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THE DUTIES OF THE NON-COMBATANT

BY

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NIETZSCHE AND THE PRESENT GERMAN SPIRIT

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NIETZSCHE AND THE PRESENT GERMAN SPIRIT.

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TOWARDS the close of his philosophic career, Nietzsche wrote, "In Vienna, in St. Petersburg, in Stockholm, in Copenhagen, in Paris, and New York—I have been discovered everywhere; I have not yet been discovered in Europe's flatland—Germany." The present generation of Germans has atoned for the sin of its fathers in this respect. Not only has it "discovered" Nietzsche; it has also extolled and exalted him as its prophet, an honour which he would certainly not have coveted. Copies of his chief works have been circulated in hundreds of thousands. Gerhart Hauptmann informed us last year that "Thus Spake Zarathustra" finds a place in every cultured German soldier's knapsack. Friedrich Paulsen, late Professor of Philosophy in Berlin, admits that "young Germany welcomes Nietzsche as a revelation," and that "the nation reads and intoxicates itself with his writings." Bernhardt, who may be taken as the mouthpiece of the dominating political and military party in the Empire, has inscribed on the title-page of "Germany and the Next War" one of Nietzsche's aphorisms—"War and courage have done greater things than love of one's neighbours. Not your pity, but your bravery has hitherto saved the unfortunate." Indeed, the whole of this book is little more than an adaptation of Nietzschean ideas pressed into service to furnish a

justification of Prussian policy. Prussianised Germany, in short, greets the thought of this philosopher with the feeling, this is bone of my bone, flesh of my flesh.

I shall not attempt to demonstrate that Nietzsche has, in any degree, created the spirit which feeds upon him, nor shall I consider the question whether he has consciously set himself the task of expressing and philosophically justifying the nation's spiritual development. Confronted by the fact that he supplies palatable mental and moral food to the people, I shall attempt to discover what there is in his philosophy which makes it acceptable, which stimulates the Prussian spirit, and furnishes a psychological sinew of war. We may be led to see that Germany's leaders might bolster up the lust for dominion which on her part is the primary motive to the present conflict, and support the ruthless methods by which she is prosecuting this war, by carefully selected and skilfully adapted texts from the philosophy of the "Will-to-power." The interpretation which Germany is giving to these texts may be a wrong one, but it is a perfectly natural one, one to which Nietzsche lays himself open.

In the first place, it should be noted that Nietzsche presents us with no rounded-off system of philosophy. His physical ill-health and his defective eyesight prevented any sustained effort on his part. He, therefore, adopted the form of the polished aphorism and the detached paragraph to express flashes of insight. His plan was to note down during his solitary walks the main ideas that coursed through his mind, and to spend the evening in casting and polishing the expression of those ideas. His avowed ambition is "to say in ten sentences what everyone else says in a book, what everyone else does *not* say in a book." With characteristic self-esteem, but nevertheless perfect sincerity, he tells his readers, "Aphorism and the sentence, in which I, as foremost among the Germans, am master, are the forms of eternity." This form of expression militates against anything like a connected system. Further, acquaintance with his personal life quickly reveals that his mind was continually being swept by tempests of violent love and hate. He lived in whirls of ecstatic admiration

or revolt. We shall not expect to find, in the product of a mind which is under the stress of such conflicting currents of feeling, the measured judgment and the critical justice which we are accustomed to look for in a philosopher. This difficulty is emphasised when it is remembered that he was consumed by a boundless egotism which carried him again and again to the borders of megalomania, and which, in the end, developed into a state of incurable madness. Where, for example, could one find a more superb expression of consuming egotism than in this utterance: "To lay bare to you, friends, my inmost heart: if there were gods, how should I bear it not to be a god? *Therefore*, there are no gods." Or when he announces in the preface to his latest volume, "This book belongs to the select few. Perhaps even none of them yet live. It is only the day after to-morrow that belongs to me. Some are born posthumously. . . . Well, then, these are my readers, my true readers, my predestined readers; of what account are *the rest*? The rest are merely mankind. One must be superior to mankind in force, in loftiness of soul—in contempt."

