⁴ Such a viewpoint may have a superficial resemblance

1. Nietzsche: *The Antichrist*, 54. The Kaufmann translation given here is to be found in Kaufmann, op.cit., p.304. P.R. Stephensen's translation might also have been used; though his translation often travesties Nietzsche's text, it is acceptably faithful in this instance.

2. e.g., the poem "Nobility" in "The New Life", Collected Works, Vol.I, p.136.

3. Baylebridge: Vol.I, p.215. cf. also pp.196, 194, 195.

4. "General Preface", p.xxii.

to certain statements of Nietzsche concerning the usefulness of fictions in past history, of those articles of faith without which nobody now could stand life. But to assume that Nietzsche too held the possibilities of intellectual inquiry in similar low esteem is not only incorrect but implies that Nietzsche would perforce have been compelled to regard his own doctrines likewise; which is most strongly contradicted by the example of his reaction to the doctrine of the eternal recurrence. Nietzsche's criticism of culture as based on useful fictions gains significance from his reference to the truth which these fictions conceal, and which is so testing on those who are confronted by it that it is dangerous to the common run of men. Baylebridge, who shows no sign of having experienced the kind of truth accepted by Nietzsche, that heart-breaking denouement which may well have been associated with Nietzsche's final collapse, appears to depreciate the speculative reason because he is in fact making an act of faith in "a will that thou comprehendest not". That is, we find no properly specified criterion for the choice to be made by conscious willing in man; while at the same time the impression is gained from Baylebridge's writings that the energetic attempt to expand and overcome our limitations will find some form of prompting and support from the unconscious will in us, the evolutionary urge which is successively modified and passed on by inheritance. This accumulated evolutionary gain in blood, flesh and mind is regarded as an "abler self" and as "deity".¹ We find views such as the following:

God in us is our best
Working to better,
Both in travail
And in sweetness of spirit.
In all such workings
We take hold, for a moment,
Of God's hand; etc. (L.T. XIII, ii)

As discussed earlier, Baylebridge in his general evolutionary scheme is much more akin to Hegel than to Nietzsche. This is particularly relevant in the present context, because Baylebridge hereby discloses that he is really on common ground with those whom Nietzsche criticises. Thus, after having been told that -

God, the Unguessed, for clay to stay me,
Rifled through remotest spheres; etc. (L.T. XV, ii)

we find the goal of evolutionary endeavour depicted in terms such as: "To put off these rags of flesh and rise in Incorruption"²...for

1. cf. "Life's Testament", XIII, i.

2. L.T. XVI, iii.

"discontinuance in the flesh is a new nativity in the Spirit"¹ and, like a passage from the *Phaenomenologie des Geistes* - "The finite in us bears its yoke for the infinite in us; the finite in us is nothing except in its relation to the infinite in us."² Bearing in mind the earlier discussion of Hegel and his philosophical interpretation of Christian doctrine, we may ask how it is possible to avoid the conclusion that Baylebridge too is not still on the side of those who require, albeit in a refurbished form, those same ideas which Nietzsche regarded as spiritual props? There appears to be little reason why the words of Nietzsche in *The Dawn of Day* are not applicable to Baylebridge as well:

"Selfishness against selfishness. - How many still end by saying: 'Life would be unbearable if there was no God' (or, as idealists express it: 'Life would be unbearable if the ethic import of its basis were wanting') - hence there must be a God (or an ethic import of existence). In reality it only comes to this, that he, who has been accustomed to these conceptions, does not wish for a life without them...." ³

But this viewpoint would probably characterise the majority of those thinkers who were both convinced of the evolutionary hypothesis and appalled at Darwinism. In one form or another, thinkers such as Butler, Shaw and Bergson, discerned a power analogous to Providence operating in the evolutionary process and giving man a significant role. That is, they found or invented an "ethic import of existence", since in their eyes the world-process provided a moral base for the assessment of human conduct - one became relatively "good" or "bad", however this might be equivalently expressed, by acting respectively in or out of accord with the basic direction of the process.

The question of whether it is really only a matter of "accustoming", as Nietzsche has it, that is responsible for these conceptions, or of something more lastingly necessary for mental stability, is a separate issue. Although it is not appropriate to pursue the matter in detail here, there is an interesting example of other thought in the views of the alienist C.G. Jung. These views, though intended on Nietzsche and Europe, remind us of a certain "inflation" in Baylebridge's work. Jung is giving his view of mental changes that have taken place in Europe:

1. Ibid.

2. L.T. XVI, iv.

3. *The Dawn of Day*, 90; translated by Johanna Volz from Nietzsche's *Morgenroete*, pub. Fisher Unwin, London 1903.

"The Medieval picture of the world was breaking up and the metaphysical authority which was set above this world was fast disappearing, to emerge again in man. Did not Nietzsche predict that God was dead, and the Superman would be heir to the divine inheritance; that fatal rope-dancer and fool? It is an immutable psychological law that a projection which has come to an end always returns to its origin. So when somebody hits upon the singular idea that God is dead, or does not exist at all, the psychic image of God, which represents a definite dynamic and psychic structure, finds its way back to the subject, and produces a condition in which the thinker believes himself to be "like unto a God"; in other words, it brings out all the qualities which are only characteristic of fools and madmen and therefore leads to a catastrophe." ¹

These are harsh words, but they were uttered in the face of the horrors of recent European history. Nor has Australia altogether lacked incipient possibilities for their application.

It appears that Baylebridge is assuming a position that is much like Nietzsche's idea of the "man of faith", but with the difference that, in keeping with the transfer of authority referred to by Jung, he has made a decisive, if contradictory step in the direction of being his own authority for his faith. That is, his faith really appears to be composed of two elements; one element involving faith in the evidence of evolution as demonstrating an "ethical import" and another element which, flanked by distrust of rational enquiry, seeks to complement the first by pure self-assertion. In earlier discussion, it has been said that one of the attributes traditionally associated with the idea of God is that of self-determination. In the present case, Baylebridge lays it down as doctrine that man ought to struggle for self-determination in order to progressively realize the "deity" in him which, in turn, appears to be none other than the ultimate in self-determination. Nietzsche, in his madness, identified himself as God and freely disposed, in writing, of those people who had acted independently of him in the real world of common consent. Thus, we find in a letter to Burckhardt of 6.1.1889,

1. C.G. Jung: "After the Catastrophe", trans. by Elizabeth Welsh, in *Essays on Contemporary Events*, pub. London, 1947, pp.69-70. Original title, *Aufsaetze zur Zeitgeschichte*, pub. Switzerland, 1946.

"Dear Herr Professor, when it comes to it I too would very much prefer a professorial chair in Basle to being God, but I did not date to go as far in my private egoism as to refrain for its own sake from the creation of the world."

Elsewhere, in a note to Fraulein von Salis, he writes:

"The world is transfigured for God is on earth. Do you not see how all the heavens rejoice? I have just now taken possession of my kingdom, am casting the Pope into prison, and am having Wilhelm, Bismarck and Stoecker shot." ¹

Baylebridge certainly did not exhibit any such extremities of statement, nor did his behaviour become so far alienated from normal life. He was, however, considerably withdrawn from the everyday world and particularly from those participants in it who may have knowingly engaged with him in his speculations. Those features have already been alluded to in earlier biographical remarks. They are referred to again because it is thought worthwhile to introduce a brief digression which, though it cannot be developed here *in extenso*, may direct attention to yet another aspect of Baylebridge's thought.

Many writers have attempted to delineate what they consider to be pathological aspects of Nietzsche's life and work. Jaspers, mentioned before, is not the only one to have given a diagnosis of Schizophrenia. Nor, as with many prominent figures, has Nietzsche's sexual life passed unnoticed. ² However, Nietzsche has not only provided an occasion for diagnosis, but his work, paradoxically, has helped towards the establishment of a system of concepts within which the diagnoses of one school

1. First pub. in *Neue Schweizer Rundschau*, April 1955, p.721. quoted in Kaufmann, op.cit., p.370. Stoecker, an exponent of anti-semitism, is omitted from the index of Kaufmann's book.

2. Kaufmann's rejection of the well-known alienist, Wilhelm Stekel's suggestion that Nietzsche was latently homosexual is based on argument that essentially ignores the clinical significance of the word "latent". None of the factors adduced by Kaufmann contradict this concept. Indeed, Kaufmann, in sharing a common prejudice against psycho-analysis, ignores the central point - i.e. the paucity of Nietzsche's sexual relations with women. Whatever Nietzsche's feelings or phantasies in the matter, something got in the way of their realisation. Stekel's case may not be correct, but Kaufmann shows no evidence of having properly grasped it. cf. Kaufmann, op.cit., p.368, Note 10. As already mentioned, Baylebridge had an intense emotional relationship with his mother's sister, the details of which are not known. He did not marry. cf. P.R. Stephensen's Preface to Baylebridge's, "The Growth of Love", Vol.III, Collected Works, op.cit., p.xiv.

of psychiatry have come to be made, namely, the so-called existential-phenomenological school. ¹ This school, which, in particular, has addressed itself to the problem of schizophrenia, makes a distinction between "phenomena" as found defined in Husserl and Heidegger, and the "being" to whom such phenomena appear. Sartre attributes this concept of phenomena to the elimination of what Nietzsche called "the illusion of worlds behind the scene". ² The ensuing analysis of phenomena so construed has led to generalised models of mental health and schizoid withdrawal. In the first of these cases, phenomena are experienced as having values considered to be real, and thus as engaging the perceiving self in actions felt to be genuine and meaningful. In the second case, phenomena are valued as unreal and are said to involve the self in a split between an "inner self" which preserves a sense of "reality" it cannot express, and a "false self" involved in the unreal world of phenomena. The inner self can relate to objects of its own phantasy or memory, and it is said that the dynamics of mental life lead it to increasingly isolate itself from the false, non-genuine self which deals with phenomena. The practical expression of this is withdrawal from commitment in the everyday world, in favour of inner, unrealised values.

There are a wide range of positions possible in terms of this model, including people who may have a viable if somewhat eccentric relation to the world, and those who, to preserve their inner core of "reality" from any subjection to the "false" world outside, become completely alienated in psychosis. The devaluation or de-realisation of phenomena is generally related by this school to familiar and cultural factors.

One writer, R.D. Laing, ³ illustrates the cultural shift that has taken place in this connection by citing from the literary critic, Lionel Trilling, a passage comparing Shakespeare and Kafka. Shakespeare, he says, is no less revolted by being in the 'prison of the world'

1. An account of this may be found in: "The Origins and Significance of the Existential Movement in Psychology" by Rollo May, contained in *Existence - a new Dimension in Psychiatry and Psychology*, ed. May, Angel, Ellenberger, New York 1958, pp.3-36.

2. Jean-Paul Sartre: *Being and Nothingness: An Essay in Phenomenological Ontology*, trans. Hazel Barnes, New York 1964, p. xlv.

3. R.D. Laing: *The Divided Self: An Existential study in Sanity and Madness*, Pelican 1965, p.40.

than is Kafka:

"But in Shakespeare's cell the company is so much better than Kafka's, the captains and kings and lovers and clowns of Shakespeare are alive and complete before they die. In Kafka, long before the sentence is executed, even long before the malign legal process is even instituted, something terrible has been done to the accused. We all know what that is - he has been stripped of all that is becoming to a man except his abstract humanity, which, like his skeleton, never is quite becoming to a man. He is without parents, home, wife, child, commitment, or appetite; he has no connection with power, beauty, love, wit, courage, loyalty, or fame, and the pride that may be taken in these. So that we may say that Kafka's knowledge of evil exists without the contradictory knowledge of the self in its health and validity, that Shakespeare's knowledge of evil exists with that contradiction in its fullest possible force."

Nietzsche's work offers an analysis of, and a contribution to precisely this stripping of man to his skeleton. The close relevance of Nietzsche's viewpoint to that of Kafka is discussed among others, by Heller¹ who, in a manner fitting with our model, points in both cases to a phenomenal order devoid of meaning, and to the counterpole in one case of a Superman conceived as strong enough to stand this horrific meaninglessness and in the other case to a despairing quest for a pole of authority and meaning that cannot be found. Of Kafka, Heller says:

"Thus he knows two things at once, and both with equal assurance: that there is no God, and that there must be God." 2

An analogous situation can be found in Baylebridge. The lowest values are attributed to the common-place world of phenomena. The flesh, though vital, is only a "rag"³ for the spirit, instrumental for individuation of the infinite in man.⁴ The highest value and the focus of attention is given to the achievement of man's realisation of the evolutionary godhead in him. Characteristically, in terms of the psychological model, the pole of "higher" reality remains poorly "structured". We find in Baylebridge repeated emphasis and exhortations pertaining to the "God in Man", but despite the profusion of these references there is no clear specification of what the reader ought to do. Yet something

1. Heller, E.: "The World of Franz Kafka", in *The Disinherited Mind*, Pelican 1961, pp.181-183.

2. p.181.

3. Baylebridge: *Life's Testament*, XVI, iii; op.cit., Vol.I, p.52.

4. *ibid.* XI, ii.

must be done; and the doing must involve transactions between the "World" and the core of inner, "higher" reality, otherwise the "true self" becomes alienated from the world and, in keeping with the Greek "idios", which is the root of our word "idiocy", one comes to court that privacy which leads to madness. In the words of the alienist:

"If the 'I' only comes into play vis-a-vis the objects of phantasy, while a false self manages dealings with the world, various profound phenomenological changes occur in all elements of experience." 1

Nietzsche finally identified himself with the "higher" reality of Dionysos and inducted into his life those "various profound phenomenological changes". Baylebridge, by lacking such scrupulosity in his thinking, was able in the interests of "practice", to make a rationally unjustified leap towards bodying his "higher" reality out into the world. The nature of this leap will be considered shortly.

1. R.D. Laing, op.cit., p.142.

6. Stress and commitment.

In the meantime, it is recalled that attention was drawn above to Baylebridge's idea of faith and that this was basically similar to Zarathustra's will to "invent" his comfort. It was also indicated that this idea, essentially related to notions of deity and self-determination, involved more than a mild deciding; indeed, in Baylebridge we find that faith is associated with energy and vehemence of assertion, even with fanaticism. This assertiveness finds expression in numerous instances throughout Baylebridge's work, yielding the impression of a certain inflation, albeit of high purpose and dedication. There are numerous repetitions and stridencies, for the most part of a highly generalised character. The person of the author, however, does not appear directly, which is unlike Nietzsche who, in his later works, is frequently claimant of high regard for his sufferings and writings. Nevertheless, the apparent self-effacement of Baylebridge is more than countered by the archaistic hyperbolising with which his work abounds. Clearly, the implicit purport of his style would confer an elevated rank on its author.¹ In line with the remarks made above on the psychological expression of this author's position, there appears to be justification for again applying to Baylebridge some remarks made by Jung both in a general sense and in application to Nietzsche. Jung, in writing of his classification of the introverted type,² in which he places Nietzsche, and in considering how this type can become unduly exaggerated, states:

1. A small point which may be indicative here, and which can be matched with other reports, derives from a reminiscence of the author, Frank Dalby Davison, as told to the present writer. Davison, as incidental to a personal meeting with Baylebridge, proposed that the two authors exchange autographed copies of their works; but Baylebridge declined in such a manner that Davison gained the impression of being rejected from any association with a standpoint conceived of as being far higher and altogether removed from Davison's own democratically and popularly oriented work.

2. The disputed status of this personality classification, as with many psychological concepts, is acknowledged by the present writer, but is not thought to affect the descriptive value of the quotation. It is noted that this classification has been approached experimentally and has found support; cf. H.J. Eysenck: *Fact and Fiction in Psychology*, pub. Pelican, 1965, pp.52ff.

"The undeniable, world-determining power of the subjective factor then becomes concentrated in the ego, developing an immoderate power claim and a downright foolish egocentricity. Every psychology which reduces the nature of man to unconscious power-instinct springs from this foundation. For example, Nietzsche's many faults in taste owe their existence to this subjectification of consciousness."¹

And these faults of Nietzsche have been characterised as "Dionysian Imperialism", bragging and self-dramatisation, tedious repetitions and overstatements, self-propelled rhetoric and hyperbole, and strident tone in certain works and passages.² Generally, this list could be paralleled from Baylebridge, though one would hesitate to say that Baylebridge has ever committed any of these faults with anything like the verve and wit so frequently encountered in Nietzsche.

So far, attention has been given to the fact that in both thinkers there is to be found an approximate correspondence of what, in the psychological terms used, may be called the structure of the self. In this connection, reference has been made both to the works of the two authors and certain salient biographical facts. With Nietzsche, we have related Hamburger's statement about Nietzsche's insanity. Nietzsche found no viable communication between his most valued concerns and the world about him, not even in the synthetic or programmatic activity of imagination. Under increasing lack of subordination to any factor external to itself, it seems that there ensued that subjectification of consciousness referred to by Jung. Baylebridge, less scrupulous in thought, ignored the rational contradictions implicit in his conception of evolving human divinity and, at least in imagination, directed his thought outwards to the world on broadly programmatic lines. Viewed in terms of his own philosophy, his "practical" choice is irrational; at best, it can claim only "intuitive" appeal. Yet it has the virtue, in terms of the psychiatric model above, of hazarding a throw on reality. The increasing subjectification of consciousness thus meets a counter-force in the active and passive resistances, either experienced or envisaged as coming from the world, in response to the changes to be imposed upon the world. To this extent, the dangerous process of increasingly unbridled subjectivity is inhibited by

1. C.G. Jung: *Psychological Types or The Psychology of Individuation*, translated by H. Godwin Baynes, Kegan Paul, London 1946, p.477.

2. Hamburger, op.cit., p.40.

subordination to practical considerations. Of course, the choice of programme and its execution may result in an even greater danger. The nihilistic attempt to break the threat of complete personal alienation may involve the incorporation of others in a common structure of aberrant values, with the consequence of a larger ultimate catastrophe. Baylebridge's choice is for a resurgent nationalism, for a "consciously regenerated" stock.¹ Although, in terms of Baylebridge's "higher" philosophical level, we find more affinity with Hegel and less with Nietzsche, a different character emerges at the "practical" level where the climate of ideas is more suggestive of Lothrop Stoddard and similar writers.

1. Baylebridge: "National Notes", op.cit., Vol.I, p.156.

PART III

PRACTICE AND "THE NEW NATIONALISM"

The "practical" expression of these high sentiments is to be found in Baylebridge's "Nationalism" as delineated principally in the sections, "National Notes" and "Political Verse", of *This Vital Flesh*. Baylebridge writes:

"National Notes was an attempt to bring our youthful idealism, not the less vague for being perhaps predestined, to solid ground. It went upon the assumption that doing precedes being."¹

For Baylebridge, it appears that the nation is "a circumscribed and specialized form of life"² and that it is "a ground for experiment in the things of life."³ Man is considered here not purely as an embodiment of life but "as a national animal".⁴ Baylebridge pleads that this distinction necessarily brings us to conclusions based on expediency and that we must to a great extent become mechanists; for the nation, employing "its social, economic and religious machinery, is largely a materialistic conception".⁵ It is possible, in his eyes, that "a mechanist conception would be the more serviceable".⁶ However, this should not obscure the fact that for Baylebridge the national regeneration he advocates is firstly spiritually based.⁷

From Baylebridge's own statements,⁸ "National Notes" and "Political Verse" were written between 1909 and 1913 and first published in that period or shortly afterwards. He invites comparison of these dates "with those of the Russian, Italian, German, and other experiments".⁹ He does not state any of the sources of his ideas but states that

1. Baylebridge: *This Vital Flesh*, General Preface, p.xxiii.

2, 3. p.xxii.