Through unbalanced statement, fierce invective, bitter controversy, and exaggerated self-appreciation, however, it is possible to penetrate to certain thoughts which form the ground-work of this fantastic structure. Nietzsche claims, above all, to be the herald of a new era in the ethical life of the human race. In this connection his thought follows two lines—one negative, the other positive. In the first, the destructive portion of his thought, he enters upon a savage criticism of existing morality. He "flung himself with all the impetuosity of his temperament into the analysis and history of the moral sentiments, and gloried in stripping man of every ideal glamour and dragging to light the animal impulses and selfish motives to which a cynical naturalism reduces human feeling and action." It cannot be helped, he cries, the sentiment of surrender, of sacrifice for one's neighbour and all self-renunciation, morality must be mercilessly called to account and brought to judgment. The virtues which are customarily regarded as the very tissue of the moral life—

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truth, justice, honesty, mercy, sympathy, toleration—are criticised and condemned—on what grounds we shall presently see. Having convinced himself that the transition which, in human life, has taken place from instinct and impulse to rational will is a huge blunder, and having rid himself of the incubus of generally recognised moral restraints, he proceeds to his constructive ethics. He boldly proclaims himself an immoralist. His habit of exaggerated expression may easily mislead us here. Nietzsche regards himself as an immoralist only in the sense that he refuses to be judged by existing moral standards. It is not his intention to reject *all* standards of morality. He has no wish to sink back into the life of mere brute impulse. On the contrary, he desires to lift himself, and such as he, above the level at which customary moral criteria need to be applied. When he conceives a life “beyond good and evil,” what he has in view is a life beyond good and evil *as currently defined*. Certainly he makes Zarathustra proclaim, “Break in pieces, break in pieces the old tables: there is an ancient delusion called good and evil;” but he also calls upon his followers to be creators of new standards of good and evil. They have their own set of beatitudes:—“Ye have heard how in old times it was said, ‘Blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the earth;’ but I say unto you, ‘Blessed are the valiant, for they shall make the earth their throne.’ And ye have heard men say, ‘Blessed are the poor in spirit;’ but I say unto you, ‘Blessed are the great in soul and the free in spirit, for they shall enter into Valhalla.’ And ye have heard men say, ‘Blessed are the peacemakers;’ but I say unto you, ‘Blessed are the warmakers, for they shall be called, if not the children of Jahveh, the children of Odin, who is greater than Jahveh.” He removes the old criteria, only to substitute new ones conceived to be forged by the free spirit—valour, untrammelled freedom, power to prosecute successful war.

On what grounds, it is naturally asked, does Nietzsche condemn existing moral standards and current moral valuations? In the first place, he insists on the relativity of moral values. “In all valuation,” he tells us, “there is a

definite purpose; the preservation of an individual, a community, a race, a state, a belief, or a culture." The morality of any period is binding only in so far as it serves the purposes of that period. It is relative to time, to race, to circumstances. Habits of truthfulness, sentiments of generosity and mercy, the love of justice—these are temporary conventions either deliberately or unconsciously designed to fulfil a definite purpose. The distinction between good and evil, the basis upon which such virtues are praised or blamed, is not an ultimate distinction. It is an arbitrary, or, at least, an artificial one. "Good and evil which would be everlasting—it does not exist. All is in flux. Everything good is the evil of yore which has been rendered serviceable." Again, "My leading doctrine is this: there are no moral phenomena, but only a moral interpretation of phenomena. The origin of this interpretation itself lies beyond the pale of morality." Actions in themselves are neither good nor evil: only thinking makes them so.

In the particular system of morality which expressed the life of his time, Nietzsche discovered that the end which the virtues were calculated to subserve was the preservation of the equilibrium of existing society. All the so-called virtues are preservative measures. They are means skilfully, cunningly devised for the continuance of stagnant life. They minister to the comfort of those who have no other or higher desire than to exist, of those who act upon the supposition of the truth of Schopenhauer's doctrine of "The Will to Live." They subserve "the universal green-grazing happiness of the herd." They guarantee "the contemptible species of well-being dreamt of by shop-keepers, Christians, cows, women, Englishmen, and other democrats." They are preservative measures for "mediocre people," for "sufferers," and for "the lowly." The whole of the morality of Europe, he contends, is based upon the values which are useful to "the herd." "The qualities and tendencies which are praised: peacefulness, equity, modesty, chastity, honesty, rectitude, pity, helpfulness, conscientiousness, simplicity, mildness, justice, generosity . . . freedom from envy, good nature, industry"—are

praised because they tend to preserve one type of man in a stable and harmonious form of society.

But, it may be urged, is not humanity, as organised in society, an end which it is right that we should serve, and are not the virtues the practice of which renders the social structure more stable and harmonious thereby justified? Do we not regard service devoted to the Common Good as our most essential constituent of the highest ethical life? Does not the best self find its own in all men's good? To these questions Nietzsche's reply is unambiguously negative; he completely reverses such a view of the moral life. Humanity in itself, and, more particularly, humanity as at present organised, is entirely unworthy of service. "There are only three respects," he writes, "in which the masses appear to me to deserve a glance—first, as blurred copies of great men, executed on bad paper and from worn-out plates; secondly, as opposition to the great; and lastly, as instruments for the great; for the rest, let them go to the devil and to statistics." Far from being an end in itself, humanity is a means, a scaffolding, to a higher, select, race. "The essence of a good and healthy aristocracy is that it should *not* regard itself as a function either of the throne or the community, but as the sense and ultimate justification of the whole—that it should, therefore, accept with a good conscience the sacrifice of innumerable men, who, *for its sake*, must be depressed and reduced to incomplete men, slaves, and instruments. Its fundamental belief must be precisely that society has a right *not* to exist for its own sake, but only as a foundation and scaffolding, by means of which a select class of beings may elevate themselves to their higher duties, and in general to a higher existence."

Such a view is equally opposed to the spirit of Kant and to that of Hegel. Kant's maxim, "So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of every other, in every case as an end, never as a means," falls under Nietzsche's condemnation, because it acknowledges the value of every man as an end in himself. And Hegel's doctrine of the State as "an absolutely complete ethical organisation, the *be-all* and *end-all* of everyone's education," is likewise condemned, because Hegel, with whatever

measure of success, at least attempted to preserve to the individual members of the State a certain independence as free critics of it. Indeed, the idea of devotion to the State on the part of great individuals is utterly repugnant to Nietzsche's mind. It matters not whether it be the most advanced form of democracy or the extreme Prussian militarist State; in any form, the State is simply a corporation invented to do what the individual has not the courage to do; it subserves the ends of the masses. It is significant, however, that Nietzsche qualifies his scornful criticism in the case of the military State. "The military State," he says, "is the last means of adhering to the great tradition of the past; or, when it has been lost, of reviving it. By means of it the superior or strong man is preserved."

Nietzsche's final criticism of current morality is that it devitalizes men. The more dangerous a quality seems to the herd the more completely it is condemned. Everything which tends to disturb the equilibrium of society or to rouse it from its stagnation is branded as evil. The strong passions, the powerful instincts of the exceptional man have this effect. They are dangerous; they tend to shatter the levelling conventions which are customarily regarded as moral laws; consequently they fall under the ban of existing morality. "Instead of making use of and economising the great sources of passion, those torrents of the soul, which are often so dangerous, overwhelming and impetuous, morality—this most short-sighted and most corrupted of mental attitudes—would fain make them *dry up*." It is in this connection that Nietzsche makes his vehement and very significant denunciation of the Christian ethic. He sees the perfect efflorescence of Christian virtue in anæmic mediæval asceticism, and can find in Christian morality only systematic suppression of life's elemental forces. It is the refuge of the enslaved and the oppressed. It has served only "to shatter the strong, to spoil great hopes, to cast suspicion on the delight in beauty, to break down everything autonomous, manly, conquering and imperious into uncertainty, distress of conscience, and self-destruction . . . until at last a dwarfed, almost ludicrous species has been produced, a gregarious animal, something

obliging, sickly, mediocre—the European of the present day.” It has preserved that which should have perished, namely, the bungled, the botched, the anæmic type of man. Hence, with supreme egotism, bordering on insanity, Nietzsche affirms: “I pronounce my sentence, I condemn Christianity. . . . I call it the one great curse, the one great intrinsic depravity, the one great instinct of revenge, for which no expedient is sufficiently poisonous, secret, subterranean, *mean*: I call it the one immortal blemish of mankind.”