4. p.xxiii.

5, 6. p.xxiii.

7. pp.xxv-xxvi.

8. p.xxvii.

9. loc.cit.

there were sources that furnished material for "further illustration - and sometimes the checking - of the writer's conclusions".¹ But he also says that "at this distance of time, and without notes, it is impossible to be more explicit here".² He is willing if the critic will treat his work as in some measure an assessment and interpretation of contemporary thought, but with the addition that the synthesis is, without qualification of any kind, the author's own.

Since the main aim here is to examine the relationship between the thought of Nietzsche and that of Baylebridge, it is not proposed to examine Baylebridge's "Nationalism" further than is necessary for this. The first requirement is to find out what Baylebridge's concept of the "New Nationalism" essentially comprised.

The general setting for his concept is in agreement with the cultural criticism of Nietzsche: Christianity is said to have brought a transvaluation of the world; this force has now spent itself and the next transvaluation is due.³ The New Nationalism is to be an experiment in the conscious organisation of life.⁴ Every man by the inviolable law of his being is an adventurer, a warrior, a god.⁵ He is to have a passion for action, a magnanimous devotion to the future. He is to overcome the despotism of custom. His confirmed instinct is sacred.⁶ "Our deliverance would come largely of instinct."⁷ He will delight in becoming, even in the joy of annihilation.⁸

There are numerous sentiments of this kind associated with the New Nationalism. As we have already found elsewhere in Baylebridge, there is here much emphasis of a general, exhortatory kind. The more specific directives are only to be discerned later. Firstly, in the present context, there is the appeal to energy, action and adventure. This is accompanied by a command to break prevailing customs and laws - these are depicted as restricting the expansionary drive of "life". Laws are of artificial origin and would treat humanity as static, whereas "we know it to be kinetic".⁹

1. p. xxiv.

2. loc. cit.

3. "National Notes", op. cit., p. 147.

4. p. 148.

5. loc. cit.

6. p. 149.

7. p. 150.

8. loc. cit.

9. p. 154.

The aim of this expansionary bursting of laws is to revitalise the nation and possibly the whole world.¹ This "vitalism" is based on energy which "is co-existent with all the robust virtues".² Here, we note, as elsewhere, the association of "vitalism" with fervent affirmation, with an intense mood, rather than with philosophical doctrines of that name. Energy is vital, in the imperative sense. "Leaders are highly energised..."³ And again we find the statement, "...what we can do, we are."⁴

But energy needs "clearness of vision". What is Baylebridge's vision? At this point, we at last come closer to the "practical" and find that "Our vision is a land peopled by a renewed stock, consciously regenerated, and not less than complete men."⁵ This implies a conscious interference with instinctive evolution, after the manner of great artists: "...what artists would be greater than ourselves, working, as we would be, in the greatest of mediums, blood and brain?"⁶ This is the burden of the New Nationalism, and the rest of "National Notes" is largely taken up with a gloss on this "artistic" interference in evolution, with what indeed are eugenic considerations.

The idea of the nation is apparently equated with that of race.⁷ Race-welfare is the first objective: "To ignore that, what ever faith we followed, would be to renounce everything.... Both as nationalists, and as rejecters of annihilation, we would breed the race."⁸ There is plainly some discrepancy in Baylebridge's ideas, between those of nation and race. But his discrepancy is not to be found clarified. He does not give any definition of race, nor in any clear way compare races so as to illustrate his conceptions. It might be thought that the concept of race considered by Baylebridge would be broader than that of the nation. Yet this does not appear to be the case. Rather, the doctrine of evolution, including that of the inheritance of acquired characters, implies that the nation fashions the race, so that the two concepts draw closer together. Thus, the Australian nation may, roughly speaking, be thought of as an instance in grouping people of the British race.

1. p. 154.

2, 3. p. 155.

4. p. 156.

5. pp. 155-156.

6. p. 156.

7. General Preface, p. xxiii.

8. "National Notes", p. 199.

imp
race

But, in Baylebridge's eyes, the national practice of Australians will result, through inheritance, in the emergence of a distinctly Australian race. The concept of the nation is, accordingly, an organic one:

"A nation is 'an ever-changing organism, advancing or declining as it obeys or disobeys the laws natural to it... Evolution, selection, heredity, differential fertility - these, and such things as these, are not merely terms in biological science: they are the things that have a direct application to human life. On a right understanding of such things hangs the fate of nations.'" ¹

Here, the focus of attention on evolutionary means should not, however, allow it to pass unnoticed that the nation has an essential principle identical with that of the individual human being considered at the "philosophical level". That is, the nation too is seen as self-determining in a context devoid of objective truth. It must posit its own values, on its own authority. We find references in Baylebridge to the idea of higher and lower types, and the evolutionary development of the nation is often enough spoken of as though the desirable values to be attained were self-evident. But, although the evolutionary means to improvement are emphasized, the moral parameters necessary to assess this improvement are vague and, ultimately self-contradictory. What remains, consistently, is only the evolutionary, expansionist principle itself. The nation is to be ambitious and aware of the potentialities of organic evolution, energetically pursuing the "experiment" of regeneration and expansion. "Ambitious nations must achieve, or at least attempt, the evolution of these higher types.... Thus from the doctrine of organic evolution itself, there emerges the conception of a supreme race."²

The "practical" means to achieve the supreme race are to be derived from scientifically based eugenics. Baylebridge, plainly, has considerable faith in eugenic methods for solving problems of national degeneracy and national fitness. For example, the effective way to remove slums is to remove the slum mentality - and this would be achieved by eugenics.³ This is indicative of his general approach to problems of "welfare" - not the improvement of the conditions of life is important but the improvement of life itself. The provision of

1. p.199.

2. loc.cit.

3. p.166.

social welfare services smooths the path of the unfit at the cost of those who are fit.¹

Much, if not all, of Baylebridge's eugenic programme is suggestive of that "highly promising" Eugenics Party which the English Nietzschean, Dr Oscar Levy, had felt impelled to keep his eye on. Additionally, we find that the overriding, expansionary aims of the New Nationalism give an urgency to these measures and a justification for a high degree of state-interference in sexual relations and child-raising.

As well as the positive, expansionary motive, there is also to be found the defensive reason of holding the Australian continent against the menace of neighbouring races having higher birth-rates. We are ignorant of our position vis-a-vis our Pacific neighbours, and the answer is: "as a nation, we must populate or perish."² The answer to the need for increased population is both immigration and increased fertility. This latter, however, must not only be increased but improved. This entails "An intensive study, amongst other things, of heredity in man, of differential marriage rates, of differential fertilities, of selective death rates, of migration, and the correlation of all these with the positive and negative qualities of the several reproductive groups in a community - this seems necessary for their solution."³

The various "practical" measures include incentives to encourage those judged fit to marry. Economic incentives would be used to reduce the mean age of marriage. Married persons would receive more favourable economic consideration than the unmarried. Inducements to celibacy and to the separation of the "amorous sentiment" from reproduction, such as prostitution, contraception and abortion, would be eliminated. Infertile marriages would be regarded with prejudice, and marriage might become binding on the birth of offspring - to emphasize its meaning. The forms of marriage and the family would be modified to suit national aims. "Morality, with us, must conform to the mission of the race."⁴

For women, this means that the chief business of life would be maternity, in the sense of "citizen-making". Women would become

1. p.165.

2. p.177.

3. p.167.

4. p.162.

repossessed of the sense of race-motherhood and would find their highest duty and pleasure in producing and bringing up the largest number of efficient citizens that their health and means would permit. At present, the unlimited reproduction of poor stock lessens the value of maternity. But "proper remedies", including economic independence, would help women approach their task with more confidence. Women are "the sacred vessels of maternity". They should embrace this cause, and with resolution.¹

On the negative side, the unfit would be discouraged from reproducing themselves. "For the degenerate...segregation might be used, or sterilisation. (The monstrous, and the charity of the lethal chamber, are subjects for another category.)"² Baylebridge supplies material in alleged support of the deleterious multiplication of defective and degenerate stock, of the kind that might well be found in such formerly well-known authors as Lothrop Stoddard and Alexis Carrell. Eugenic measures would handle this problem easily: "We could clear the ground for our work proper in a single generation, and by the least complex of means. The feeble-minded, their near kindred, the unemployable (as distinguished from the unemployed), and perhaps other degenerates, could be denied assistance from the State until - at their own request, preferably - they had been made incapable, by the simple and harmless methods now at hand, of propagating their unfitness. The resolution to begin, and a small addition to our present social machinery, are all that would be required here."³ The familiar resonance of these ideas with certain of those of National Socialism in Germany is not likely to be missed. There is no scope to follow this matter further here, although some aspects of it will come to light incidentally in a later section of this inquiry.

However, there remains one rather unexpected idea to be mentioned in rounding-off this brief summary of the New Nationalism. In dealing with the problem of fertility, Baylebridge writes that the proper and essential increase would be exalted and thus ensured by the national religion.⁴ He does not mean the Church of England. In stating that ambitious nations have no option but to adopt eugenics, he means that "Eugenics, as a practical idea, would have to be introduced into the

1. p.167.
2. p.174.
3. p.174.
4. p.170.

national consciousness forthwith, and with the authority of a new religion."¹ He proposes that a new national religion would be evolved.² This new religion would be

"the vividly present and active soul of our corporate existence. Indeed our religion would be so essential to the State, so bound up with its entire structure, in general and detail, that to think of these things separately would be impossible. And, incidentally, as there was no secular State, there would be no need for an ecclesiastical religion. With us, politics and religion, differing fundamentally from what we imply now by these terms would not be two conceptions, but one."

There is no indication of the source of this fusion of ideas to be found in Baylebridge. One might momentarily think of romantic theory, such as that of Adam Mueller and Novalis in 18th and 19th century Germany, and even more suggestively of Hegel; but these theoretical fusions of state and religious power, being theocratic, lacked the kind of arbitrary self-determination involved in Baylebridge's view. Possibly, Baylebridge may have thought he was adapting from Nietzsche's "this-side" religion of Dionysos - which is Nietzsche's name for the unfathomable pathos of being as the unity of the will-to-power and the eternal recurrence.³ But Baylebridge does not supply enough information to settle the matter and, in any case, his conception of the nation, politics and the role of the individual is contrary to Nietzsche, both in formal content and in the spirit with which it is advanced. This will be clarified shortly.

If precedents are to be sought for the particular amalgam of religion, evolution and eugenics advanced in "National Notes" then, to the present writer, the most promising reference is George Bernard Shaw. In this connection, it is recalled that Shaw was mentioned in our introductory survey as one of those writers who had been quick to acknowledge Nietzsche and foster the publication of his works in English. Shaw states, Nietzsche was "among the writers whose peculiar sense of the world I recognize as more or less akin to my own."⁴ It is useful to recognise affinities between Shaw and Baylebridge, in order to show that what is sometimes attributed to Nietzsche in

1. 'Eugenics', p.169.
2. 'Eugenics', p.196.
3. cf. Fink: *Nietzsche's Philosophie*, op.cit., p.176.
4. George Bernard Shaw: *Man and Superman*, Penguin ed. 1946, p.xxx.

Baylebridge's "National Notes" is more properly to be described as Nietzsche refracted by Shaw, or better still, as simply Shavian, since the divergence between Shaw and Nietzsche is considerable. The following extract, though taken from a play, and hence subject to reservations about the author's own view, does appear to accord with Shaw's own attitude to Nietzsche and give support to the above contention. It is from the third act of "Man and Superman"¹ published in 1903. Shaw, of course, is himself among the "Life Force" school, if not the fanatics:

"The Statue. And who the deuce is the Superman?
The Devil. Oh, the latest fashion among the Life Force fanatics. Did you not meet in Heaven, among the new arrivals, that German Polish madman? What was his name? Nietzsche?
The Statue. Never heard of him.
The Devil. Well, he came here first, before he recovered his wits. I had some hopes of him; but he was a confirmed Life Force worshipper. It was he who raked up the Superman, who is as old as Prometheus; and the 20th century will run after this newest of the old crazes when it gets tired of the world, the flesh and your humble servant.
The Statue. Superman is a good cry; and a good cry is half the battle. I should like to see this Nietzsche.
The Devil. Unfortunately he met Wagner here, and had a quarrel with him.
The Statue. Quite right, too. Mozart for me!
The Devil. Oh, it was not about music. Wagner once drifted into Life Force worship, and invented a Superman called Siegfried. But he came to his senses afterwards. So when they met here, Nietzsche denounced him as a renegade; and Wagner wrote a pamphlet to prove that Nietzsche was a Jew, and it ended in Nietzsche's going to heaven in a huff..."

It is not proposed to comment on this passage beyond saying that, in terms of the previous discussion of Nietzsche and vitalism, this depiction of Shaw's is a very inaccurate caricature indeed.

The relevance of *Man and Superman* to Baylebridge's ideas is shown, not only by a general correspondence to be found in matters of evolutionary religion and eugenics, a fact which may still only indicate that the two authors happened to think alike on certain points without one of them having necessarily read the other, but by reasonable evidence that Baylebridge did in fact borrow from Shaw. For example, Shaw, in "The Revolutionist's Handbook", which is appended

1. George Bernard Shaw: *Man and Superman*, Penguin ed. 1946, p.182.

to *Man and Superman*, discusses the role of contraceptives in combining pleasure with sterility. Baylebridge too, alludes to the point Shaw is making. The passages are:

Shaw: "This fear, by putting on airs of offended morality, has always intimidated people who have not measured its essential weakness: but it will prevail with those degenerates only in whom the instinct of fertility has faded into a mere itching for pleasure."¹

Baylebridge: "Is it not mostly among deteriorants, those degenerates in whom the instinct of fertility has faded into a mere itching for pleasure, that reluctance to disturb our conjugal licences would wear the cloak of offended morality?"²

Or again,

Shaw: "...for what is purposed in nothing but the replacement of the old unintelligent, inevitable, almost unconscious fertility by an intelligently controlled, conscious fertility, and the elimination of the mere voluptuary from the evolutionary process."³

Baylebridge: "To secure national efficacy, the elimination of the mere voluptuary from the evolutionary process would be essential."⁴

Further examples, perhaps not so obvious, could be provided. A reading of Shaw's *Back to Methuselah*, including the Preface and Postscript, also yields an interesting retrospective account of parallel ideas, although Shaw is writing at a much later date therein (1921, then revised in 1944).

But in what relation do the ideas of "National Notes" stand to Nietzsche? Is it correct to call them "a pastiche of Nietzschean ideas", as does Frederick T. Macartney,⁵ and thus load Nietzsche's reputation with yet another instance of his alleged baleful, fascistic influence?

It will be of value in deciding this question to firstly consider Nietzsche's response to the idea of nationality. Shaw, in the excerpt from *Man and Superman*, has the Devil mention Nietzsche as a German Polish madman. Nietzsche himself insisted on his Polish ancestry,

1. p.240.

2. p.182.

3. p.241.

4. p.182.

5. *Southernly* 2 (1957), p.115.

although it appears to have been uncertainly known.¹ He was no enthusiast for the German nation as discussed by the circle of imperialists in which his sister's husband, Bernhard Foerster, was prominent. Foerster was also a prominent leader of the German anti-Semitic movement which Nietzsche is known to have loathed. In 1885, Nietzsche wrote to his mother and sister: "As for enthusiasm for 'German-ness', I've hardly ever been able to rise to it, far less to the desire to keep this glorious race pure. On the contrary, on the contrary."² This latter demur, as will be seen shortly, stands in relation to Nietzsche's idea of race-mixture as a richer source of in herited qualities for selection.

Nietzsche was no enthusiast for the nationalism of his acquaintances, nor was he an enthusiast for nationalism at all in the narrow sense. Still referring to Foerster and his associates who had emigrated to Paraguay to found a Teutonic colony, Nueva Germania, Nietzsche writes to his mother: "You see, because of this species of men I could not go to Paraguay: I am so happy that they exile themselves voluntarily from Europe. For even if I should be a bad German - in any case I am a very good European."³ This emphasis on the European as opposed to the perpetuation of the "Kleinstaaterei" of Europe, that is, the narrow-mindedness of thinking in terms of small States, is also found elsewhere in Nietzsche's work. He prefers to be a good European and an heir of "millennia of the European spirit".⁴ He even hopes that the growing threat of Russia will compel an ending of the long spun-out comedy of nationalism and bring an end to small politics by the establishment of a pan-European ruling caste.⁵ Nietzsche is concerned with large blocs organised beyond the confines of the European nations and including racial variety. Politics within Nation-States are petty and cramping. He states that culture and the State are in opposition:

"Culture and State - one should not deceive oneself about this - are antagonists: 'Kultur-Staat' is merely a modern idea. One lives off

1. Hamburger, op.cit., p.37.

2. Nietzsche: 2nd vol. of letters to his mother and sister, No.402, cited Kaufmann, op.cit., p.48.

3. Nietzsche: 2nd vol. of letters to his mother and sister, No.443, Kaufmann, p.49.

4. Nietzsche: *Die Froehliche Wissenschaft*, Note 377; Schlechta ed., Vol.II, p.253.

5. Nietzsche: *Janessite von Gut und Boese*, Note 208; Schlechta ed., Vol.II, p.672.

the other, one thrives at the expense of the other. All great ages of culture are ages of political decline: what is great culturally has always been unpolitical, even anti-political. Goethe's heart opened up at the phenomenon of Napoleon - it closed up at the "Wars of Liberation". At the same moment when Germany comes up as a great power, France gains a new importance as a cultural power." 1

It becomes clear that in relation to Baylebridge, Nietzsche stands at variance on several issues: firstly, though Nietzsche is concerned, like Baylebridge, to wish that a spiritually lethargic nation might be stirred up, he is no advocate of nationalism as Baylebridge would have it. There is nothing in Nietzsche to lead one into believing that Nietzsche too would have tacitly approved of the "Russian, Italian, German and other experiments", as did Baylebridge.² Baylebridge could quote in his own justification a broadcast-statement that, "Whatever else nationalism has done, it has caused a wonderful clean-up and efficiency drive in Europe and elsewhere."³ But he is also forced to add, in admitting that virtue by excess can become vicious, that Australia, if it elects to,

"can avoid those excesses which, on the adoption since then of similar systems elsewhere, have sometimes been associated with it, but which are not fundamental to nationalism as a mode of national life." 4

This is certainly a concession, in part at least, to Nietzsche's view that "die Macht verdirbt", that "One pays heavily for coming to power: power makes stupid..."⁵ and Nietzsche's other strictures on nationalism.

Secondly, there is the relation of culture to the State.