This attitude of revolt against the accepted laws of the moral life, although it has rarely taken such an exaggerated form, is not an uncommon one. Indeed, the reformer almost invariably feels himself to a greater or less extent opposed to the laws and customs of his age. He frequently has to attack and overcome the inertia of a traditional system which may have spent its vital force, and under the deadening control of which men are ignobly content to persist in the *status quo*, perfunctorily discharging a series of duties which have lost all living significance. From this point of view one is prepared, after stripping off the exaggeration and coarse abuse which disfigure it, to find much valuable criticism in Nietzsche's attack upon the morality current in his time. The important thing, however, is to know what the negative critic is to substitute for the system which he attempts to undermine. This is the more important in the case before us because of the thorough-goingness of the destructive criticism. We are thus led to a consideration of the positive and most characteristic features of Nietzsche's thought.

His constructive thought is perhaps best grasped by reference to the metaphysics of Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer had found in the irrational Will-to-live the ultimate reality behind all appearance. Man and animal alike have been launched upon life by the force of a blind irrational pressure, and are impelled to continue in life by an inner urgency. For man life is a huge unintelligible mistake; man should, therefore, if possible, renounce life. This he attempts to do through the cultivation of self-denying virtues and a Bhuddistic eradication of desires which have

their source in the irrational Will-to-live. Nietzsche appears to have accepted in his youth this doctrine of Schopenhauer's. But he soon found himself at variance with his master. He made a notable advance upon Schopenhauer's position when he affirmed that at the heart of reality is not the "Will-to-live," but the "Will-to-power" (*Wille zur Macht*.) "Only where there is life there is will; not Will-to-live, however, but Will-to-power." "A living thing seeks above all, to discharge its strength—life itself is *Wille zur Macht*. Self-preservation is only one of the indirect and most frequent results thereof." Man is thus called upon to say "yea" to life. The ethics of self-denial and renunciation which Schopenhauer's metaphysic implied must yield to an ethic of a more robust type; it must be life-furthering, not life-denying. The ideal man is he who "affirms the world out of a sheer sense of overflowing life." Into the self-content and stagnation of decadent humanity the individual in whom the Will-to-power is free comes with disturbing effect. "Let us acknowledge, unprejudicedly," says Nietzsche in a review of the history of morals, "how every higher civilisation hitherto has originated. Men with a still natural nature, barbarians in every sense of the word, men of prey, still in possession of unbroken strength of will and desire for power, threw themselves upon weaker, more moral, more peaceful races, or upon old mellow civilisations in which the fundamental vital force was flickering out in brilliant fireworks of wit and depravity." These are the higher men; they are the creators of new values, the incarnation of the new ethic. This "noble" type of man "regards himself as a determiner of values; he does not require to be approved of; he passes the judgment: 'What is injurious to me is injurious in itself;' he knows that it is he himself only who confers honour on things; he is a *creator of values*. He honours whatever he recognises in himself; such morality is self-glorification. In the foreground there is the feeling of plenitude, or power which seeks to overflow, the happiness of high tension, the consciousness of a wealth which would fain give and bestow . . ." Such powerful men rise above the level on which ordinary moral judgments are relevant. The test of their superiority is this: Canst thou give thyself thine

evil and thy good, and suspend thy will over thee as a law? Canst thou be thine own judge and the avenger of thine own law? The value of a man lies in the quantum of power and fulness of his will, and the power of a will is to be tested by the amount of resistance it can offer, the fierceness of attack it can make, the amount of pain and torture it can endure and know how to turn to its own advantage. Further, supreme dominating egoism is an essential quality of the noble, the distinguished man. "Egoism belongs to the essence of the distinguished soul: I mean by that the immovable belief that to a being such as 'we are,' other beings must naturally be in subjection and have to sacrifice themselves." The noble soul has the right to dominate because it has the power. Far from feeling himself under any obligation to use his power for the well-being of the masses, he will call upon them to minister to his desire for more power, or he will bestow by subdual his power upon them. He will loftily accept their sacrifices; he will contemplate with stony indifference the sufferings of the weak and the sorrows of the failures. He will resist all sentimental weakness. For him "life is essentially appropriation, injury, conquest of the strange and weak, suppression, severity, obtrusion of his own forms, incorporation, and at the least, putting it most mildly, exploitation." He will worship power in every form—the necessitating power of the overmastering brute instinct or the unchastened passion; the power of the unbending will which destroys every obstacle, animate or inanimate, in its progress to its end; the power of the flashing intellect capable of creating strong and original ideas. The truth of any idea is to be determined by its enhancement of the feeling of power; the goodness of any action is to be gauged by its contribution to the expansion of power, of vitality, of dominion.