Baylebridge, more conventionally, envisages that by conscious and national organisation of human life we will be enabled to "shape our way to the beauty and grandeur awaiting us in the unknown."⁶ This would involve in Baylebridge's eyes a new patriotism in which the individual would regard himself as firstly "an instrument of consecrated service".⁷

1. Nietzsche: *Goettedaemmerung*, "Was den Deutschen abgeht," 4; Schlechta ed., Vol.II, pp.985-986.

2. Baylebridge: "This Vital Flesh", pp.xxiii and xxvii.

3. p.252.

4. "Democracy and Nationalism", p.253.

5. Nietzsche: "Was den Deutschen abgeht", I, in *Goettedaemmerung*; Schlechta ed., Vol.II, p.983.

6. "The New Nationalism", p.148.

7. "The State, Politics", p.187.

He would be identified with the "corporate life" which would deliver him "from the close circle of personal interests to a sphere of wider views, higher aims."¹ Less conventionally, he envisages the replacement of ecclesiastical religion by a new State religion in which politics and religion "differing fundamentally from what we imply now by these terms, would not be two conceptions, but one."² Such a stance on Baylebridge's part is not only in contrast to Nietzsche's view of the antithetical relationship between the State and culture, already mentioned, but it is also quite contrary to what is implied in the philosophical account of the will-to-power, as given previously in this study. For, there, the subjectification of the ultimate principle and the perspectivism associated with it made it clear that the primary source of value was in the subject. Accordingly, the State, or any institution, can only have a derivative value, depending on the perspective of the concrete will-to-power. Considerations of this kind allow Kaufmann to characterise "The leitmotif of Nietzsche's life and thought" as "the theme of the antipolitical individual who seeks self-perfection far from the modern world".³ Thus Kaufmann in his summing up of Nietzsche's work can find an influence true to Nietzsche's intentions, not in National Socialism and its antecedents, such as Spengler, but in such works as those of Hermann Hesse, from *Demian* and *Siddharta*, to the *Glasperlenspiel*, all concerning the self-perfectioning of the individual. The core of this heritage is illustrated by Nietzsche's statement:

"I know that in the not distant future many Germans will feel as I do: the desire to live for one's education free from politics, nationality, and newspapers... There must yet be circles as the monastic orders were, only with broader contents... Education through the State's education is to be scorned."⁴

It would be a mistake to think on Baumeier's⁵ lines, that Nietzsche's remarks refer only to a particular form of the State and Nationalism, because of his being ignored by the second Reich, and that Baylebridge would escape Nietzsche's criticism by establishing a State based on allegedly Nietzschean principles. For as Baumeier justifiably remarks

1. p.187.

2. "Religion", p.197.

3. Kaufmann, p.357.

4. Masarion ed. VII, 383f., quoted Kaufmann, p.357.

5. Referred to in Kaufmann, p.252.

elsewhere, apropos of *Der Wille zur Macht*, but with applicability to Nietzsche's philosophy as a whole, "Das Niveau des Gedankenganges in ganzen verbietet es, auf, die Ebene der politischen Loesungsformeln hinabzusteigen."¹

But the question remains of the relationship between Baylebridge's ideas on eugenics and the apparently similar ideas to be found in Nietzsche. Already, in reviewing Nietzsche's ideas on biological development, mention has been made of the fact that Nietzsche favoured conscious selection in man. This idea is already found in embryo in *Schopenhauer als Erzieher*,² and is developed more clearly later, finding its fullest expression in the posthumous collection of notes in *Der Wille zur Macht*. This selection, it may be recalled, has two aspects, positive and negative. The negative side involves, as in Baylebridge, the denial of the right of reproduction in certain cases, and even castration:

"Die Gesellschaft soll in zahlreichen Faellen der Zeugung vorbeugen: sie darf hierzu, ohne Ruecksicht auf Herkunft, Rang und Geist, die haerteren Zwangs-Massregeln, Freiheits-Entziehungen, unter Umstaenden Kastrationen in Bereitschaft halten."³

Criminals should be given the possibility of making their peace with society, but if they belong to a race of criminals they should be denied the power of reproduction: "erste Operation, sobald man ihn in der Gewalt hat: ihn kastrieren."⁴ Certain criminals should be offered the opportunity for suicide.

Marriage, of course, is a vital matter in Nietzsche's view since it concerns the possible development of a higher type of being. From the negative aspect, Nietzsche states, in general agreement with Baylebridge, that marriage is to be preceded by a medical examination signed by responsible communal officials in which several specific questions must be answered on the part of those engaged and the doctors, i.e. family-history. Each marriage is to be vouched for by trusted members of the community, as a matter of communal concern.⁵ Likewise in agreement with Baylebridge, is the desire to eliminate

1. Alfred Baumeier, in his 'Nachwort' to Nietzsche's *Der Wille zur Macht*, Kroener 1959, p.705.

2. Nietzsche: *Schopenhauer als Erzieher*, 6; Schlechta ed., Vol.I, pp.327-328.

3. Nietzsche: *Der Wille zur Macht*, Note 734.

4. Note 740.

5. Note 733.

prostitution. Nietzsche's counteracting measures here would be trial-marriage legalised for years or months, with a guarantee for the children.¹ For Baylebridge, prostitution would be unnecessary under a "proper system" and "would be excluded from the Commonwealth".² Baylebridge suggests that marriage might become binding on the birth of off-spring. This would emphasize the meaning of marriage.³

More positively, both authors would provide incentives to marry or, more accurately, for approved persons to produce children.⁴ Baylebridge would assure to women a generous economic independence. Nietzsche, less partial to women, would provide "advantages of all kinds for fathers who amply bring boys into the world: under circumstances, a majority of votes".⁵ Baylebridge would encourage early marriage among the fit and make it a matter of honour for healthy men to have off-spring.⁶ Nietzsche would put penalties of taxation and military-service on youths from a certain age onwards, to encourage marriage.⁷

It should be emphasized that the above points referring to Nietzsche are taken from *Der Wille zur Macht*, the collection of notes posthumously collected, arranged and published by Nietzsche's sister and her assistants. The status of this publication has already been discussed: the matter is raised here again as a precautionary hint against accepting these notes as necessarily representative of Nietzsche's considered view. There is a certain amount of corroborative material to be found in other of Nietzsche's literary remains, but so far as the present writer has found, the works that Nietzsche himself prepared for publication contain very little material that is equally specific. It is also noted here that these eugenic considerations mentioned above are not contained in the "Zucht und Zuechtung" section of *Der Wille zur Macht* but are to be found under the heading, "Gesellschaft und Staat", in the third book which treats of "Der Wille zur Macht als Gesellschaft und Individuum".

1. Note 733.

2. Baylebridge: "National Notes", p.180.

3. p.182.

4. p.184

5. Nietzsche, Note 733.

6. Baylebridge, p.179.

7. Nietzsche, Note 733.

There is no doubt, as Stewart¹ attests, that Nietzsche had considerable influence on the Eugenics movement, and it may well be that Baylebridge, so far as his "Notes" on eugenics are concerned, did not draw on Nietzsche directly or at all. For Nietzsche's influence on the Eugenics movement, named by Sir Francis Galton in 1885, appears to have been more of an inspirational or philosophic kind rather than as a supplier of biological prescriptions. These latter are well supplied, firstly by writers on whom both the Eugenic society and Nietzsche would have drawn, such as Spencer, and secondly by writers prompted by Nietzsche's own writings, including George Bernard Shaw. The eugenic literature of the time is very voluminous. Some of it explicitly acknowledges Nietzsche, like the once influential scientific work of Schallmeyer,² and other works have analogous ideas while being sparing of Nietzsche's name or not mentioning him at all. Some of this may be due to the desire to avoid association with the "Nietzschean fanaticism" mentioned by Stewart. For instance, Schallmeyer presumes that Benjamin Kidd does not mention Nietzsche's name in his *Social Evolution* because of religious scruples. George Vacher de Lapouge,³ who was one of the sources on which Dr Hans F.K. Guenther⁴ drew for racial doctrines that were in turn utilised by the Nazis, advances numerous ideas analogous to those of Nietzsche while barely mentioning Nietzsche's name. And so on.

However, despite this general agreement on eugenic principles in Baylebridge and Nietzsche, it is essential to consider a quite important divergence between them. The prime purpose of marriage, for both writers, is the production of children of superior quality. But there are certain differences to be found in the specifications of this superiority. Though there is a lack of detail in Baylebridge's "Notes", the notion of the "higher type" is found to be associated with racial purification, "fitness" and even with the deliberate preparation for war.⁵

Nietzsche's ideas on the purpose of marriage are perhaps best

1. Stewart: "Cult of Nietzsche", op.cit.

2. Schallmeyer: *Vererbung und Auslese im Lebenslauf der Völker*, 1903; cf. pp.231, 243.

3. George Vacher de Lapouge: *Sélection Sociale*, pp. 443, 457, 480, 487.

4. In Kaufmann, p.253.

5. Baylebridge, p.192.

set out in the section "Von Kind und Ehe" in *Also Sprach Zarathustra*. Marriage is defined therein as a twofold will to create a will that is more than those who created it.¹ This is an agreement with the theoretical notion of alliances between power-quanta for the sake of further power, as discussed previously. The will to marriage is justified by the longing for a superior state of being, for the 'Ueberschensch'. It is easy to slip into generalisation here and forget that the Ueberschensch does not stand for any collection of individuals, e.g., a race, but for a state of being indefinitely transcending the present state of the individual. The aim, as always, is directed to single individuals: "Grundfehler: die Ziele in die Herde und nicht in einzelne Individuen zu legen!"² This does not imply individualism in Nietzsche's eyes; for individualism still has an aspect of collective subordination in so far as the individualist is representative of all individuals against the collective. The anarchist too attracts a similar criticism. The element of representation, of service to others, is a sign of slackening, of degeneration.³ For, as already discussed, the individual being, as the concrete expression of the will-to-power, is the direct locus of development: "Jedes Einzelwesen eben der ganze Prozess in gerader Linie ist (nicht bloss 'vererbt, sondern er selbst-')." ⁴ The individual is of immense importance, but when he acts more in accordance with his essential principle he acts less as an individual and more as, what Nietzsche terms, a "person".⁵ Individualism is a modest and still unconscious kind of will-to-power.⁶

Something of what Nietzsche means by an "individual", from a more recent point of view, is given by Alexander Mitscherlich,⁷ Professor of Psychosomatic Medicine at the University of Heidelberg:

"Individuen in Nietzsches Wortgebrauch sind denkende, selbstständig entscheidende Menschen - mit einer gelungenen Ichentwicklung. Fragen wir weiter: Wenn sie keine 'Individuen' sind was sind sie dann? Die Antwort kann nur sein:

1. Schlechts ed., Vol. II, p. 332.

2. *Der Wille zur Macht*, Note 766.

3. Notes 784, 785.

4. Note 785.

5. Note 784, and more explicitly Note 886.

6. Note 784.

7. Alexander Mitscherlich: *Auf dem Weg zur vaterlosen Gesellschaft - Ideen zur Sozialpsychologie*, Piper Verlag, 1963, p. 194.

Besser oder schlechter funktionierende Gruppenwesen, die ohne die massiven Handlungsanweisungen ihrer Gruppen 'ausser sich' geraten. Die Welt im allgemeinen, ihre Umwelt und die verschiedenen Arten des Dranges, die sie in sich erleben, halten sie mit Angst und durch Schuldgefühle so unter Druck, dass sie vor jedem selbständigen Durchdenken ihrer Lage zurückschrecken. Geraet gar die Gruppemoral ins Wanken, dann sind sie vollends nicht in stande, in aktiver Anpassung an die Gruppe dazu beizutragen, dass vernünftige Lösungen gesucht werden. Sie 'laufen mit', und wie die Geschichte aller Zeiten bis zur Gegenwart beweist, bis zu einem Paroxysmus der Unvernunft." (The emphasis is Mitscherlich's.)

A "person" is much more rare, a being who, in comparison with the great importance of progress and what is typical, is almost unnatural, "Widernatuerliches".¹ Such persons will not wish to reconcile themselves with the masses and thereby develop from the two types a third or "hermaphrodite" type.

Such a person will desire to develop himself further and to "overcome" himself in his children and produce a nobility of character. Traditional aristocracies have always striven for this. "Jede Erhoehung des Typus 'Mensch' war bisher das Werk einer aristokratischen Gesellschaft - und so wird es immer wieder sein..."² But the process of increasing mediocrity in the mass of peoples in modern times makes it desirable to strive for this aim by means of a new aristocracy. The qualities desired are those which the masses are becoming progressively deficient in: will, responsibility, self-assurance, ability to set goals for themselves.³ Nietzsche has elsewhere advocated⁴ the comparative study of history to ascertain the conditions under which a superior type of man best flourishes, and he states that history teaches us that the means for this are conditions which are the inverse of those typical today; accustoming to inverse valuations, a passion to keep one's distance, a free conscience in what is most undervalued and most forbidden at present. The levelling of European man is a process not to be restricted but accelerated.⁵ Out of this there arises

1. Note 886.

2. *Jenseits von Gut und Boese*, Neuntes Hauptstueck, "Was ist Vornehm?", 257; Schlechts ed. Vol. II, p. 727.

3. *Der Wille zur Macht*, Note 898.

4. *Der Wille zur Macht*, Note 973.

5. Note 898.

the necessity of a gulf between the mediocre and those who are aristocratic because they are oriented to the possession of higher qualities in the striving for self-overcoming and their longing for the 'Ueberschensch'. This new nobility becomes so by striving and by inheritance of acquired qualities that derive from the prior effort of forebears. There is only nobility by birth;¹ so-called 'aristocrats of the spirit' are suspect as expressing merely the claims of parvenus.

Nietzsche's view has the aspect of a sociological forecast. He sees that men will be relieved by science of much of their previous slavery to nature and that virtues and beliefs which were previously necessary conditions of existence will become obsolete. There appears then the choice of letting oneself go in mediocrity or of taking advantage of leisure to consciously raise oneself further to the new aristocracy.² The new aristocrat will pursue his self-development on the basis of an extremely intelligent mass of herd-creatures. This basis is accepted by the aristocrat as the condition of his existence although he cultivates entirely distinct aims. He does not sacrifice himself to its welfare nor does he seek to destroy it.³ However, as the basis of the higher type of life, he seeks to govern this mass. One may say that this is a transformation of the idea of slavery as the basis of Greek culture. It is to be found in other writers also; for example in Kidd's *Social Evolution* and Lapouge's *L'Aryen* (p.487). The idea is not nationally based but is international in conception. In *Der Wille zur Macht*, there is a note in which Nietzsche writes of international 'Geschlechts-Verbaende' which will set themselves the task of cultivating or breeding a master-race:

"Welche sich die Aufgabe setzen, eine Herren-Rasse heraufzuzuechten, die zukuenftigen 'Herren der Erde'; - eine neue, ungeheure, auf der haertesten Selbst-Gesetzgebung aufgebaute Aristokratie..."

These international associations would establish this aristocracy with the aid of self-legislation extending over very long periods of time.⁴ This elite order or caste of men, by virtue of their personal qualities, would influence Europe and eventually the whole of the Earth, to trans-

1. Note 942; cf. Kaufmann, pp.264, 265.

2. Note 953.

3. Elisabeth Foerster-Nietzsche: *Das Leben Friedrich Nietzsches*, op.cit., Vol.II, pp.798, 799.

4. p.531. Also Note 960 of *Der Wille zur Macht*.

form himself into an artist.¹ Already there are in existence isolated instances of this superior type, and from these, out of their own choosing, a chosen people will grow, from which will come the Ueberschensch:

"Ihr Einsamen von heute, ihr Ausscheidenden, ihr sollt einst ein Volk sein: aus euch, die ihr euch selber auswaehlet, soll ein auserwaehltes Volk erwachsen - und aus ihm der Ueberschensch." 2

From Zarathustra we learn that the superior man has to endure great disgust with man.³ Baylebridge also, it is noted, tells us that "the road to perfection runs through successive quagmires of disgust".⁴

Here, the question arises of the means to achieve this caste of superior men. It may at first appear that it is simply a matter of the eugenic proposals of Nietzsche already noted previously. But these proposals have not been placed by Frau Elisabeth Foerster-Nietzsche in the fourth book of *Der Wille zur Macht*, that is, in the book dealing with "Zucht und Zuechtung", rather they have been included by Peter Gast in the third book which has the general heading "Prinzip einer neuen Wertsetzung", and in this book they are classified under "Gesellschaft und Staat". They do not have an explicit reference here to the breeding or cultivation of the elite from which the 'Ueberschensch' is to come. Presumably, they refer to the improvement of the "base", the broad mass of humanity bent on its own common purposes and providing the conditions⁵ for arising of the differently oriented aristocracy who will cultivate and select themselves by marriage and inheritance, thought of in Lamarckian terms. In the fourth book, the title of which was only tentatively entertained by Nietzsche but selected by his sister, possibly because it suited her 'Foerster' ideas, the notes selected to deal with "Zucht und Zuechtung", the "cultivation and breeding" (there are also connotations of discipline in the original) of the higher type, contain virtually none of the medical or physiological prescriptions mentioned in the third book. There is a proposal for race-mixture,⁶ to gain fullness of nature by coupling opposites, and an acknowledgement that the great man represents an

1. Elisabeth Foerster-Nietzsche, pp.804 and 531.

2. Nietzsche: *Also Sprach Zarathustra*: "Von der schenkenden Tugend", 2; Schlechta ed., Vol.II, p.339.

3. *ibid.*; Schlechta ed., Vol.II, p.464.

4. Baylebridge: "The New Nationalism", p.150.

5. cf. *Der Wille zur Macht*, Note 864.

6. Note 862.

inherited accumulation of the striving of his forebears.¹ But the essential agent for "breeding" the higher type is suffering; for suffering involves self-overcoming, and the gains of this are considered to be conserved in a Lamarckian fashion. This point is perhaps indicated most clearly in *Jenseits von Gut und Böse*:

"Die Zucht des Leidens, des grossen Leidens - wisst ihr nicht, dass nur diese Zucht alle Erhöhungen des Menschen bisher geschaffen hat? Jene Spannung der Seele im Unglück, welche ihr die Staerke anzuechtet, ihre Schauer im Anblick des grossen Zugrundegehens, ihre Erfindsamkeit und Tapferkeit in Tragen, Ausharren, Ausdeuten, Ausnutzen des Unglücks, und was ihr nur je von Tiefe, Geheimnis, Maske, Geist, List, Groesse geschenkt worden ist - ist es nicht unter Leiden, unter der Zucht des grossen Leidens geschenkt worden? Im Menschen ist Geschöpf und Schoepfer vereint: im Menschen ist Stoff, Bruchstueck, Ueberfluss, Lehm, Kot, Unsinn, Chaos; aber im Menschen ist auch Schoepfer, Bildner, Hammer-Haerte, Zuschauer-Goettlichkeit und siebenter Tag - versteht ihr diesen Gegensatz? Und dass euer Mitleid dem 'Geschöpf in Menschen' gilt, dem, was geformt, gebrochen, geschmiedet, gerissen, gebrannt, gegluet, gelaetert werden muss - dem, was notwendig leiden muss und leiden soll?"²

Here we are yielded a doctrinal justification for the Schadenfreude of which Hamburger speaks deprecatingly in Nietzsche.³ Such suffering requires stringent conditions of all kinds but, additionally, there is needed in Nietzsche's view, a doctrine which is strong enough to have the effect of breeding: strengthening for strong natures, laming and breaking for the world-weary.⁴ As discussed already, this doctrine is the same as that which rendered Zarathustra as though dead for seven days - the doctrine of the eternal recurrence. "Ich will den Gedanken lehren, welcher vielen das Recht gibt, sich durchzustreichen, - den grossen zuechtenden Gedanken."⁵

Dr Oscar Levy had caught this doctrinal aspect of Nietzsche when, in reference to the Eugenic society, he said that the successful "breeding" of man can only be brought about by religious or philosophic

1. Notes 969, 863.

2. Nietzsche: *Jenseits von Gut und Böse*, Note 225, Schlechta ed., Vol. II, pp. 689-690.

3. Michael Hamburger: "A Craving for Hell", *Encounter* 109, October 1962, p. 39.

4. Nietzsche: *Der Wille zur Macht*, Note 962.

5. Note 1056.

faith.¹ Yet Levy missed the extreme emphasis which Nietzsche placed on the doctrine of eternal recurrence. This aspect is almost entirely absent from Baylebridge. It is correct to say that there are ideas of a kind of human recurrence to be found in Baylebridge,² but such considerations are peripheral to the "New Nationalism" and in any case pertain to an "open-ended" evolutionary system, in contrast to the closed or cyclical system of Nietzsche. This point is important because it relates to the quite different standpoints of the two authors.