Life is wrongly described as a struggle for existence. It is a struggle for power, and every instinctive impulse plays its part in the struggle. This process culminates in the emergence of the super-men, the higher race, beings rich in vitality, with an overflowing plenitude of procreative fructifying power. These are the rightful masters, the
but the masses if for no other reason than that they fit

subduers of mankind. They "separate themselves by ages of war and subdual from the beings in whom the opposite of their exalted, proud disposition displays itself; they despise them." Thus there evolves a splendid aristocracy of "intellect, beauty, courage, felicity and power, scornfully smiling, exuberantly vital." The evolution of this aristocracy is the meaning of the world. The human race is but the scaffolding on which the super-men can devise their higher mode of existence.

In the earlier stages of his thought Nietzsche appears to have contemplated the super-man as a single individual, who is approached in the personality of Napoleon, or Frederick the Great, or Cæsar Borgia. But the super-man gradually passes into the form of a super-species—good Europeans—a species yet to emerge. He calls upon men of like mind with himself to labour, to discipline and sacrifice themselves, with a view to the production of this higher super-national race. He becomes an advocate of Eugenics, inculcating the doctrine of legislation for the future race rather than for the present individual. "He turns also to Education, not of the masses, but of the few picked men, for great and lasting work—the aristocracy of good Europeans, the higher men, who shall be bridges to the super-men—men self-disciplined, obedient, faithful; men of a good courage and a burning hope. So shall heroism come back into honour, and an age shall arise 'which will carry heroism into the domain of knowledge and wage wars on behalf of ideas and their consequences.' "

All this concerning the super-men is nebulous, but one fact stands out clearly. The human race divides itself into two groups—the millions whom Nietzsche contemptuously terms "the herd," and the super-men and their begetters. There are two corresponding forms of morality. "In a tour," says Nietzsche, "through the many finer and coarser moralities which have hitherto prevailed or still prevail on the earth, I have found certain traits recurring regularly together, and connected with one another, until finally two primary types revealed themselves to me, and a radical distinction was brought to light. There is master-morality and slave-morality." Slave-morality finds its expression in the Christian virtues. These virtues should be practised

mankind for service to, and in the last resort for subdual and exploitation by, the higher men. Master-morality is summed up in the precept: Live dangerously. "To demand of strength that it should not manifest itself as strength, that it should not be a will for overcoming, for overthrowing, for mastery, a thirst for enemies and struggle and triumphs, is as absurd as to demand of weakness that it should become strength. Live dangerously! Build your cities on Vesuvius! Launch your ships on uncharted seas! Live at war with your equals and with yourselves! Be robbers and conquerors, ye enlightened ones, so long as ye cannot be rulers and possessors."

The two forms of morality are *contrasted*. They do not supplement each other. Nietzsche is not pleading here for a morality which all men may practise, a morality in which the laws shall be vitalised by the power of those instincts and emotions which lie at the basis of human character; nor is he advocating the organisation and spiritualization of these root forces of instinct and emotion under the control of reason. He holds firmly before his mind two contrasted kinds—ascetic, life-negating, or Christian morality, and the onrushing power of unfettered, unchastened instinct. I have no hesitation in affirming that this contrast cannot be maintained without deserting in one case or the other the ethical point of view altogether. Indeed, the contrast transforms itself in Nietzsche's own hands from a contrast between a lower and a higher form of morality into that between an ethical life and one which is non-ethical. In releasing the life of the higher man from all generally recognised ethical controls Nietzsche is in reality dehumanizing him, de-moralizing him. Milton's words about the wicked wizard and his magic draught are applicable here:—

"Soon as the potion works, their human countenance,
The express resemblance of the gods, is changed
Into some brutish form of wolf or bear,
Or ounce, or tiger, hog, or bearded goat,
All other parts remaining as they were;
And they, so perfect is their misery,
Not once perceive their foul disfigurement,
But boast themselves more comely than before."