For the "person", in the Nietzschean sense, the purpose of marriage then is the creation of offspring who will lead to the superior personal being of the 'Uebermensch'. There is no justification for believing that Nietzsche intended this aim to be pursued via a combination of nationalism and eugenics either on National Socialist lines or on similar lines to those advocated by Baylebridge. There is a lack of precision in Baylebridge's writings, and a variety of expression in Nietzsche, such as may in particular instances give an impression of agreement between the two authors. Indeed, it is reasonable to conclude, as we have seen, that there are points of agreement. But, viewed in toto, the "practical" tendencies of the two authors are quite diverse.

Nietzsche's name has been associated with the ideology of National Socialism.³ Not only that, but his work has been described by numerous authors as having contributed to Germany's part in the First World War as well. It is not proposed to examine this latter case nor deal with the former, beyond invoking support to show that just as the "breeding" ideas of Nietzsche are quite distinct from those of the National Socialism with which Baylebridge may be more justifiably compared. A survey of the stages in the Nazi falsification of Nietzsche and in what has been called the Nietzscheans' victory over Nietzsche is perhaps most conveniently given by Hamburger,⁴ who takes into account, among others, the recent work of Schlechta and

1. Levy, op.cit., pp. xxxi-xxxii.

2. e.g., "Life's Testament", vi, p. 17.

3. cf., inter alia, R.H. Samuel: "The Origin and Development of the Ideology of National Socialism," *The Australian Journal of Politics and History*, Vol. 9 (1963).

4. Hamburger, op.cit.

Podach. In fact, the work of fiddling with Nietzsche's image has begun long before the Nazis, when, as is known, Nietzsche's sister, a Deutsch-Nationale as she termed herself, forced her mother towards the end of 1893 to renounce all rights in Nietzsche's works and, shortly afterwards, founded the Nietzsche-Archiv at Weimar, remaining the head of this until she died in 1953. Hamburger, in following the exploitation of Nietzsche from these beginnings, arrives at the conclusion: "That the vulgarians seized on his crudities and excesses for their own much cruder and more excessive ends is a reflection not on Nietzsche, but on them."¹

Kaufmann, too, in his chapter on the "Master-Race", comes to conclusions that are in general agreement with Hamburger. More specifically, on the matter of race-breeding, he cites with approval the views of Curt von Westernhagen who, in his book, *Nietzsche, Juden, Antijuden*,² aptly describes Nietzsche's relation to Gobineau:

"He has used the terminology of the man who has brought the doctrine of race to support his own doctrine of un-race. In spite of certain popular superficial analogies, an expert like Schemann therefore designates Gobineau and Nietzsche - with complete justification - as 'antipodes'".

Kaufmann adds to Westernhagen's own remarks his view that,

"Westernhagen's careful account of Nietzsche's race views differs from other Nazi studies by being scholarly and candid - and, significantly, he concludes that Nietzsche must be repudiated in the name of National Socialism."³

Here, concerning Baylebridge, we draw the conclusion, that, from a properly Nietzschean viewpoint, Baylebridge, despite the various Nietzschean allusions to be found in "National Notes", remains at the level of "Gesellschaft und Staat", that is, with concern for improving the "base", consisting in Nietzsche's view of "Herdentier" and "Fuehrertier", herd-animal and leader-animal. The true nature of the "person", and of his selection and "breeding" under the terrible stress of realising what the doctrine of the eternal recurrence means, and his consequent longing for the Overman, have escaped Baylebridge's understanding.

1. Hamburger, p.40.

2. Weimar, 1936, p.29.

3. Kaufmann, Note No.11, p.291. Further references are given here.

PART IV

"AUSTRALIA FIRST"

A. P.R. Stephensen and the Dionysian Aesthetic.

Percy Reginald Stephensen (1901-1965), to whom Baylebridge entrusted the editing of the Memorial Edition of his works, first met Jack Lindsay (b.1900) at the University of Queensland in 1919. They were fellow students. Jack, the eighteen year-old son of Norman Alfred William Lindsay (b.1879), was a year ahead of Stephensen in the Arts Course. He and his two younger brothers were the offspring of Norman's first marriage. Though born in Melbourne, Jack had spent most of his boyhood in Brisbane where he had also received his earlier education at Brisbane Grammar School. Stephensen, a year older, became very friendly with Jack Lindsay. He visited¹ the Lindsay boys at their home at Kangaroo Point, Brisbane, where they lived alone with their mother. The father, Norman, was by now living at Springwood, in the Blue Mountains of New South Wales; after having left his home town of Creswick, Victoria, at the age of sixteen, he had already made a name for himself on a more popular level as a humorous illustrator, gained over twenty years of association with the *Sydney Bulletin*, and was now receiving increasing attention from private collectors of art-works, particularly because of his etchings conceived in terms of his "Dionysian" aesthetic. Indeed, he was at this time engaged in the literary formulation of this aesthetic, which appeared in book-form in 1902, under the title of *Creative Effort*.

1920 Occasionally, Norman wrote to his sons, pouring out his ideas, sending them proofs of his etchings. The effect of these communications on the boys, particularly Jack, is reported as magical. Their father seemed like a faraway demigod, and his influence on the intelligent

1. P.R. Stephensen: *Kookaburras and Satyre*, privately printed in an edition of 225 copies at the Talkarra Press, 64 Young Street, Cremorne, 1954, p.10.

and sensitive mind of his eldest son was disturbing, even disruptive. Stephens, in writing of Norman Lindsay's development at this time, states:

"It was in this phase that his zeal to excel, and to become philosophically self-conscious, and to find an aesthetic rectification of the hate-motif engendered in humanity by the First World War, came with a shattering impact upon his adolescent son, Jack, and to a lesser extent upon others of the younger generation of Australians, myself included." 1

Norman, in arriving at his Dionysian aesthetic had been strongly influenced by the writings of Friedrich Nietzsche.

Jack Lindsay describes his own reaction to Nietzsche in the following terms:

"With Nietzsche, who arrived in 1918 in a copy of 'Zarathustra' from my discovered father, the world came up behind me and laid an arresting hand on my shoulder. I was terrified and then carried away. History became, in the blink of the eye, an extended problem stretching in incredibly etched detail into the remote horizon. The inner conflict of values, fought out in George Street and the upper reaches of the Brisbane River, was found to be identical with a conflict which had been going on for quite a long time in history, a conflict still being fought out....Nietzsche gave in one disturbing breath a new and sharper vindication of aloneness and a prophetic insistence on active implication. When I read 'Zarathustra' in my solitude, the green hollow was a circus of clanging gladiators; and once I cheered or yelled back, I was caught." 2

The nature of this influence will be commented on later.

In 1924, Stephens passed through Sydney, en route to England as a Rhodes Scholar. He spent a day with Jack Lindsay and found that Jack, in association with a young businessman, John T. Kirtley (already mentioned earlier as a source of biographical information on Baylebridge), was becoming interested in fine-quality hand-printing of books, including Norman Lindsay's work. This interest later developed into the Fanfrolico Press, the principal agent of crusade for the Lindsay aesthetic.

1. p.11.

2. Jack Lindsay: "Zarathustra in Queensland", *Meanjin*, Vol.7, No.4, Summer, 1948, pp.221-222.

Stephens went to Oxford. Early in 1927, he was visited there by both Jack Lindsay and Kirtley. They had gone to London towards the end of 1926 to subsequently establish the Fanfrolico Press in 1927, enthusiastically determined to counter the sickness at the heart of civilisation, by means of Dionysian ideas. Jack Lindsay's arrival rekindled Stephens's enthusiasm for the Lindsays' ideas, father and son. He had become disillusioned with what he called the bogus ideals of "Democracy" as plugged for by professional propagandists to stir up hatred against the Germans in the First World War. He was hoping for a rebirth of the human spirit to counter a spreading desolation in Britain. He had explored Communism, joining the Communist Party in Brisbane in 1921, but abandoning it in 1926 when he discovered that it is "only banditry disguised as a political philosophy".¹ It might be mentioned in passing, that he is said to have made, in this period, the first translation of the Communist Manifesto into English, from French, in association with a fellow student. It did not seem odd to Stephens, that Australia should supply the nucleus of ideas for a European or, at least, a British renaissance. Though he thought differently later, it seemed proper for the ideas of *Creative Effort* and associated works to have been germinated in Australia from stock transplanted from Europe. To him, they had an affirmation of vitality, a sunlit quality.

Now impatient to assist in this movement, he spent his final terms at Oxford mainly reading Nietzsche and attempting to persuade his tutors there to read Norman Lindsay's *Creative Effort*. He states that he took Honours in 'Modern Greats' but never bothered to take out his M.A. degree.² Towards the end of 1927, Kirtley, who had become homesick, left for Australia after offering Jack Lindsay his fare back home. Lindsay, however, stayed on; and Stephens became the manager of the Fanfrolico Press. From this press, between October, 1927, and March, 1929, there were produced some thirty or more Fanfrolico Press books. According to Stephens,³ every book was preceded by a prospectus with a manifesto of Dionysian theories, usually written by Jack Lindsay.

One of these publications was Stephens's own translation of Nietzsche's *Der Antichrist*. Nietzsche had made plans, as mentioned

1. Kookaburras and Satyrs, p.21.

2. p.23.

3. p.27.

previously, for the writing of a book to be called "Der Wille zur Macht" (The Will to Power). But after completing "Goetzendaemmerung" (The Twilight of the Idols), he abandoned these plans and decided to write a book under the title of "Umwertung aller Werte" (Revaluation of all Values), in four parts. He completed the preface and the first part, known as *Der Antichrist*. The title of the book in German contains a certain ambiguity in so far as it has connotations of Anti-Christian, as well as the more obvious and sensational one of the Anti-Christ as referred to in the Apocalypse. There is also a possibility of an intended parallel to the appellation of Anti-Semite which Nietzsche would have associated with the anti-semitic protestant Christianity of Naumburg. The work is one of the most polemical and intentionally blasphemous that Nietzsche wrote. Its two main themes concern, on the one hand, the historical development of Christianity, as a strategem of resentment on the part of the sick and disinherited of life against what is healthy, and, on the other, an analysis of the psychology of the Redeemer and of Christians. The Gospels introduce us to a "queer and sick world".¹

The Fanfrolico Edition of *The Antichrist* was limited to 550 copies. It was produced on hand-made paper, illustrated from seven of Norman Lindsay's etchings, and printed at the Botoolph Printing Works in Gate Street, Kingsway, London. As an example of book-production, it is clearly a prize for bibliophiles. Considered as a translation of Nietzsche's work, it has considerable defects. Stephensen in his Introduction, states that it is the fourth version of *The Antichrist* in English since the work was first written, and that he has made the version enthusiastically, the guiding principle being "not so much literalness in rendering from the German as a readability in English".² In practice, this has frequently meant that Stephensen has compounded his own rhetoric with Nietzsche's. Stephensen's rendering is more suited to proselytising than to textual verisimilitude. One gathers from Stephensen's statements, both in the Introduction to this work and elsewhere, that any objections on grounds of textual accuracy would be dismissed as anaemic quibbles inappropriate to the vigorous demands of "life"; irrespective of whether the quality of that life was diminished by such arbitrary practices in rendering another man's work.

1. Nietzsche: *Der Antichrist*, 31; Schlechta ed., Vol. II, p. 1192.
2. *The Antichrist of Nietzsche - A New Version in English*, by P.R. Stephensen, The Fanfrolico Press, London, 1928; last paragraph of Introduction.

But, as Stephensen says, "How eager we were to excel! The amount of work we did was tremendous, and we did it easily, for the youth and the zeal were in us."¹ They were eager to find whether they could achieve a Dionysian synthesis world-wide in its application for the first time in history. Like Baylebridge, they too believed the old order was at an end, "the walls of Jericho are crumbling", and Nietzsche's *Der Antichrist* was "the first shattering clarion".²

But the effort to save Britain from slithering further into the abyss of "modernistic" despair by attempting a Dionysian Resurgence failed. "The rot had set in, and nothing could stop it."³ In about March, 1929, Stephensen left the Fanfrolico Press. He had met D.H. Lawrence and offered to publish a book of reproductions of Lawrence's paintings; but Lawrence wanted no association with the Lindsay aesthetic. Stephensen accordingly established another press, the Mandrake Press, and left the running of the Fanfrolico Press under the management of Brian Penton. In 1931, at the invitation of Norman Lindsay, Stephensen returned home to establish the Endeavour Press in Sydney, which functioned for a year under his management.

1. P.R. Stephensen: *Kookaburras and Satyrs*, p. 27.
2. Stephensen's "Introduction" to *The Antichrist of Nietzsche*, op.cit.
3. *Kookaburras and Satyrs*, p. 29.

B. The New Nationalism and "The Publicist"

In 1933, Stephensen met William Baylebridge for the first time and continued to meet him frequently, in Sydney, up to 1941.¹ On the first occasion of their meeting, Baylebridge would have been fifty years of age, well senior to Stephensen, seventeen years his junior. This difference in years is of interest in relation to Stephensen's remarks concerning his enthusiasm for Norman Lindsay's ideas, for these same remarks may well be applied, in essence, to his enthusiasm for Baylebridge's ideas. Writing in retrospect from 1954, apropos of Norman Lindsay, Stephensen comments,

"Nor had it occurred to me that Norman Lindsay's Dionysianism of the 1920's had stemmed from the 'Paganism' of the 1890's. ... These ideas, fresh during Norman's own adolescence (he was born in 1879) were not part of the Zeitgeist of our generation, adolescent during the First World War..."²

The explanation of this seeming naïveté presumably lies in the way these ideas were refurbished by Norman Lindsay so as to appear novel in the eyes of a war-oppressed younger generation. Their satyric and sunlit vitality appealed too much to allow of their being undermined by any drab inquiry that might deprive a keen young man of the emotional release and visionary camaraderie they offered. Something of this desire to "push forward" without regard to origins appears to have been still operating with Stephensen in those relations he was then entering into with Baylebridge.

The formal purpose of their meetings was the discussion of typographical and other aspects of the various books that Stephensen was having produced for Baylebridge, under the imprint of the Tallabilla Press. This connection between the two men had arisen out of events following Stephensen's being given command of the Endeavour Press by the *Bulletin*. Stephensen was shown high interest among literary circles of the time, because of the promise he held out for the publication of specifically Australian works, both in terms of

1. Baylebridge: *This Vital Flesh*, Editor's Preface by Stephensen, p.vi.

2. Stephensen: *Kookaburras and Satyrs*, p.22.

financial reward to authors and quality of book-production. A large number of authors called on Stephensen - among them Baylebridge. He was impelled by the thought of sympathetic treatment from a publisher, of a kind that would give a stamp of standard technical excellence to any book he might produce. After Stephensen's relations with the *Bulletin* had reached a crisis, Baylebridge was instrumental in setting-up Stephensen in an office in Bond Street, Sydney, to publish on his own account.

In 1936, there appeared the first issue of the monthly publication, *The Publicist*; No.1, July, 1936. In this issue it was stated that

"The prime object of this 'Publicist' is to help create and foster the spirit of nationalism in Australia."

Furthermore, in a manner fully in agreement with Baylebridge, it was declared that,

"With Australia, because of its relatively sparse population it is 'populate or perish', so that Australia has a particular urgency for the practice of a self-saving philosophic principle which Britain has not".

Any interest in Britain as the site of a cultural renaissance had now disappeared from Stephensen's thought; Britain is relegated to the category of a pernicious foreign influence.

Stephensen declares himself to be a conservative, but he is, of course, revolutionary as well. In view of his later development, this declaration is allusive of the phase of "Conservative Revolution" in the history of National Socialist ideology in Germany. Indeed, Baylebridge's ideas on Nationalism find a surprising degree of kinship with what Professor R.H. Samuel terms the 'eschatological sanctification' which Moeller van den Bruck (1876-1925) gave to the 'conservative revolution':

"German nationalism is the fighter for the final Reich (Endreich). This is for ever promised (verheissen). And it will never be fulfilled. It is the Perfect, which can only be realised in the Im-perfect."

And Moeller van den Bruck goes on to conclude that,

"In the midst of this debased world, which is victorious today, the German Nationalist attempts to salvage what is truly German;

1. John Kirtley: "My Friend Baylebridge", *Southerly*, Baylebridge issue, 3 (1955), p.147.

at the same time he fights for the cause of Europe - for what radiates from Germany into Europe." 1

With appropriate change of countries, and no significant change of ideas, these statements are wholly applicable to the Nationalism of Baylebridge and Stephensen. The relevance of this comparison is also increased when it is considered that Oswald Spengler was included in the supporters of this "Revolution", and that there are again mutual features to be found in Spengler and Baylebridge, apart from the common Nietzschean reference. Though Stephensen, in the first issue of *The Publicist*, shows no recognition of this affinity when he speaks of Spengler's *Decline of the West* as a muddled metaphysical fountain "of all European, including English, intellectual decadence and literary defeatism", he is, nevertheless, already much more respectful of Spengler and European thinkers by the July issue of *The Publicist* in the following year, 1937 (p.6). This change in ideas, from the early to the later issues of *The Publicist*, finds other examples. For instance, Major Douglas of the Social Credit Movement is described in the first issue as a "bore" but later his ideas on Jews and the notorious *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* are spoken well of.

We find that, "Baylebridge, adequately considered, is one of the world's greatest living poets". 2 After a scathing criticism of recent English literature, we find a eulogistic reference to Baylebridge's *This Vital Flesh*:

"Read Waugh's *Decline and Fall*, Huxley's *Those Barren Leaves*, Beverly Nicholls' *Cry Havoc*, Eliot's *Waste Land* (or note the titles merely); or read the terrified 'confessions' of harassed modern English females such as Ethel Mannin and Vera Brittain... Then, read Baylebridge's splendidly-titled work, *This Vital Flesh* - and realise that Australia's national philosophy is entirely Antipodean to that of England-in-decline."

In the August issue of 1936, which refers to Baylebridge's "National Notes" as "a true Australian literary event of the first magnitude" and "The Most important philosophical-political work ever written and published in our Commonwealth...", there is contained a list of Fourteen Points for Australians which is claimed to be better than President Wilson's Fourteen Points for Europe or Moses's Ten -

1. Arthur Moeller van den Bruck: *Das dritte Reich*, 1923, pp.244-245; quoted in Samuel, pp.158-159.

2. *The Publicist*, No.1, July, 1936, p.7.

Points for the Jews; for Stephensen's Points, it is claimed, will lead Australians more quickly out of the wilderness than those of Moses. It might be mentioned in passing that *The Publicist* is amply laced with humour of this kind; it is often heavy-handed though not lacking at times in engaging ebullience - somewhat after the style of Dr Oscar Levy's polemic.

The "Fourteen Points for Australians" is the forerunner of later lists leading to a more resolute formulation in the Australia First Party and the Australia First Movement. The most striking 'Points' refer to abolition of all State Governments, in favour of unification under the control of one centralised government, a complete embargo on the export of all industrial minerals from Australia, the maintenance of a fleet of at least two thousand bombing aircraft, and a proposal to encourage the "fertility of our best stocks, and discourage breeding by the unfit".

One seemingly odd request, in view of what one might expect from a reading of Baylebridge's eugenic Notes, is that the Aborigines be encouraged to interbreed with the whites. But it will be recalled that Baylebridge's use of the term "race" is ambiguous, though he is in favour of white supremacy. Presumably, Stephensen envisages ultimate absorption of the aboriginals, or at least a situation in which they do not constitute an important division of class or race. Baylebridge, in arguing "to preserve a white race here", gives, as his main point, the desire to avoid divisions of class or race which weaken a nation. In any case, the proposed interbreeding would probably not stand in opposition to Nietzsche's views, though Nietzsche was cautious about the desirability of mixing races that were markedly distinct from each other.

Baylebridge's "National Notes" appeared in a new edition in July, 1936, coincidentally with the first issue of *The Publicist*, in what Stephensen called "one of those coincidences proper to great moments in history". 1 There is no doubt of the whole-hearted acceptance of the "Notes" by Stephensen and the Australia-First Group. To Stephensen's mind, it was "an enormous advantage that a philosophical thinker of the splendid stature of Baylebridge should be here - a mine of intellectual gold for our winning". 2 He contends that Baylebridge

1. *The Publicist*, August, 1936, p.7.

2. *The Publicist*, loc.cit.

would counter the "Europe-minded" outlook of Australians. Stephensen stated that he will return again and again to Baylebridge's "National Notes" in his future writings for *The Publiotist*.¹

1. *ibid.*

C. The Lindsay Aesthetic

Stephensen's support for Baylebridge's work stands in contrast to his criticism of Norman Lindsay, particularly of the ideas expressed in *Creative Effort*¹ which first appeared in 1920, the book in which Lindsay set out his artistic credo.

It is not proposed to examine the relationship between Nietzsche and Norman Lindsay's "affirmation", beyond what is necessary to indicate the diversity of viewpoints between Lindsay and Stephensen. In *Creative Effort*, there is clearly set out what Norman Lindsay holds to be the difference between his own views and those of Nietzsche. He acknowledges the immense debt he owes to Nietzsche,² and, whether explicitly acknowledged or not, it is plainly evident from this book that Norman Lindsay has assimilated many of Nietzsche's ideas. Lindsay believed he was following Nietzsche's thought in its development and was able to supply the necessary correction to it, at the point at which Nietzsche went wrong. This divergence is certainly significant enough to characterise the two most noticeable streams of Nietzschean influence in Australia, namely:

1. The stream which proceeds via Baylebridge to P.R. Stephensen and The Australia First Movement, having at the literary level associations with poets such as Ian Mudie, Rex Ingamells and the Jindyworobak movement, all interested in the development of a nationalist ethos,
2. The stream of influence passing via the works of Norman Lindsay and becoming variously diffused in the works of a considerable number of writers, principally poets, of the stature of Hugh McCrae, Kenneth Slessor,³ R.D. FitzGerald and Douglas Stewart, interested in the production of works of art embodying values transcending the limits of nationalism and the mundane concerns of common humanity.

1. Norman Lindsay: *Creative Effort. An Essay in Affirmation*, pub. Cecil Palmer, London, 1924. This publication is marked as a "first edition" but is really a second edition, the first having been published by *Art in Australia*, (Sydney, 1920); cf. George Mackaness: "Collecting Norman Lindsay", *Southerly* 1 (1959), pp. 27-28.

2. *ibid.*

3. An account of Lindsay's influence on Australian poets is given in Slessor's Commonwealth Literary Fund Lecture of 1954, first pub. in *Southerly* No. 2 (1955) and later in a revised and condensed version in *Southerly* 1 (1959).

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It would be interesting to follow the Nietzschean aspect of Norman Lindsay's influence in the works of those writers who admit the personal influence of Lindsay. It is probable that, on the one hand, the Nietzschean aspect would be largely repudiated by the writers concerned while, on the other hand, it would be discovered to exist in their works as an expression of attitudes derived from the infectious personal example of Norman Lindsay. Thus, R.D. Fitzgerald, who was an associate of the Lindsay circle from his youth onwards, ascribes the main stimulus to Norman Lindsay himself, rather than to Nietzsche:

"Nietzsche came into the picture as an influence on Norman Lindsay's philosophical essay, *Creative Effort*, which Norman himself would probably reject at this date. But it was not Nietzsche who inspired and invigorated that time and gave to creative thought and work in Australia an impetus which has not yet expired; rather it was the vitality and energy released by Norman Lindsay's own contribution to art and literature." 1

It is thought by the present writer that an examination of the circumstances under which vitality and energy came to be released by Norman Lindsay's contributions would lead back to Nietzsche and the general complexus of problems already described in this study. Fitzgerald states that he himself knows practically nothing of Nietzsche.² Be that as it may, Fitzgerald's own work has Bergsonian and Nietzschean elements, in such a way that it may be placed in what has been perhaps loosely called the vitalist trend in Australian literature. T. Inglis Moore, for example, writes of Fitzgerald: "So the poet turns vitalist, exalting, like Baylebridge, the instinctive life, putting blood before brain."³ Unfortunately, it would lead too far afield to pursue the matter here. It must suffice here to indicate briefly the possible scope of Lindsayian doctrine, by referring to the view of Kenneth Slessor:

"For it is undoubtedly true that this doctrine has had more to do with a great deal of Australian poetry written in the last forty-five years than is generally realised or admitted. The briefest of roll-calls of poets

1. R.D. Fitzgerald: "The Lives of Jack Lindsay", 2, *Menzies* 3, 1961, p.324.

2. *ibid.* cf. also Jack Lindsay: "Aids to Vision", *Southerly* 3 (1953), p.204.

3. T. Inglis Moore, *op.cit.*, p.210.

who have been moved by it, profoundly or slightly, directly or indirectly, would have to include such names as Hugh McCrae, Rupert Atkinson, Leon Gellert, Jack Lindsay, Robert Fitzgerald, Ronald McCuaig, Kenneth Mackenzie, Douglas Stewart and Francis Webb - all of these have felt its impact in one way or another, or have been quickened, even if unconsciously, by his example, criticism or correspondence. My own debt to Norman Lindsay's perpetual power-house of stimulation and suggestion is obvious." 1

In pursuing the thought of Norman Lindsay as expressed in *Creative Effort*, one finds, in relation to Baylebridge's ideas on evolutionary development and nationalism, a more faithful adherence to Nietzsche's views. In general, one can say, that whereas Baylebridge in his "National Notes" shifted the emphasis from the concept of individual development as advanced in "Life's Testament", the primacy of the collective, albeit as guided by the faith of its leaders, Lindsay, more in keeping with Nietzsche, turned away from the "base" level of mankind and placed his greatest emphasis on the creative effort of the individual, which is "dominion only over self".² In Kenneth Slessor's words, Norman Lindsay's doctrine is

"a severe, uncompromising and even rather chillingly Olympian doctrine which has nothing to do, except scornfully, with sociology, political economy, humanitarianism, demagoguery, jurisprudence, dialectics, theology, 'social consciousness', scientific inquiry, or any of the practical aspects of ordering and regulating human existence." 3

In disagreeing with Nietzsche, Lindsay thought that Nietzsche had reached a point of despair at which he was drawn into conferring an unwarranted importance on these mundane matters. Lindsay states that "The problem of intellectual effort today is inseparable from the problem of Nietzsche."⁴ He describes the lack of essential development in the broad mass of mankind, and the "eternal recurrence" of human mediocrity, in a way that is close to the account we have already given of Nietzsche's views. The horror that this spectacle gives rise to is also recounted in Nietzschean terms. There then arises the question of what response this horror should evoke. With Nietzsche, the essential response is that of Zarathustra who "invents his comfort" and proclaims the necessity for the 'Overman'. This has been discussed

1. Kenneth Slessor: "Australian Poetry and Norman Lindsay", *Southerly* 1 (1959), p.10.

2. Norman Lindsay: *Creative Effort*, p.5.

3. Kenneth Slessor: "Australian Poetry and Norman Lindsay", *op.cit.*, pp.13-14.

4. Norman Lindsay: *Creative Effort*, p.9.

rejection of
Nationalism

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earlier in relation to Baylebridge. Lindsay now draws a conclusion which stands in opposition to our earlier analysis: he concludes that Nietzsche was led, not to "creative effort" but to the political State. Nietzsche left the "higher direction in order to step down to a lower plane - he allowed the political to impinge upon the intellectual..." and, again, "His search did not lead him to the one enduring element of man's life - which is creative effort, but to that which is least durable - the created state."¹ Norman Lindsay does not provide the evidence for this conclusion. However, a general reading of the relevant part of *Creative Effort* gives the present writer a strong impression that Lindsay is basing his judgement on material contained in *Der Wille zur Macht*, the posthumous compilation whose reduced status in the body of Nietzsche's work has already been discussed. One finds, for example, an argument against the possibility of attaining perfection of earthly life,² an argument which is strongly suggestive of Nietzsche's formulation in Note 1062 of *Der Wille zur Macht*, that is, the argument which runs - "Hätte die Welt ein Ziel so müsste es erreicht sein" etc. Lindsay states: "If perfection of earthly life were an end, and therefore possible, man would have achieved it a million years ago. Since a million years has not seen it achieved, the answer returns like a blow. It will never be achieved."

Also, as we have already remarked in the discussion of Baylebridge's "National Notes", it is only in *The Will-to-Power* that we find Nietzsche expressing ideas which could be as conveniently construed in support of the idea of a political state. And even these ideas, quite apart from their peripheral and uncertain standing in the body of Nietzsche's work, do not properly lend themselves, as we have seen, to a political interpretation. Indeed, Norman Lindsay, in advancing his own corrective to what he conceives Nietzsche's position to be, puts forward ideas that are in much closer accord with what Nietzsche was really referring to in "The Will to Power". Here, confirmation of this view is also to be found with Jack Lindsay who, writing from his later Marxian viewpoint, states that Norman, in developing his earlier Nietzscheanism, fabricated a transcendental philosophy in which

"he was aided by that side of Nietzsche which, unable to see any basis for a sane and life-affirming society in the world around him, had turned to plans for brotherhood groups and

1. Norman Lindsay: *Creative Effort*, pp.13-15.

2. p.18.

has shouted in lonely rage at the driven mob of the nations (in fact the bourgeoisie blindly controlled by the system of exploiting controls they had themselves devised). Hence the scheme of *Creative Effort*, which saw the art-image as autonomous, living in its own unity, its own higher time-space, and which saw the artist as a member of a sort of Apollonian secret society or blood-brotherhood spread over the ages and redeeming the hungry chaos of matter by the stabilizing image. A sort of Neoplatonism cast in the focus of all that was most lost and exasperated in Nietzsche." 1

The essential result, in the present context, is that Norman Lindsay repudiated nationalism:

"Therefore, for us, there can be no seriousness in labels dealing with greatness of Race, greatness of State, greatness of Nationality." 2

P.R. Stephensen found that

"Mr Lindsay's aesthetic philosophy of *Creative Effort* was, under any possible examination of it, precisely the opposite to national or Australian in outlook." 3

Thus, the main point of division between these two men who were once so close together in thought is that of nationalism. *Hand of the artist*

Nietzsche, as has already been discussed, cannot be properly construed as a nationalist. His thought, as Jack Lindsay rightly remarks, has a supra-national aspect, and this stands in clear opposition to the nationalism of Baylebridge and Stephensen. Moreover, Stephensen later, in 1941, clearly expresses his opposition to internationalism and supranationalism. He states that,

"To use the word 'international' (without a hyphen), as though it meant 'supernational' or the abolition of Nations and Nationalism, is an example of modern preposterousness: a symptom of that strange disease, Pernicious Idealism."

1. Jack Lindsay: *The Roaring Twenties. Literary Life in Sydney, New South Wales, in the Years 1921-6*, The Bodley Head, London, 1960, p.67.

2. Norman Lindsay: *Creative Effort*, p.21. cf. also his *Madame Life's Lover. A Human Narrative Embodying a Philosophy of the Artist in Dialogue Form*, Panfrolico Press, London, not dated, but 1929, pp.167ff.

3. *The Publicist*, November-December, 1936, pp.10-11.

Such ideas, he states, come mainly from the "University" type who are out of touch with reality, largely through being nurtured in religiously influenced European Universities.¹ Stephensen, however, was himself by no means divorced from Europe, despite his attempts to give nationalism a local name and place.

D. The Rise of a Movement, and Fall.

In 1936, Stephensen was claiming that war was biologically inevitable.¹ In the following year, we find him considering the process of breeding a race, with reference to Baylebridge's "National Notes". He regards the sterilisation of the unfit as a desirable precept of eugenics.² At the same time, however, he disagrees, as did Nietzsche, with the sending of men into battle, as this is contrary to eugenics, since war sterilises the fit by killing and maiming them. He writes:

"By a coincidence not altogether inexplicable, those citizens who make the best soldiers are also those who make the best breeders. Those who in Australia are male, physically fit, and between the ages of 18 and 45 years, are eligible not only for meat-export: they are eligible to remain here as bulls, for breeding purposes."³

This does not mean that he opposes war as such, since he declares it to be biologically inevitable, but that in keeping with his nationalism he does not wish to expend men in fighting what he calls "foreign" wars, those outside of Australia, whether with British associations or not. Thus, there is implied here a contradiction of the general principle of opposing war on eugenic grounds: one withdraws men from "compulsory sterilisation" by those wars defined as "foreign", in order to keep them for breeding a race that itself will ultimately undergo compulsory sterilisation in a biologically inevitable war.

Stephensen was quite certain in 1937 that war would break out soon, and was opposed to the conscription of men for military service outside of Australia.⁴ At the same time, he was comparing Adolf Hitler's "frankness and objectivity" favourably with W.M. Hughes. According to Stephensen, Hughes, in his capacity of Prime Minister during the First World War, had applied "the technique of the Totalitarian State" as hypothesised in Baylebridge's "National Notes".

national documents

1. *The Publicist*, May, 1941, pp.8-9.

1. *The Publicist*, November-December, 1936, p.1.

2. January, 1937, p.7.

3. loc.cit.

4. loc.cit.

But he had applied it, "not for the constructive purposes of peace envisioned by Baylebridge, but for the destructive and kakogenic purposes of war".¹ Hitler, to the contrary, was conceived of as a much more sensible person.² About two-fifths of Hitler's speech to the Reichstag on the 30th January, 1937, was reprinted in *The Publicist* of May, 1937. This long extract appeared, with comment, over the name of John Banauster, which Stephensen later explained in 1941 as being one of a number of pseudonyms he had used for himself.³

In August, under the same pseudonym, Stephensen stated that Germany had been made a scapegoat and had justifiable claims.⁴ At the same time he was expressing criticism of Churchill,⁵ and he published a sympathetic article on Hitler by a Dr G. Philpot.⁶ He was becoming increasingly well disposed to Germany. We find the statement that, "The founder and first Governor of New South Wales, Admiral Arthur Phillip, was a pure-bred German, though born in London." The exact relevance of this is not clear. He hopes that Germany may prosper.⁷ In June, 1938, he published a first instalment of Hitler's long speech to the Reichstag on the 20th of February, 1938, and gave it his approval.⁸ By now, Stephensen was giving talks over radio 2SM in Sydney every Monday at 7.30 p.m. and claimed that he had a wide audience.⁹

He was finding an increasing similarity between Hitler's ideas and his own views on nationalism. Hitler too, was interested in an inward and outward regeneration of the people:

"Regeneration! 'Ye must be born again!' Hitler's party gives this an earthly, not a heavenly, meaning. His words seem cryptic, or merely mystic, in Australia today; but they will appear less so, I firmly believe, when Australians begin to examine the true causes of the stagnation and discouragement that has become chronic in our land in recent years." 10

1. May, 1937, pp.1 ff.

2. June, 1941, p.6.

3. August, 1937, pp.1 ff.

4. p.11.

5. p.13.

6. December, 1937, p.2.

7. *ibid.*

8. June, 1938, pp.13 ff.

9. p.16.

10. July, 1938, p.8.

And furthermore, under the caption of 'Blood, Place, and Race', Stephensen states:

"The Germans found their salvation in the non-economic concept of what Hitler describes as 'a new ideal, that of the people as such... the essence of eternal substance, determined by and bound to blood, as the foundation of all life in a nation'. Allowing for the awkwardness of translations into English of German philosophical terms, I think I can see something in this of what Nietzsche has preached in Germany, and to a certain extent, of what the elusive and reticent William Baylebridge has, with too much diffidence, preached in Australia. What is the basic concept in a Nation, that undying (or 'eternal') substance which endures when the individual perishes? 'blood', says Hitler. 'This Vital flesh', says Baylebridge..." 1

This quotation is revelatory of Stephensen's conception of Baylebridge, Nietzsche and Hitler as sharing in common a variously expressed principle which in terms of our previous examination, is not properly Nietzschean at all.

Stephensen had now come to the point where he could say that, "The Publicist also supports (sympathises with) the Nazis and their actions in Germany."² There followed further long instalments of Hitler's speeches - "Leader Hitler", as he was referred to.³

"Hitler's own splendid frankness has inspired his people. We have never read as frank speeches by a modern statesman as those by Hitler of 30th January, 1937, and 20th February, 1938. The almost complete absence of rhetoric makes them unique." 4

Stephensen's goodwill was also extended to Italy and Japan. He was impressed by the "revivification" of the Italians under the inspiration of Mussolini.⁵

Additional to Stephensen's increasing sympathy with Nazi Germany, there was now appearing a criticism of Christianity. This is not surprising in view of Stephensen's translation of Nietzsche's *Der Antichrist* and his support of Baylebridge's views. It is a viewpoint that he had also long shared with the Lindsays, whose view of religion, and Christianity in particular, was Nietzschean. In a

1. *loc.cit.*

2. September, 1938, p.10.

3. October, 1938, p.1.

4. *loc.cit.*

5. *ibid.*

lengthy comment on a statement by the Bishop of Goulburn, Stephensen castigates the Bishop for purveying "dope" and deprecating the Australian passion for sport and recreation, which Stephensen states may be a thoroughly healthy passion. More seriously, he rejects the Bishop for his support of Britain's foreign policy at the time, and states that if we are to love our enemies, "then the people to love are the Italians, the Germans and the Japanese."¹ The Church of England stands on the side of British Imperialism and is in opposition to an Australian culture. The Church is the purveyor of a morality which is really non-existent but which is talked about to conceal other purposes. Religion may have its own views on what it is in human affairs that calls for a pessimistic prognostication, but Stephensen views religion itself as decadent and, in seeking to define decadence, he states that the best short definition he knows is that of Nietzsche, as given in *Der Antichrist*:

"I define an animal species or individual as decadent when it loses its instincts; when it adopts and even prefers, that which is injurious to itself."