It was not Nietzsche's intention to present such an ideal; he desired this power to be regarded as spiritual. But there is no doubt that this is the form which his ideal assumes. It is implicit in his reiterated appeal for the unrestricted play of instinct. It has been rightly urged that *human* life becomes possible only when the break with instinct as such is made; when the necessitation of instinct gives place to the "guidance and control of instinct by a self-conscious being, in the interests of some larger and more satisfying end." Thus, while ostensibly lifting his super-man above the masses whom he professes to despise, Nietzsche is, from the moral point of view, dragging him down to a lower level—that of unrelieved animalism. The ethical life is degraded into "physiological prosperity." This is so in spite of much which Nietzsche says to the contrary, as, for example, when he calls to the disciples of Zarathustra, "All beings hitherto created something beyond themselves; and will ye be the ebb of this great flood, and rather return to the animal than overcome and surpass man?" But the degradation is certain. The super-men, in "enjoying liberty from social restraint," to use his own words, "revert to the beast of prey's innocence of conscience, and become rejoicing monsters. . . . Deep in the nature of all these noble races there lurks unmistakably the beast of prey, the blond beast, lustfully roving in search of booty and victory." Man is thus "translated back into nature" with a vengeance, into that non-ethical nature which Huxley argued is opposed to what is ethically best, to human goodness and virtue.

We have now before us the general features of Nietzsche's teaching concerning morals. It remains for us to consider, very briefly, how this morality or a—morality has embodied itself in the spirit which has overwhelmed modern Germany, that of Prussian militarism. It would be foolish to assert that this is the only spirit operative in the Germany of to-day. The human soil in which the virtues of mercy, generosity, truth, justice, honesty grow and fructify is there in abundance, as I, for one, who have lived in Germany, can testify. There are still, it may safely be said, currents broad and deep of that national life and culture which found points of concentration in Kant and Goethe. But these streams have become sadly polluted by the pre-

dominance of Prussian influence. The history of the growth of the German Empire is the history of the expanding domination of Prussia. The empire has been welded together by the force which Prussia has been able to exert, and its international position has been secured largely by the exercise of that same force. This militarist aristocracy has organised the life of the people in a system "complete, consequent, well thought-out, harmonious," in every detail a system which, so far as organisation is concerned, compels the admiration of the world. The Constitution is such that the executive power lies in the hands of Prussia, and, in the last resort, of the ruling Kaiser and those whom he appoints to office in Berlin. Government is of the people, by the Prussian State, for the Prussian State; and for this State, and, therefore, indirectly for the German people, whom it has exploited, "the cult of forcible expansion is the central and dominating ideal."

The point of contact between Nietzsche and Prussianized Germany is then, surely, obvious. Let this virile nation, glorying in the sense of its power, choose to regard itself as the super-State; let it interpret power to mean ruthless material force and boundless subdual, and it will find much in Nietzsche's doctrine to fortify its spirit and stimulate its lust for dominion. It may be frankly recognised that Nietzsche was an unsparing critic of the militarist State, and that his contempt for German *kultur* was supreme. But the darts of criticism do not strike home when they are aimed against a Kaiser and a Junkerdom armoured in an abnormal self-regarding sentiment. Besides, it is easy to pass by criticism when one finds in the critic's teaching much that seems to provide a philosophical justification for the pursuit of one's ideal. The doctrine of the super-man interprets itself for Germany in the super-State, "exalted as something separate from the mind and conscience of its citizens, a non-moral predatory organism seeking only strength superior to that of other States." This super-State, freed from the control of those moral laws which express and regulate the relations between individuals, creates its own forms of conduct in diplomacy and war. These laws have their sole justification in the fact that they permit of the expansion of the nation's power. Belgium's

neutrality would be recognised, only so long as the need for the successful conduct of the war, which means for Germany "world dominion or downfall," is met. Germany had the power to "hack its way through Belgium;" let it do so. If you go carefully through the official replies which Germany has made to America's protests against her piratical methods of conducting warfare, you will find that in every instance the final appeal is to necessity. The actions taken, whether justifiable or not from the point of view of accepted international law, were necessary for Germany's success in the conflict. Have we not here a striking translation into action of Nietzsche's teaching that the "Will-to-power" knows no law except that which it itself creates? And when we allow our thoughts to dwell on the sinking of the *Lusitania*, the killing of babies in unfortified towns, the officially-countenanced ravishing of womanhood in Belgium, the brutal and barbarous methods of conducting warfare which Germany has devised, shall we not say that Nietzsche was prophetic of this super-State when he pictured "the blond beast, lustfully roving in search of victory and booty, a rejoicing monster which goes on its way after a hideous sequence of murder, conflagration, violation, torture"? For Germany's sake, and in the interests of modern civilisation, the power of this super-State must be broken.