The understanding of the disease of decadence is to be pursued, according to Stephensen, not from the religious standpoint, but from a bio-philosophical view. Thus, rather than point to so-called moral issues, one should recognize that the most serious symptom of Australian decadence is the declining birth-rate.²

But, compared with Stephensen's general forthrightness, there is a restraint in his anti-religious polemic which suggests that he may not have thought it expedient to labour the matter. His criticism is directed chiefly to the un-Australian, political features of the churches rather than to the more general cultural and psychological aspects treated of in *The Antichrist* as well as in Baylebridge's works. He may not have expected such criticism to have served as a unifying factor. This does not apply, however, to another matter in which he apparently expected to capitalise on a certain degree of prejudice: anti-semitism.

On Monday, the 18th July, 1938, a Dr Shein of Jerusalem was reported in the Press as stating in Sydney, at a "Public Service of Intercession for Jewish and other Persecuted Peoples", held at the

1. June, 1937, p.8.
2. October, 1941, p.5.

Pitt Street Congregational Church, that "the Jewish people had done more for humanity than Herr Hitler would ever do." Stephensen took exception to this and stated that,

"We of this Australia-First PUBLICIST are all Gentiles and do not think, as Jew Shein appears to imply that he does - i.e. that the Jews have done good for the world." ¹

In the following year, Stephensen published extracts from an unpublished book, purportedly by a Mr Hardy Wilson who was said to have been appointed Director of the National Art Gallery in Melbourne in 1936, but who was also said to have had his appointment vetoed by the Government of Victoria. Mr Hardy Wilson's article, under the heading of "The Jewish Influx into Australia", describes the Jew as the drone of humanity, who has no instinct to lead, has never held his own territory, and is a parasite whose only place in nature is to fertilise other people. The Russian Revolution, according to Mr Wilson, was controlled by Jews who are not influentially placed in the Communist movement. But the Jews in Europe, being Asiatic, are really foreigners there and hence there is a movement to force them out of Europe, so that they may take up their fertilising task elsewhere, including Australia which is destined in any case to be a new site of the creative impulse. The views of a German writer, Dr F.K. Wicke, in his book *Germany and the Jewish Problem*, are quoted in support.²

Later, in April, 1940, Stephensen, in considering whether Jews are decadent, invoked Nietzsche to support his claim that the Jews are not decadent in themselves but that they encourage decadence in others, to obtain their own ends. Stephensen states that Jews deliberately foster "vice-rackets", pornography, gambling, birth-control, money-borrowing, astrology and similar Gentile-weakening practices.³

The question of whether Nietzsche can be properly brought in to justify anti-semitism cannot be examined in any detail here. The question has, however, been considered elsewhere, and it is clear that any use of Nietzsche's work to justify anti-semitism can only be made by ignoring certain statements and using others out of their proper context. Of *Der Antichrist*, from which Stephensen has

1. September, 1938, p.11.
2. November, 1939, p.9.
3. April, 1940, p.5.

severally drawn, Kaufmann remarks

"...it becomes perfectly clear that Nietzsche's anti-Christianity was not motivated anti-Semiticly at bottom and that he did not develop a racial interpretation of history." ¹

Both Hamburger² and Kaufmann³ find that an anti-semitic interpretation of Nietzsche, such as made by the Nazis, involves distortion and that Nietzsche's writings not only yield no support for anti-semitism but, on the contrary, contain strong expressions against it. From the evidence, Nietzsche had a marked antipathy to anti-semites, particularly his sister's husband, Bernhard Foerster, and those people associated with the nationalist politics he pursued. It is unfortunate that Stephensen uses Nietzsche in a context that associates him with anti-semitism, just as it is equally so when he later brings Nietzsche into association with a criticism of democracy as decadent,⁴ for such associations, made in the course of polemic, obscure the proper nature of Nietzsche's work and provide yet another instance of a thinker's work being neglected in its own terms while being hastily exploited for an extraneous purpose.

Stephensen's anti-semitism soon became associated with two other well-known items in this field, namely, race-theory and the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*. He emphatically distinguishes the Semites from the Aryans, and includes himself among the "non-democratic Aryans of *The Publicist*" who are also anti-Communists and anti-Pacifists.⁵ His use of the term, Aryan, is broad (he includes the Australian aborigines under this heading) but it is nevertheless held to be vitally distinct from the term, Semitic. He thinks that anti-semitism in Germany has greatly increased the power of the German people.⁶ The 16th point of "The Publicist's 50 points of Policy for an 'Australia First' Party after the War" became, "For Aryanism; against Semitism".⁷ It might also be mentioned that the 6th point was, "For national socialism; against international communism."

His attitude to the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* is that the question of their authenticity is hardly relevant, considering that

1. Kaufmann, p. 260.

2. Hamburger, pp. 34, 37.

3. Kaufmann, pp. 47-50, 251-263.

4. *The Publicist*, April, 1940, p. 4.

5. May, 1940, p. 1.

6. *ibid.*

7. No. 48, June, 1940, p. 1.

the "Protocols", for Stephensen, do in fact reveal the methods by which Jews exercise an influence among Gentiles, far in excess of what could be expected from their numbers.¹

A more defined target for Stephensen's polemic against the Jews was provided by Dr Isaac Steinberg, Secretary of The Freeland League of Jewish Territorial Colonisation. Dr Steinberg had hoped to obtain from the Australian Commonwealth Government the right to establish in Western Australia a large-scale Jewish settlement for refugees from Eastern and Central Europe. The proposal involved rights to some 7,000,000 acres of land in the East Kimberley district of the north-west, back from the port of Wyndham. The history of the proposal and its failure has been recorded in book-form by Dr Steinberg.² *The Publicist* of May, 1940, (p. 18) published a strident attack on the proposal, over the name of Rex Williams. The principal target of the attack was not so much the economic and political argument advanced by the Freeland League in its "Manifesto", published in *The Sydney Morning Herald* of April 19th, 1940, over the names of some 50 important signatories, but it was the more specifically Jewish aspect of the scheme that was attacked. The issue was dealt with in similar vein in later issues of *The Publicist* also. The matter published by Stephensen provided ample justification for Steinberg, in his consideration of whether anti-Semitism exists in Australia, to treat of Stephensen under the heading, "The Sworn Enemy of Israel".³

Having thus briefly indicated some of the salient features of Stephensen's propagandist activity, it now remains to indicate the course of the movement⁴ that attempted to gain a more concrete expression for the ideology of "Australia First". With this next step in "practice", the "theory" recedes still further into the background and frequently finds no explicit acknowledgement at all. It appears that for some individuals the ideological structure and its sources have only a catalytic function enabling them to act in ways dominated by a personal context. Such people, insufficiently autonomous, need the blessing of some wider, if poorly understood scheme of things before their action can ensue.

1. *The Publicist*, May, 1940, p. 1.

2. I. N. Steinberg: *Australia - the Unpromised Land. In Search of a Home*. pub. Gollancz, London 1948. For reference to Stephensen, see pp. 94 ff.

3. pp. 94 ff.

4. For a more detailed account of the specifically political aspects, and personae of the movement, cf. also Bruce Muir: *Puzzled Patriots*, Melbourne University Press.

Mention has already been made of Stephensen's "Fourteen Points for Australians", of 1936, and the "50 Points of Policy for an 'Australia First' Party after the War", of May, 1940. The latter points were described in *The Publicist* of the following month, as "a preliminary set of principles, not planks, from which a progressive political policy for a nationalist party could be derived."

In the following year, a working committee was constituted on 15th October, to organise an Australia-First political movement. A Constitution was adopted on the 20th October and an Executive Committee elected. P.R. Stephensen was the Chairman; other members were: W.F. Tinker, Treasurer; L.K. Cahill and Adela Pankhurst Walsh, Organisers; Vera Parkinson, Marjorie Corby, Elaine Pope, G.T. Rice, Ian Mudie; and S. Rice, Secretary. It was decided to publicise the Movement with a series of weekly public meetings to begin in November, 1941. The first meeting was to be held in the Australian Hall, 148 Elizabeth Street, Sydney, on 5th November, 1941. A ten-point manifesto was drawn up of the "Australia-First Movement - For Australian Unity and Independence." In comparison with the earlier lists of "points", this inaugural list for the "Movement" was more restrained. It affirmed loyalty to the King and to the upholding of established law and order, while at the same time it appealed for a distinctively 'Australian National Sentiment' and the right of self-determination in all important matters. These included foreign policy, military forces, immigration, trade agreements and overseas investment in Australia.¹

The first meeting, duly held on the 5th of November, opened with the singing of "Advance Australia Fair", with the speakers standing in front of a large Australian flag. About 200 people attended, and towards the end the meeting became rowdy. There were constant interjections when reference to Russia and Communism were made. Mrs Adela Pankhurst Walsh voiced opposition to the granting of American bases in the western Pacific. She also criticised the Atlantic declaration of Churchill and Roosevelt. Stephensen was greeted with applause when he said the movement claimed the same measure of independence for Australia as the people of Britain claimed for their country in external affairs.²

A fortnight later, frequent uproar ensued when Stephensen, addressing another meeting of the movement, assailed the conscription

1. *The Publicist*, November, 1941, p.5.

2. *Sydney Morning Herald*, 6th November, 1941, p.14.

of Australian soldiers for service overseas. He also assailed the influence of Press and Radio, the immigration into Australia of Jewish refugees, limitation of trade relations with Japan and the effect of sectional politics. He stated that there were then fewer than 100 members of the Australia-First Movement, but if the movement gained 50,000 or 60,000 members it would consider nominating candidates for Parliament.¹

Mr Cahill, speaking at a later meeting, on 3rd December, 1941, advocated national unity on the Portuguese model and stated that Portugal was one country which had achieved stability as a result of national unity. He was greeted with cries of, "Definitely Fascist!" Stephensen, replying at the same meeting to a barrage of heckling, admitted advocating national socialism as opposed to international communism, and earned a response of "Hail Stephensen!"²

In the following year, on 19th February, the police were called in to quell what was reported as one of the worst brawls ever to occur in a Sydney public hall, at a meeting of the Australia-First Movement. Just as the meeting was beginning, a man shouted a remark about Fascism. This appeared to be a signal for a "breaking-up" group to start fighting. For more than half-an-hour, men and women fought furiously; rotten eggs and stink-bombs were thrown indiscriminately, one man wielded with effect a specifically prepared wooden hammer, chairs were picked up and in some cases smashed, and other hall appointments were extensively damaged. Six men rushed the president of the movement, P.R. Stephensen, knocking him to the floor, where he was kicked. Although two teeth were knocked out, his right eye badly marked and his head torn in several places, Stephensen spoke afterwards for 90 minutes.³

The movement came under government criticism. In the Federal Parliament, Mr M. Falstein, M.H.R., and in the New South Wales State Parliament, Mr A. Landa, M.L.A., described the organisation as being a Fascist body, one of whose main planks was anti-Semitism. Stephensen, in a letter to members of the State Parliament, denied that the movement was Fascist or anti-Semitic.⁴ Mr Landa, M.L.A., replied that these charges against the movement could be proved in

1. 20th November, 1941, p.14.

2. 4th December, 1941, p.14.

3. *Sydney Morning Herald*, 20th February, 1941, p.6.

4. 3rd March, 1942, p.7.

several ways, by referring to the various published statements and utterances of the movement. He referred to Nazi type propaganda.¹ It was demanded that the movement be suppressed. The Sydney Trades and Labour Council voiced similar criticism.

Two days later, on the 5th March, the police prevented the holding of a meeting by the Movement at Manly. The Commissioner of Police, Mr MacKay, communicated to Stephensen that he had reason to expect a breach of the peace if the meeting were held.² Stephensen later claimed that the meeting was to have dealt, among other matters, with the recall of the Australian Imperial Forces from the Middle East to defend "Australia First", and that Commissioner MacKay's action was in response to an order by Dr Evatt, then Attorney-General.³

On the 9th March, according to Stephensen at the subsequent Inquiry, a telegram was sent from Perth by Lieutenant-Colonel Moseley, Deputy-Director of Security, Western Australia, to the various Commands, including Eastern Command Headquarters at Sydney. This telegram announced the discovery of a plot by the Australia-First Movement. It was later conceded that this West Australian incident did not have any tangible relation with Stephensen's Movement. Nevertheless, in the early hours of the morning of the 10th of March, sixteen members or associated of the Australia-First Movement were arrested in Sydney. Dr Evatt left that day for the U.S.A., where he remained for approximately six months, leaving Mr J. Beasley to act in his stead.

The arrests were made under the National Security Act, Regulation 13, whereby the detainees could be held for 10 days without any charge. About the 20th March, an order was issued under Regulation 26 of the Act, which allowed detention of any person in the interests of national security for the duration of the war. Some five days later, on the 25th March, Mr Blackburn, M.H.R.,⁴ made a protest in the House of Representatives about the detentions, stating that apparently no charges had been made. The Acting Attorney-General promised to inquire into the matter.

The following day, the Minister for the Army, Mr Forde, revealed in the House of Representatives that documents had been seized in

1. 4th March, 1942, p.7.

2. 6th March, 1942, p.5.

3. P.R. Stephensen: "How Dr Evatt Put Me in Gaol", *The Observer*, Sydney, 22nd August, 1959, p.517.

4. *Sydney Morning Herald*, 26th March, 1942, p.4.

connection with the Australia-First Movement, which

"set out plans for the assassination of leading Australians and for sabotaging vulnerable points in this country, and describe methods calculated to make resistance to the Japanese impossible." ¹

A number of "Australia-First" office-bearers and committee-members expressed astonishment at the charges, declaring that the Minister's allegations were preposterous and horrifying. This reaction becomes understandable in view of later evidence that the Minister's allegations more properly related to the West Australian affair referred to above. The detainees, however, had no right of appeal to a court of law but only via an Advisory Committee of the Commonwealth Government. The next day, the 27th of March, it was announced by the Prime Minister, Mr Curtin, in the House of Representatives, that the Solicitor-General was considering the matter of a civil trial. It was also stated by the Minister for the Army that the Government had not announced the names of those arrested, because it did not want to prejudice them. The Government, he said, was intensifying the hunt for elements working against Australia's safety. Large numbers of aliens had been interned on suspicion. Mr Fadden, then Leader of the Opposition, demanded that the detainees be tried for their lives.² Mr Price of the United Australia Party, South Australia, said that the announcement that 20 Australians had prepared elaborate plans to welcome the enemy, assassinate Australian leaders and sabotage Australian defences was the worst story in Australian history, and one of the worst stories in the history of the British people. He wanted to know if treachery was associated with the bombing of Darwin.³

It was announced by the Prime Minister in the following month that legal proceedings would be taken against certain of the alleged members of the Australia-First Movement who had been interned.⁴

In the meantime, an alleged "Australia-First" case was heard before Mr W.J. Wallwork, S.M., in the presence of a crowded gallery in a police-court in Perth. Four people were charged with having, between December 7, 1941, and March 9, 1942, conspired together to assist, within Australia, the armed forces of Japan. They were Laurence

1. 27th March, 1942, p.5.

2. 28th March, 1942, p.11.

3. *ibid.*

4. 11th April, 1942, p.13.

Frederick Bullock, Nancy Rachel Krakourer, Charles Leonard Williams, and Edward Cunningham Quicke. Frederick James Thomas, an investigator, attached to Military Intelligence, stated that, under the adopted name of Frederick Carl Hardt, he had commenced an inquiry into the activities of the Australia-First Movement in Western Australia. He had met Bullock, a 42 year old organiser for the Primary Producers' Association, who had also described himself as the organiser of the Australia First Movement in the State. Bullock had allegedly stated that a pamphlet produced by the Movement in Sydney was only a facade. He himself had been in touch with a Herr Schriemer, German propaganda chief for North America, and had obtained National Socialist propagandas from him. Together with his other associates, he had considered plans for obtaining the explosives necessary for blowing up the Ford Motor Works and a power-house. This sabotage, Bullock explained, may have been necessary to assist the Japanese and enable his Movement to seize control with Japanese assistance. Williams, a 36 year old insurance agent, had said that all Jews were to be sterilised, and Krakourer, the only woman in the party, stated that the hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church should be shot and ordinary priests put on road work.

There were exclamations in the court when a proclamation addressed to the men and women of Australia was read. It included 12 principles laid down by the Australia First organisation. The proclamation, intended to be promulgated on seizure of power, stated among other things:

"This Government expresses, on behalf of the Australian nation, a tribute to the valiant efforts of the Japanese who have so successfully fought for the liberation of our peoples from Jewish domination and the danger of Communism. We welcome to our country, as friends and liberators, Japanese military leaders and the army, who have and are assisting the true patriots of this country to smash forever the British strangle-hold over our people." 1

The four accused were subsequently put under heavy bail and committed for trial at the Supreme Court in the following month. The trial, before the Chief Justice, Sir John Northmore, evoked great interest and occupied 16 days before a packed gallery. The interdict, laid under the Crimes Act, charged the accused with having conspired to assist a public enemy, the Japanese Empire. The jury took three and a half hours to make its verdict, and decided that Bullock and Williams

1. *Sydney Morning Herald*, 8th May, 1942, p.5.

were guilty, but that Krakourer and Quicke were not - they had been interned under National Security Regulations and were returned to this custody.¹ Bullock was sentenced to imprisonment for three years, and Williams for two.²

The only connection, and that a tenuous one, which could be adduced as involving Stephensen's Movement lay in Quicke's statement that he had written to P.R. Stephensen about forming a branch of the Australia-First Movement in Western Australia.³ Stephensen claimed that the Australia-First Movement in Sydney knew nothing of the Perth affair and that the "Australia-First" movement there was the work of a government agent-provocateur.⁴ However, the degree to which Stephensen's propagandist activities had influenced the thoughts of this "bogus" movement is not known.

On the 25th of August, the Attorney-General, Dr Evatt, made a statement in which it seemed certain that there was no guilty association between the members of the movement in New South Wales and the group of the same name in Western Australia. It appeared that Dr Evatt was not happy with the handling of the case of Australia-First internees in N.S.W. Five of them had been released on the 23rd of August.⁵ A leading article⁶ in the *Sydney Morning Herald* contrasted the sensation officially created by the Minister for the Army in his disclosures of five months ago, with the anti-climax of Dr Evatt virtually inviting the remaining internees to lodge appeals against their treatment. The paper asked for "fair-play" in the matter. Mrs Stephensen, who had also been interned, said that her husband would not appeal if he was to be heard in private only. She stated that her husband was determined to have a public trial, in view of the treasonable associations made with his name.⁷ One of the released internees, a Mr Martin Watts, stated that, under the conditions applying to release of the internees, they were no more than prisoners at large.⁸ An application for writs of habeas corpus in respect of two of

1. 24th June, 1942, p.7.

2. 30th June, 1942, p.7.

3. *Sydney Morning Herald*, 19th June, 1942, p.7.

4. *The Observer*, Sydney, August 22nd, 1959, pp.516-517.

5. *Sydney Morning Herald*, 24th August, 1942, p.4.

6. *ibid.* 26th August, 1942, p.6.

7. *ibid.* 28th August, 1942, p.7.

8. *ibid.* 29th August, 1942, p.11.

the internees, Valentine Corley and Sydney Hooper, part proprietors of *The Publicist*, was refused by the Full Court on the 3rd September. The Chief Justice said the Court had no jurisdiction as the Minister was responsible for power exercised under National Security Regulations.

Well over a year later, Mr R.G. Menzies, then Leader of the Opposition, pressed strongly in the House of Representatives for an inquiry into the matter, to determine whether there was any real reason for the internments. He had been through the University with a man, a Melbourne solicitor of good repute, who had been pulled out of his home and interned for eight months. He gave a further example of alleged injustice, as well as mentioning the apparent unrelatedness of the West Australian affair. Dr Evatt stated that there was no doubt, judging by their speeches and letters, that some of the internees were preparing at the time to act as quislings in the event of the Japanese successes continuing. But he promised to review the whole affair. There followed a noisy debate, and at times uproar ensued.¹

1. 1st April, 1944, p.11.

E. The Commission of Inquiry

The former members of the Australia-First Movement, who had been interned for various periods from six months to twenty-three months, drew up a list of matters for a full investigation by the inquiry promised by Dr Evatt.¹ The inquiry itself was announced to begin on June 19th, 1944, and to have very wide terms of reference. It was to be conducted by Mr Justice Glynne appointed as Commissioner under National Security Regulations.²

Twelve former internees were represented by counsel or appeared before the Commission in person. Mr Dovey, K.C., assisting the Commissioner, stated in his opening address that ample evidence would be presented to show that some of the members of the organisation would prefer to have a swastika as a badge rather than the Union Jack. He claimed that there were matters known to the Army and Security which may well have justified them in taking the view that the West Australian Movement and that in New South Wales were one and the same. There could be little doubt, he claimed, that some members of the Australia First Movement were avowed defeatists, anti-English, anti-United-States, anti-Semitic, pro-Fascist, pro-Nazi, and pro-Japanese at a time when Australia was at war with Japan and Germany. He also made a statement, relevant to a wider context, that there were a number of people, respected in the community, who were caught up in the movement, and who did not understand what the real objects of its leaders were. This claim certainly appeared to become justified in the course of the Commissioner's Inquiry.

The originator of the Australia-First Movement was said to be a William John Miles, a wealthy man, born in Australia, an accountant by profession, who at one time spent up to £4,000 a year in furthering the cause. In 1935, Miles had got in touch with P.R. Stephensen, and had obtained assistance in publishing some pamphlets. In July, 1936, Miles assisted by Stephensen, Sidney B. Hooper (about 70 years of age) and Valentine Crowley, produced *The Publicist*, of which Miles was the

1. 11th May, 1944, p.4.

2. 3rd June, 1944, p.4.

sole proprietor. Miles died in 1942, and the three others took over the publication. Hooper was described as a retired bank manager, a man of substance who seemed a perfectly respectable member of society, interested in real estate and a member of one of the most exclusive clubs in Sydney. He was an early member of Australia-First but was not active. Crowley, at the time of the Inquiry, was about 60 years of age and was claimed as making no secret of his anti-British attitude.

According to Security evidence, Miles and Stephensen had endeavoured in 1939 to obtain co-operation and friendship with a Mr Arnold von Skerst, secretary of the German-Australian Chamber of Commerce, and editor of an avowed Nazi propaganda paper circulating in Australia, *Die Brucke*. The anti-Semitic, anti-democratic, Aryan and National-Socialist characteristics of *The Publicist* were referred to. The Security service had sent one of its officers to become a member and report on private meetings of the Yabba Club, in which Stephensen and his followers discussed matters claimed to be subversive. It was said that they wanted all statues of kings and queens to be removed from their pedestals.

Mrs Adela Pankhurst Walsh, mentioned previously, was stated to have visited Japan at the expense of the Japanese Government and to have written to a Japanese official that the movement would further Australian-Japanese co-operation. Some other members had objected to this, and she had been asked to resign.

Mr Dovey's remarks on the unwitting complicity of some members is in agreement with the Security service's version of the internees in 1942. For example, Keith Percival Bath was described as a member of a firm of real estate agents, a member of Manly Council, the Royal Empire Society, the Constitutional Association etc. - a "thoroughly respectable and worthy citizen who found himself in an internment camp for a cause, the true purport of which he did not understand."¹ Another internee, Cecil Walter Salier, was rather similarly described; he was "a thoroughly reputable and honest citizen", a member of the Historical Society and the Australian Institute of Political Science; he became a keen member of the Australia First Movement "but did not appear to fully appreciate the significance" of the movement.² Similar opinions were given about other members.

1. *Sydney Morning Herald*, 20th June, 1944, p.4.

2. 20th June, 1944, p.4.

Thomas John Kirtley, already referred to in connection with Jack Lindsay and the Fanfrollico Press, as well as with Baylebridge, was described by Security as a member of the Movement, a defeatist who had a contempt for Australians and an admiration for the leaders of Germany and Japan.¹

Oddly enough, Leslie Kevin Cahill, one of the speakers mentioned previously, was described as actively associated with the Communist Party in Western Australia.² Other members were cited as having copies of *Mein Kampf*.

Another member, Alexander Rudd Mills, born in Tasmania in 1885, and a legal practitioner in Melbourne, was stated to have published a paper called *The Angle* and another paper called *The National Socialist* which ran for only two issues. He was also said to have written a book called, *The Ordianist Religion - Overcoming Jewish Christianity*. He admitted posting a copy to Hitler and had received an acknowledgement from Hitler.³ In 1932, he was in Munich and had been introduced to Hitler as Mr Mills, from Melbourne.⁴ He was avowedly anti-Semitic.

The amount of evidence presented to the Commissioner was considerable: at one stage, his Honor asked whether a railway-train had had to be chartered to bring the exhibits from Sydney.⁵

Stephensen, under cross-examination, denied that he was pro-Japanese or pro-Nazi, or that seditious statements had ever been made at the Yabba Club.⁶ An unnamed woman witness who was said to have been employed as an assistant to the secretary of the German-Australian Chamber of Commerce, Arnold von Skerst, stated that while at the Chamber von Kerst had met Miles once or twice a week. She had heard Stephensen's name mentioned. *The Publicist* was said to have been the only Australian paper to advertise in the chamber paper, *Die Brucke*, which von Skerst edited.⁷

It was also adduced in evidence that Stephensen had entered into correspondence with a number of Japanese persons and had kept a list of many Japanese firms in his office, in connection with subscriptions

1. p.4.

2. p.4.

3. 24th August, 1944, p.3.

4. 29th September, 1944, p.4.

5. 26th August, 1944, p.4.

6. 3rd October, 1944, cf. also 4th October.

7. 5th October, 1944, p.4.

for *The Publicist*.¹

Another of the internees, Edwin Arnold, a former docker and painter, admitted he had been an ardent admirer of Hitler, believed in Nazism, Fascism and the inherent superiority of the Aryan race. He wanted to remove all Jews to Madagascar.²

Finally, Mr Justice Clyde tabled his report on the movement, in the House of Representatives on 13th September, 1944. He found that eight of the 16 persons detained in New South Wales were unjustifiably detained, and recommended payment of compensation to seven of them and to the widow of the eighth. He stated, however, that the persons who were wrongly detained were largely to blame for the misfortune which overtook them. They were associated, he said, with certain persons who were using the Australia-First Movement to cause dissension and to foster opinions prejudicial to Australia's part in the war. He stated that many of the persons who became members of the movement had been interested in *The Publicist*. The movement, generally, he said, was hostile to the Jewish race. Some of the members had a marked admiration for Japan; others, though keen advocates of Australian nationalism, were not hostile to Britain or America or friendly to Japan. The original aims of the movement might be regarded as legitimate, but behind the movement's ostensible aims there were activities by certain members calculated to prejudice the Australian war effort.³

Of His Honor's comments on particular cases, it may suffice to mention but two here. John Thomas Kirtley, already mentioned as the former associate of Baylebridge and the Lindsays, was said to have given ample grounds for his detention. He was released early in February, 1944. He was found to have subversive views, and appeared to be an intense admirer of Japan. He considered Australians to be "gutless swine". He was not a member of the Australia-First Movement, but wrote articles for *The Publicist*.

Percy Reginald Stephensen was found to have given substantial reasons for his detention. His Honor said it was perhaps justified to say that Stephensen, a Rhodes Scholar, had done little to realise the aspirations of Cecil Rhodes since leaving Oxford. Stephensen's writings in *The Publicist* showed that he admired the Nazi regime. He

showed marked hostility to Britain, and had an extreme admiration for Japan. He was in favour of the withdrawal of Australian troops from overseas, independence from Britain, and the conclusion of a separate peace with Japan.¹

Thus the affair concluded and passed from public interest. The varying fusion of ideas and personal influence, in which Nietzsche, the Lindsays and Baylebridge had played significant parts, had become assimilated into the political activities of a man who was described by one of his brothers as, a "revolutionary, narrow as a Puritan, extremely clever, and doubtless a power to be reckoned with".²

Stephensen had once thought "that National Resurgence can come solely through literature", but, as the author of *The Foundations of Culture in Australia*, he had, in 1935, already passed through and reluctantly abandoned that phase of belief.³ When young and in association with Jack Lindsay, he had thought "to astonish the burghers" but, on reflection,

"Thirty years later, I may say that the burghers have more frequently astonished me than I have astonished them. They astonished me particularly in 1942, when they made me a scapegoat for their Japanese panic..."⁴

He continued on, after his release from internment, with a variety of publishing and literary activity, including his editing of Baylebridge's 'Collected Works'. Baylebridge had died on the 7th May, 1942, as the result of a heart-attack while fighting a bush-fire in the Blue Mountains.

Stephensen was addressing a meeting of the Savage Club in Sydney, on the 28th May, 1965; he had just received a standing ovation for his speech when he collapsed and died. A doctor seated near the stage treated him for several minutes but could not revive him.⁵ In these later years, he still appeared to have retained his hopes for the future of the Australian nation. In 1959, he had stated,

"I am satisfied to be an Australian Nationalist...A true Resurgence could occur in Australia; at any time from now on, as self-confidence grows; but

1. 7th October, 1944, p.4.

2. 9th December, 1944, p.5.

3. 21st June, 1944, p.3.

1. 21st June, 1944, p.3.

2. In an essay on the "Jindyworobaks" in *The Publicist*, September, 1941, p.12.

3. P.R. Stephensen: *Kookaburras and Satyrs*, op.cit., pp.14-15.

4. *ibid.*

5. *The Age*, Melbourne, 29th May, 1965.

Nationalism
yuck

it will be made by those who stay here,
or by those who go away for only a while
and then return". 1

With Baylebridge, however, there was not the same assurance. Kirtley states that Baylebridge told him once that Asia would conquer Australia since Australians did not want their heritage. At the time of his death, Baylebridge was staying in the Blue Mountains, no doubt having gone there, according to Kirtley, at the height of the fear of a Japanese invasion.

"He would only refugee in a mood of bewilderment
and not one of cowardice. Possibly, in view of
what he said to me years before, he felt that
our national existence was finished." 2

Kirtley himself, it may be recalled, had been found by Mr Justice Clyde to have despaired of Australians and to have admired other nations.

1. P.R. Stephensen, p.35.

2. John Kirtley: "My Friend Baylebridge", *Southerly* 3 (1955, pp.136-137.

PART V

EPILOGUE

"Because of this, I thought it worthwhile
to make more than a passing and cursory
reference to it, and to place it well in
view, so that there can be no mistaking
its features and their significances. 1

Randolph Hughes

As stated initially, the main purpose of this inquiry has been to ascertain the relationship between the works of certain Australian authors and those of Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche. The relevance of Nietzsche to Australian literature has already been well acknowledged by critics. A.D. Hope,² Judith Wright,³ and Vincent Buckley,⁴ for example, have all noted his importance. Indeed, the latter critic, in an inquiry into general trends in Australian literature has concluded, "So I am tempted to say that if Australian literature has a beneficent grand-uncle, it is not Karl Marx but Nietzsche..."⁵

However, one of the first difficulties that has had to be faced in this inquiry is that of satisfactorily defining Nietzsche's own views, so that they may be distinguished in their own right and allowed to contribute their proper criticism to the allegedly Nietzschean views of other writers. For reasons already explained in the Preface, this task has inevitably involved considerable attention being given here to Nietzsche's views in themselves. This has been absolutely necessary in view of the varying status of the views attributed to Nietzsche,

1. Apropos of P.R. Stephensen's *Foundations of Culture in Australia*, in an article by Randolph Hughes, "Culture in Australia", *The Nineteenth Century*, London, Nov. 1936, p.627.

2. A.D. Hope: "Henry Handel Richardson's 'Maurice Guest'", *Meanjin* 61 (1955).

3. Judith Wright: *Preoccupations in Australian Poetry*, Melbourne, 1965, p.47.

4. Vincent Buckley: "Utopianism and Vitalism", *Quadrant* 10 (1959), p.51.

5. *ibid.*

not only by Australian writers, but also in view of the state of the Nietzsche literature available in English. Apart from its relevance to the Australian authors dealt with here, it is hoped that this philosophical spade-work will facilitate the assessment of Nietzschean influences in other Australian authors still, and will help in drawing attention to the wider problems concerned.

Apart from more immediate attention to Nietzsche, the nature of the subject has also made it incumbent to consider how much the Australian authors treated of here are symptomatic of those general features of 19th century thought which found such divided and problematic expression in Nietzsche. Baylebridge, Stephensen and others were ostensibly, even vehemently, Australian. Nevertheless, on close examination, their ideas in principle prove to be almost wholly of European origin. Seen in the broader context, their works are not so much valuable in themselves as symptomatic of what Judith Wright, for example, in her essay on Baylebridge,¹ calls the "modern Problem".

The literature which seeks to define and diagnose this "modern" problem, whether on pessimistic lines, often in terms of gnosticism, liberalism, and a general decay of man's image in a godless world, or, more optimistically, as some form of humanist emergence into new enlightenment, is both large and generally too broad in treatment to have been of much use in the present study. On the other hand, the available studies which refer to the Australian authors treated of here are too restricted in scope to adequately demonstrate connections with the wider development.

The need for this wider consideration has not, of course, gone unnoticed. Judith Wright's essay, mentioned above, has sought to treat Baylebridge in universal terms of thought, as a philosopher and prophet of his age. In her book, *Preoccupations in Australian Poetry*, we find it as Judith Wright's view, that the main stream of European thought and feeling has largely impoverished the life of Australia; she also states that

"...the 'death of God' that Nietzsche announced with lament and triumph, was felt less consciously here, but its effects were even more devastating." 2

Vincent Buckley, in seeking to answer the question of whether one can

1. Judith Wright: "William Baylebridge and the Modern Problem", *Southerly* 3 (1955), p.139.

2. Judith Wright: *Preoccupations in Australian Poetry*, Oxford University Press, Melbourne 1965, pp.46-47.

properly speak of 'trends' in Australian literature, has tentatively advanced the view that there is a 'Vitalist' and a 'Utopian' trend discernible - Nietzsche, as already mentioned, is placed at the head of the vitalist trend. An additional reason for invoking the broader context, apart from the reasons of the critics, is that Baylebridge himself has made claim to having his 'conception of life' considered 'as a phase in the long sequence of human endeavour'.¹

Furthermore, there is the depressing fact that Baylebridge's ideas found acceptance and employment in a political movement which, although it was avowedly Australian and could attract Australians of goodwill, was nevertheless similar to the National Socialist party of Germany in a number of important items of policy. This fact alone should warrant examination of the ideology by which the Australia First Movement sought to gain power, for although the movement itself has lapsed into history, the demonstrated possibility of its ideas are too fraught with menace to be left without scrutiny. Baylebridge, it may be recalled, provided in his will that certain monies be applied to the fostering of his works.

In seeking to examine the influence of Nietzsche on Australian literature, this study has perforce been obliged to confine itself largely to one particular line of influence. The particular trend which Vincent Buckley has called the 'vitalist' trend has been considered by the present writer to be capable of further approximate division into a "Nationalist" trend and an "Aesthetic" trend. The latter is represented by Norman Lindsay and those influenced by him or by similar ideas. The former trend, the 'Nationalist' one, is the one that has been the main concern here. Nietzsche, of course, is relevant to both of them.

It would be desirable to have broadened the inquiry further and to have included some reference at least to Henry Handel Richardson and Christopher Brennan. Limitations of space and the necessity of adequate treatment here have not allowed of this. To the present writer, it seems probable that the Nietzschean influence in the former case would prove to be complex and worthy of examination in extenso.

In the case of Brennan, however, it is worthwhile to make a small digression here since it is sometimes claimed that Brennan's work was

1. Baylebridge: *Collected Works*, op.cit. Vol.I, p.xii.

aesthetic
reason for per
idols in
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influenced by Nietzsche. Vincent Buckley,¹ for example, claims that the whole conception of Brennan's "Wanderer" was drawn from a metaphysic of the will based on Nietzsche. This is not so. Brennan, in his lectures on "Symbolism in Nineteenth Century Literature" (June-July 1904)² is shown to have respected Nietzsche for his honesty in pursuing a line of thought to its logical extremity, but it is clear that his attitude to Nietzsche's philosophy is not that of a disciple. The present writer, in an earlier study of Brennan,³ has sought to show the far more important relationship between Brennan and the German Romantics, principally Novalis (Friedrich von Hardenberg 1772-1801) in so far as it concerns what Professor G.A. Wilkes⁴ has called the "conceptual framework". In the view of Professor A.R. Chisholm, who knew Brennan personally, the poet's cast of mind was essentially too Catholic to gain any great emotional experience from Nietzsche's work. Brennan, he recalls,⁵ did not give much prominence to Nietzsche in his lectures at Sydney University partly because he concentrated on earlier periods. It may also be mentioned that a notebook⁶ of one of Brennan's students records that in 1912 Brennan classified Nietzsche under the heading of "Gegenromantik (Reaction)". This same notebook also indicates the considerable space Brennan gave to the Romantics, that is, to Novalis and the Schlegels. Thus, up to the time of the completion of *Poems 1918*, there is no indication that Brennan was influenced in any important, positive way by Nietzsche. Afterwards, early in 1915, Brennan gave several lectures in German at a Modern Language Congress organised at the University of Sydney. The last of these lectures, which had been on the German Romantics, was to be on Nietzsche, and a number of non-German speakers asked him to give it in English - which is probably indicative of the interest then taken in Nietzsche's thought. The large classics lecture-room on the first floor of the Arts Building was full, and by no means with language teachers only.⁷ As Professor Chisholm recalls it, Brennan's talk was certainly not anti-Nietzsche,

1. Vincent Buckley, op.cit., p.47.

2. *The Poems of Christopher Brennan*, ed. A.R. Chisholm and J.J. Quinn, 1962, p.130.

3. Noel Macainsh: "Christopher Brennan and Die Romantik", *Southerly* 3 (1963), p.150; also "Einige Bemerkungen zum Brennan's 'Prelude'", *LENQ* (Literature in North Queensland), No.2, 1974.

4. G.A. Wilkes: "New Perspectives on Brennan's Poetry", *Southerly* 3 (1953), p.160.

5. Personal Communication.

6. Mitchell Library, Sydney, B1599.

7. *The Verse of Christopher Brennan*, ed. A.R. Chisholm and J.J. Quinn, 1960, p.28; also personal communication.

and this same writer recalls that Brennan used to say after the outbreak of the 1914 war that he would not have Nietzsche's name dragged in the dust by fools. Additionally, the present writer has published some notes based on unpublished material of Brennan relating to Nietzsche.¹ These notes serve to reinforce the view already afforded by other material, namely, that Brennan was familiar with Nietzsche's work but was firmly opposed to Nietzsche from his own romantic standpoint. Nevertheless, Brennan, as may be seen from his support of F.C.S. Schiller's (1864-1937) evolutionary pragmatism,² may be seen as sharing certain teleological and subjectivist principles which, however differently expressed, do bring him into a general relation with Baylebridge and Norman Lindsay.

Returning to the main theme, one might attempt to broadly characterise the influence of Nietzsche by saying that for those thinkers who were concerned with the apparently materialistic implications of 19th century biology, his works came as a powerful stimulus in the attempt of men to rationally assert the power to transcend themselves. More simply, Nietzsche represented spirit against matter: "Darwin hat den Geist vergessen".

Darwinism, which gave an immense stimulus to the idea of evolution, became associated with emergent political forces of nationalism and socialism, especially with the widespread belief in progress. Darwin's work offered the tempting prospect of a mechanistic explanation of the manifold and mysterious nature of living creatures while at the same time it appeared to bestow the authority of natural law on political movements, chiefly Liberalism and Socialism. One could add that the accelerating growth in population and the general spread of elementary education provided a milieu in which ideas could spread with great ease and effect while at the same time being little subject to scientific control. It might be added further that neither Baylebridge nor Norman Lindsay were trained as philosophers in the academic sense, and that P.R. Stephensen, though a Rhodes Scholar, was derivative of Universities and showed more concern for polemic than dispassionate inquiry.

1. Noel Macainsh: "Brennan and Nietzsche", *Southerly*, No.4, 1966; also, "Brennan on Nietzsche", *LENQ* (Literature in North Queensland), No.3, 1974.

2. cf. Brennan's address to the Sydney University Philosophical Society as retiring president 1902-3. 'Prose' Vol., op.cit., pp.40 ff.

An important consequence of this rapid dissemination of Darwinistic anthropology was the strong opposition to established religious thought. Together with the clash of Darwinism and religious orthodoxy, there arose a more general ferment of ideas concerning religion and evolution. Numerous attempts at synthesis were made. At the one extreme were religious fundamentalists, and at the other extreme there were cosmic evolutionists who sought to comprehend everything in evolutionary terms. The truly seminal figure whose influence appears again and again in diverse attempts at synthesis is that of Hegel. Whether directly or indirectly, Hegel's influence in one form or another is highly pervasive at this time. The reason for this, as already discussed, lies in the possibilities he offers for carrying traditional religious attitudes forward into evolutionary contexts. Samuel Butler, in whom religious need and respect for science had wreaked such inner turmoil, had asked for an immanent God, "He in us, and we in Him". Hegel, in contrast to orthodox theistic conceptions, had met this need by a philosophy which in principle abolished the abyss of objectivity between man and God. As Marcuse¹ has put it, "No longer is there the finiteness of being as ens creatum contrasted to the Creator-God, rather this finiteness no longer has any contrast..." It could be said, that without this contrast, a fitting sense of human limitations was in danger of being lost.

Philosophically, there was also Kant's paradox of the unknowable self and the empirical self, and the way in which Schopenhauer had attempted to solve this paradox by his doctrine of the Will - an attempt which in Koerner's² view has provided the basis for modern irrationalisms. Together with Hegel, important elements of these thinkers are to be found in Baylebridge's conceptions.

But it is where Nietzsche contributes to this stream of thought that the characteristics and difficulties of Baylebridge's thought are most clearly shown. For Baylebridge, while partaking of some of Nietzsche's criticism, lags behind him in important respects. Two points need to be made. Firstly, Nietzsche as a philosopher in his own right, has shown the abyss of thought and even personal danger into which the preceding philosophical development has tended. Secondly, Baylebridge, while having drawn on the same sources, did not go as

1. Marcuse: *Hegel's Ontologie und die Grundlegung einer Theorie der Geschichtlichkeit*, Frankfurt, 1932, p.150.

2. Koerner, op.cit., pp.67-68.

far as Nietzsche in his analysis and criticism of them; with the result that Baylebridge represents to a large degree positions which Nietzsche attacks.

Of Baylebridge, one could say that he has encountered Nietzsche in various ways, certainly through George Bernard Shaw,¹ probably through the Levy translation, and possibly from the German texts themselves. In the hiatus created by Darwinism, he would have encountered numerous works involving Nietzschean ideas, either gained from Nietzsche or of a kind that Nietzsche would have entertained. There is no evidence however that he has understood Nietzsche to the same extent as, say, Brennan or the Lindsays, Norman and Jack. Rather, the more specific features of Nietzsche's thought, such as the eternal recurrence, the will-to-power and the analysis of nihilism are not properly present in Baylebridge's work; their import may even have been lost on the young man who composed *Life's Testament*. It appears that Baylebridge, as the young intuitive and ambitious poet, has for a short time beforehand avidly steeped himself in the 'advanced' literature of the day, then dredged the accumulated material in his desire to articulate a fitting poetic gospel. It would be interesting to know how much the 'Testaments' of John Davidson served him as a general model in his ambitions at this early time in his career. The general atmosphere of thought at the time might well, as it in fact appears to have done, persuade him that something more than he himself was co-operating in his attempt to forward the evolutionary process. The result, presented with fervour and conviction, is a basically Hegelian-type system overlaid with a variety of ideas, Nietzschean and otherwise. The 'practical' ideas of "National Notes" and "Political Verse" with their basic premise of selection by racial and national conflict are far more redolent of Herbert Spencer and the various enthusiasts of eugenics than of Nietzsche. The measure of support that may be obtained for these ideas from Nietzsche derives essentially from *The Will to Power*, the collection of notes of uncertain status in Nietzsche's thought, which was posthumously compiled and published as Nietzsche's main philosophical work, without proper approval by Nietzsche. These circumstances are rendered more unfortunate in that this book has been very influential among Nietzsche's works.

1. cf. Noel Macainsh, "Baylebridge, Shaw, Nietzsche - some observations on the New Nationalism", *Australian Literary Studies*, No.2, 1975.

Baylebridge's position corresponds approximately to what Nietzsche characterises as "incomplete" nihilism, that is, the stage in the development of nihilism when the place occupied by God is thought of as vacant, when the being of God is denied in such a way as may be found in Feuerbach, and the attempt is made to conserve the "ethical import" of divinity by some form of humanism. We have, as in Baylebridge, the attempt to replace previous values by new ones which are largely of an ideal nature, pointing beyond the present, and even beyond this life itself. In place of God and the Church, there appears Man-God and the State-Religion. In place of the idea of redemption as in traditional Christianity, we find Baylebridge's heavy stress on the "redemptive" effort which is to turn man into a God and the State into a paragon of race-breeding and Nationalism.

Baylebridge's system also exhibits a resonance with the 19th century of a kind which a Marxian observer might note: the constant accumulation of economic capital, or rather the attempt of the individual entrepreneur to do so, is matched in Baylebridge's scheme by the struggle to achieve an increasing accumulation of capital of a biological and spiritual kind. Presumably, Baylebridge also attempted to pursue an analogous progress in his own economic activities of speculation and investment. The same Marxian observer might also comment on how this "entrepreneurial" spirit would appear to place Baylebridge's philosophy as expressive of certain vested interests, not of the larger economic interests with their ties to Britain and the Crown, but of the lesser echelons of the bourgeoisie, such as may be typified by those who later became associated with "Australia First" - a class of individual whose relative position in society might reasonably be compared with that of those German people who at one stage felt that there might be "something" in National Socialism.

Occasion is provided here to point to a quite vital distinction between Nietzsche and Baylebridge, a distinction that separates Nietzsche's work from that of those who have sought to exploit him for political purposes; namely, the distinction between *Weltanschauung* and the ideology as mentioned earlier, and already pointed out by Professor R.H. Samuel. That is, Nietzsche is concerned with the search for truth as expressing itself in a *Weltanschauung* or philosophy, whereas Baylebridge is concerned with the search for power, as expressing itself in a 'visionary speculation' or ideology. If this difference

1. cf. R.H. Samuel, op.cit., p.138

is kept in mind, Baylebridge's use of Nietzsche and other thinkers, notably Hegel, becomes readily understandable. But to regard Baylebridge as a thinker in the manner of Nietzsche, searching for truth, is to confound categories that ought to be kept clearly apart. Baylebridge is not a thinker in the Nietzschean sense at all. Thus, to call Baylebridge an "Australian Nietzsche" as does T. Inglis Moore, may express some partial aspect, but it is also misleading and were best not done at all. The whole mode of Baylebridge's expression is adapted to laying down the law, not to searching for it.

It can be said that the true depth of Nietzsche's cultural criticism, the analysis which precedes the nihilist crisis, and which has led to a wealth of further meditation in subsequent artistic and philosophical production, is not to be found in Baylebridge. "Grosse Geister sind Skeptiker" said Nietzsche, but Baylebridge has a will to unconditional affirmation; he does not exhibit himself in the usual processes of philosophical enquiry.

In sum, one may say that Baylebridge, as many others of his time, has sought to conserve the main points of traditional religious faith in the face of modern doubts regarded as too strong to be simply rejected. By a path which he does not disclose but of which we can discern the main features, he has assimilated the essential characteristics of Hegel's evolutionary philosophy of the spirit, which has been described by one writer¹ as a secularised version of German mysticism, adapted to the needs of 19th century consciousness. Additionally, we can say that in keeping with the general trend of liberal theology, he has sought to espouse a doctrine of God based on evolutionary and subjective principles. It has been one of the main concerns of this inquiry to examine these principles, predominantly in relation to Friedrich Nietzsche, and to show the dangerous propensities they contain.

It has been shown here that a non-monist interpretation of Nietzsche's will-to-power, whatever the difficulties it may entail, does come out on the side of the individual in supporting him against any totalitarian institutional claims made upon him. On the contrary, a monist interpretation of Nietzsche lends itself to totalitarian adaptations of his work. Such an association of monism and totalitarianism is not, of course, restricted to interpretations of Nietzsche's work alone, as in Nazi falsifications, but is a more general

1. N. Berdyaev, op.cit., p.28.

possibility. Thus, it has been remarked that,

"The premise of an objective spirit, for example, as in Hegel, leads to monism, and to the tyranny of the general over the individual as in totalitarian systems." ¹

The attempt has been made here to demonstrate the historical application of this statement, not in terms of the rise of the National Socialist Movement in Germany, but with reference to the Australia First Movement here. This movement was both limited in effect and easily contained by the authorities, but its occurrence is a curious reminder that an attempt to be most insularly national, to be

"Australian" in the extreme, was, in much of its philosophy and policy, similar in its own minor way to the contemporary and disastrous course of German nationalism.

P.R. Stephensen was adamant that Baylebridge's work was published in Australia long before the "Nazi Germans" were heard of and that none of the essential statements in "Life's Testament" could be antedated by statements in "any philosophical work, in any language" ². Unfortunately, it does not appear to be so easy to produce new thoughts. Virtually all the elements in Baylebridge's synthesis can be shown to have European antecedents.

Stephensen too, with his acceptance of Baylebridge's Nationalism, was also very much antedated by European ideas of Nationalism and the organic State. The production of his *The Foundations of Culture in Australia*, in 1936, was, apart from the local reference, essentially a spirited and rather crude repetition of ideas widely and variously expressed in the 19th century. The fact that these ideas were "in the air" in the Australia of the 30's, even if not much reflected on, may account for the storm that was stirred up by the appearance of Stephensen's 'Foundations'. Stephensen's main thesis - that Australia has no need of England, or Europe - was certainly no new thing in this country; there had long been an anti-English and isolationist sentiment here, expressed in many ways, including the *Sydney Bulletin* and the opposition to conscription in the First World War. It was this sympathetic background of opinion that gave such significance to Stephensen's book. This point was recognised with considerable foresight at the time by Randolph Hughes. ³ In discussing the extreme views

1. N. Berdyaev, op.cit., p.59.

2. *The Publicist*, 1st December, 1937, p.17.

3. Randolph Hughes: "Culture in Australia", *The Nineteenth Century*, London, 1936, p.626.

expressed in *The Foundations of Culture in Australia*, Hughes could write:

"It will no doubt be said that there are in Australia people the opposite of Mr Stephensen, and that he is only one of a very small number, who may be viewed as being negligible. I know perfectly well of the existence of this other class of people, and I have drawn attention to the importance of the work of a certain number of them; some of them are good friends of mind, and I am in no danger of undervaluing them. But they are no more than a very small 'elite', and their efforts run counter to the main line of development of the country, which in the end is bound to prevail against them. This main line of development is well represented by Mr Stephensen; he and his brethren are already a majority, and the majority increases rapidly every decade. The only difference between him and his 'fair-dinkum' companions-in-arms is that he is more obstreperously vocal than they. A book such as his, which will probably meet with no effective answering voice in Australia, will undoubtedly add very largely to the ranks of these malcontents!"

The subsequent development of Stephensen's polemical activities through the important medium of *The Publicist* and the Australia First Movement did nothing to contradict the pronosis made by Randolph Hughes. The isolationist policy could find expression as late as 1941 in the words of the poet Ian Mudie who, in *The Publicist*, in the September of that year, looked forward to

... the beauty we shall not find
till Europe fades from the mind.

But by this time, the isolationism expressed earlier by Stephensen had not only become associated with the kind of doctrine found in Baylebridge's 'National Notes' but was spiritually negating itself by increasingly open sympathy with National Socialism, Fascism and the declared aims of the Japanese. In these terms, the Australia First Movement became intolerable from the viewpoint of security and was accordingly suppressed by the Commonwealth Government.

Stephensen was not a creative thinker but was essentially a publicist who needed other men's ideas. Earlier, he had been enthused of the Dionysian ideas of the Lindsays; later he became enthused of Baylebridge's ideas and endeavoured to give them practical expression. In both phases, there is, as has been shown here, a common Nietzschean reference - based in the one instance on a more aesthetic interpretation

eclectic
conglomerate

in the manner of Nazi falsifications. Locally, Baylebridge must emerge as the true ideologue of the Australia First Movement. Accordingly, it is not proposed to return to Baylebridge's views and to conclude with some remarks which it is hoped will add to the perspective.

Judith Wright,¹ in her "Baylebridge and the Modern Problem", has sought to present Baylebridge's conception as basically sound though blemished by his failure, as she sees it, to place sufficient trust in the "life-force" no matter where it leads him. But to the present writer, it appears that such a view misses the key aspect of the whole question. Walter Kaufmann has significantly referred to Nietzsche as being in the tradition of the Old Testament prophets. This is relevant for the broad hint it gives vis-a-vis the liberal religious doctrines of Divine Immanence such as are involved in Baylebridge's conception, and also for Nietzsche's view of nihilism. For it is characteristic of the Old Testament that God is separate from his creatures, not participant in their subjectivity as in modern evolutionary theories. Nihilism can be seen from this prophetic view as the progressive supplanting of an objective God by an immanent One, or, more plainly, as the usurping of divinity by human beings. With Hegel, a fusion of philosophy and Christian teaching gave a strong stimulus to the spread of doctrines of Immanence; the previous religious categories become modified till eschatological hope is supplanted by historical progress. The limitations of the human condition are thought to be infinitely subject to human assertion inspired by a glimpsed image of human perfection.

However, the tendency for the individual man to become his own God, as discussed earlier, is ultimately pathological. Mental health requires objective values, ideals about which the self may strive to integrate itself. Nietzsche emphasised that no creature lives without valuing. Additionally, the values by which an individual lives must be shared extra-individually, otherwise social cohesion breaks down. If the highest accepted values devalue themselves, as Nietzsche states in his definition of nihilism, then presumably a society will only have lower values to bond it together. If these too are ultimately despaired of and become worthless, then one would expect disintegrative behaviour to become general.

Judith Wright, in her summing up of Baylebridge as a thinker and

1. Judith Wright: "Baylebridge and the Modern Problem", *Southerly* 3 (1955), p.146.

prophet, finds fault with him for hesitating at this prospect, for abandoning his entire system when confronted with "the modern breakdown of values". She states that Baylebridge was "caught in the very trap from which he was trying to rescue mankind - a failure of faith". Furthermore, Judith Wright points to Baylebridge's inconsistent attempt to set up "the past achievements of mankind as an immutable measure for the future" as though this were the regrettable weakness of a man otherwise possessed of a true gospel.

However, it is inevitable that some such attempt be made if sanity is to be preserved. Far from being a weakness in Baylebridge's system, it appears as a possible source of strength, and one cannot help but recall here the long gaze of Burckhardt, and speculate that if Baylebridge had survived long enough he may have so increased his respect for historical tradition as to finally dissolve the amalgam of biology and religious titanism he composed in his youth. Indeed, there are indications of a mellowing in his later work.² What is regarded by Judith Wright as a failing in Baylebridge's work has been seen by others as a positive strength in the face of nihilism. Thus, Karl Jaspers, not the least known for his own studies of Nietzsche, has stated that we pass through nihilism to an assimilation of tradition:

"If we refuse to be complacent, it means that nihilism is actual as a possibility of our own experience. We know the decay of valid norms, we know how precarious the world becomes when no faith, no collective self-consciousness commands adherence. A few men had such experience even in Nietzsche's time, some have had it since 1933, others more recently, but to-day there is scarcely a thoughtful man who has not had it. Perhaps we are now coming to the point at which we are ready to hear the message conveyed by all historical epochs of cultural breakdown, the call of their thinkers. Nihilism, as intellectual movement and as historical experience, becomes a transition to a profounder assimilation of historic tradition."²

There are signs that this assimilation is already proceeding within the smaller perspective of Australian history. And it is to be

1. Noel Macainsh: Editor's preface to *A Harvest of Hours*, Collected Works of William Baylebridge, Vol.5, op.cit. (In press).

2. Karl Jaspers: *The Perennial Scope of Philosophy*, London, 1950, pp.165-166. Trans. of "Der Philosophische Glaube", first pub. Munich, 1938.

fervently hoped that this process will broaden and deepen so that we may attain a maturity of historical understanding adequate to protect us from the kinds of temptation that have already emerged in our past.

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